VII Social Impact of the Transition
Author: Mr. Gerd Schwartz
Language:
English
Keywords:
OP; bottom; exchange rate; enterprise; government; State budget; wage income; poverty estimate; extent of poverty; retirement age; income gap; Income; Aging; Pension spending
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Abstract

Poland’s pretransition social protection arrangements centered around an extensive social insurance system, which, among other things, provided for old-age, disability, and survivors pensions, health care, work injury benefits, sick pay, family allowances, and maternity benefits. In addition, there existed a limited system of local social assistance to support the poor. While, on the surface, these systems look much like the arrangements found in many market economies, the differences were in fact striking.

Social Safety Net at the Outset of the Transition

Poland’s pretransition social protection arrangements centered around an extensive social insurance system, which, among other things, provided for old-age, disability, and survivors pensions, health care, work injury benefits, sick pay, family allowances, and maternity benefits. In addition, there existed a limited system of local social assistance to support the poor. While, on the surface, these systems look much like the arrangements found in many market economies, the differences were in fact striking.

A basic feature of Poland’s pretransition social protection arrangements stemmed from the central role of labor in socialist societies: participation in the labor market was viewed as almost obligatory, and access to many social benefits depended on being in the labor force. Employment and social protection policies aimed at providing a job guarantee to every citizen, and the distinction between wages and cash benefits was blurred, with wages largely set to achieve distributional objectives. There was considerable hidden unemployment that disguised the need for unemployment benefits, job counseling, retraining, and social assistance.

Another basic feature of Poland’s social protection arrangements in the period preceding the transition stemmed from the fact that poverty was essentially viewed as a distinguishing feature of capitalism. Explicit basic income and emergency support policies were made largely superfluous by a combination of fixed prices, extensive subsidies for a large number of basic consumer goods, and substantial cash transfers in the form of family allowances and other benefits. In addition, many benefits were administered and provided directly by state–owned enterprises (SOEs). These included free vacations at designated resorts, housing, child care, access to consumer goods, and other in–kind benefits.

Who Were the Poor at the Outset of the Transition?

Poland’s income distribution before the outset of transition was similar to that of other socialist economies. It can be characterized by seven stylized facts (Milanovic (1992a)): (i) income inequalities were less pronounced than in market economies even though there existed problems of differential access to benefits; (ii) rural incomes exceeded urban incomes (in the case of Poland by about 16 percent); (iii) property income was insignificant; (iv) in–kind benefits were more important than in market economies while wage income was less important; (v) self-employment income, including in–kind consumption, was relatively more important than in many western economies, reflecting a large agricultural sector; (vi) similar to the situation in western economies, cash transfers accounted for about a fifth of gross income, but unlike in western economies, these cash transfers were distributed almost equally on a per capita basis; and (vii) direct taxes played almost no role in redistribution.

The various existing studies on poverty in pre–transition Poland all tackle the standard problems of defining a poverty line, measuring the number of people that fall below this poverty line, assessing by how much they fall below the line, and estimating how long they remain in poverty. Still, measuring the extent of poverty in pretransition Poland is complicated by the fact that the definition of living standards is somewhat abstract in economies with chronic shortages of goods and services, since having a higher income does not necessarily imply having a higher living standard (Graham (1993)). While there is no doubt that income in pretransition Poland was much more equally distributed than in market economies, the available data do not include various privileges enjoyed primarily by the nomenklatura or enterprise–specific in–kind benefits, such as subsidized vacations at company facilities, food, housing, and better access to scarce or subsidized goods.

Given these important limitations, the available evidence shows a rather consistent pattern of the degree to which different population groups were affected by poverty in pretransition Poland)1 This is not surprising, since all studies use data from the annual Household Budget Survey (HBS). Hence, differences in the results reflect differences in defining poverty lines and equivalence scales for various household types, and methods of calculation. The studies by Milanovic (1992b and 1993) and Panek and Szulc (1991) are typical in this respect. This research suggests that, during 1988–89, the poverty rate was highest among pensioners and lowest among mixed farmer–worker households (Table 7-1).2 All studies also agree that the probability of being poor was higher for single–parent households than for two–parent households, increased with the number of children, and decreased with the level of educational attainment. Contrary to some other studies, Milanovic (1992c) finds that in the 1980s there was a strong increase in the number of the poor in urban areas: urban poverty increased from 7.8 percent during 1978–79 to 21.5 percent during 1987–88, largely as a result of a decline in real wages in the industrial sector during the 1980s.3 At the same time, rural poverty remained rather constant, amounting to 13.3 percent in 1978–79 and 13.7 percent in 1987–88, probably owing to favorable terms of trade in the agricultural sector. All studies show a slight increase in the overall extent of poverty even before the onset of the transition.

