APPENDIX: Case Studies
Ecuador
Stand-By Arrangement
The Fund approved a one-year stand-by arrangement for Ecuador on June 1, 1983. The arrangement was for SDR 157.5 million, equivalent to 150 percent of Ecuador’s then-prevailing quota in the Fund. This was Ecuador’s first stand-by arrangement since 1972.
Exchange Rate Developments
Ecuador had maintained a dual exchange market since November 1971. The free market was limited to most private sector services and certain private sector capital transactions. The spread between the free market rate and the official exchange rate remained small until late 1981, when the two rates diverged by 35 percent. The free market exchange rate had depreciated to 33 sucres per US$1 compared with the official rate of S/. 25 per US$1. The exchange rate in the free market continued to depreciate thereafter, reaching S/. 84 per US$1 by March 1983. In the official market the sucre was depreciated in May 1982 to S/. 33 per US$1 and again to S/. 42 per US$1 in March 1983 when it was announced that it would be depreciated by S/. 0.04 per US$1 per working day until further notice. In June 1983 this rate of depreciation was increased to S/. 0.05 per US$1 per day.
Balance of Payments Problem
The balance of payments, which had been in surplus since 1976, recorded large deficits in 1981 and 1982. The current account deficit reached US$1.0 billion in 1981 and US$1.2 billion in 1982. A major factor underlying this deterioration was a weakening of export receipts from petroleum (owing to rising domestic consumption of refined products, and since 1980, to lower international prices). Other major factors were a continued high level of imports—despite an intensification of restrictions—and a sharp growth in interest payments on public sector debt. Net capital inflows declined by 25 percent in 1982, and there were major changes in the composition of the capital account. While the public sector sharply reduced its long-term foreign borrowing, there was an increase in the use of short-term credits against future oil exports. Amortization payments increased. There was a very large net outflow of private sector capital (about US$135 million), compared with a small inflow in 1981, reflecting declining confidence on the part of both the private sector and foreign banks. By the end of 1982, gross official reserves had declined to US$457 million, compared with US$678 million at the end of 1981, and arrears on external payments amounted to US$211 million. In November 1982 the Government prohibited importation of a wide range of commodities for an indefinite period.
The fact that nonpetroleum exports had either stagnated or declined for a number of years gave particular cause for concern. However, much of the impact of this decline on the balance of payments had been masked by the buoyancy of petroleum exports. The decline was at least in part attributable to the loss in Ecuador’s international competitiveness during the previous decade. The real effective exchange rate index had appreciated almost continuously from 1970. The sucre appreciated sharply in real terms in 1981 as a result of the strength of the U.S. dollar (to which the sucre is linked) and as a result of a pickup in domestic inflation.
An adjustment of the exchange rate was therefore considered important for two reasons. First, it would be an immediate signal that the authorities were taking firm action to reverse the deteriorating economy and re-establish confidence. Secondly, an adjustment would serve as a means to change the structure of relative prices so that incentives in the traditional traded goods sectors could be revived and so that reliance on import restrictions could be reduced. The amount of adjustment required was considered to be so large as to rule out a program that did not include some exchange rate action.
Determining the Amount of Exchange Rate Adjustment
The principal objective of the authorities with regard to exchange rate policy was to re-establish the long-term competitiveness of the Ecuadoran economy. On the basis of developments in the real effective exchange rate index since 1970—the last year of balance of payments equilibrium before the major changes in oil output and prices—it was judged that the 24 percent depreciation in the official market in May 1982 was not sufficient to accomplish this objective. The amount of the depreciation was eventually established as that needed to restore the real effective exchange rate to the 1970 level.
In addition to the need to restore international competitiveness, the authorities were faced with an immediate need to reduce the spread between the official and free market exchange rates. This was considered essential to reduce speculative capital outflows through underinvoicing and overinvoicing of exports and imports, and to ensure that competitiveness was not eroded further over time. Thus, another important objective of exchange rate policy was to ensure a convergence of the two exchange rates and an eventual unification at a realistic rate. Because immediate unification of the exchange rates was not considered to be feasible, unification was to be accomplished by gradually depreciating the official exchange rate, while shifting transactions from the official to the free market.
