The imbalances between aggregate demand and supply in Morocco at the beginning of the 1980s were due in part to the pervasive distortions of the incentive structure, which hindered the growth of aggregate supply and distorted the pattern of demand. Measures to improve resource allocation and increase productivity were therefore essential elements of the adjustment strategy adopted in 1980. These measures envisaged liberalizing the price, trade, and marketing systems, as well as reforming the public enterprise sector and the investment codes.

The imbalances between aggregate demand and supply in Morocco at the beginning of the 1980s were due in part to the pervasive distortions of the incentive structure, which hindered the growth of aggregate supply and distorted the pattern of demand. Measures to improve resource allocation and increase productivity were therefore essential elements of the adjustment strategy adopted in 1980. These measures envisaged liberalizing the price, trade, and marketing systems, as well as reforming the public enterprise sector and the investment codes.

These structural measures took time to develop and implement, as they required considerable preparatory work and involved extensive changes in the economy’s legal and institutional framework. Furthermore, they needed to be implemented in a carefully sequenced manner to ensure their consistency with other measures and policies. Although the structural measures were expected to improve supply conditions and thus to lessen the degree of restraint in aggregate demand management over the medium term, they needed to be supported by restrained financial policies in the short term to counter the pressures that would result from the initial phase of liberalization. In particular, the timing of the reforms had to take account of the possibility of transitional losses in output and budgetary revenue, which complicated the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies. Within structural reform, the sequencing of measures also needed careful coordination to ensure their success. For example, increasing competition from abroad through trade reform required domestic firms to become more competitive in home markets so as to prevent either a loss of output or an increase rather than a decline in external imbalances. Similarly, the liberalization of prices called for a concomitant removal of restrictions as well as an opening up of the economy to prevent an increase in monopolistic rents. Taking all these factors into account, the liberalization process in Morocco was generally implemented in a gradual and coordinated manner.

Public Enterprises

Public enterprises have traditionally accounted for an important share of economic activity in Morocco, reflecting the inward-oriented growth strategy adopted by the authorities in the 1970s. During those years public involvement increased, particularly in the capital-intensive industries. In 1973, the Agency for Industrial Development (Office pour le développement industriel) was created to encourage private initiatives, and major industrial trusts were created in the chemical (Maroc chimie and Maroc phosphore) and steel industries (Société nationale de sidérurgie). Moreover, the “Moroccanization” drive initiated in 1973 aimed at reducing the influence of foreign capital interests, which were considered incompatible with national control over domestic resources and inward-oriented growth. As a result, the number of enterprises with direct or indirect state participation grew by roughly 75 percent during the 1970s and reached a total of about 620 companies by the end of 1985. By the end of 1993, there were around seven hundred public enterprises, of which two-thirds were commercial and industrial companies, one-tenth were public utilities, and the rest were quasi-governmental bodies, including regulatory agencies, universities, and hospitals. Wholly owned government enterprises enjoyed a monopoly in basic utilities (energy, water supply, and telecommunications), railroads, air transport, phosphate production, and petroleum refining. However, in late 1993 steps were initiated to open the power-generating sector to private activity and to leave the development of new telecommunications services to the private sector: similar plans for the water and transportation sectors were under consideration. Government-controlled companies dominated development banking and virtually all of the wine-and tobacco-processing activity. About thirty core public enterprises accounted for the bulk of output, employment, and investment in the public sector. 14

From a legal point of view, there are different types of public enterprises (offices, régies, sociétés nationales, sociétés d’économie mixte, and filiales d’entreprises publiques), with varying degrees of financial and administrative autonomy. Capital belongs partly or entirely to the central administration or local governments, but Moroccan law does not precisely define a public enterprise. In 1980, the public enterprise sector included 204 enterprises wholly owned by the stat; 16 corporations with private capital but with a majority shareholding by the state; and 397 enterprises that were subsidiaries of other public enterprises or that had minority government participation. In 1992–93, the Government had more than a one-third stake in about half of all public enterprises, generally with a smaller share in commercial and industrial companies.

Although no reliable data are available on the public enterprise sector’s share in the overall economy, its share in output is estimated to have doubled during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1989, public enterprise production accounted for about 20 percent of total GDP and for more than 50 percent of value added in the mining, energy, water supply, transportation, and communications sectors; 25 percent in the industrial sector: and 10 percent in the agricultural, commercial, and construction sectors. Furthermore, in 1989, public enterprises are estimated to have accounted for about 50 percent of total merchandise exports and about 30 percent of total investment.

