The current weakness of the budgetary situation had its origins in the civil strife and accompanying mismanagement that characterized the 1971–85 period. During this period the public service lost many of its best-trained people, and there was no adherence to the laws and regulations governing the appropriation, issue, and accountability of public funds. Corruption was rampant; the Government's management information system had deteriorated; and basic data for planning and budgeting had become virtually unobtainable.
By the time the National Resistance Movement took over in early 1986, government authority had virtually collapsed. The most elementary systems of public sector management had broken down, and the civil service was totally demoralized. Public expenditure was out of control, and such capacity for tax collection as existed was used more for personal gain than for public good. From early 1986 to mid-1987, budgetary policies were largely ad hoc, contributing to major overruns in expenditure and a widening of the budget deficit, to almost 5 percent of GDP. Domestic budgetary financing also increased sharply, with bank credit to the Government accounting for 70 percent of the total increase in the broad money stock of almost 100 percent in 1986/87.
First Steps Toward Stabilization Under the Economic Recovery Program
Developments in 1987/88–1988/89
In response to the daunting challenges Uganda faced in the economic sphere, the Government launched the ERP in 1987/88. It included a wide range of fiscal policy measures, as well as a major reform of the national currency and the imposition of a 30 percent currency reform levy (see Section VI). A number of customs duty exemptions were eliminated; the exemption from income tax of civil servants' salaries was abolished; and petroleum prices were increased to reflect all costs plus a margin for revenue. In regard to expenditure, a census was to be taken, to eliminate “ghost workers” from the payroll, together with a study of the functional and staffing structures of the civil service. Stringent limits were imposed on certain categories of recurrent expenditures, and development expenditure was to focus on the completion of ongoing projects and rehabilitation of existing capital stock. Performance under the program was mixed, at best. Revenue fell short of target, and budgetary expenditure targets were missed by a wide margin. The envisaged net reduction in net bank credit was not realized and, with a large budgetary overrun, government reliance on bank credit increased to 80 percent of opening money stock (Table 6).
Summary of Central Government Operations
(In millions of Uganda shillings)
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Summary of Central Government Operations
(In millions of Uganda shillings)
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue and grants | 29,048 | 62,014 | 114,822 | 206,993 | 380,639 | 595,182 | 651,423 | |||
Revenue | 22,548 | 47,854 | 94,526 | 136,808 | 185,995 | 281,428 | 363,881 | |||
Tax revenue | 19,697 | 40,423 | 86,556 | 128,211 | 172,700 | 259,024 | 338,818 | |||
Of which: Coffee | 6,299 | 5,370 | 14,931 | 12,730 | … | … | … | |||
Nontax revenue | 2,851 | 7,431 | 7,970 | 8,597 | 13,295 | 22,404 | 25,063 | |||
Grants | 6,500 | 14,160 | 20,296 | 70,185 | 194,644 | 313,754 | 287,542 | |||
Expenditure and net lending1 | 44,300 | 91,596 | 174,928 | 269,168 | 581,495 | 718,342 | 816,771 | |||
Current expenditure2 | 24,700 | 60,870 | 98,296 | 130,583 | 323,017 | 323,452 | 390,566 | |||
Wages and salaries | 3,700 | 9,778 | 12,973 | 24,132 | 47,846 | 62,691 | 84,427 | |||
Interest payments | 2,300 | 5,800 | 8,557 | 18,656 | 90,093 | 69,386 | 63,677 | |||
Transfers to the URA | … | … | … | … | … | 11,727 | 14,500 | |||
Other | 18,700 | 45,292 | 76,766 | 87,795 | 185,078 | 179,648 | 227,962 | |||
Of which: Defense | … | … | … | … | 64,927 | 64,623 | … | |||
Development expenditure3 | 19,600 | 28,800 | 76,632 | 134,085 | 249,978 | 393,690 | 423,405 | |||
External | 11,800 | 18,037 | 42,804 | 82,015 | 213,272 | 357,926 | 383,600 | |||
Domestic | 2,500 | 4,105 | 5,816 | 9,855 | 36,706 | 35,764 | 39,805 | |||
Net lending and investment | … | … | … | … | 8,500 | 1,200 | 2,800 | |||
Overall deficit (commitment) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | (21,752) | (43,742) | (80,402) | (132,360) | (395,500) | (436,914) | (452,890) | |||
Including grants | (15,252) | (29,582) | (60,106) | (62,175) | (200,856) | (123,160) | (165,348) | |||
Primary surplus/deficit (-) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | 148 | (7,216) | 4,787 | 24,881 | (46,929) | 27,362 | 36,992 | |||
Arrears | (1,248) | (3,222) | (9,441) | (12,385) | 2,491 | (72,868) | (51,017) | |||
Adjustment to cash | … | … | … | … | … | 19,038 | 100 | |||