Table 7–1.

Poverty Head Count Indices

(Shore of the poor in total group population)

article image
Sources: Cited studies: and IMF staff estimates.

Unweighted average of various nonrura1categories.

Social Protection During the Transition

With the onset of the transition, existing social protection arrangements quickly became unsustainable and needed to be reoriented in several aspects: to lend support to the transformation; to be aligned to the requirements of a market-based environment: and to prepare for changes in the demographic structure. As a first step, several elements that were central to the old system of social protection, such as job guarantees, fixed prices, generalized subsidies, and various in–kind benefits, needed to be either curtailed or abolished. The extensive system of food subsidies, for example, had already been abolished de facto in 1989.

During the transition, the main elements of Poland’s system of social protection were unemployment benefits, pensions, social assistance, family allowances, sickness benefits, and, more generally, health care. At the same time as direct consumer subsidies were dramatically reduced, there was a strong expansion of the system of cash benefits. Within the cash benefit system, the brunt of the transformation-induced increases in social expenditures was borne by social insurance arrangements (mainly pensions and unemployment compensation) rather than social assistance schemes targeted to the poor or other, more temporary arrangements. This was largely owing to ease of access to social security and a more attractive benefit structure. Unemployment benefits and pensions can be used as examples for the many recent changes and current problems of the system of cash benefits.4

As regards unemployment benefits, the Employment Law of December 1989 fully recognized unemployment and stipulated that unemployment compensation was no longer a discretionary benefit. The initial provisions were fairly generous: in general, the level of benefits was linked to the claimant’s last wage, and there was no limit on duration. This invited abuse, particularly in larger cities where administration is more difficult and alternative employment opportunities are easier to come by. Often, people who were about to be laid off were given substantial wage increases to enable them to draw higher unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits initially had the character of general income support rather than targeted assistance, particularly since many beneficiaries continued to work in the shadow economy. Also, being registered as unemployed was a way to retain access to various social insurance benefits, particularly free health care, and to continue to accumulate pension rights (Ksiezopolski (1991)). Hence, even people who intended to withdraw from the labor market generally decided to remain registered as unemployed.

Unemployment benefits underwent several reforms during 1990–93. Most importantly, a general 12-month duration limit was introduced in December 1991, and a generally flat-rate benefit structure at 36 percent of the average wage that prevailed in the economy during the previous quarter was introduced in February 1992. The level of unemployment benefits appears roughly in line with minimum subsistence, but more so for smaller households than for larger ones. Still, problems remain. The system does not provide an explicit minimum subsistence guarantee, and there are concerns regarding the adequacy of the indexation mechanism. Also, to the extent that the duration limit is binding, much of the burden of caring for the long–term unemployed and those withdrawing from the labor market subsequently falls upon basic income support and emergency assistance policies, a shift that implies a major devolution of responsibilities from the national level to the local authorities. Finally, the value of active labor market measures tends to be reduced to the extent that labor mobility remains constrained by the absence of a housing market and a general housing shortage.

As for the pension system, there have been an impressive number of changes during 1990–93, but fundamental reform has yet to take place. The major changes (discussed above in Section II, “Public Finances”) have tried to address the six main problems of Poland’s pension system:

  • liberal eligibility criteria for early retirement and disability pensions and generous stipulations regarding the right to receive pensions while continuing to be employed:

  • a high average replacement rate, largely a result of the formula for calculating the pension base:

  • inadequate mechanisms for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs);

  • persistent structural abnormalities, including occupation–specific privileges and incorporation of noninsurable risks into the social security system;

  • insufficient pension system financing, in part due to evasion and the buildup of arrears to the social security system;

  • weak administration, resulting from inefficient management, insufficient modern equipment, and inadequate regulations.

In general, it was easier to address the obvious excesses that invited abuse than to address fundamental issues.

