Abstract

Most countries faced extreme difficulties during the first years of transition. Output fell dramatically across the board as trade links and internal economic relationships were broken. Inflation skyrocketed as price and foreign exchange controls were removed. The countries with better initial conditions and more aggressive approaches to reform reached stabilization faster. In several other countries, however, conflict or institutional obstacles to market reforms exacerbated the transition challenges.

Most countries faced extreme difficulties during the first years of transition. Output fell dramatically across the board as trade links and internal economic relationships were broken. Inflation skyrocketed as price and foreign exchange controls were removed. The countries with better initial conditions and more aggressive approaches to reform reached stabilization faster. In several other countries, however, conflict or institutional obstacles to market reforms exacerbated the transition challenges.

ch02ufig01

GDP growth

Source: WEO; various sources for some countries in early years.Note: CEE average weighted by GDP, others unweighted.

By the end of the 1980s, imbalances in socialist economies had reached critical levels. Falling world oil prices undercut the Soviet Union’s export revenues and diminished its ability to support other socialist-bloc countries. Budget deficits ranging from about 7 percent of GDP (Poland, 1989) to over 20 percent of GDP (USSR, 1991) were covered mostly by printing money. At the same time, consumer prices remained fixed or heavily regulated, while all basic social services were provided for free. These policies overloaded economies with money that could not be redeemed for goods or services (the “monetary overhang”). In the USSR and other countries, supply deficits that were common for centrally planned economies turned into acute shortages of basic staples like sugar and soap. The contrast between these realities and the perceived wellbeing of Western economies inspired daring reforms that had seemed impossible just a few years before.

“Shock therapy” vs. gradualism

Across Eastern Europe, groups of economists debated blueprints for reforms. Many policymakers and members of the general public believed that sweeping transformation of economies and society could be accomplished within a couple of years, if not months. In Poland, a commission led by Leszek Balcerowicz finalized plans for market reforms in late 1989 (see Box 1). Implemented from early 1990, these reforms became known as “shock therapy”, a term coined by Jeffrey Sachs—an adviser to the Polish reformers—in the mid-1980s for reforms in Latin America.1

Meanwhile in Yugoslavia, the new prime minister Ante Markovic initiated a planned transformation to a market economy over the medium term. The stabilization and disinflation program formally launched in December 1989 involved abandoning socially owned, worker-managed companies and liberalizing exchange and import regimes. The aim was to correct economic, structural and institutional weaknesses of the economy in the context of a fixed exchange rate. The reforms were supported by an IMF arrangement approved in February 1990. The program initially achieved a large decline in inflation, at a relatively low cost in terms of output loss.2 However, it foundered in late 1990, in part because of the diverging interests of the Yugoslav republics.

In the USSR in 1990, a group led by Grigory Yavlinsky and Stanislav Shatalin came up with a plan for urgent reforms named “500 days”. It proposed extensive privatization of state property in the first 100 days, then price liberalization and removal of administrative controls in the next 150 days. The following 150 days would witness market stabilization after the initial price shock, and the last 100 days a renewal of economic growth. The newly elected Russian parliament supported the program. However, the Soviet parliament and government considered it overly ambitions. Fearing social consequences, President Gorbachev opted for a gradual transition instead. But this proved insufficient to address mounting problems or meet people’s desire for change.

The “Balcerowicz Plan” in Poland

In late 1989 the new Polish government took advantage of the first window of opportunity to embark on a front-loaded stabilization and reform program. It was a bold approach with many risks, and many observers—including some at the IMF—were not confident of its success. Initial conditions were highly unfavorable:

  • Most prices were administered. Initial liberalization in an environment of cheap credit, open-ended subsidies, and fiscal deficits financed by the central bank had led to near-hyperinflation.

  • Foreign exchange was rationed, with the official rate fixed at a much more appreciated rate than the market rate; the current account deficit widened and Poland defaulted on external debt.

  • The labor market was not functioning, with high levels of over-employment. The capital stock was obsolete. Outside of agriculture, ownership was dominated by state firms.