Overall deficit (cash) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | (23,000) | (46,964) | (89,843) | (144,745) | (393,009) | (490,744) | (503,807) | |||
Including grants | (16,500) | (32,804) | (69,547) | (74,560) | (198,365) | (176,990) | (216,265) | |||
Financing | 16,500 | 32,804 | 69,548 | 74,561 | 198,366 | 176,990 | 216,265 | |||
Externat (net) | 3,700 | 19,404 | 91,796 | 65,152 | 142,338 | 200,816 | 243,227 | |||
Domestic (net) | 7,800 | 13,400 | (22,248) | 9,409 | 56,028 | (23,826) | (26,962) | |||
Bank | 7,800 | 12,300 | (19,326) | 3,700 | 51,391 | (17,291) | (36,700) | |||
Nobank | … | 1,100 | (2,922) | 5,709 | 4,636 | (6,535) | 9,738 | |||
Memorandum item: | ||||||||||
GDP at current market prices | 391,813 | 901,936 | 1,395,073 | 1,821,485 | 2,718,870 | 3,888,676 | 4,613,336 |
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Summary of Central Government Operations
(In millions of Uganda shillings)
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue and grants | 29,048 | 62,014 | 114,822 | 206,993 | 380,639 | 595,182 | 651,423 | |||
Revenue | 22,548 | 47,854 | 94,526 | 136,808 | 185,995 | 281,428 | 363,881 | |||
Tax revenue | 19,697 | 40,423 | 86,556 | 128,211 | 172,700 | 259,024 | 338,818 | |||
Of which: Coffee | 6,299 | 5,370 | 14,931 | 12,730 | … | … | … | |||
Nontax revenue | 2,851 | 7,431 | 7,970 | 8,597 | 13,295 | 22,404 | 25,063 | |||
Grants | 6,500 | 14,160 | 20,296 | 70,185 | 194,644 | 313,754 | 287,542 | |||
Expenditure and net lending1 | 44,300 | 91,596 | 174,928 | 269,168 | 581,495 | 718,342 | 816,771 | |||
Current expenditure2 | 24,700 | 60,870 | 98,296 | 130,583 | 323,017 | 323,452 | 390,566 | |||
Wages and salaries | 3,700 | 9,778 | 12,973 | 24,132 | 47,846 | 62,691 | 84,427 | |||
Interest payments | 2,300 | 5,800 | 8,557 | 18,656 | 90,093 | 69,386 | 63,677 | |||
Transfers to the URA | … | … | … | … | … | 11,727 | 14,500 | |||
Other | 18,700 | 45,292 | 76,766 | 87,795 | 185,078 | 179,648 | 227,962 | |||
Of which: Defense | … | … | … | … | 64,927 | 64,623 | … | |||
Development expenditure3 | 19,600 | 28,800 | 76,632 | 134,085 | 249,978 | 393,690 | 423,405 | |||
External | 11,800 | 18,037 | 42,804 | 82,015 | 213,272 | 357,926 | 383,600 | |||
Domestic | 2,500 | 4,105 | 5,816 | 9,855 | 36,706 | 35,764 | 39,805 | |||
Net lending and investment | … | … | … | … | 8,500 | 1,200 | 2,800 | |||
Overall deficit (commitment) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | (21,752) | (43,742) | (80,402) | (132,360) | (395,500) | (436,914) | (452,890) | |||
Including grants | (15,252) | (29,582) | (60,106) | (62,175) | (200,856) | (123,160) | (165,348) | |||
Primary surplus/deficit (-) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | 148 | (7,216) | 4,787 | 24,881 | (46,929) | 27,362 | 36,992 | |||
Arrears | (1,248) | (3,222) | (9,441) | (12,385) | 2,491 | (72,868) | (51,017) | |||
Adjustment to cash | … | … | … | … | … | 19,038 | 100 | |||
Overall deficit (cash) | ||||||||||
Excluding grants | (23,000) | (46,964) | (89,843) | (144,745) | (393,009) | (490,744) | (503,807) | |||
Including grants | (16,500) | (32,804) | (69,547) | (74,560) | (198,365) | (176,990) | (216,265) | |||
Financing | 16,500 | 32,804 | 69,548 | 74,561 | 198,366 | 176,990 | 216,265 | |||
Externat (net) | 3,700 | 19,404 | 91,796 | 65,152 | 142,338 | 200,816 | 243,227 | |||
Domestic (net) | 7,800 | 13,400 | (22,248) | 9,409 | 56,028 | (23,826) | (26,962) | |||
Bank | 7,800 | 12,300 | (19,326) | 3,700 | 51,391 | (17,291) | (36,700) | |||
Nobank | … | 1,100 | (2,922) | 5,709 | 4,636 | (6,535) | 9,738 | |||
Memorandum item: | ||||||||||
GDP at current market prices | 391,813 | 901,936 | 1,395,073 | 1,821,485 | 2,718,870 | 3,888,676 | 4,613,336 |
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Building on the experience of 1987/88, the Government revised its economic adjustment and rehabilitation program: a major reduction in the fiscal deficit and improvements in public sector management were the cornerstones of the 1988/89 adjustment program. Revenue-boosting measures included the effects of the exchange rate change on coffee exports, increases in petroleum prices, an extension in the coverage of the Commercial Transactions Levy, and a 400 percent rise in deposits for corporate tax liabilities. Among the measures to reduce outlays were a 30 percent decrease in (temporary) “group” employees, the establishment of a central supplies directorate, and curbs on specific operational expenditures. A large shortfall in revenue occurred because coffee prices had averaged well below program projections. However, given the Government's tight control of current expenditures and a shortfall in development expenditure, the overall deficit was close to that programmed.