A main unresolved problem of the Polish pension system is the reform of eligibility criteria for early retirement and disability pensions. During 1990–93 the number of pensioners increased rapidly, while the number of contributors dwindled. During the four–year period from December 1989 to December 1993, the total number of pensioners grew by 28 percent, from 6.9 million to 8.8 million (Chart 7-1). Much of this increase occurred in the early stages of the transition: between December 1989 and December 1991 alone, the total number of pensioners increased by 21 percent, to 8.4 million. There was a particularly pronounced increase in the number of old–age pensioners, including early retirement pensioners, which, for the main pension fund (FUS), increased by over 36 percent during the December 1989–December 1993 period. At the same time, the number of contributors dropped from 14.8 million in December 1989 to 12.5 million in December 1993. Excluding the pension scheme for farmers, which traditionally has covered over 90 percent of its expenditures by transfers from the state budget, the ratio of contributors per pensioner (dependency ratio) dropped from 2.7 at end–1989 to below 1.9 at end–1993 (Chart 7-2).

Chart 7-1.
Chart 7-1.

Main Pension Fund (FUS): Contributors and Pensions

(December 1984 to December 1993; in thousands)

Sources: Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; and IMF staff estimates.
Chart 7–2.
Chart 7–2.

Main Pension Fund (FUS): Dependency Ratios,1 December 1984 to December 1993

Sources: Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; and IMF staff estimates.1 Number of labor force participants to number of retirees.

The drop in the dependency ratio has been accompanied by a drop in the average age of pensioners, largely due to a sharp increase in the number of early retirees, which has gone hand in hand with a sharp drop in the average retirement age. While in 1989 the overall average retirement age was 59 years,5 in the second half of 1992 it had dropped to below 57 years; even the average early retirement age was reported to have dropped from 49 years in 1989 to below 46 years in 1992 (Poland, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (1993)). Latest estimates for mid–1993 indicate that the overall average retirement age may now be as low as 55 years. The pronounced shift toward early retirement can be attributed to four main factors: (i) the attractiveness of early retirement benefits relative to unemployment benefits, given that early retirement is widely perceived as an alternative to unemployment; (ii) liberal eligibility criteria that, initially, did not penalize pensioners who continue to work; (iii) limited supervision and enforcement capacities that still make it difficult to keep track of working pensioners; and (iv) anticipation of restrictive pension reforms that would adversely affect later retirees.

However, it is not only the steep increase in the number of old–age pensioners (including early retirement pensioners) that continues to create problems for the Polish pension system, but also the high level of disability pensioners. In December 1989 there were only 1.1 old–age pensioners per disability pensioner, implying that almost 50 percent of all labor market participants who had left the labor force had done so for health–related reasons before reaching regular retirement age. To some extent, the large number of disability pensioners is a legacy of socialism: liberal eligibility criteria for disability pensions reduced some of the pressures of having to provide a job guarantee for every citizen. Accordingly, disability was basically defined in terms of “damage to health” rather than “inability to work.”

A second unresolved problem concerns the statutory replacement rate, that is, the average ratio of an individual pension to the work income it replaces. Currently, the rate is relatively high, particularly considering the low dependency ratio. Related to this is the issue of COLAs. Until 1990 all COLAs occurred ad hoc and were constrained by the need to prevent a financial collapse of the pension system. Frequently, delays in indexation were used to generate actual replacements rates that were significantly below statutory levels. While there is no optimal level for statutory replacement rates, the arbitrary way in which the system was maintained would appear undesirable. In general, two main issues arise in connection with COLAs: the selection of the indexation mechanism, and the selection of the in dex itself. Currently, pensions are indexed to average wages in the previous quarter, and the indexation mechanism is invoked when average wages in the previous quarter have increased by at least 10 percent over the average wage that was used for the last COLA. While the current choice of the index allows pensioners to share in general productivity increases (at least to the extent that these are reflected in wages), the mechanism is still somewhat tardy, and only limits, but does not prevent, temporary erosions of the real value of pensions. In particular, the current minimum pension, that is. 39 percent of the average wage in the economy that was used in the last COLA, does not provide an effective minimum subsistence guarantee.6

Various other changes in social expenditures during 1990–93 largely reflect the need to contain government expenditures, and are interim solutions that eventually will need further reform. Two examples may suffice. One is the freezing of family allowances at ZI 167,000 per beneficiary since early 1992, a measure that helped to control expenditures without addressing the actual problem of finding ways to improve the targeting of these allowances. Another example is the free distribution of drugs to pensioners and health service staff, which was discontinued in late 1991 (UNICEF (1993)). While improving the cost-effectiveness of the health care system is important, improving the targeting of benefits would probably be a more desirable way of containing costs than blanket reductions or withdrawals of benefits.