During the 1970s, the financial situation of the public enterprise sector had become increasingly difficult as a result of rigid pricing policies, unprofitable investments, and high government payments arrears to various public enterprises. Consequently, many public enterprises had to resort more and more to borrowing, to accumulating interenterprise arrears, and in some cases to increased budgetary transfers—actions that contributed to the country’s growing domestic and external imbalances. The adjustment process initiated at the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, included a number of measures to improve the performance, monitoring, and control of public enterprises.

In the early 1980s, these measures improved the financial position of public enterprises but, because they were limited and ad hoc, they did not attenuate the basic structural problems of the public sector. However, in 1985, the Government decided to undertake a major restructuring of the sector with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank under a public enterprise restructuring loan. The restructuring program encompassed measures to (1) improve the financial performance of public enterprises so as to reduce the budgetary burden; (2) develop their administrative autonomy and accountability; and (3) reduce the role of the Government in the economy through the privatization or liquidation of targeted enterprises.

The reform program also envisaged changes in utility tariffs and pricing policies as well as a strengthening of the planning, evaluation, and monitoring of investments. Accordingly, starting in 1985, the tariffs for electricity, water, and transportation were substantially increased. In addition, a first set of three-year performance contracts, which established and rationalized investment programs and operating procedures, was signed with eight public enterprises during 1985–93. At the end of 1993, 13 enterprises were operating under performance contracts, and program negotiations with a number of additional enterprises were at an advanced stage.

Beginning in 1987, the Government acted to address the arrears overhang that had developed in the early 1980s between the Government and the public enterprises. At the end of 1986, the overhang was estimated on a gross basis (i.e., adding both government and public enterprise gross arrears) at some DH 26 billion, or 17 percent of GDP. The process to eliminate the arrears entailed cross-cancellation of mutually owed obligations, cash settlements by the treasury, and the issuance of interest-hearing medium-term bonds to public enterprises. A comprehensive government census of public sector arrears undertaken in 1992 indicated that gross public sector cross-arrears still amounted to DH 21.1 billion, or 8.7 percent of GDP, at the end of December 1992. By the end of December 1993, the amount had been reduced to DH 16.2 billion, or 6.4 percent of GDP, through cross-cancellation and cash settlements. The stock of gross arrears owed by the Government to public enterprises thus declined from DH 12.9 billion in 1985 (10 percent of GDP) to DI-15 billion in 1987 (3.1 percent), and to DH 3.3 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) by the end of 1993.

Changes were also effected in the institutional framework regarding the management and supervision of public enterprises. The Department of Public Enterprises and Participation (DEPP) of the Ministry of Finance was strengthened, and a permanent committee, the Interministerial Committee for Public Enterprise and State Participation (CIPEP), was created to address and make decisions concerning major issues of public enterprise strategy and to approve performance contracts. The performance contracts negotiated by CIPEP established financial objectives, investment programs, and operating procedures for each enterprise, whose performance would then be evaluated on the basis of those objectives. Thus, the Government’s role has evolved from that of controlling a public enterprise’s functions to that of holding the management responsible for performance objectives.

A comprehensive policy framework for privatization was developed in 1985. Under this framework, studies were undertaken to identify (1) those enterprises that were not performing and that needed restructuring; (2) those that should be liquidated; and (3) those that were engaged in activities that could be carried out by the private sector. Based on those studies, 112 enterprises, including 37 hotels, were targeted to be sold to the private sector before the end of 1995, and enterprises in the mining and sugar sectors were slated for restructuring. The legal framework for this privatization program was adopted in 1989, but implementation started in earnest only in 1993, with the privatization of 10 enterprises, yielding DH 2.1 billion in revenue. An additional 5 enterprises were sold in the first quarter of 1994, and the auditing process that precedes the offer for sale has been concluded for another 35 enterprises. Privatization is being conducted through direct negotiations and tenders, as well as through the stock market.

As a result of these actions, the financial burden imposed by public enterprises on the budget has declined substantially. Total current and capital transfers from the Government to public enterprises, which amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP in 1982, declined gradually to 1.7 percent of GDP in 1993.