The reform package was built around three mutually reinforcing pillars:

Tightening financial policies. The zloty was devalued and fixed to the dollar, supported by a stabilization fund and credits from the IMF and other international financial institutions. Interest rates were sharply increased. Tax-based incomes policy applied to all state firms, with penalties on wage increases above the norm. Fiscal tightening involved elimination of income tax exemptions and most subsidies.

Liberalizing the economy. Most price controls were removed, and energy prices were adjusted to reflect cost. Import restrictions and foreign trade monopolies were replaced by tariffs. Foreign exchange became freely available for most current transactions.

Building market infrastructure. Structural changes were launched to set up capital markets to facilitate ownership changes; to modernize and strengthen the banks; to improve regulatory and accounting standards; and to modernize the tax system based on income tax and VAT.

Results were positive, though mixed :

Nominal anchors held and financial conditions improved. The exchange rate peg held for more than a year, much longer than the targeted three months. Real wages declined during 1990–91. Initial inflation targets were exceeded, but disinflation resumed in the face of lower demand and import competition. Monetary aggregates remained under control and real interest rates were mostly positive. External performance was initially robust but real appreciation and the collapse of Comecon subsequently eroded competitiveness. Fiscal accounts over-performed in 1990, on the back of windfall corporate profits.

The output loss was deeper than expected. A sharp contraction in state firms was partly offset by private sector expansion. Employment declined less than assumed, as state firms hoarded labor in the hope of a policy reversal. While open unemployment surfaced, many laid-off workers found jobs in the private sector or took advantage of early retirement and disability provisions. Social safety nets based on product subsidies and employment guarantees were replaced by programs focused on unemployment, pensions, family benefits, and social assistance, but the generosity of some programs—such as unlimited unemployment benefits or liberal disability assessment—invited abuses.

In retrospect, the reforms were successful in stabilizing the economy and setting a sound foundation for a market economy. By end-1991, the corporate and financial sectors were reacting to market incentives and there were early signs of recovery; privatization was gaining grounds; and the credibility of market policies was well established. But as with the experience of many early reform efforts, there was a political cost: the government lost the 1991 elections.

Prepared by Robert Sierhej.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, worsening economic imbalances emboldened the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin to give a mandate for radical reforms to the government led by Yegor Gaidar. Largely following the “shock therapy” in Poland, the reforms in Russia started with removal of price and exchange rate restrictions in 1992, liberalization of external trade, and lifting of administrative controls at the enterprise level. However, the reforms quickly met with resistance. Vested interests successfully pushed for public financing to loss-making enterprises, and large-scale monetization of public sector deficits continued for several years.

The rapid reforms undertaken in Poland set an example for other countries in the region. They were followed most closely by Czechoslovakia in 1990 and, two years later, by the Baltic countries. Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia trod more cautiously, in part because they had more liberalized economies at the start of the transition and less of a need for rapid change. Albania, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia tried to implement quick reforms and made some initial progress. But the transition pace in these countries subsequently slowed, because of rising economic and social challenges. Eyeing this experience, Ukraine, Romania and Belarus adopted a gradualist approach, delaying or avoiding reforms.3 Meanwhile, intensification of conflict in the former Yugoslavia hampered economic transformation, despite its initially more market-oriented economy.

Sequencing of reform

Closely related to the question of speed of reform was sequencing, with some suggesting that liberalization, and especially privatization, should have waited until adequate legal and institutional frameworks were in place in which the private sector would operate—and taking China’s transition as a model. Like many of the early reformers, the IMF’s view was clear, with the approach towards Russia’s first program in mid-1992 characterizing most of the early programs: “…[I]t was important to move as quickly as possible with all the key changes, especially macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization. The IMF recognized that many [structural] reforms would take years to complete… But this was not seen as a reason for postponing the main stabilization and liberalization measures.”4 The approach reflects the reality that a China-style sequencing and gradualism was neither feasible nor desirable for the European transition countries. Unlike in China, the collapse of industrial and trade structures meant economies were mostly already in sharp decline and the new governments (of new countries, in many cases) were struggling to establish credibility, stability and control. Liberalization, hard budget constraints on state firms, and (inevitably far from perfect) privatization were preferable to allowing private interests to move into the vacuum left by the collapse of central planning and administrative control, by stripping assets of public companies and extracting rents from price and trade distortions. And importantly, where pursued vigorously, the broad-based reform agenda allowed the emergence of brand-new firms, which became the engine of growth as recovery took hold. 5