Mechanism of Exchange Rate Adjustment
The sucre was devalued in March 1983 by 21 percent to S/. 42 per US$1 with a preannounced depreciation rate of S/. 0.04 per working day. In June the depreciation rate was adjusted to S/. 0.05 per day. Also in June, the authorities transferred to the free market 30 percent of foreign exchange proceeds from petroleum and petroleum-related exports and an equivalent value of imports. Other measures were also taken to improve competitiveness and the efficiency of resource allocation. A restrained public sector wage policy was announced. Certain domestic prices were raised with the intention of eliminating subsidies, including the prices of petroleum derivatives and of major consumption items such as wheat and milk. Another important element of the adjustment program was a substantial reduction in the consolidated public sector deficit, from 6.8 percent of gross domestic product in 1982 to 4.2 percent in 1983, through a combination of tax measures and expenditure restraint.
Ghana
Stand-By Arrangement
The Fund approved a one-year stand-by arrangement for Ghana on August 3, 1983. The arrangement was for SDR 238.5 million, equivalent to 150 percent of Ghana’s quota in the Fund. At the same time, a request was approved for a purchase of SDR 120.5 million (76 percent of quota) under the compensatory financing facility to offset a shortfall in export receipts during calendar 1982. A previous one-year stand-by arrangement for SDR 53 million (50 percent of quota) had been approved in January 1979, but became inoperative following a change of government in June 1979.
Exchange Rate Developments
From February 1973 until mid-1978, Ghana maintained the exchange rate at 1.15 cedis per US$1. Between June and August 1978, the exchange rate was gradually moved to 
2.75 per US$1, a cumulative devaluation of 58 percent. No further changes were made in the exchange rate until April 1983.
As part of the adjustment program, on April 21, 1983, the Ghanaian authorities introduced, for a transitional period, a system of bonuses and surcharges on the official rate of 2.75 per US$1. This system resulted in two rates: 23.375 per US$1 and 29.975 per US$1. The weighted average of these rates was about 25 per US$1, representing a depreciation of 89 percent in foreign currency terms. The relatively appreciated rate applied to about one half of total payments, including imports of essential items and capital goods, and to traditional exports, accounting for about 80 percent of total receipts.
Balance of Payments Problem
The need for exchange rate adjustment had long been apparent, but had not been undertaken because of the perceived political consequences. As the economic situation steadily deteriorated, the resistance was finally overcome in 1983 by the systematic efforts of the Government to educate the public on the need for a major adjustment program.
Severe balance of payments difficulties demonstrated the need for a large exchange rate adjustment. The imbalances were primarily the result of expansionary financial (particularly fiscal) policies and, to a lesser extent, a deterioration in the terms of trade stemming from adverse movements in oil and cocoa prices. As prices rose sharply, particularly after 1981, a fixed official exchange rate in terms of the U.S. dollar resulted in a large and growing overvaluation of the cedi. The shortage of imports, along with efforts by the Government to contain the rise in the cost of living through price controls, led to a decline in economic activity, as well as the development of a large parallel market. Export receipts from cocoa, the major export, declined steadily, owing to reduced producer incentives and smuggling to neighboring countries. An increase in producer prices for cocoa in 1981 to counter these developments was financed through the budget, further raising the fiscal deficit and fueling inflation. Fiscal revenues were eroded. Foreign aid declined because of the growing disenchantment of donor governments with Ghana’s policy performance. As a result, investment expenditures were curtailed and the country’s productive base gradually became outdated. The return of about one million expatriates and persistent drought severely pressured food supplies in early 1983, resulting in a sharp price increase for food staples.