Until the early 1980s, two primary considerations had been instrumental in shaping trade policy in Morocco. The first was the desire to promote industrialization by shielding import-substituting activities from international competition. The second was the tendency to, resort to trade restrictions as a means of containing external imbalances and mobilizing revenue. This trade policy, administered through relatively high tariffs and wide-ranging quantitative restrictions, generated a strong anti-export bias. Lower protection on intermediate products and capital equipment, through lower tariffs and extensive tax exemptions, resulted in high effective protection and discrimination against labor-intensive activities, an area in which Morocco enjoys a comparative advantage. The frequent ad hoc introduction of new layers of trade taxes in response to budgetary needs created volatile and highly dispersed tax rates, further distorting the incentive system. Resources were being allocated to highly protected and inefficient sectors, lowering the overall productivity of the economy.

During the 1980s, the shift away from the inward-oriented development strategy led to a reduction of the restrictions on trade payments and foreign investment in order to improve efficiency, diversify the export base, and make the economy more resilient to external shocks. The trade liberalization strategy, adopted in 1983, had the following objectives: gradually lower protection, reduce the dispersion of tariffs, and replace most nontariff barriers (quotas, licensing requirements, and reference prices) with tariffs. Trade policy reforms in the mid-1980s and early 1990s were supported by the World Bank under two Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Loans, two Structural Adjustment Loans, and two Agricultural Structural Adjustment Loans.

Quantitative restrictions have been dramatically reduced. At the beginning of the 1980s, imports were regulated by a general import program, which distinguished three categories of imports: (1) List A for goods that could be freely imported: (2) List B for goods subject to quantitative restrictions; and (3) List C for goods whose importation was prohibited. Quantitative restrictions were enforced through import licensing and state trading. Since 1983, goods have been steadily transferred from Lists B and C to List A. List C was formally abolished as of February 1986. By early 1994, import-licensing requirements affected only items on a short negative list, mainly those related to security and moral considerations. Although the list also includes petroleum products, edible oils, sugar, oilseeds, cereals, and derivatives of these products, the relevant decree provides for phasing out import-licensing requirements on these products by mid-1995, in line with the recent agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that Morocco signed in May 1994. The scope of reference prices was also drastically reduced, and the share of domestic output subject to reference prices declined from 66 percent in 1980 to less than 10 percent in 1993. A new foreign trade law adopted in 1992 provides a legal basis for antidumping and countervailing procedures. Its effective implementation is seen as a prerequisite for the removal of the remaining reference prices, which are to be phased out within eight years in accordance with the GATT Customs Evaluation Code that Morocco signed in 1993. While the state’s involvement in trading has been diminishing, state agencies still play a role in the importation of cereals, tea, sugar, and tobacco, and a public enterprise distributes crude oil for refining. The monopoly on tea and tobacco imports, however, was abolished in late 1993.

Trade reforms have reduced both the level and dispersion of tariff protection, leading to a more neutral incentive structure. Prior to the reforms, customs duties were subject to wide variations between and within sectors, with rates ranging from zero to 400 percent, generally rising with the stage of processing. The maximum customs tariff, excluding the special import tax, was reduced to 60 percent in July 1984, 45 percent in February 1986, 40 percent in May 1992, and 35 percent in 1993, except for a few agricultural goods. In parallel, the special import tax declined from 15 percent in 1983 to 12.5 percent in 1988. The number of tariff bands was reduced from 26 to 15 in 1990 and further to 9 in May 1992. Although most nontariff barriers were replaced by tariffs, the mean unweighted tariff, including the fiscal import tax, fell from 47 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in the early 1990s; on an import-weighted basis, it declined from 34 percent to 27 percent. The effective average import tax rate fell from 23.5 percent in 1980 to 20.4 percent in 1993. The decline in tariffs on consumer goods was larger than that on intermediate and capital goods, and manufacturing still retains the highest protection. Morocco bound 156 tariff lines, accounting for one-third of total imports, when it joined the GATT in June 1987.

Several reforms were introduced concurrently to eliminate barriers to exports and reduce incentive disparities between export-and import-substituting activities. Export-licensing requirements, which had proliferated at the beginning of the 1980s to safeguard supplies for the domestic market, had been abolished on virtually all industrial, agricultural, and mining products by early 1994; by that time, only exports of flour, charcoal, and certain works of art or antiques continued to require licenses. A levy of 1 percent on agricultural exports also remained in effect and was used to finance an agency that controls quality and promotes trade. As part of Morocco’s policy to promote exports, a temporary admission scheme was introduced in 1973, under which goods imported for processing and re-export were exempt from import duties. The benefits of this regime were expanded and made more attractive during the 1980s. For example, both direct and indirect exporters (i.e., local suppliers to exporters) were made eligible to import all inputs duty free without having to obtain a license for products on Lists B and C. Imports under the temporary admission scheme expanded from 5 percent of total imports in 1983 to 25 percent in 1991, when about 60 percent of merchandise exports were produced using duty-free inputs. Participants in this scheme are also eligible for forward foreign exchange cover, provided by Bank Al-Maghrib on behalf of the treasury since 1979.