The Poor During the Transition

How did the transition affect the character and extent of poverty during 1990–93? Two main factors seem particularly relevant. First, the significant decline in output, particularly during 1990–91, affected the average level of well–being: second, new opportunities that were brought about by the transition induced changes in the income distribution that increased relative income disparities.

While it is difficult to measure the exact quantitative extent of these effects, there exists general agreement on two things: first, the extent of poverty increased significantly during 1989–93: second, much of the observed increase in poverty was transition–induced. Also, there is fairly broad agreement that the increase in poverty cannot be attributed to a dramatic worsening of the income distribution, nor to a contraction of social transfers, nor to a retreat of the state (UNICEF (1993)). In general, the extensive safety nets in place prior to the transition have been maintained and even extended to include unemployment compensation and social assistance benefits, which is not to say, however, that these mechanisms have been effective or efficient. Again, the general agreement on central aspects of poverty during the transition is not surprising, since much of the available quantitative evidence is based on the same data source, the annual HBS.

Milanovic (1992c and 1993) finds that poverty increased significantly in 1990, the first year of the transition, rising from 17.3 percent of the population (6.6 million) in 1989 to 31.5 percent (11.9 million) in 1990 (Table 7–1). The increase was most pronounced among wage earners (workers), particularly those employed in the state sector. The extent of poverty among pensioners increased only slightly during the first year of transition, although it continued to exceed that of any other group. These changes in poverty were mirrored by changes in income: with overall real per capita income dropping by 31 percent in 1990, farmers experienced a drop of 40 percent and pensioners a drop of 19 percent. While the drop in the income of farmers was steep, poverty among farmers in 1990 remained below the levels found among workers and pensioners. Children appear to have been particularly severely affected during the first year of the transition: over 50 percent of all children are estimated to have lived in poverty in 1990, whereas in 1989, at most 28 percent did so (UNICEF (1993)).

Moreover, the poverty gap—that is, the total income needed to bring all poor households to the estimated poverty threshold level—increased by 40 percent in real terms, though it declined by 23 percent in per capita terms (Milanovic (1993)). This may suggest that many people are just below the poverty threshold, and that estimates of the extent of poverty are quite sensitive to the definition of the poverty line. If this is correct, it would help to explain the significantly different estimates of the extent of poverty: in 1990, for example, these ranged from 19 percent of the population (Ochocki (1993)) to over 40 percent (UNICEF (1993)). Regardless of the exact extent of poverty, the principal gainers in the first year of transition were private sector entrepreneurs, some workers who shifted from the public to the private sector, and possibly property owners (Milanovic (1992b)).

During 1991–92, the extent of poverty largely stabilized at the increased 1990 level (Table 7–1). Still, the pattern of poverty underwent a marked change: while in 1990 the increase in poverty was most severe among urban households, and particularly state sector workers, in 1991 the social costs began to shift more strongly toward farmers and mixed farmer–worker households (Milanovic (1993)). Accordingly, the incidence of poverty is most severe among households that are (i) headed by pensioners, single parents, young workers, or persons with a low level of educational attainment, (ii) large, with five or more members, or (iii) located in small towns (below 20.000 inhabitants). While some other studies, such as UNICEF (1993), do not find a strong differential between urban and rural poverty during 1990, it is generally agreed that urban poverty did not increase during 1991–92 as rural poverty continued to increase (Table 7–1). Another interesting finding is that poverty rates among pensioners remained fairly stable (albeit at a relatively high level), possibly indicating that the pension system was used as a social safety net device during the transition. Also, during 1991–93, the incidence of poverty became particularly prevalent among the unemployed: currently, poverty among the unemployed is almost 50 percent higher than among the overall population.

Did the welfare of the population really decrease during the transition? There are at least five main problems with the available evidence. First, the discussion generally ignores the counterfactual of the transformation: at least in the long run, if not already in the short and medium term, it is likely that the extent of poverty would have been even more severe absent the reforms that were undertaken.

Second, the annual HBS data may not always provide an adequate reflection of reality. For one thing, the HBS has on occasion recorded dramatic changes in poverty even before the onset of the transition. For example, Panek and Szulc (1991) estimated an increase in poverty from 14 percent to 30 percent of the population during 1982–84, which is not unlike the increase from 17 percent to 34 percent of the population that was estimated by Milanovic (1993) during 1989–91. While 1982–84 were also years of crisis, and at least some increase in the extent of poverty may have been expected, the reduction in poverty down to 15 percent of the population during 1984–88, as estimated by Panek and Szulc (1991), is quite surprising. These strong variations in the extent of poverty cast doubt on the reliability of the HBS data.

