Abstract

In pursuit of the Economic Recovery Program, Uganda has taken a number of actions in the financial sector; most important, the growth of money has been progressively reduced through strengthened credit and fiscal management. Additionally, interest rates have been progressively liberalized, ensuring positive real levels and improving the allocation of financial resources. The authorities have also improved the performance of problem banks. Nevertheless, Uganda's financial system remains a source of considerable structural weakness. The challenge to the financial sector is to strengthen resource mobilization and allocation in order to promote the diversification and development of the economy; new financial instruments are also required for effective policy implementation.

In pursuit of the Economic Recovery Program, Uganda has taken a number of actions in the financial sector; most important, the growth of money has been progressively reduced through strengthened credit and fiscal management. Additionally, interest rates have been progressively liberalized, ensuring positive real levels and improving the allocation of financial resources. The authorities have also improved the performance of problem banks. Nevertheless, Uganda's financial system remains a source of considerable structural weakness. The challenge to the financial sector is to strengthen resource mobilization and allocation in order to promote the diversification and development of the economy; new financial instruments are also required for effective policy implementation.

Structure of the Financial Sector

Since 1987, Uganda's financial sector has grown considerably and now comprises the central bank (Bank of Uganda), 15 commercial banks, 10 credit institutions (including an almost defunct Post Office Savings Bank), 19 insurance companies, 2 development banks (which primarily on-lend donor funds), and 1 building society. In July 1990, as a part of its liberalization program, the Government commenced licensing foreign exchange bureaus, of which there are now 76. While there appear to be a large number of financial institutions offering diversified services, the commercial banks have been the dominant financial intermediary. Uganda's banking system has been dominated by one government-owned bank—the Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB)—that accounts for about half the deposits in the system and four foreign-managed banks—Barclays, Bank of Baroda, Grindlays, and Standard Chartered—that account for an additional 30 percent of deposits. The banking system has been characterized by a lack of competition and a large element of government ownership and control. Bank lending has been concentrated in three main areas: manufacturing, agriculture, and trade and commerce. Most agricultural lending is in the form of crop finance, providing short-term funds to coffee exporters until they receive payment from foreign purchasers; there is little bank lending to farmers for the purpose of farming or expansion.

Uganda's formal financial sector is one of the least developed in sub-Saharan Africa. The financial sector is characterized by a low degree of monetization of the economy. Only some 70 percent of the economy is estimated to be monetized, and the ratio of broad money to GDP is about 9 percent, compared with almost 40 percent for Kenya and 35 percent for Tanzania. Moreover, the economy is cash oriented, with about 34 percent of outstanding money supply in the form of cash, compared with 20 percent in Kenya and 32 percent in Tanzania. The strong preference for cash reflects in part the structural deficiencies of the financial sector and in part a lack of confidence in the banking system, which was exacerbated by the 1987 currency reform that was accompanied by a 30 percent tax on currency in circulation, bank balances, and financial assets. It was further encouraged by high inflation and the negative real interest rates between 1985 and 1988. Until April 1992, all interest rates had been administratively set by the BOU, usually at levels well below the rate of inflation. In 1992/93, however, real interest rates turned strongly positive, which was due to both the progressive liberalization of nominal rates and a sharp decline in inflation. In 1993/94, real interest rates turned negative again because of a rise in the rate of inflation and a decline in interest rates on account of excess liquidity in the financial system (Table 9).

Table 9.

Financial Indicators

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Source: Ugandan authorities.

At current market prices.

End of period.

Calculated as: [(1 + current interest rate)/(1 + year-on-year inflation rate) - 1].

The portfolio of available financial instruments is very limited. Nearly all the financial assets held in Uganda consist of liabilities of the Government, the BOU, or commercial banks. The development of a treasury bill market was initially limited by a ban on the holding of treasury bills by commercial banks. This ban was lifted in February 1991; commercial banks are now the main bidders in an active weekly auction and hold more than one half of all bills outstanding.

Monetary Policy Framework and Recent Developments

Monetary and Credit Control Framework

The Bank of Uganda has used three main instruments for the implementation of its monetary policy; reserve requirements, lending to commercial banks, and treasury bill auctions.

Reserve Requirements

Beginning in 1977, commercial banks were required to hold 10 percent of their deposits as statutory reserves in unremunerated accounts. In 1993, this requirement was reduced to 8 percent of demand deposits and 7 percent for time deposits. The banking system has typically held considerable excess reserves, although some problem banks have frequently fallen below their statutory requirements. In order to make it more effective, the authorities have split the single reserve account into three accounts—a statutory reserve account, a clearing account, and an interest-bearing borrowing account.