Structural Measures
During this period, the authorities agreed to institute a number of important structural policies, including reforms in tax administration, budget formulation, and expenditure control. Improvements to tax administration came through an upgrading of the staff of the three revenue departments (income tax, customs and excise, and inland revenue), a revamping of their operational procedures, and an increase in the resources at their disposal. The Government also addressed problems specific to each of the three revenue departments. The Government also moved to end budgetary indiscipline by strengthening all its monitoring and accounting procedures to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized overspending by ministries and departments—expenditures in excess of monthly budget allocations were to be adjusted against subsequent budget allocations. Important steps were also taken to computerize the major elements of the budget process, to permit more careful review of ministerial requests, and to ensure better monitoring during the year.
In addition to fiscal policy measures, the Government implemented several structural changes aimed at improving public sector management and fiscal performance. The wage bill of “group” employees was reduced by 30 percent in the absence of reliable data on the number employed; some progress was made in integrating the development budget with the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP) to ensure that budget expenditures reflected investment priorities;7 and expenditure control was tightened with the establishment of an Economic Analysis Unit, which provided timely monthly reviews. The Government also initiated a program of public enterprise divestiture and rehabilitation and attempted to strengthen its capacity to rehabilitate enterprises by selecting ten specific public enterprises for diagnostic studies and by establishing an audit corporation to monitor parastatal enterprises.
Developments Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Program, 1989/90–1993/94
During this period, fiscal discipline was to continue to play a key role in the Government's strategy for achieving stability. Thus, (i) the overall budget deficit including grants was to be maintained at about 5 percent of GDP; (ii) a major revenue mobilization effort was envisaged, with total revenues to GDP rising by the equivalent of about 1 percent of GDP annually; (iii) the ratio of total expenditure to GDP was programmed to vary between 15 percent and 20 percent, with recurrent expenditure representing about a third of such expenditure; and (iv) structural measures were to include reducing dependence on external budgetary support, widening the tax base, implementing a comprehensive program to strengthen tax administration, and continuing the implementation of budgetary reform.
Developments in the Budget Balance
During the five-year period 1989/90–1993/94, the overall deficit including grants averaged 5.1 percent of GDP, with a peak of 7.3 percent in 1991/92 and a declining trend thereafter (Table 7). Excluding foreign grants, the overall deficit was much higher, averaging 10.5 percent of GDP. Of significance is the strong rise in the grant element of budgetary financing, which averaged around 8 percent of GDP in the past three years (Chart 6). The tax revenue-GDP ratio showed a slowly rising trend, despite the elimination of the export duty on coffee.
Central Government Budget Operations
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Includes arrears and, for the FY 1992/93 and 1993/94, also includes adjustment to cash.
Recurrent expenditures (excluding interest) less recurrent revenue (excluding grants).
Revenue less current expenditure.
Central Government Budget Operations
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(In percent of GDP) | |||||||||||
Recurrent revenue and grants | 7.4 | 6.9 | 8.2 | 11.4 | 14.0 | 15.3 | 14.1 | ||||
Recurrent revenue | 5.8 | 5.3 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.9 | ||||
Tax revenue | 5.0 | 4.5 | 6.2 | 7.0 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 7.3 | ||||
Nontax revenue | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | ||||
Grants | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 3.9 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 6.2 | ||||
Expenditure and net lending1 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 12.5 | 14.8 | 21.4 | 18.5 | 17.7 | ||||
Recurrent expenditure2 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 11.9 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||||
Development expenditure3 | 5.0 | 3.2 | 5.5 | 7.4 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 9.2 | ||||
Overall deficit (cash)4 | |||||||||||
Excluding grants | -5.9 | -5.2 | -6.4 | -7.9 | -14.5 | -12.6 | -10.9 | ||||
Including grants | -4.2 | -3.6 | -5.0 | -4.1 | -7.3 | -4.6 | -4.7 | ||||
Financing | |||||||||||
External (net) | 2.2 | 2.2 | 6.6 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | ||||
Domestic (net) | 2.0 | 1.5 | -1.6 | 0.5 | 2.1 | -0.6 | -0.6 | ||||
Of which: Banking system | 2.0 | 1.4 | -1.4 | 0.2 | 1.9 | -0.4 | -0.8 | ||||
Memorandum items | |||||||||||
Primary surplus/deficit5 | — | -0.8 | 0.3 | 1.4 | -1.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | ||||
Current budget balance6 | -0.5 | -1.4 | -0.3 | 0.3 | -5.0 | -1.1 | -0.6 | ||||
(In millions of Uganda shillings) | |||||||||||
GDP at current market prices | |||||||||||
(in millions of U Sh) | 391,813 | 901,936 | 1,395,073 | 1,821,485 | 2,718,870 | 3,888,676 | 4.613,336 |
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Includes arrears and, for the FY 1992/93 and 1993/94, also includes adjustment to cash.