Also, as already mentioned, until 1991 the HBS did not cover the self–employed, workers in the private sector, and the military and police, groups that are generally considered to be among the better off. Excluding these groups would tend to overestimate the extent of poverty and underestimate changes in the income distribution, which may help to explain the surprising stability of the Gini coefficients shown in Table 7–2. In addition, some recent estimates have suggested that about 20 percent of economic activity goes unreported. Hence, it would not seem unreasonable to assume that an equal share of income is unreported. In fact, for the fourth quarter of 1989, the Central Statistical Office (GUS) estimated that incomes reported for the annual HBS were 21 percent below the incomes reported by enterprises (Gorecki and others (1992)). If anything, this gap can be expected to have increased during 1990–93, particularly considering the growth in private sector employment. In this context, it is interesting to ask why the available evidence suggests that poverty among pensioners was least affected by the transition. A possible answer would be that pensioners are the group that is probably least able to underreport income, since their main source of income comes directly from the state.

Table 7–2.

General Indicators of Population Well–Being

article image
Sources: UNICEF (1993); and IMF staff estimates.

Third, the high–inflation environment that existed at the outset of transition is likely to have created measurement distortions. Average consumer price inflation amounted to about 250 percent in 1989 and 585 percent in 1990. Given the extent of price liberalization during 1989–90, the high inflation rates largely reflected step adjustments and significantly exceeded the underlying rate of inflation. These inflation–induced distortions may help to explain some of the strong intertemporal variations in the extent of poverty: Panek and Szulc (1991), for example, estimated a drop in poverty from 23 percent of the population in the second quarter of 1989 to 11 percent in the third quarter.

Fourth, it has sometimes been suggested (Lipton and Sachs (1990)) that Polish pretransition statistics had a bias toward presenting a rosier picture than real conditions warranted, and that once this bias is eliminated, as happened during the transition, the new situation necessarily appears worse.

Fifth, even if it could be assumed that FIBS data provide an adequate reflection of reality, estimates of poverty are entirely determined by the definition of equivalence scales and the poverty line for different population groups. This is a rather subjective science, as shown by the range of poverty estimates for Poland, where, for example, depending on the study, either 19 percent or 40 percent of the population lived in poverty in 1990.

Given these limitations, it would be desirable to supplement the HBS–based research. This may be accomplished in at least three ways. First, one could carry out more detailed analyses with the existing data. This could include measuring the duration of poverty and estimating the size of interhousehold transfers (or private family safety nets). Second, explicitly subjective estimates could be employed, that is, household members could be asked about the income level necessary to maintain the household at its subjectively perceived poverty line, and then the actual income could be compared with the subjective poverty line. Third, one could use nonmonetary indicators, particularly indicators of deprivation (nutrition, calorie intake, food consumption), but also information concerning dwelling conditions, possession of household durables, and so forth.

Research along these lines has just begun. As regards the first option, recent research has shown that the duration of poverty may actually not be long for many of the poor. Ochocki (1993), on the basis of the Survey of Living Conditions of the Population (SLP) carried out periodically by the Central Statistical Office since 1984, has estimated that only 12 percent of the population considered themselves poor in both 1990 and 1991, though about twice as many people were considered poor in either 1990 or 1991 (Table 7–1). Still, the available evidence is not clear: from among households surveyed in both years, close to 60 percent of those who were poor in 1990 remained so in 1991; evidence for 1991–92 suggests that this increased to about 80 percent, indicating that poverty shows a tendency toward becoming persistent.

Similarly, recent research has shown that private interhousehold transfers increase in response to household earning losses, and that family networks can complement governments as a means of income redistribution. Simulation exercises by Cox and others (1993) on the basis of the 1986 HBS indicate that these private family safety nets are an important part of Polish income, filling about a sixth of the income gap left by lost earnings, and that these are well targeted to low–income households. The response was highest for households with one income earner (replacing 30 percent of the income lost) and lowest for households with more than one income earner (replacing 5.5 percent of the income lost). Thus, in many cases, increases in private interhousehold transfers could have substantially narrowed or even bridged the poverty gap.

As for the second option, the use of subjective poverty estimates has yielded results that are not unlike the head count indices derived from the annual HBS. Ochocki (1993), again on the basis of the SLP, has estimated that about a third of all households could be considered “subjectively” poor in 1990 and 1992 (Table 7–1). These subjective poverty estimates also suggest that some of the recent research claiming that over 40 percent of the population lived in poverty during 1990–92 may overestimate the extent of poverty. Again, a finding of a large number of poor people is the result of using a relatively high poverty line, such as the Polish “social minimum,” which it is generally agreed significantly exceeds minimum subsistence (World Bank (1993) and Graham (1993)).

As for the third option, there are a number of largely nonmonetary indicators available. Indicators of deprivation are of particular interest for estimating the extent of poverty. In general, the available indicators do not suggest that basic needs have been threatened by the transition (Table 7–2). Perhaps most interestingly, the sharp curtailing of direct subsidies to the population from 8.4 percent of GDP in 1989 to 3.9 percent in 1990, and particularly the discontinuation of food subsidies—which, before the transition, accounted for nearly 30 percent of the total value of food consumption (Graham (1993))—appears to have had little effect on the average nutritional status. While the consumption of milk, which, before the transition, had a producer price that was six times above the consumer price, dropped by 9 percent during 1989–92, meat consumption, which was rationed before the transition, increased by 8 percent during the same time period. Although the energy content of the average Polish diet fell by 2 percent during 1989–91, total calorie intake remains more than adequate.7 It is also interesting to note that, while maintaining their calorie intake, the share of food in total consumption in 1992 was significantly less than in 1989 (Table 7–2), notwithstanding the almost total withdrawal of food subsidies.

A number of other indicators have sometimes been used to estimate the extent of poverty in Poland. Usually, these indicators are not very comprehensive but may provide useful supportive evidence. For example, between 1990 and 1992, 18 percent of all kindergartens were closed, which would tend to support the argument that children have been particularly affected by the transition. However, under socialism, having an abundance of child care facilities was an important element for achieving the dual policy goal of high labor force participation with full employment, and the current level of child care facilities is probably more commensurate with the requirements of a market economy.

Often, though, these alternative or complementary indicators do not achieve what they set out to demonstrate. For example, the fact that “at the end of 1992 rent was not being paid regularly for 43 percent of the housing units owned by cooperatives, municipalities, and employers, and . . . payment delays were of three months or more in about 11 percent of the cases” has been cited as reflecting inability to pay and a sign of growing poverty (UNICEF (1993)). However, nonpayment is not automatically equal to inability to pay, particularly since the absence of a credible threat of eviction creates a strong element of moral hazard. In addition, while much of the housing stock is eventually to be privatized, property rights remain unclear, a situation that may also have contributed to an erosion of payment discipline.

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1

See also Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) for a detailed comparison of the different studies.

2

Until 1991, the Polish HBS sample contained four major occupational groups: households of manual and nonmanual workers employed in state–owned enterprises or cooperatives (workers): households of farmers; households with farmers and workers; and households of pensioners. Households of the self–employed, private sector employees, military, and police were excluded from the sample. This omission became increasingly serious as the private sector expanded. However, since 1992 all groups have been represented. See Gorecki and others (1992) and Kordos (undated) for further details.

3

Since the basic data are the same, this finding is essentially due to definitional differences: while Milanovic (1992c) defines “rural” as farmers plus mixed farmer–worker households and “urban” as workers plus pensioners, other studies use more detailed data on town size.

4

See Maret and Schwartz (1993) or the World Bank (1993) for detailed reviews.

5

Hambor (1992) reports slightly different data, where in 1990 the average retirement age for FUS pensioners was 57 years for women and 58 for men.

6

The 39 percent applies since January 1994. Before then, it was 35 percent.

7

Moreover, the UNICEF estimates of daily calorie intake shown in Table 7–2 are about 15 percent below alternative estimates such as Graham (1993).

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Cover Poland
Poland
The Path to a Market Economy
Author: Mr. Charalambos Christofides, Mr. Paul Mylonas, Ms. Inci Ötker, Mr. Liam P. Ebrill, Mr. Gerd Schwartz, and Mr. Ajai Chopra
ISBN:
9781557754110
ISSN:
0251-6365
Publication Date:
15 Sep 1994
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557754110.084
Pages:
118
  • View in gallery

    Main Pension Fund (FUS): Contributors and Pensions

    (December 1984 to December 1993; in thousands)

  • View in gallery

    Main Pension Fund (FUS): Dependency Ratios,1 December 1984 to December 1993

Main Pension Fund (FUS): Contributors and Pensions

(December 1984 to December 1993; in thousands)

Main Pension Fund (FUS): Dependency Ratios,1 December 1984 to December 1993