Bank of Uganda Lending to Commercial Banks

This lending takes place mainly through the borrowing account, but also through an overdraft facility in the bank's clearing account. Because of the lack of an interbank money market, banks in a tight liquidity position have had to borrow from the BOU through this facility, making this type of lending an important source of slippage in the management of monetary policy.

Treasury Bill Auction

In the past, treasury bills were primarily a mechanism for financing government fiscal operations from the nonbank sector—commercial banks were not allowed to hold treasury bills. Since April 1992, treasury bills have been used as an instrument of monetary policy; the weekly issue of bills has been increased to affect liquidity conditions in the banking system. Although there are no repurchase agreements nor a secondary market, the BOU allows secondary sales and stands ready to discount bills at the rediscount rate.

Recent Developments in Monetary Policy

Since the beginning of the structural adjustment period in 1987, monetary aggregates have been influenced by the policy on credit to the public sector: both excessive net credit to the Government and periodic direct central bank credit to public enterprises have caused high monetary growth and consequent inflation, frequently leaving the commercial banks and the private sector with a tight liquidity constraint. Thus, during 1991/92, net credit to the Government expanded by 32 percent of the initial money stock and led to a rate of inflation of 63 percent on a year-end basis (Table 10), or an annual average of 42 percent. A tight fiscal policy was introduced in 1992/93, during which time the Government of Uganda repaid U Sh 17 billion to the banking system, equivalent to 8 percent of initial money stock, and the rate of inflation plunged to a negative 1 percent on a year-end basis. The evolution of prices in 1992/93 can be traced to developments in liquidity conditions in the monetary sector. The tighter liquidity resulted from the Government's net repayments to the BOU, the increase in foreign exchange purchases for imports, and the large amount of nonperforming loans—all effectively removing Uganda shillings from the banking system. As a result of the generally tight conditions during 1992/93, the private sector increasingly went abroad for financing in the form of coffee prefinancing and additional private foreign transfers. The result was an expansion in money supply (M2) in 1992/93 by 42 percent, of which over 70 percent was due to the increase in net foreign assets of the banking system. In contrast, in 1991/92, a 53 percent (U Sh 74 billion) increase in money supply was fueled by a 75 percent (U Sh 218 billion) rise in net domestic assets, which, given a large decline in net foreign assets, was equivalent to almost three times the expansion in money supply.

Table 10.

Monetary Survey

(In billions of Uganda shillings)

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Source: Ugandan authorities.

Foreign exchange deposits of residents.

The trends that began in 1992/93 were also broadly observable in 1993/94. Fiscal conditions continued to be tight with the Government continuing to repay the banking system, such that it was, for the first time, in a net creditor position vis-à-vis the banking system. Following the major improvements and liberalization efforts in Uganda's exchange and trade system during the early part of the year, net foreign assets (particularly in the BOU) improved dramatically, by U Sh 131 billion, while net domestic assets declined by U Sh 40 billion. Thus, the increase in money supply (M2) of U Sh 101 billion, or 33 percent, was wholly on account of a 67 percent increase in net foreign assets, which was partially offset, for the first time, by a contraction in the net domestic assets of the banking system.10 Inflation as measured by the consumer price index remained well under control, with the annual average declining from 28 percent in 1992/93 to 6.5 percent in 1993/94.

Interest Rates and the Market for Government Securities

Interest Rate Policy

Until 1992, the monetary authorities determined all formal financial sector interest rates, including treasury bill rates. The level and structure of interest rates were administered by the BOU, which, in consultation with the MOFEP, made periodic adjustments. The resulting interest rate policy led to highly negative real interest rates throughout most of the 1980s, which inhibited saving and encouraged speculation. Only in mid-1990 did the Government commit itself to achieving positive real interest rates and begin the necessary quarterly adjustments. Institutional regulations further discouraged saving; as of end-1990, commercial banks were not allowed to hold government treasury bills, and they held just 0.1 percent of other government securities outstanding. The reform of interest rates and the market for government securities began only in 1992.