Early reform outcomes

The full scope of transition challenges and related trade-offs became apparent only when the actual reforms commenced, albeit half-heartedly in many countries. Broadly as expected, the centrally planned systems ground to a halt in nearly all economies. However, the new market-based mechanisms were slow to emerge. Many economic and trade linkages within the former communist bloc collapsed, aggravated by the painful dissolution of the former USSR and Yugoslavia, and individual producers faced a long road towards reintegrating into local and global supply chains. Many plants and factories ceased production, as their output met no demand under the new conditions. In turn, they stopped paying wages, or, in some cases, paid them in kind with their own products. As a result, output collapsed or shifted into the informal “gray” economy.

ch02ufig02

Timing of macro stabilization

Source: WEO; various sources for some countries in early years.Note: Colors reflect regional groupings.

Cumulative GDP contractions in the first three years of transition ranged from about 13 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia to about 25 percent in Bulgaria and Romania, 30–40 percent in the Baltics, Russia and Ukraine, and 50 percent in Moldova.6 Moreover, in a few countries the output contraction extended long beyond the first years of transition. At the same time, there are reasons to believe that the imperfect Soviet-style statistics (focused on “material product”) exaggerated the scale of early output losses. On the production side, much of the decline came from falling output of heavy equipment that was of questionable value outside the communist trade and output system, while emerging goods and services sectors were not fully captured in the statistics. Falls in living standards were overstated from the consumption side too: prices went up (so measured real incomes fell) but little or nothing had been available at the low prices and a lot was available at the new higher prices. In addition, queuing and other costly resource-using, rent-seeking activities from before the reforms had never been counted.7

Budget revenues collapsed as well, as old revenue channels splintered and new taxation systems were not yet established. Delays in restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) implied a need to cover their losses as well. In nearly all countries, the resulting large public sector deficits were financed by printing money. Adding to the inherited “monetary overhang”, this stoked hyperinflation in many countries. In the first year after the controls were removed, prices jumped by about 7 times over in Poland, 26 times in Russia and over 100 times in Ukraine. Hyperinflation and the bankruptcy of government-owned banks, like Sberbank and its branches in Russia and other former Soviet countries, wiped out the life savings of ordinary people. Many workers of defunct state-owned companies lost their jobs and faced extreme difficulties adjusting to the new realities.

For many countries, the economic contraction and accompanying currency devaluation made external debt service unbearable. Over 1990–92, Poland and Bulgaria successfully restructured their external debts under the Paris Club framework, in the context of IMF-supported programs. For the former Soviet republics, the solution came as a deal brokered with Russia and the Paris Club. As a result, Russia assumed responsibility for all debts of the former USSR to official creditors, and negotiated their restructuring with the Paris Club. In exchange, it took all former USSR property abroad, as well as its claims on other countries (mostly hard-to-recover claims on developing countries that had received economic and military assistance from the USSR). Along with its assets, debt of the former Yugoslavia was apportioned to the states resulting from its dissolution, paving the way for the countries to reach debt restructuring agreements with the Paris and London Clubs.