Recurrent expenditures (excluding interest) less recurrent revenue (excluding grants).
Revenue less current expenditure.
Central Government Budget Operations
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(In percent of GDP) | |||||||||||
Recurrent revenue and grants | 7.4 | 6.9 | 8.2 | 11.4 | 14.0 | 15.3 | 14.1 | ||||
Recurrent revenue | 5.8 | 5.3 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.9 | ||||
Tax revenue | 5.0 | 4.5 | 6.2 | 7.0 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 7.3 | ||||
Nontax revenue | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | ||||
Grants | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 3.9 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 6.2 | ||||
Expenditure and net lending1 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 12.5 | 14.8 | 21.4 | 18.5 | 17.7 | ||||
Recurrent expenditure2 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 11.9 | 8.3 | 8.5 | ||||
Development expenditure3 | 5.0 | 3.2 | 5.5 | 7.4 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 9.2 | ||||
Overall deficit (cash)4 | |||||||||||
Excluding grants | -5.9 | -5.2 | -6.4 | -7.9 | -14.5 | -12.6 | -10.9 | ||||
Including grants | -4.2 | -3.6 | -5.0 | -4.1 | -7.3 | -4.6 | -4.7 | ||||
Financing | |||||||||||
External (net) | 2.2 | 2.2 | 6.6 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | ||||
Domestic (net) | 2.0 | 1.5 | -1.6 | 0.5 | 2.1 | -0.6 | -0.6 | ||||
Of which: Banking system | 2.0 | 1.4 | -1.4 | 0.2 | 1.9 | -0.4 | -0.8 | ||||
Memorandum items | |||||||||||
Primary surplus/deficit5 | — | -0.8 | 0.3 | 1.4 | -1.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | ||||
Current budget balance6 | -0.5 | -1.4 | -0.3 | 0.3 | -5.0 | -1.1 | -0.6 | ||||
(In millions of Uganda shillings) | |||||||||||
GDP at current market prices | |||||||||||
(in millions of U Sh) | 391,813 | 901,936 | 1,395,073 | 1,821,485 | 2,718,870 | 3,888,676 | 4.613,336 |
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 on a commitment basis.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 all defense expenditures in the budget are included in current outlays.
For the period 1987/88–1990/91 includes net lending.
Includes arrears and, for the FY 1992/93 and 1993/94, also includes adjustment to cash.
Recurrent expenditures (excluding interest) less recurrent revenue (excluding grants).
Revenue less current expenditure.
Recurrent expenditure showed a rising trend, and during the period 1989/90–1993/94 averaged about 9 percent of GDP, boosted by the large level of recurrent spending in 1991/92 (Chart 7). Development expenditure amounted to some 8 percent of GDP on average, bolstered by the large increase in the shilling value of external assistance (both loans and grants) received during this period. Except for 1990/91, the current balance (defined as revenue less recurrent expenditure) was consistently negative, although a declining trend emerged in the past three years (Chart 8). On the other hand, with the exception of 1991/92, the primary surplus (the current balance less interest payments) was consistently positive. Apart from the high level of foreign financing, a significant development in the past two years was the large repayments to the domestic banking system.
Expenditures and Net Lending
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1Includes net lending for the period 1987/88–1990/91.Expenditures and Net Lending
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1Includes net lending for the period 1987/88–1990/91.Expenditures and Net Lending
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1Includes net lending for the period 1987/88–1990/91.Primary Surplus and Budget Balance
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.Primary Surplus and Budget Balance
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.Primary Surplus and Budget Balance
(As percent of GDP)
Source: Ugandan authorities.Developments in Tax Revenue
Overall Trends
Tax revenue performance as a percentage of GDP has shown a rising trend since the coming into power of the present Government in 1986, as the authorities have pursued policies of stabilization, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and overall economic recovery (Table 7). Nevertheless, the tax revenue-GDP ratio is well below that achieved two decades earlier and also well below (less than half) the average tax-GDP ratio in sub-Saharan African countries.
Uganda's tax system relies heavily on indirect taxation. Even though the ratio of income tax as a percentage of total tax revenue has increased in recent years, taxes on exports (almost wholly on coffee)—which traditionally constituted the largest share, almost a third, of tax revenue—have been zero in the past two years. Nevertheless, taxes on international (import) transactions have averaged around 60 percent, and those on domestic goods and services have been about 27 percent of total tax revenue (Table 8 and Chart 9). Moreover, the revenue base has remained very narrow; for example, about half the 1993/94 revenue came from indirect taxes on four products—petroleum, cigarettes, beer, and soft drinks.
Composition of Tax Revenue
(In percentage of total tax revenue)
Airport tax and stamp duties. Exchange profits, currency reform levy, and unallocated tax receipts are excluded.
Composition of Tax Revenue
(In percentage of total tax revenue)
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total tax revenue | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | ||
Taxes on income and profits | 8.9 | 11.4 | 10.9 | 10.7 | 13.8 | 15.2 | 14.6 | ||
PAYE | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.9 | … | … | ||
Non-PAYE | 8.5 | 10.2 | 10.0 | 9.9 | 12.0 | … | … | ||
Taxes on goods and services | 28.0 | 43.3 | 32.2 | 27.5 | 25.3 | 24.0 | 28.0 | ||
Sales tax on domestic production | 18.4 | 29.3 | 21.8 | 15.5 | 13.3 | 13.5 | 12.7 | ||
Excise tax | 8.2 | 11.8 | 7.9 | 9.6 | 8.8 | 7.0 | 11.2 | ||
Commercial transaction levy | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.2 | ||
Taxes on international trade | 62.4 | 44.4 | 56.2 | 60.9 | 60.9 | 59.9 | 56.8 | ||
Import duties | 16.8 | 18.7 | 27.7 | 38.4 | 46.5 | 46.1 | 42.0 | ||
Petroleum products | 5.5 | 7.5 | 18.2 | 28.0 | 33.7 | … | … | ||
Other | 11.4 | 11.3 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 12.8 | … | … | ||
Sales tax on imports | 14.1 | 12.7 | 11.4 | 12.7 | 12.1 | 13.8 | 14.8 | ||
Export duties | 31.5 | 13.0 | 17.1 | 9.9 | 2.3 | … | … | ||
Coffee | 31.4 | 12.9 | 17.1 | 9.9 | 2.3 | … | … | ||
Other | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | … | 1.0 | 0.6 | ||
Other1 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | … | 1.0 | 0.6 |
Airport tax and stamp duties. Exchange profits, currency reform levy, and unallocated tax receipts are excluded.
Composition of Tax Revenue
(In percentage of total tax revenue)
1987/88 | 1988/89 | 1989/90 | 1990/91 | 1991/92 | 1992/93 | 1993/94 Est. | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total tax revenue | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | ||
Taxes on income and profits | 8.9 | 11.4 | 10.9 | 10.7 | 13.8 | 15.2 | 14.6 | ||
PAYE | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.9 | … | … | ||
Non-PAYE | 8.5 | 10.2 | 10.0 | 9.9 | 12.0 | … | … | ||
Taxes on goods and services | 28.0 | 43.3 | 32.2 | 27.5 | 25.3 | 24.0 | 28.0 | ||
Sales tax on domestic production | 18.4 | 29.3 | 21.8 | 15.5 | 13.3 | 13.5 | 12.7 | ||
Excise tax | 8.2 | 11.8 | 7.9 | 9.6 | 8.8 | 7.0 | 11.2 | ||
Commercial transaction levy | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.2 | ||
Taxes on international trade | 62.4 | 44.4 | 56.2 | 60.9 | 60.9 | 59.9 | 56.8 | ||
Import duties | 16.8 | 18.7 | 27.7 | 38.4 | 46.5 | 46.1 | 42.0 | ||
Petroleum products | 5.5 | 7.5 | 18.2 | 28.0 | 33.7 | … | … | ||
Other | 11.4 | 11.3 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 12.8 | … | … | ||
Sales tax on imports | 14.1 | 12.7 | 11.4 | 12.7 | 12.1 | 13.8 | 14.8 | ||
Export duties | 31.5 | 13.0 | 17.1 | 9.9 | 2.3 | … | … | ||
Coffee | 31.4 | 12.9 | 17.1 | 9.9 | 2.3 | … | … | ||
Other | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | … | 1.0 | 0.6 | ||
Other1 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | … | 1.0 | 0.6 |
Airport tax and stamp duties. Exchange profits, currency reform levy, and unallocated tax receipts are excluded.
Composition of Tax Revenue
(As percent of total tax revenue)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1 Less export duty on coffeeComposition of Tax Revenue
(As percent of total tax revenue)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1 Less export duty on coffeeComposition of Tax Revenue
(As percent of total tax revenue)
Source: Ugandan authorities.1 Less export duty on coffeeThe budget for 1989/90 reduced the revenue target (to 8 percent of GDP) on account of lower revenue from the coffee sector, which stemmed from a decline in the export price and higher domestic margins. Nevertheless, a number of measures were taken to streamline and broaden the tax base: these included increases in import duties, sales taxes, and excise duties, a raising of the income tax threshold, and a reduction in the maximum marginal rates for personal and corporate income taxes. In the event, revenue was much weaker than expected (some 7 percent of GDP), largely on account of a coffee tax shortfall that was due to lower shipments (despite a large depreciation of the official exchange rate) and lower sales taxes and excises.
The fiscal program for 1990/91–1992/93 aimed at building a strong foundation for generating a substantial improvement in the revenue effort, thereby increasing the volume of budgetary resources for the rehabilitation and maintenance of important social and economic services and for the restructuring of public services. Accordingly, several measures were introduced in the 1990/91 budget: the number of customs duty rates was reduced to five standard rates and a surtax was imposed on imported goods similar to domestic excisable goods; the number of sales tax rates was reduced to four; and the specific duty rates were raised on petroleum, with a stipulation that the rates were to be periodically reviewed to ensure a full pass-through of costs.
A number of important revenue measures were taken in 1992/93 and 1993/94, all of which sought to rationalize and expand the revenue base. Regarding income tax, the Government imposed a 20 percent tax on 80 percent of gross rentals in excess of a threshold, and further enlarged coverage, with the inclusion of allowances and benefits as a part of taxable income, while reducing the number of tax brackets and the top marginal rate from 40 percent to 30 percent. At the same time, investment incentives were streamlined and combined with a reduction in the level of corporate income tax from 35 percent to 30 percent, that is, the same maximum marginal rate as for personal income taxation. Import duties were also rationalized with a reimposition of a minimum 10 percent tariff on raw materials, while rates were reduced from 0–50 percent to 0–30 percent and the number of rate bands was cut from six to four. The taxes on cigarettes, beer, soft drinks, and spirits were increased, as was the sales tax on imports and local products, together with a 50 percent increase in the tax on services. More important, the tax on coffee exports was abolished, thereby eliminating all taxes on exports and providing significant incentives to producers and exporters.
Improvements in Tax Administration
Major efforts were also made during this period to improve tax administration and collection. In the 1990/91 budget, the Government decided to set up a tax authority to improve the revenue effort. Following the recommendations of an IMF staff tax mission in April 1991 to set up such an authority outside the regular civil service, legislation to set it up was presented to the Assembly in July 1991, and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) became operational in March 1992. Such an arrangement has a number of advantages and allows the URA to offer enhanced benefits to its employees, reduce corruption, and improve efficiency. As the main function of the URA is to collect all revenue, its powers have been progressively widened since its inception.8 In addition, the URA was further strengthened by providing it with adequate resources despite budgetary constraints; all senior staff positions were to be filled with the help of development assistance, and the URA Board was to apply firm guidelines regarding the removal of surplus staff. Together with the creation of the URA, other elements of the improved tax administration include the introduction and expansion of the Taxpayer Identification Number system; implementation of a computer system to monitor import duty calculations and exemptions; tightening of customs documentation procedures and preshipment inspection of imports; and improvement of auditing and computerization of tax records. These administrative measures are also designed to facilitate the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT), which is now slated for July 1996. Finally, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) needs a strong capacity to formulate tax policies, to continue the process of broadening the tax base, rationalizing the tax structure, and making the tax system simpler, more efficient, and equitable.
Trends in Expenditure
In Uganda, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP is relatively low. It was estimated to be close to 18 percent in 1993/94, having risen from 11 percent in 1987/88, compared with an average of 30 percent for sub-Saharan African countries (Table 7). However, it is not by design that aggregate public expenditure is low; rather, it is constrained by the exceptionally weak domestic revenue effort. Low aggregate public expenditure offers part of the explanation for the inadequate funding of a wide range of government programs; this is not to suggest, however, that total government expenditure should be increased regardless of the efficiency concerns or the capacity to implement public programs and projects. The Public Sector Investment Program consists primarily of donor-financed projects except for a few locally financed projects. In the early years, the PSIP was driven by the authorities' strong desire to re-create, to the same standard, the infrastructure that had been destroyed or damaged by the civil war. As a result, projects were added to the PSIP without due consideration of future recurrent costs and weaknesses in implementation capacity.
The Government has recognized that public expenditure policy initiatives need to be geared to meeting the pressing imperatives of the reform agenda. In particular, this requires that public expenditure programs take into account the strengths and weaknesses of the private sector and then nurture the key sources of growth, principally by providing effective economic infrastructure and services, improving basic social services, and strengthening the capacity of the civil service. A February 1991 review of public expenditure programs in key economic and social sectors in the early years revealed that the Government had been unable to provide these basic conditions for growth and development. Specifically, severe underfunding and weak implementation capacity impeded the effectiveness of critical programs: agricultural research and extension, road rehabilitation and maintenance, power transmission and distribution, primary health care, primary education, and water supply in rural areas. Activities critical to the reform agenda had to receive greater priority in funding and institutional strengthening. Expenditure allocations for critical activities in economic and social sectors had to be increased; at the same time, the Government needed to phase out unproductive facilities, activities, and personnel within and across sectors.
Public Expenditure Prioritization
Recurrent Budget
In 1990/91, the Government instituted a process of expenditure prioritization, starting with the recurrent budget. (See Box 2 for a description of the budgetary process.) It identified primary education, primary health care, water supply, agricultural research and extension, and road maintenance as high-priority programs. The selected programs were to receive substantial real increases in allocations in future budgets. The allocations were, in turn, protected from expenditure cuts when revenue collections fell short of estimates. In effect, high-priority programs were to benefit from automatic releases of funds during the fiscal year. Allocations for high-priority recurrent programs would be made after provision for the following items, which were to have first call on resources: wages, interest, amortization, domestic arrears, statutory expenditure, funding for the URA, and counterpart funds for core development projects. With effect from 1993/94, the Government has expanded the list of high-priority recurrent expenditure programs to include police service and the judiciary system, and offices of the Auditor General and the Inspector General. The Government's policy is to channel more resources into high-priority programs, particularly those that provide basic social services.
Ugandan Budgetary Process
The basic laws governing public finances in Uganda consist of Chapter IX of the Constitution and the Public Finance Act, together with the Financial and Accounting Instructions issued under the act. In common with the practice in other anglophone countries, Uganda's annual estimates are divided into recurrent and development budgets. The preparation of the annual estimates works reasonably well, although there are a number of questions about the content of the exercise. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has seen the need to consult the Cabinet early in the estimates process. Each year the MOFEP submits a Budget Issues Paper to the Cabinet around the end of May (the financial year begins July 1), presenting the results of the budget discussions in the context of macroeconomic projections for the next three years but focusing on the coming year.
The system of expenditure releases is a combination of monthly releases and the “Requisition to Incur Expenditure (RIE),” representing a prudent movement away from the unduly restrictive RIE system for accounting officers to manage their programs. The payments system has been streamlined and simplified over the years in step with the release of funds, although from time to time ministries have abused the system by entering into commitments in excess of their approved estimates, thus creating domestic arrears. The control and monitoring of revenue and expenditure have improved in large measure because of the creation of the Economic Analysis Unit, which has been able to create a fairly comprehensive fiscal data base that is updated monthly. There is a statutory timetable for the submission of final accounts and the Auditor General's report on the accounts. In spite of progress made, there is delay in the production of accounts. Many factors militate against the timely production of accounts, including poor work incentives and the shortage of suitably trained staff.
Development Budget
As with recurrent expenditure, development expenditure during the period reflects the Government's tendency to spread its limited resources and implementation capacity thinly over a large number of projects, some of doubtful economic value. The shortage of counterpart funds to support donor projects and the slow implementation of projects strongly suggest that the development budget should be revamped in order to improve its effectiveness. Moreover, the development budget is too large in relation to the recurrent budget, and insufficient consideration has been given to the recurrent cost implications of new projects. Furthermore, many projects do not fit into the highest expenditure priorities, such as the provision of essential infrastructure and the more rapid development of human resources. Accordingly, the Government decided that it should concentrate on its core functions of providing basic social services (health, education, and water supply), basic economic infrastructure, feeder roads, agricultural research, environmental protection, and maintenance of law and order. In line with these criteria, the 1993/94 budget was divided into core and noncore projects, with some 80 percent of counterpart funds going into the support of core projects; the ratio of such funds allocated to core projects is expected to increase strongly in the near future. It should be noted, however, that the core-noncore classification will not be a permanent feature of the development budget; rather, it should be viewed as a transitional phase that recognizes financing and implementation constraints. It is expected that in about two years there would be no need for this classification, and the development budget would consist of only high-priority projects that the Government can fund and implement. (See Box 3.)
Problems of Project Implementation
The problems of project implementation are significant, complex, and particularly intractable in Uganda. The most difficult is the poor environment for a results-oriented management in the public sector, which is exacerbated by the lack of counterpart funds, the complexity of procurement regulations, the inadequate compensation of government employees, and slow and ineffective project implementation, owing to the inability of the Government to monitor and supervise projects. The inadequacy of counterpart funds is thought to arise partly from the diversion and release of funds to other activities, including off-budget activities. In the design of project management, there are significant choices to be made between short-term, donor-driven projects and longer-term, institution-building projects; between autonomy and strict control; and between performance-based compensation and the tendency toward uniformity.
To improve project implementation, the Government will therefore need, inter alia, to improve procurement procedures, develop training courses and procedures for project staff, accelerate civil service reform and introduce results-oriented management, restructure the development budget to focus on high-priority projects, and provide full counterpart funding of projects and stop the diversion of funding to other activities.
Civil Service Reform
Since 1987, one of the institutions most in need of reform and rehabilitation has been the civil service, in order to improve the Government's capacity to deliver public services. Key issues in regard to civil service reform have been the rationalization and downsizing of the service, the reform and decentralization of government functions, and the introduction of improved personnel management systems. The reform program, which was launched in 1992, has eliminated about 40,000 ghost workers from the payroll, reduced “group” (temporary) employees by about 60,000, and retrenched and laid off another 14,000 civil servants.9 In a continuing effort to reduce the size of the service, the Government has also introduced a voluntary redundancy scheme, which is expected to bring total staffing levels to 150,000 (of which more than 50 percent would be teachers) by 1995. As a feature of the social safety net, the Government is providing (over and above the severance package) assistance to retrenched civil servants in the form of counseling and retraining, as well as an entrepreneurship re-employment program. In parallel with this retrenchment, the Government has improved the remuneration of those who remain in the civil service. Considerable increases in real terms have taken place in the past three years, as evidenced by the rise of over 350 percent in the wage bill between 1991/92 and 1993/94, or 260 percent in real terms, despite a sharp reduction in the number of civil servants. Nevertheless, the civil service salaries remain low because per capita GDP in Uganda is very low.
An important step in upgrading the overall structure of civil service pay and employment is the ongoing effort to monetize benefits (housing and transport), which will make the remuneration package more transparent and equitable. The reform program has reduced the number of ministries from 34 to 21. In addition, the assessments of the functions and staffing of ten ministries are complete, and the Government has endorsed five of these; further assessments have to take into account the decentralization initiatives now under way. The Government intends to reduce further the cost of the civil service through a computerization of payroll administration. The installation of audit and verification procedures will provide firm control over staffing and the payroll.
Military Expenditures
In tandem with the restoration of peace throughout the countryside, Uganda has successfully reduced the size of its military establishment through a demobilization program. The demobilization exercise has been undertaken in three phases. The objective of this effort has been to reduce defense expenditures and reallocate the freed-up resources to priority social and economic needs (Box 4). The Government demobilized a total of 33,000 soldiers in 1992/93 and 1993/94. With considerable donor support, the demobilization program has included an important social safety net feature, namely that all demobilized soldiers are provided with a financial package to assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration into Ugandan society (Box 5).
Military Expenditures and the “Peace Dividend”
In a region characterized by instability, the peace dividend in Uganda resulting from the demobilization program has been substantial. This dividend has come about in two ways. One is the reduction in the size of military expenditures, which has been the major concern of the Government and donors. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined from 2.4 percent in 1991/92, to 1.6 percent in 19927/93, to 1.3 percent in 1993/94. The other is the economic activity generated by the return of veterans to their respective districts. They have invested their repatriation benefits in economic activities, mostly in agriculture. They have brought new land into production, produced foodstuffs for local markets, and are introducing new crops into their villages. Also, contrary to expectations, the presence of ex-soldiers in the villages has not resulted in higher crime rates but has been a cause of reduced crime.
Social Safety Net: The Case of Army Demobilization
Between December 1992 and June 1994, Uganda demobilized a total of about 33,000 soldiers in two phases, with financial assistance from the donor community. The final phase involving about 10,000 soldiers is scheduled for completion in 1994/95, after which the size of the army will have been halved, to about 45,000. Each demobilized soldier received a basic in-cash settlement package comprising food, agricultural implements, seeds, medical coverage, and transportation per diem. In-kind settlement included roofing sheets and transportation from assembly point to home.
Although various operational difficulties have been encountered, budgetary provisions include educational benefits, predischarge orientation to facilitate the transition back to civilian life, and a monitoring and evaluation system for assessing both the demobilization program and future integration needs.
The resourcefulness of some of the veterans has eased their reintegration into the community. Some have set up small enterprises in rice cultivation, roof tile fabrication, and brickmaking, using the financial resources from the settling-in package.
Parastatal Reform
In 1991/92, the Government devised a strategy for public enterprise reform, which consists of (i) definition of a program of divestiture and liquidation of specific enterprises; (ii) preparation of a comprehensive program for rationalizing the remaining enterprises; (iii) preparation of a long-term policy and administrative framework for the sound management of the public enterprise sector; and (iv) institutional strengthening to monitor performance. The initial stages of this parastatal reform commenced in the late 1980s and included efforts to reduce the scope of public enterprises in economic activity, along with steps toward increasing the efficiency and viability of public enterprises, such as a study of the techniques to be applied in the divestiture of parastatals and the establishment of a public enterprise secretariat to advise the Government on the reform program. Consistent with the objective of increasing the participation of the private sector in the economy, the export monopoly of the Produce Marketing Board was abolished in 1989/90. This was followed in 1990/91 by the abolition of the export monopoly of the Coffee Marketing Board. Following a review of the reform program, a Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Statute was enacted by the Assembly in August 1993. This enactment confirms the Government's three-tiered approach of liquidation, divestiture, and reform and contains a classification of public enterprises under which the Government will (i) retain 100 percent shareholding in 10 enterprises; (ii) retain a majority shareholding in 17 enterprises; (iii) retain minority shareholding in 20 enterprises; (iv) fully privatize 43 enterprises; and (v) liquidate 17 enterprises. The new law creates an institutional framework for divestiture and reform and delineates a careful process of audit and valuation prior to sale. In the first year (through end-June 1994), progress on the disposition of public ownership proceeded slowly—with only two enterprises being sold and nine liquidated. Since then, there has been an acceleration in the privatization process with 4 more enterprises being sold, 2 enterprises being returned to previous owners, and 11 more enterprises being brought to the point of sale. A comprehensive action plan has also been worked out with the World Bank for enterprises for which the Government will retain 100 percent or majority shareholding. A performance contract was recently agreed with the Railways Corporation, and reform programs are in process for three other enterprises.
In Uganda, the PSIP, loosely defined, is the four-year rolling Rehabilitation and Development Plan.
The 1994/95 budget announced the shift of the collection of “other nontax” revenue from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to the URA.
In 1989, the Public Service Review and Reorganization Commission was set up. In September 1990, its recommendations were presented to the Government and, through Sessional Paper No. 1, 1992, the policy framework for the civil service reform was defined.