The maximum lending rate charged by commercial banks was also administratively set by the BOU until November 1992. At that time, the monetary authorities decontrolled interest rates by freeing some and linking others to a reference rate—the annualized discount rate on treasury bills. The reference rate was used to set the maximum lending rates for term loans, development loans, and agricultural loans, as well as the minimum deposit rates for time and savings deposits. Lending rates on overdraft accounts and interest rates on demand deposits were freed completely and have since been determined by market forces. To reinforce the improved allocation of financial resources, the Government abolished, effective July 1, 1994, the formal links between the reference rate and lending and deposit rates. The borrowing rate paid by the Government on its ways and means advances remained constant at 14 percent from September 1990 until October 1993, was raised gradually to 22 percent by March 1994, and reduced to 11 percent by June 1994. The Government also receives the same rate on all its deposits; this has assumed some significance with the large net payments to the BOU in 1992/93 and 1993/94. BOU lending to commercial banks is at the bank rate, which historically has been set at one percentage point above the rediscount rate, an administered rate. These rates have effectively set a ceiling on the commercial banks' cost of funds. For the years prior to November 1992, the bank rate averaged 49 percent, but it declined subsequently, reaching 24 percent by September 1993 and 20 percent by end-June 1994 (Tables 11 and 12 and Charts 10 and 11).

Table 11.

Structure of Interest Rates, March 1990–December 1992

(On a quarterly basis)

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Table 12.

Structure of Interest Rates, January 1993–June 1994

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Source: Ugandan authorities.
Chart 10.
Chart 10.

Structure of Interest Rates

(on a Quarterly Basis)1

Source: Ugandan authorities.1 Annual percentage rates.
Chart 11.
Chart 11.

Structure of Interest Rates

(on a Monthly Basis)1

Source: Ugandan authorities.1 Annual percentage rates.

Market for Government Securities

The money market in Uganda is dominated by treasury bills, which account for 99 percent of all government debt. A treasury bill auction was initiated in April 1992 and was offered initially on a biweekly basis but later on a weekly basis. The auction offers a predetermined quantity of 91-day bills to bank and nonbank bidders. While most bids are competitive, small purchases are allowed on a noncompetitive basis. In January 1993, the term structure of the bill market was lengthened, with the weekly auction being augmented by a monthly allocation of 182-day and 273-day bills. Despite its operational success and its sizable increase in recent months, the bill market remains small, at around 8 percent of broad money; most of the bidders are commercial banks. In addition to treasury bills, there are also small amounts of nontradable government securities—comprising ordinary stocks, tax certificates, and crop finance bills—accounting for only about 1 percent of total government securities.

Developments in the Treasury Bill Market

The 91-day treasury bill rate is the most important rate in the country as it represents a risk-free rate and, even now, an informal reference rate for the banking system. The response of the treasury bill rate to market forces has been impressive. At the time of liberalization, the discount stood at 39 percent and the auction was generally fully subscribed. A substantial reduction in issues created a growing excess demand, which pushed the annualized discount to 22 percent by the end of December 1992. An increase in issues brought the rate back to 18–24 percent through the end of 1993. With the increasing liquidity of the banking system that stemmed from rising external inflows, and despite the doubling of the weekly bid, the rate stood at 11 percent by end-June 1994, about half the level prevailing at the beginning of 1994. In the meantime, the annualized rate for 182-day bills declined less strongly, from 20 percent at end-December 1993 to 16 percent by end-June 1994, indicating the strong preference for liquidity (over profitability) for bills of short maturity.

Relationship Between Money and Prices

Data since 1989 indicate a strong linkage between broad money and prices in Uganda, and similarly between base money and prices. Econometric evidence substantiates this relationship and implies that, on average, 70 percent of the change in broad money has translated into price changes within three to four months and that the whole effect has been felt within nine months. However, for the two years 1992/93 and 1993/94, Uganda saw considerably higher money growth than inflation. Thus in 1992/93 broad money grew by 42 percent, and the annual average increase in the consumer price index was 28 percent, while on a year-end basis the rate of inflation was minus 1 percent. In 1993/94, broad money grew by as much as 31 percent while the annual average increase in consumer prices was 7 percent and 16 percent on an end-year basis. This suggests that policy changes over the past two years or the source of the impulse may have resulted in some behavioral change and that some structural factors also came into play.

The critical factor affecting the money-inflation relationship is the apparent declining velocity of money of about 0.5 per annum on average. Despite the instability of the velocity ratio, there may be a decline under way on account of the continued monetization of the economy, the reduction in inflation, the rise in real interest rates, and the recent attractiveness of an appreciating Ugandan shilling, which has been enhanced by the political and economic uncertainty faced by some of Uganda's neighbors. The monetary component of GDP continued to rise from 1987/88 to 1991/92 with the return of political and economic security, rebuilding of the infrastructure, and improved marketing and distribution mechanisms. The second element affecting the historical money-inflation relationship is the emergence of positive real interest rates owing to a drastic decline in inflation. Thirdly, the cause of the increase in money supply has changed from domestic asset creation to net foreign assets, and it may be that the transmission mechanism between foreign assets and prices is less certain and direct. Finally, the Ugandan shilling has become a stable currency and, with its recent appreciation, has become very strong regionally. Given the economic instability in some neighboring countries, the stability and strength of the Ugandan shilling have led to its more widespread use, especially in its border trade, in those countries (Chart 12).