The liberalization of Morocco’s trade system, supported by a flexible exchange rate policy, made external trade more important, exposed a growing proportion of local industry to competition from abroad, and shifted resources away from import substitution and toward activities in which Morocco had a comparative advantage. Buoyant exports, which benefited from the improved incentive structure, together with the liberalization of imports, allowed imports to expand. Export volumes rose by about 7 percent a year on average during 1983–90, leading to some gain in market share. However, reflecting the 1992–93 drought and weakening export markets, volumes declined slightly during 1991–93. Manufactured products have been the fastest-growing component of exports; their share in total exports increased from an average of 16 percent in 1980–81 to an average of 32 percent in 1991–93. Following the policy changes implemented since 1983, the growth of outward-oriented industries was relatively higher than that of import-substituting industries. Moreover, an analysis of export performance and relative factor intensities of production techniques indicates that industries that have been successful exporters (such as textiles and clothing, footwear, and leather goods) appear to he the most labor intensive. Import volumes grew broadly in line with export volume—slower between 1980 and 1988 but faster afterward. Within imports, there was a marked shift toward manufactured goods, the hulk of which were capital goods and semifinished products. The relative importance of food items and raw materials declined steadily, except during intermittent drought years.

The geographical pattern of Morocco’s trade changed relatively little during the 1980s. Its main trading partners remained the EU countries, which accounted for 54 percent of imports and 64 percent of exports in 1992, with France accounting for the largest share of exports and imports. The EU’s share in both exports and imports rose during the 1980s, while the share of trade with Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union declined sharply. Morocco has preferential trading agreements with the EU and, in the context of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU),15 with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Within the framework of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement—concluded in 1976 and amended in 1988 following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU—the EU has granted Morocco significant nonreciprocal trade preferences. Most industrial goods are admitted into the EU duty free, and limitations on Moroccan exports of textiles and clothing have been gradually relaxed. At the end of 1993, only a voluntary export restraint on trousers and shorts remained in effect. In agriculture, restrictions arising from the implementation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy affect notably citrus fruits, tomatoes, and grapes. Preferences granted for certain products include tariff reductions and nontariff preferences, such as seasonal quotas or tariff quotas. The agreement between Morocco and the EU is currently under renegotiation.


Through the early 1980s, the Government continued to be heavily involved in setting prices in product and factor markets. A comprehensive system of price controls and subsidies aimed at providing incentives to producers, offering basic foodstuffs at low prices, insulating producers and consumers from short-term international price fluctuations, and containing price increases. Interventions in the pricing system were effected through (1) setting prices the state marketing organizations would pay to agricultural producers; (2) subsidizing retail prices of consumer goods (flour and flour derivatives, sugar, edible oil, milk, and butter); (3) subsidizing prices of producer inputs (cement, fertilizers, and petroleum products); (4) fixing tariffs charged by public enterprises; and (5) fixing prices or profit margins on various goods or requiring that the Government authorize changes.

The system of price controls was based on a law, adopted in 1971, that established three categories (A, B, and C) of goods and determined how controls would he enforced. List A included goods of “strategic” importance, as well as basic consumer goods; these prices were controlled by the central Government. Lists B and C covered goods of regional or local importance, and responsibility for the controls was vested in the regional or local authorities. Given the wide scope of controls, the system was never fully implemented, although in many areas it stifled price competition among producers and thus provided no incentive to minimize costs while encouraging rent-seeking activities. The Price Stabilization Fund subsidized the retail prices of certain petroleum products, sugar, butter, milk, edible oil, and cement, and the Office national interprofessional des céréales et légumes (ONICL) intervened by buying cereals at the official producer and import prices and subsidizing the price of flour-derived products. Although the Price Stabilization Fund obtained its resources largely from earmarked levies, mainly on petroleum products and cement, transfers to these two institutions were also a heavy burden on the budget. The total budgetary cost of subsidies in 1981 was estimated at 2.7 percent of GDP.

With a view to improving resource allocation, the Government substantially reduced its interventions in pricing mechanisms during 1981–93. Direct price controls on manufactured goods were gradually removed, except those on a few subsidized products. Subsidies were eliminated on milk in 1982, on butter in 1984, on petroleum products in 1985, and on cement in 1991. Since 1982, subsidies on fertilizers have been administered directly by the Office chérifien des phosphates (OCP). For sugar, edible oil, and flour, substantial adjustments in retail prices were implemented during the 1980s, yet certain varieties of these products remained subsidized in 1993. Reflecting movements in international prices, subsidies per unit cost as well as the total amount of subsidies have fluctuated from year to year, but on a generally declining trend; during 1991–93 they amounted to less than 1 percent of GDP. Furthermore, in line with the objective of increasing Morocco’s self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, agricultural producer prices were increased substantially during the 1980s and maintained at or above import prices; all cereal producer prices, except those for soft wheat, were liberalized beginning with the 1987/88 crop season; official producer prices were maintained for milk, cotton, sugar, and sunflower seeds.

With the liberalization of prices, the share in the consumer price index of goods subject to price control and intervention declined from about 50 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to about 25 percent at the beginning of the 1990s. Consequently, the consumer price index became a more accurate indicator of underlying inflationary pressures in the economy. With the reduction in the number of subsidized products and adjustments in their prices to reflect cost and market conditions, the burden of consumer subsidies on the budget declined from 2.7 percent of GDP in 1981 to 0.8 percent in 1993.


At the beginning of the 1980s, farmers depended on marketing services provided directly by the Government or its agencies. The Government’s involvement at the marketing level was closely linked to the pricing policies covering agricultural producer and consumer goods.

On the agricultural inputs side, the Government regulated fertilizer marketing through a state-owned company, which had the monopoly over imports of fertilizers and domestic sales of locally produced phosphate-based fertilizers. It was also involved in wholesale and retail trade and set fixed distribution allowances. For cereal crops, certified seeds were marketed by a public enterprise. These interventions discouraged the private sector from developing a wide distribution network and left many farmers without assured and timely access to fertilizers.

Cereals were marketed by the ONICL, which had the monopoly over imports through 12 licensed traders, operated the system of domestic price support, and purchased domestic production at fixed prices through government-run cooperatives and licensed private traders. However, trade regulations prevented millers from buying soft wheat directly from farmers and traders, and because the fixed handling margins were set very low, private traders were not willing to participate in the ONICL’s program. Consequently, the private domestic collection network contracted, limiting access to the system to large farmers who could benefit from the official producer price by bringing their produce to the main collection centers. For other cereals, the marketing system was less controlled than that for soft wheat, largely because no consumer subsidies were involved. However, the public sector still set a producer price at which it bought those quantities supplied by producers to government procurement outlets and had a monopoly over external trade. In addition, in the oil seeds and edible oil sector, internal marketing was managed by a state agency, while in the sugar sector, imports were controlled through a public sector monopoly.

The Government’s intervention in marketing within the agricultural sector was reduced substantially during the 1980s. The subsidy for the marketing of fertilizers was abolished, and input distribution services, previously provided by the Government, were privatized. Furthermore, domestic trading of cereals (except soft wheat used for subsidized flour), representing some 85 percent of locally produced grains, was completely liberalized. In the case of soft wheat, the margins allowed for government-run cooperatives or private traders to purchase domestic cereals in the local market were increased to compensate fully for the costs involved in their marketing. As a result, the share of official marketing by the ONICL in domestic wheat, barley, and maize production fell from 27 percent in 1980/81 to 7 percent in 1992/93.

Investment Codes

The system of investment incentives in Morocco, which was put in place in 1958, was embodied in six sectoral investment codes covering industry, handicrafts, tourism, the maritime sector, real estate, and mining; a code covering young entrepreneurs; and two export codes. All codes provided fiscal incentives through preferential tax treatment and exemptions designed to (1) encourage the development of the export sector; (2) stimulate investments in the less developed regions of the country: and (3) benefit industries engaged in a broad range of activities.

These codes provided ad hoc incentives with tax exemptions, included no follow-up controls, and used different criteria for approval, In addition, benefits provided by the various investment codes differed widely from one sector to another, so that the user cost of capital was not the same for all sectors. They also unintentionally favored real estate speculation because corporate tax and capital gains tax exemptions made investment in other sectors relatively unattractive. The cost of these codes to the Government in terms of administration and revenue forgone was substantial, while exemptions reduced the buoyancy of profit taxes, particularly as the tax benefits were directed to the more dynamic sectors of the economy. The budgetary costs of the investment codes amounted to an estimated 7.8 percent of government revenue, excluding that from the OCP, in 1980. Furthermore, these codes introduced sizable distortions that favored capital-intensive investments. In 1978, the cost of labor relative to capital at market prices was estimated to be 65–79 percent higher than the relative cost of labor at shadow market prices.

In view of the heavy financial and economic costs of the system, the Government decided in 1988 to rationalize investment incentives within the framework of the existing codes. The duration and rate of existing tax exemptions were limited, and intersectoral disparities in the tax codes were reduced. More specifically, in sectors other than export-oriented industries, the duration of profit tax exemptions was shortened, and the exemption rate was reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent. In the export-oriented industries, the ten-year exemption was curtailed, with exporters subject to taxes on one-half of the profits earned from the sixth year on, and exemptions for various state-owned banks were repealed. In addition, the procedures governing the administration of the investment codes were simplified, and the limit of 49 percent on foreign ownership of local enterprises in sectors affected by the “Moroccanization” decree was abolished.

As a result of these changes, investors in less developed regions and those in privileged sectors saw a reduction in their tax advantages, both in absolute terms and in relation to other sectors that had benefited from the reduction in the corporate income tax in 1987. Nevertheless, the cost of the system has remained high. The cost of the investment codes in terms of revenue forgone was estimated at about DH 1.4 billion in 1989, equivalent to 3.2 percent of total revenues and 0.7 percent of GDP Of this total, exemptions from profit taxes were estimated at DH 0.5 billion (about equally distributed between export and other sectors), equivalent to about 12.5 percent of receipts from taxes on profits; exemptions from the value-added tax at DH 0.3 billion, equivalent to about 3 percent of total value-added tax receipts: and exemptions from trade taxes at DH 0.6 billion, equivalent to about 15 percent of revenue from import duties.

In 1990, the Government undertook a major study of the codes to lay the foundation for reforming the system of investment incentives by simplifying and harmonizing the incentives provided in different codes, taking into account the Government’s priorities and budgetary constraints. The results of the study prompted the authorities to narrow the options for reforms to two: (1) eliminate the sectoral investment codes altogether, or, perhaps as an intermediate step, (2) unify the existing codes. In the first option, any investment incentive would become part of the general tax code and would thus be independent of the sector or location in which the investment was made. Either reform would eliminate the distortions inherent in the sectoral approach to investment incentives, ensure greater transparency of the system, and reduce or eliminate budgetary costs.


Mainly production and distribution of water and electricity, telecommunications, rail, air, maritime transport, phosphate mining and processing, and tobacco processing.


For a background study on the AMU, see Finaish and Bell (1994).

  • Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, Richard D. Haas, Steven A. Symansky, and Ralph W. Tryon, Debt Reduction and Economic Activity, IMF Occasional Paper, No. 68 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, March 1990).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Finaish, Mohamed, and Eric Bell, “The Arab Maghreb Union,” IMF Working Paper No. 94/55 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, May 1994).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Gold, Joseph, The Fund’s Concepts of Convertibility, IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 14 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1971).

  • International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual Report (Washington, various issues).

  • International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, various issues).

  • International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, various issues).

  • Morocco, Bank Al-Maghrib, Annual Report (Rabat, various issues).

  • Morocco, Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Privatization, Text of Law and Decrees Authorizing the Transfer of Public Enterprises to the Private Sector (Rabat, 1994).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Morocco, Ministry of Finance, Statistiques du Trésor (Rabat, various issues).

  • Morocco, Ministry of Finance, Loi de Finances (Rabat, various issues).

  • Morocco, Premier Ministre, Ministère Charge de l’Incitation de l’Economie, Direction de la Statistique, Annuaire Statistique du Maroc 1993 (Rabat, 1993).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Nsouli, Saleh M., Current Account Convertibility: Anachronism or Transition (paper presented at the Seminar on Currency Convertibility, Marrakech, December 1993).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Nsouli, Saleh M., Peter Cornelius, and Andreas Georgiou, “Striving for Currency Convertibility in North Africa,” Finance and Development, Vol. 29 (December 1992), pp. 4447.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965–92 (Paris, 1993).