IMF support for early transition

At the outset, the IMF assumed the lead role in channeling international assistance to the former communist countries, with other institutions—including the EBRD, created in 1991 primarily to support the nascent private sector—playing increasing roles as transition advanced.8 During this period, the IMF provided advice and technical assistance in areas such as upgrading taxation systems, establishing modern central banks, and adopting international standards for statistics and for fiscal and monetary data reporting. Progress in implementing recommendations varied considerably, very much depending on the authorities’ program “ownership” and commitment to reforms. In addition, the IMF helped meet the urgent early needs to strengthen institutional capacity and develop understanding of the market economy via a wide range of training courses, provided both at headquarters and at the new Joint Vienna Institute.9

Divergent transition paths

The results of the first years of transition were very uneven. Poland, the Baltics and the other countries that embraced “shock therapy” reforms went through the transition faster. But there were still high initial social costs. In Poland, for example, the unemployment rate reached 16 percent, as over a million people lost their jobs. Bold reforms set these countries firmly on the path to economic restructuring and recovery. By 1992, the Polish economy stabilized, and then began to grow. The other Central European economies and the Baltics followed closely, with reversals of their output declines already in sight.

The situation was different in countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, which had stayed longer in the Soviet system and gone deeper in suppressing private sector initiative. These countries often preferred a gradualist approach to reforms and sought to maintain features of the old system. They could not escape the initial sharp economic contraction but lagged behind in the post-transformation recovery. In these countries, the initial stabilization attempts—including those supported by the IMF—did not produce the intended results, and economic slump extended well beyond the early 1990s. And in the former Yugoslavia and Moldova, policy challenges were aggravated by conflict and civil wars.

5

See, for example, Stiglitz (1999) and Dąbrowski et al (2000), while Husain and Sahay (1992) discuss the impact of sequencing in privatization.

6

Estimates refer to cumulative output declines over 1990-92 except for Baltics and CIS, where the comparable transition period is 1992–94.

7

Lipton and Sachs (1990) model some of these effects (including pre-transition repressed inflation). Blanchard (1997) uses alternative measures such as industrial production. See also Åslund (2007).

8

“By far the most important actor in providing assistance during the early stages of the transition is the IMF… Apart from macroeconomic significance, its programs provided a strong boost to genuinely-committed reformers in transition economies. Once the goals of economic stabilization are achieved, other actors have the potential to play in institution-developing and sectoral problems.” Dąbrowski (1995), p4.

9

The JVI was established in 1992 in cooperation with the Austrian authorities and other international partners. Examples of critical areas of support included the creation, from scratch, of monetary authorities in the former Soviet republics and the development of national treasury systems to enable budgetary planning and control.

Contributor Notes

Prepared by Michael Gorbanyov.
  • Åslund, Anders, 2007, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Atoyan, Ruben, 2010, “Beyond the Crisis: Revisiting Emerging Europe’s Growth Model,” Working Paper No. 10/92 (Washington: IMF).

  • Atoyan, Ruben, Albert Jaeger, and Dustin Smith, 2012, “The Pre-Crisis Capital Flow Surge to Emerging Europe: Did Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Make a Difference?Working Paper No. 12/222 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Avdjiev, Stefan, Zsolt Kuti, and Elod Takats, 2012, “The euro area crisis and cross-border bank lending to emerging markets.BIS Quarterly Review December.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Bakker, Bas, and Christoph Klingen, eds., 2012, How Emerging Europe Came Through the 2008/09 Crisis (Washington: IMF).

  • Batini, Nicoletta, and Douglas Laxton, 2007, “Under What Conditions Can Inflation Targeting be Adopted? The Experience of Emerging Markets,” in Frederick Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, eds., Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting (Santiago: Banco Central de Chile).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Belkindas, Misha V., and Ivanova, Olga V., eds., 1995, “Foreign trade statistics in the USSR and successor states, Volume 1,” Studies of Economies in Transformation, No. 18 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Blanchard, Olivier, 1997, The Economics of Post-Communist Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

  • Blanchard, Oliver J., Mark Griffiths, and Bertrand Gruss, 2013, “Boom, Bust, Recovery: Forensics of the Latvia Crisis,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2013.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Boughton, James M., 2012, Tearing Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund 1990-1999 (Washington: IMF).