Determining the Amount of Exchange Rate Adjustment
Although the need for exchange rate adjustment was obvious, the precise amount was difficult to determine because of the limited data base and widespread distortions in the economy. The extent of the cedi’s overvaluation was analyzed in the context of inter-country price comparisons, movements in real producer prices and profitability of major exports, parallel market exchange rates and the role of parallel markets in the economy, and projections of economic performance over the medium term. The implications of alternative exchange rates for the balance of payments, price level, and the government budget were analyzed. Developments in the real effective exchange rate index and the profitability of exports, particularly cocoa, also were evaluated. The adjustment of the rate to a weighted average of 25 per US$1 involved restoring competitiveness to the level attained after the most recent exchange rate adjustment in 1978, and was considered to be the minimum required to achieve the program’s objectives.
One of the major objectives of the exchange rate adjustment was to attract resources to the official market from the large parallel market, thereby immediately improving the recorded balance of payments and the tax base. Therefore, developments in the parallel market rate also were reviewed in determining the appropriate official exchange rate. The parallel market exchange rate, which was approximately 80 per US$1 at the beginning of 1983, was not considered to represent the equilibrium rate because of that market’s risk premium and imperfections. However, in view of the extent of the parallel market activity and the need to divert it into official channels, a progressive reduction in the spread between the official exchange rate and the parallel exchange rate was considered appropriate.
Mechanism of Exchange Rate Adjustment
The authorities believed that the general public needed some time to understand and accept the implications of a large straightforward exchange rate adjustment. As a transitional arrangement, they adopted a multiple exchange rate based on a system of bonuses and surcharges on the official exchange rate, which resulted in two rates—
29.975 per US$1—and a weighted average rate of 25 per US$1. The authorities intended that the real effective exchange rate index remain constant and that ultimately the two rates would be unified. To this end, the less depreciated rate was expected to be adjusted more quickly than the more depreciated rate.Sri Lanka
Stand-By Arrangement
The Fund approved a stand-by arrangement for Sri Lanka on September 14, 1983, for the period through July 31, 1984. The arrangement was for SDR 100 million, equivalent to 56 percent of Sri Lanka’s quota in the Fund.37 Following the introduction of significant structural reforms in late 1977, the Fund had granted a one-year stand-by arrangement in December 1977 and an extended arrangement in January 1979, which covered the period to December 1981. Sri Lanka made all scheduled purchases under these two previous arrangements.
Exchange Rate Developments
In November 1977, a major reform of the exchange and trade system was effected involving a unification of the dual exchange rate system at a depreciated level and a liberalization of the import and payments system.38 Thereafter, the exchange rate was determined by a policy of managed floating. The currency was steadily depreciated from 16.00 rupees per US$1 in November 1977 to SL Rs 21.32 per US$1 at the end of 1982. However, owing to relatively high domestic inflation, these exchange rate adjustments were not adequate to prevent a substantial real appreciation of the rupee. The rupee was further depreciated by 7.4 percent during the first half of 1983 and an additional 5 percent (to SL Rs 24.20 per US$1) on July 4, 1983.
Balance of Payments Problem
Following the liberalization measures of late 1977, Sri Lanka’s external position deteriorated. The deterioration was evidenced in the reversal of its current account balance,39 from a surplus equivalent to 2 percent of gross domestic product in 197740 to a deficit equivalent to 15 percent of gross domestic product in 1982. This weakening stemmed from several factors. First, there was a sharp rise in the volume of imports reflecting both an increase in public investment expenditures and the effects on private imports of import liberalization and expansionary financial policies. Second, the terms of trade deteriorated by about 25 percent between 1977 and 1982, owing mainly to the oil price rises during 1979–80 and a decline in tea prices from a peak level reached in 1977. Third, there was a continued stagnation in the volume of traditional exports (tea, rubber, and coconuts), which was due to weak management of state-owned estates and inadequate producer margins. Inadequate margins had contributed to a low level of investment in that sector and also to managerial problems, which stemmed from the low salary and wage structure that the low margins implied. Fourth, export diversification had not succeeded because high import tariffs protected inefficient manufacturing units, tax incentives favored sectors other than manufacturing, and exchange rate policy had eroded competitiveness.