Chart 12.
Chart 12.

Components of Monetary Survey, Exchange Rate, Broad Money, and Prices

(1980 = 100)

Source: Ugandan authorities.

Structural Problems in the Banking Sector

Until recently, banking legislation fragmented responsibility for the formulation and implementation of monetary and supervisory policies and limited the power of the BOU to enforce directives issued. Moreover, there were weaknesses in the capacity of the BOU, particularly in the formulation and implementation of monetary and supervision policy. The internal accounting of the BOU is weak, as is its balance sheet. Inadequate prudential regulation and supervision have been major constraints on the efficiency and the depth of Uganda's financial system. BOU's Bank Supervision Department was, until the early 1990s, seriously understaffed and thus unable to examine banks at sufficiently frequent intervals. Also, there is often inadequate follow-up to see that corrective actions are carried out satisfactorily.

As mentioned before, the most dominant financial institutions are government owned. The system initially had a large foreign presence, but in the past decade the Uganda Commercial Bank and the Cooperative Bank (COOP)—both government owned—have acquired the bulk of the branch network. The UCB and the COOP have been subject to extensive government intervention, particularly regarding their lending priorities. There is also a high degree of market concentration in the banking system. The formal financial sector is dominated by the UCB and the COOP bank in terms of assets, deposits, and the branch network. There are also legitimate complaints about the poor check-clearing facilities within the banking system, difficulties in the use of checks, and the inconvenience of cash transactions. As a result of the inefficiencies in the payments system, the public in Uganda has a strong reluctance to use checks as a system of domestic payments; this is reflected in the unusually high ratio of currency in circulation to money supply. The financial distress of the commercial banks has also been particularly acute in the recent past. The most important impediments to a healthy and growing banking system include the lack of public confidence in the financial system, the short maturity and instability of deposits, and the lack of adherence and absence of well-defined standards of accounting and auditing practices.

The Government has recognized that an efficient financial sector with an effective banking system at its core is essential to support and foster Uganda's stabilization and adjustment program. The overall and long-term objective of the Government's reform program is to deepen the financial system and to establish an efficient system of resource mobilization that would offer a greater variety of instruments to borrowers and savers in an increasingly liberal and market-oriented environment. The Government's reform program has been supported by a World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment Credit and covers actions on the policy, legal and regulatory, and institutional fronts.

Monetary Policy

Responsibility for monetary policy formulation and implementation has now been completely transferred from the MOFEP to the BOU; earlier, the authority for approving changes in interest rates had rested with the MOFEP. With the liberalization of interest rates in 1992, most rates are market determined, and the authority to determine other rates is now wholly with the BOU. Accordingly, the BOU has ensured that both the availability of technical staff and resources reflect this shift of responsibility. While the range of monetary policy instruments available to the BOU has remained limited, action has been taken (as outlined above) to widen the scope of the treasury bill market and introduce new instruments to the public. A strategy for improved monetary control through reserve money programming and management has already been developed with technical assistance from the IMF. To ensure timely and accurate information, commercial banks have been reminded of their legal responsibility to provide regular data, and a Monetary Policy Management Unit has been created in the Research Department of the BOU to supervise this. The open-ended lending to commercial banks, which was a significant source of inflationary pressure, has been eliminated. In the future, the BOU will lend only as a source of reserve management and as temporary financing for liquidity shortfalls. Initial steps have been taken to facilitate the development of an interbank market, but the lack of an appropriate infrastructure and wide differences in the financial health of commercial banks are major obstacles to its development. The Government's commitment to move to a market-determined interest rate structure has been fully realized. Since June 1994, interest rates have been fully liberalized, and the BOU has been managing these rates through indirect monetary instruments, with a key interest rate (the treasury bill rate) as an anchor.

To raise the efficiency of the financial system as a whole, the Government has taken actions to encourage effective and genuine competition among banks and reduce its own participation in the financial system. With the recent licensing of 3 new domestic banks and 1 foreign bank, the number of commercial banks has risen to 15. To improve the competitive environment, the new Financial Institutions Act (see below) has liberalized entry and exit barriers in the banking sector. In order to avoid an excessive proliferation of small banks, the Government has increased minimum capital requirements for new and existing banks, although the increased minimum capital requirements still remain quite low.