  • Campos, Nauro F., and Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002, “Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don’t, and What We Should,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 793836.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Coricelli, Fabrizio and Roberto de Rezende Rocha, 1991, “Stabilization Programs in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Polish and Yugoslav Programs of 1990,” Policy, Research, and External Affairs Working Paper Series No. 732 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cottarelli, Carlo, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar, 2003, “Early Birds, Late Risers, and Sleeping Beauties: Bank Credit Growth to the Private Sector in the Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans,” Working Paper No. 03/213 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cull, Robert, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2012, “Bank Ownership and Lending Patterns during the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. Evidence from Eastern Europe and Latin America,” Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 6195 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dąbrowski, Marek, Stanislaw Gomulka, and Jacek Rostowski, 2000, “Whence Reform? A Critique of the Stiglitz Perspective,” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 471 (London: London School of Economics).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Dąbrowski, Marek, 1995, “Western Aid Conditionality and the Post-Communist Transition,” Network Studies and Analyses No. 37 (Warsaw: Center for Social and Economic Research).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Duenwald, Christoph, Nikolay Gueorguiev, and Andrea Schaechter, 2005, “Too Much of a Good Thing? Credit Booms in Transition Economies: The Cases of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine,” Working Paper No. 05/128 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • De Haas, Ralph, and Neeltje Van Horen. 2013, “Running for the Exit? International Bank “Lending During a Financial Crisis.Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 26, pp. 24485.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • De Melo, Martha, Cevdet Denizer, Alan Gelb, and Stoyan Tenev, 2001, “Circumstance and Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition Economies,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 131.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Djankov, Simeon, and Peter Murrell, 2002, “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 40, pp. 739792.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ebeke, Christian and Greetje Everaert, 2014, “Unemployment and Structural unemployment in the Baltics,” Working Paper No. 14/153 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • EBRD, 2013, Transition Report (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).

  • Feyen, Erik, Katie Kibuuka, and Inci Ötker-Robe, 2012, “European Bank Deleveraging: Implications for Emerging Market Countries,” Economic Premise No. 79 (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Fischer, Stanley, 1998, “The Russian Economy at the Start of 1998,” Speech delivered at the US-Russian Investment Symposium at Harvard University on January 9 (Available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/010998.htm).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Fischer, Stanley, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos Végh, 1998, “From Transition to Market: Evidence and Growth Prospects,” IMF Working Paper No. 98/52 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Gilman, Martin, 2010, “No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default” (Cambridge: MIT Press).

  • Hamermesh, Daniel S., 2014, “Do Labor Costs Affect Companies, Demand for Labor?IZA World of Labor No. 2014: 3 (Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labor).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Havrylyshyn, Oleh, 2007, “Fifteen Years of Transformation in the Post-Communist World,” Development Policy Analysis no. 4 (Washington: Cato Institute).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Havrylyshyn, Oleh, Ivailo Izvorski, and Ron van Rooden, 1998, “Recovery and Growth in Transition Economies 1990-97: A Stylized Regression Analysis,” IMF Working Paper No. 98/141 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Holland, Dawn, Tatiana Fic, Ana Rincon-Aznar, Lucy Stokes and Paweł Paluchowski, 2011, “Labour mobility within the EU—The impact of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements,” National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Husain, Aasim M., 1994, “Private Sector Development in Economies in Transition,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 260271.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Husain, Aasim M., and Ratna Sahay, 1992, “Does Sequencing of Privatization Matter in Reforming Planned Economies?” IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 801824.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • IMF, 1999, “Russian Federation: Recent Economic Developments,” Country Report No. 99/100 (Washington: IMF).

  • IMF, 2001, A Decade of Transition: Achievements and Challenges (Washington: IMF).

  • IMF, 2009, “Review of Recent Crisis Programs,” available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/091409.pdf.

  • IMF, 2013a, “Financing Future Growth: The Evolving Role of Banking Systems in CESEE,” Regional Economic Issues April 2013—Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • IMF, 2013b, “Faster, Higher, Stronger—Raising the Growth Potential of CESEE,” Regional Economic Issues October 2013—Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • IMF, 2014a, “Safeguarding the Recovery as the Global Liquidity Tide Recedes,” Regional Economic Issues April 2014—Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • IMF, 2014b, Regional Economic Issues Update October 2014—Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (Washington: IMF).