The growing current account deficits were financed partly by increased concessional aid and, particularly since 1980, by substantial commercial borrowing. However, despite the deterioration in its external position, Sri Lanka continued to maintain an exchange system virtually free of restrictions on current transactions.41 Nevertheless, it was clear that the current account deficit recorded in 1982 (15 percent of gross domestic product) was not sustainable in the medium term because of its debt-servicing implications.
Corrective measures began to be implemented early in 1983. A 7.4 percent depreciation of the rupee took place during the first half of 1983. Administered prices were raised, and new tax measures equivalent to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product were introduced in the 1983 budget.42 The growth of public capital expenditure was reduced. The balance of payments was expected to improve in 1983 because of a 12 percent reduction in oil prices: a strong recovery (22 percent on average) in export prices for tea, rubber, and coconuts; and projected substantial increases in emigrants’ remittances and aid flows. At the same time, however, a severe drought was beginning to affect the volume of major export crops and private import demand had picked up following the return of business confidence after the presidential and parliamentary elections.
Given the magnitude of the imbalances, the potential was limited for financial policies alone to produce a sustainable external position. Furthermore, it was not possible to reduce significantly the planned public sector investment expenditure (which had a high import content) without disrupting the largely concessionally financed investment program. Reliance on demand management to reduce nongovernment imports would be costly in terms of reduced economic activity. Moreover, the domestic rate of inflation was projected at over 10 percent on the basis of cost-push factors, and exclusive reliance on demand restraint policies to improve competitiveness would, in view of the low inflation rate projected in Sri Lanka’s trading partners, involve large costs of adjustment. At the same time, exchange rate action would facilitate measures to increase the efficiency of the state-owned estates and reduce effective protection.
Determining the Amount of Exchange Rate Adjustment
In arriving at the amount of exchange rate depreciation, a wide variety of indicators of competitiveness was evaluated. In addition to an assessment of the profitability of main export products, the competitiveness of the export sector was evaluated on the basis of two types of real effective exchange rate indices. The first type was based on bilateral export weights (1979–81 data). The second type was based on weights which reflected the shares in foreign markets of third countries competing with Sri Lanka in nine major products: tea, rubber, coconuts, garments, fuel, gems, shellfish, fruit juices, and ceramics. Indices of competitiveness were estimated for each product, and an overall index for the export sector was obtained as a weighted average of the nine commodity indices. The import-substituting sector was evaluated on the basis of a real effective exchange rate based on bilateral import weights. Finally, the competitiveness of the whole external sector was measured by a real effective exchange rate index based on trade (import plus export) weights. The nominal effective exchange rate indices were in each case deflated by relative consumer and wholesale prices.
Mechanism of Exchange Rate Adjustment
The authorities did not wish to achieve the desired improvement in competitiveness by exchange rate action alone. Instead, they adopted compensating measures in other areas, along with a smaller initial exchange rate adjustment and a flexible exchange rate policy aimed at maintaining external competitiveness. A 5 percent devaluation was effected on July 4, 1983, bringing the exchange rate to SL Rs 24.2 per US$1. Import tariffs were increased, mainly through application of import duties to previously exempt items. As a result, the average import duty increased by about 3 percentage points. This was expected to favorably affect the balance of payments and the budget, although at some cost in terms of production efficiency. Export duties on tea were lowered. It was planned that this decrease, together with a projected increase in the prices of traditional exports, would improve substantially the profitability of these exports.
A number of other features of the program directly affected external competitiveness. Among the measures taken to reduce the overall budget deficit by the equivalent of about 2 percent of gross domestic product, for example, was a six-month freeze on the monthly wage indexation plan for public sector employees and a shift to semiannual adjustments after September 1983. In addition, it was anticipated that public sector estates producing tea, rubber, and coconuts would undertake new investment and introduce performance-related incentives for managers and workers from the beginning of 1984.
Studies in this area include: Thomas M. Reichmann and Richard T. Stillson, “Experience with Programs of Balance of Payments Adjustment: Stand-By Arrangements in the Higher Credit Tranches, 1963–72,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 25 (June 1978), pp. 293–309; Justin B. Zulu and Saleh M. Nsouli, Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience, Occasional Paper No. 34 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, April 1985); Donal Donovan, “Real Responses Associated with Exchange Rate Action in Selected Upper Credit Tranche Stabilization Programs,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 28 (December 1981), pp. 698–727; G. G. Johnson and Thomas M. Reichmann, “Experience with Stabilization Programs Supported by Stand-By Arrangements in the Upper Credit Tranches, 1973–75,” (unpublished, International Monetary Fund, February 28, 1978). Some of the latter’s main findings were described by Reichmann in “The Fund’s Conditional Assistance and the Problems of Adjustment, 1973–75,” Finance and Development, International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Washington), Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1978), pp. 38–41.
Various aspects of the role of exchange rate policy were considered in three studies by the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. These were published in July 1984 in the Fund’s Occasional Paper series: “Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade,” (No. 28); “Issues in the Assessment of the Exchange Rates of Industrial Countries” (No. 29); and “The Exchange Rate System: Lessons of the Past and Options for the Future” (No. 30).
General questions of exchange rate assessment recently have been considered in Occasional Paper No. 29 (cited in footnote 2) and in Ahsan Mansur, “Determining the Appropriate Levels of Exchange Rates for Developing Economies: Some Methods and Issues,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 30 (December 1983), pp. 784–818.
Or, more generally, the time path of the rate.
Market-determined exchange rates are likely to be particularly volatile in the initial stages of adjustment programs, when market participants may not yet fully understand the implications of the new policies or be fully convinced that they will be sustained.
In part, this may reflect a preference for a more stable exchange rate than is likely to be the case when market forces are the primary determinants of the rate. This question is discussed in the section below: “Exchange Rate Stability as a Proximate Policy Objective.”
This would be the case, for instance, if the external imbalance has resulted from a rise in government imports, which can be reversed without significantly compromising other policy objectives, such as the rate of economic growth.
Effective demand management is a necessary aspect of any successful exchange rate action. Note that the exchange rate action and associated price increases, through their effects on the real value of financial assets, themselves contribute to reducing excess demand.
Note that both approaches involve judgments that are in some sense “political,” but with different time horizons. The political environment will be more favorable in the medium term if income and employment are better maintained, and over the medium term, the income distribution effects are likely to be similar under either approach to adjustment. High unemployment itself has particularly adverse effects on income distribution, of course.
Over time, freely operating markets would result in the development of new mechanisms and institutions that would alleviate these disadvantages of market-determined rates.
In a world of generalized floating, a fixed exchange rate against any particular currency will imply floating with that currency against other major currencies. To avoid being tied too closely to the movements of a particular currency, countries often peg to a basket of currencies.
See Reichmann and Stillson (cited in footnote 1). The study excluded arrangements where significant net purchases (not less than one half of a credit tranche) did not occur.
The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International Payments: A Report by the Executive Directors, (September 1970) (Washington: International Monetary Fund); reproduced in Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund 1966–1971: The System Under Stress, Vol. II: Documents (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1976), p. 310.
See Johnson and Reichmann (cited in footnote 1).
Most recently summarized in the World Economic Outlook, April 1985: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1985).
A recent comprehensive review of the concept of real effective exchange rates may be found in Edouard B. Maciejewski, “‘Real’ Effective Exchange Rate Indices: A Re-Examination of the Major Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 30 (September 1983), pp. 491–541.
All references to exchange rates in this paper refer to the price in foreign currency of the domestic currency; increases in the real effective exchange rate index imply a real effective appreciation.
See Karim Nashashibi, “A Supply Framework for Exchange Reform in Developing Countries: The Experience of Sudan,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 27 (March 1980), pp. 24–79.
Depending on whether the penalty costs are higher on the supply or demand side, it has been shown that the parallel rate can be either higher or lower than the restriction-free equilibrium rate. See, for example, Michael Michaely, “A Geometrical Analysis of Black-Market Behavior,” American Economic Review (Nashville, Tennessee), Vol. 44 (September 1954), pp. 627–637; and Michael Nowak, “Quantitative Controls and Unofficial Markets in Foreign Exchange: A Theoretical Framework,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund (Washington), Vol. 31 (June 1984), pp. 404–431. However, these theoretical results, based on partial equilibrium analysis, assume that the existence of exchange controls does not affect consumer preferences and that expectations are unchanged. In fact, the imposition of exchange controls alone and the emergence of expectations of further depreciations are likely to increase the demand and reduce the supply of foreign exchange, thereby resulting in the parallel rate being more depreciated than the restriction-free equilibrium rate.
Mali was not a member of a currency union at the time the program was approved, though its accession to the West African Monetary Union took place during the program period. In view of the similarity of its institutional arrangements to those of other CFA franc countries, it is classified here with members of currency unions.
Over the same period, the terms of trade for the net oil importers among the developing countries deteriorated on average by 15 percent, compared with a deterioration of 10 percent for industrial countries.
Including Argentina and Ecuador, which had not been adversely affected by an increase in oil prices.
The second quarter of 1982, rather than the whole year, is chosen as the reference period for real effective exchange rates because shifts in exchange rate policy in a number of program countries began in the second half of 1982.
Note that severe external imbalance and overvaluation of the currency had already characterized the positions of these countries in 1978.
Although, for purposes of comparison, the discussion here focuses on the ratio of the external current account balance to gross domestic product, it must be recognized that the severe distortions of relative prices in many of these countries make interpretation of such figures problematic.
Over the same period, imports by all non-oil developing countries rose in volume terms by 12 percent.
1979–82.
As discussed later in the section on the mechanism of adjustment, the adjustment usually involved both an initial devaluation and a subsequent gradual depreciation.
Initial devaluation only. A floating exchange rate system was in effect from August 5 to September 26, 1982.
Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Western Samoa, and Zimbabwe.
Movements toward unification of multiple rates also played a role in a number of other countries, as discussed in the following subsection.
The change in relative prices associated with the devaluation will normally imply some increase in the average price level, but with appropriate financial policies the increase will be limited. In determining the amount of nominal depreciation needed to achieve a given real depreciation, allowance needs to be made for the prospective increase in the average price level.
These measures are based on the uniform real effective exchange rate indices used by the Fund in its general monitoring of exchange rate developments. For most of the countries listed in Table 5, consumer price indices are used as an indicator of domestic and foreign cost developments, because better indicators, such as unit labor cost indices, are not available. Other real effective exchange rate indices may also sometimes be appropriate for particular purposes and thus, the indices in Table 5 are not necessarily the same as those used in the design and monitoring of the programs.
As noted in Chapter IV, a real effective exchange rate index may underestimate the extent of real depreciation produced by devaluation because of the effect of the latter on prices of tradable goods which may have a significant weight in the consumer price index.
Or up to December 1984, where programs had not yet expired by that date.
Mali joined the West African Monetary Union during the program period.
Purchases by Sri Lanka under the stand-by arrangement amounted to SDR 50 million. The arrangement became inoperative because understandings on policies could not be reached for the second half of the program period.
The unification of the exchange rate system at the initial level of 16.00 rupees per US$1 represented a devaluation of 46 percent in terms of the official rate in effect until then and 11 percent in terms of the parallel rate. However, the effects of the large devaluation of the official rate on the prices of traditional exports , and essential imports, to which it applied, were initially almost entirely neutralized through, respectively, higher export taxes and import subsidies.
Excluding official transfers.
It should be noted that the favorable current account position in 1977 was associated with a low level of economic activity before the liberalization measures and unusually favorable external terms of trade.
With the exception of limitations on travel allowances.
These included increased import duty rates by an average of about 3 percentage points and higher general sales and turnover tax rates.
Occasional Papers of the International Monetary Fund
1. International Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects, by a Staff Team Headed by R.C. Williams, Exchange and Trade Relations Department. 1980.
2. Economic Stabilization and Growth in Portugal, by Hans O. Schmitt. 1981.
3. External Indebtedness of Developing Countries, by a Staff Team Headed by Bahram Nowzad and Richard C. Williams. 1981.
4. World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. 1981.
5. Trade Policy Developments in Industrial Countries, by S.J. Anjaria, Z. Iqbal, L.L. Perez, and W.S. Tseng. 1981.
6. The Multilateral System of Payments: Keynes, Convertibility, and the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, by Joseph Gold. 1981.
7. International Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects, 1981, by a Staff Team Headed by Richard C. Williams, with G.G. Johnson. 1981.
8. Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Part I: Tax Policy and Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Carlos A. Aguirre, Peter S. Griffith, and M. Zühtü Yücelik. Part II: A Statistical Evaluation of Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Vito Tanzi. 1981.
9. World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. 1982.
10. International Comparisons of Government Expenditure, by Alan A. Tait and Peter S. Heller. 1982.
11. Payments Arrangements and the Expansion of Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa, by Shailendra J. Anjaria, Sena Eken, and John F. Laker. 1982.
12. Effects of Slowdown in Industrial Countries on Growth in Non-Oil Developing Countries, by Morris Goldstein and Mohsin S. Khan. 1982.
13. Currency Convertibility in the Economic Community of West African States, by John B. McLenaghan, Saleh M. Nsouli, and Klaus-Walter Riechel. 1982.
14. International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects, 1982, by a Staff Team Headed by Richard C. Williams, with G.G. Johnson. 1982.
15. Hungary: An Economic Survey, by a Staff Team Headed by Patrick de Fontenay. 1982.
16. Developments in International Trade Policy, by S.J. Anjaria, Z. Iqbal, N. Kirmani, and L.L. Perez. 1982.
17. Aspects of the International Banking Safety Net, by G.G. Johnson, with Richard K. Abrams. 1983.
18. Oil Exporters’ Economic Development in an Interdependent World, by Jahangir Amuzegar. 1983.
19. The European Monetary System: The Experience, 1979–82, by Horst Ungerer, with Owen Evans and Peter Nyberg. 1983.
20. Alternatives to the Central Bank in the Developing World, by Charles Collyns. 1983.
21. World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. 1983.
22. Interest Rate Policies in Developing Countries: A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. 1983.
23. International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects, 1983, by Richard Williams, Peter Keller, John Lipsky, and Donald Mathieson. 1983.
24. Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons, by Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait. 1983. Revised 1984.
25. Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings with Official and Bank Creditors, by a Staff Team Headed by E. Brau and R.C. Williams, with P.M. Keller and M. Nowak. 1983.
26. The Fund, Commercial Banks, and Member Countries, by Paul Mentré. 1984.
27. World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. 1984.
28. Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade: A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. 1984.
29. Issues in the Assessment of the Exchange Rates of Industrial Countries: A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. 1984
30. The Exchange Rate System—Lessons of the Past and Options for the Future: A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. 1984
31. International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects, 1984, by Maxwell Watson, Peter Keller, and Donald Mathieson. 1984.
32. World Economic Outlook, September 1984: Revised Projections by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund. 1984.
33. Foreign Private Investment in Developing Countries: A Study by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. 1985.
34. Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience, by Justin B. Zulu and Saleh M. Nsouli. 1985.
35. The West African Monetary Union: An Analytical Review, by Rattan J. Bhatia. 1985.
36. Formulation of Exchange Rate Policies in Adjustment Programs, by a Staff Team Headed by G.G. Johnson. 1985.