Legal and Regulatory Reforms

The legal and regulatory reforms consist principally of revisions to the BOU Act and the replacement of the Banking Act with the new Financial Institutions Act (FIA) enacted in March 1993. Major objectives of the revisions are to ensure that primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy rests with the BOU and that the BOU has adequate powers to fulfill its regulatory and supervisory functions in relation to all financial institutions. The new BOU legislation enacted in 1993 (i) clarifies and strengthens the role of the BOU as the monetary authority; (ii) specifies clear legal limits on lending to the Government; (iii) ensures BOU control over lending to banks; (iv) gives the BOU authority to ensure that all clearing arrangements are effective and operate on a sound basis; (v) provides for an increase in BOU capital; and (vi) establishes mechanisms to maintain adequate capital in the future. The FIA provides a sound basis for the prudential supervision of banks and provides the BOU with unambiguous powers to (i) license banks and other financial institutions; (ii) specify capital adequacy requirements; (iii) specify prudential liquidity requirements; (iv) establish minimum requirements with regard to nonperforming assets; (v) undertake inspections when necessary; and (vi) require banks to redress difficulties that emerge or, if necessary, for the BOU to take over the management.

Institutional Reforms

Institutional reforms consist mainly of central bank (BOU) reforms and restructuring of the UCB and the COOP. The BOU reforms are the result of extraordinarily productive collaboration between the IMF, the World Bank, and the Government. Under the reform program the BOU has been steadily upgrading its operations. The capacity of the Research and Bank Supervision Departments of the BOU has been substantially bolstered so that they can play an increasingly important role in policy formulation, implementation, and prudential supervision. Moreover, to improve the technical efficiency of the BOU, its organizational structure is being changed. The BOU has recently approved a business plan that will result in significant changes over the next few years. The plan is intended to ensure that the BOU maintains and strengthens its role as a viable and independent agency. Restoring the financial health of the central bank is one of the key aims of the plan, given the toll that the reforms of the financial sector have exacted. Under the business plan the MOFEP has provided for a capital injection for the BOU of around U Sh 15 billion in the form of interest-bearing securities, and operating expenses will be reduced to match revenues more accurately. In an effort to foster a well-developed accounting framework and a check-clearing system, daily statements of commercial bank accounts are being provided and clearing times in Kampala and the regions have been improved. With regard to the BOU's supervision function, its Bank Supervision Department has made significant progress in the development of banking laws, the design of supporting regulations, the modernization of supervision methodology, and the institution of ongoing reporting and monitoring. However, important outstanding issues remain, including a lack of both timely decision making and regular structured reporting, particularly on unsatisfactory institutions.

The UCB is the largest commercial bank, which had about 190 branches in early 1993, providing commercial banking services to much of the country. This extensive branch network, a lack of trained managers, and a lack of viable economic opportunities had a negative effect on the UCB's financial performance. As a result, the UCB has been insolvent for some time, with nonperforming loans exceeding one-third of its portfolio. Under the reform program, the UCB has appointed a new Board of Directors, comprising individuals who possess recognized financial or banking experience. An operations management contract has been signed and senior staff members are in place. The UCB was downsized during 1993/94, with roughly one-fourth of the branches closed and one-fifth of the staff eliminated. The nonperforming loans will be transferred to a Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust created explicitly for the troubled bank. A financial restructuring plan has been prepared and will be finalized when the amount of the nonperforming loans has been determined. The restructuring measures are expected to result in a sharply improved financial performance, and operating losses are expected to be eliminated in 1994/95.

Although much less significant in the financial system, the COOP has serious management problems; its financial performance had been impaired by a severe liquidity squeeze. The restructuring of the bank has made good progress with a recapitalization and short-term technical assistance to help complete its restructuring plan.

Financial Markets Development

With the return to profitability of the UCB, it is proposed to privatize the bank as rapidly as possible. However, the authorities have expressed concern about the dominance of the UCB in the banking sector. To this end, a contract will be awarded to a merchant bank to study optimum shares in the banking industry and how to achieve this, including the breakup of the UCB into more than one unit. A stock exchange is under preparation and could become operational during 1994/95. Necessary legislation is also being prepared to promote and facilitate the creation of a capital market.

10

Foreign exchange deposits of residents with the banking system also continued to increase throughout the two years. Inclusive of such deposits, broad money (M3) increased by 34 percent in 1993/94, compared with 43 percent in the previous year.

Cited By

Adjustment with Growth, 1987-94
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