  • Ingves, Stefan, 2001, “Financial Policy in Transition Economies: An IMF perspective” in Alexander Fleming, Lajos Bokros, and Cari Votava, eds., Banking Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges of the New Decade (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Jarvis, Christopher, 2000, “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes,” Finance and Development, Vol. 37, No. 1.

  • Kovacevic, Dragan, 2003, “The Currency Board and Monetary Stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” BIS Papers No. 17 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Kovtun, Dmitriy, Alexis Meyer Cirkel, Zuzana Murgasova, Dustin Smith, and Suchanan Tambunlertchai, 2014, “Boosting Job Growth in the Western Balkans,” IMF Working Paper, WP/14/16.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2008, “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database,” Working Paper No. 08/224 (Washington: IMF).

  • Lehmann, Hartmut, 2014, “Worker displacement in transition economies and in China,” IZA World of Labor 2014:20 (Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labor).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lipton, David, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1990, “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,” Brookings Papers in Economic Activity 1, pp. 75133.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Liu, Yan, and Christoph Rosenberg, 2013, “Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Financial Crisis,” Working Paper No. 13/44 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Loungani, Prakash, and Nathan Sheets, 1997, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 381399.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Lybek, Tonny, 1999, “Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997,” Working Paper No. 99/4 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Llaudes, Ricardo, Ferhan Salman, and Mali Chivakul, 2010, “The Impact of the Great Recession on Emerging Markets,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/237 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Masson, Paul R., Miguel A. Savastano, and Sunil Sharma, 1997, “The Scope for Inflation Targeting in Developing Countries,” Working Paper No. 97/130 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Mihaljek, Dubravko and Marc Klau, 2008, “Catching-up and inflation in transition economies: the Balassa-Samuelson effect revisited,” Working Papers No 270 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Odling-Smee, John and Gonzalo Pastor, 2001, “The IMF and the Ruble Area, 1991-93,” Working Paper No. 01/101 (Washington: IMF).

  • Odling-Smee, John, 2004, “The IMF and Russia in the 1990s,” Working Paper No. 04/155 (Washington: IMF).

  • Ongena, Steven, Alexander Popov, and Gregory F. Udell, 2013, “When the Cat’s Away the Mice Will Play: Does Regulation At Home Affect Bank Risk Taking Abroad?Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 72750.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Popov, Alexander, and Gregory F. Udell, 2012, “Cross-Border Banking, Credit Access, and the Financial Crisis”, Journal of International Economics, 87, 14761.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Purfield, Catriona, 2003, “Fiscal Adjustment in Transition Countries: Evidence from the 1990s,” Working Paper No. 03/36 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Rahman, Jesmin, and Tianli Zhao, 2013, “Export Performance in Europe: What Do We Know from Supply Links?Working Paper No. 13/62 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Sachs, Jeffrey, 1993, Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

  • Sachs, Jeffrey, and Wing Thye Woo, 1994, “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” Economic Policy, April, pp. 102145.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Slonimczyk, Fabián, 2014, “Informal employment in emerging and transition economies,” IZA World of Labor 2014: 59 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Stepanyan, Vahram, 2003, “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union,” Working Paper No. 03/173 (Washington: IMF).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Stiglitz, Joseph, 1999, “Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition,” Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington: World Bank).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Siklos, Pierre L., 1994, “Varieties of Monetary Reform,” Working Paper No. 94/57 (Washington: IMF).

  • Tanzi, Vito, and George Tsibouris, 2000, “Fiscal Reform Over Ten Years of Transition,” Working Paper No. 00/113 (Washington: IMF).

  • Vienna Initiative, 2012, “Non-Performing Loans in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe,” A report prepared by a Working Group set up in the context of the European Bank Coordination “Vienna” Initiative, available at www.imf.org/external/region/eur/pdf/2012/030112.pdf.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Žídek, Libor, 2014, “Evaluation of Economic Transformation in Hungary,” Review of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 5588.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation