- Marc Quintyn, and David Hoelscher
- Published Date:
- August 2003
Estimating the overall costs of banking crises is difficult. While the fiscal costs may be clearly specified, the overall costs to the economy are more difficult to quantify. The methodology for assessing such fiscal costs must take into account both the direct outlays of the government and the recovery from asset sales. In recent crises, the fiscal costs of a banking crisis ranged from zero to over 50 percent of GDP (Table AI.1). The steps for estimating the broader costs to the economy are described but have not been quantified.
Types of Costs
The costs of a banking crisis arise from different causes and develop over time. Clarification of the definitions used is essential if meaningful comparisons are to be made.
The costs can be defined in the following ways:
Gross costs to the public sector: Examples of such costs are outlays of the government—restructuring agencies or, in some cases, directly from the treasury—and central bank for liquidity support; deposit payments; purchase of impaired assets; and recapitalization through purchase of equity or subordinated debts.
Net costs to the public sector: Gross outlays are netted against resources generated from the sale of acquired assets and equity stakes, and repayment of debt by recapitalized entities. This measure ideally reflects the permanent increase in national debt, or the cumulative increase of fiscal deficits where budget transfers are used, resulting from the crisis.
Costs in net present value: Support to financial institutions—and especially the recovery of value from the sale of impaired assets and equity stakes—may occur over relatively protracted periods. Ideally, in estimating costs cash flows should be appropriately discounted so as to reflect the carrying cost of debt issued, the delay in recovering resources from acquired assets, and the opportunity cost of the use of public funds.51
Economic costs of crises: Systemic crises result in forgone economic growth because the intermediation function is temporarily curtailed. In some cases, the crisis of confidence may have longer-term consequences for financial sector and, therefore, overall development.52
Many of the costs borne by the public sector represent transfers to the private sector. These are not losses to the economy as a whole.53 Where liquidity support to failed institutions or financing for resolution agencies provided by the central bank has not been fiscalized (i.e., a government body has not issued debt or made cash payments to repay the central bank), the money supply increases. If this is not, or cannot, be absorbed through open market operations or other instruments, where it would show up as quasi-fiscal losses, this will be inflationary or contribute to exchange rate pressures and capital flight.
The present analysis considers only direct costs to the public sector and does not take into account the costs of inflation or forgone economic growth. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to discount appropriately the cash flows to and from the state, or otherwise calculate the net present value of the interventions.54 As asset disposals usually occur over extended periods, the present value of recoveries is lower than shown here.55 On the other hand, asset disposal processes are incomplete for most of the cases included, and no attempt has been made to forecast what future revenues from asset disposals might be. This would underestimate total recoveries in nominal terms.
|Crisis Period||Gross Outlay||Recovery||Net Cost||Assets2|
A central objective was for the estimates to be comparable across countries. This objective could be met only in part, as evidenced by the country notes below. The data are presented as ratios over GDP; where it has been possible to identify the year in which a specific cash flow or debt issuance occurred, this magnitude is divided by nominal GDP for that year. In many cases, however (especially for recoveries), only aggregate data reflecting several years of activity were available. In these cases, an average of GDP for the relevant years was used.
Gross costs were measured as outlays of the government and central bank in terms of bond issuance and disbursements from the treasury for liquidity support, deposit payments, and recapitalization and purchase of nonperforming loans. Recoveries were then subtracted to arrive at net costs. Data limitations meant that even these measures are incomplete. For example, liquidity support may be provided to institutions that later fail, and such outlays are captured here only if they were fiscalized (Table AI.2).
|Chile||Sanhueza (1999), Sanhueza (2001)||Sanhueza estimates that, of the gross costs of 53 percent of GDP, 9.4 percent of GDP was paid out to depositors in the early stages of the crisis, and 43.3 percent of GDP was spent on portfolio purchase and other recapitalization measures. Sanhueza (2001) estimates the cost of liquidating banks and the portfolio purchase program discounted for the cost of social capital (accounting for some of the hidden economic costs of intervention). These estimates raise the net cost by a total of 2.5 percent of GDP.|
|Ecuador||Authorities’ data and IMF staff estimates||Data to March 2002. The asset disposal program is only now getting under way.|
|Finland||Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998), IMF (2001)||IMF (2001) reports estimates of gross and net costs of 10 percent and 7 percent of GDP respectively, but does not detail the underlying numbers.|
|Indonesia||Authorities’ data and IMF staff estimates||Data to end-2001. Excludes Rp 40 trillion allocation to the deposit guarantee fund from September 2001. The “certificate of indebtedness” generated in this transaction will pay no interest unless the funds are used (no funds have been used thus far). Inclusion would add a further 2.7 percent of GDP to gross costs.|
|Korea||Karasulu (2002)||Data to September 2001.|
|Malaysia||IMF staff estimates||Due to lack of data, losses implied by the merger of two state-owned concerns (Bank Bumiputra and Bank Sime) with private banks are excluded. Nonperforming loans worth 9.9 percent of 1998 GDP from these entities were entrusted to AMC Danaharta, and recoveries from sale of these assets (assuming the same overall recovery rate) have also been excluded. Costs would be considerably higher if these losses were included.|
|Mexico||De Luna-Martinez (2000)||Data to June 1999. Data on gross outlays is unavailable, but the negative net worth of the Bank Savings Institute (IPAB) was equivalent to a further 12.4 percent of GDP at that time.|
|Norway||Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998)||Data on recoveries through asset disposals is unavailable, but the state retains equity stakes in banks that, if sold at current market prices, would more than cover the gross costs cited.|
|Russia||Banerji, Majaha-Jartby, and Sensenbrenner (2002)||Through liquidity support, regulatory forbearance, deposit transfers, and special credits to banks undergoing restructuring, a bank run was avoided. A blanket guarantee or state-funded recapitalization measures were never undertaken. The net costs were positive, but small.|
|Sweden||Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998), IMF (2002)||Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998) gives gross costs, and the Financial System Stability Assessment comments that the state was able to fully recover initial outlays plus operating costs of the resolution agencies.|
|Turkey||Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2002)||…|
|United States||Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) staff estimates, and Curry and Shibut (2000)||The figures shown refer only to the savings and loan crisis. Including resolution costs for insolvent banks would raise net costs by 0.5 percent of GDP (FDIC,“Failed Bank Costs Analysis 1986–95”).|
|Venezuela||de Krivoy (2000)||As of end-1998. The figures represent cash flows through the Venezuelan Deposit Guarantee Agency (FOGADE); thus gross cost excludes direct central bank support to banks that subsequently failed. As of end-1998, FOGADE retained assets of value equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP. If these are included, net costs fall to 10.9 percent of GDP (the net cost given by the source used for the data).|
|Crisis Dates||Composition of the Sector1|
|Country||Onset||Exit||Before||After||Estimated Net Cost to the State as Percent of GDP2|
|Argentina||July 2001: Deposit run begins, spurred by uncertainty over fiscal sustainability and exchange rate policy. Deposit freeze imposed December 3, 2001; devaluation in January 2002.||Deposit freeze gradually lifted, ending in 2003.||89 commercial banks Of which||As of December 2002: 88 commercial banks Of which||…|
|Ecuador||August 1998: Intervention in Banco de Préstamos. Bank credit lines were cut in response to Russian crisis and supply shocks (oil prices and weather related).||2001: Blanket guarantee lifted.||35 commercial banks||End-2001: 22 commercial banks||21.7|
|Finland||August 1991: Skopbank (apex bank for savings banks) intervened. Markka depreciation affected borrower repayment capacity; real estate bubble collapsed.||1993: Bank profitability restored in 1996.||10 commercial banks (61) 150 savings banks (25) 359 cooperative banks (14)||End-1995: 7 commercial banks 40 savings banks 300 cooperative banks||11.2|
|Indonesia||August 1997: Devaluation of rupiah. Followed Thai baht devaluation in July. October 1997: Hong Kong stock market crash worsened the crisis.||Ongoing June 2000: System capital became positive again.||238 commercial banks Of which||As of December 2002: 145 commercial banks Of which||End-2001: 52.3|
|Korea||November 1997: Devaluation of won. Followed devaluation of Thai baht in July, and falls in bank credit lines despite official guarantee of external liabilities in August.|
October 1997: Hong Kong stock market crash worsened the crisis.
|2000: Repayment of central bank liquidity support by April 1999.||79 commercial banks (40) Of which||June 2000: 61 commercial banks (44) Of which|
|Malaysia||July 1997: Devaluation of ringgit two weeks after Thai baht devaluation. October 1997: Hong Kong stock market crash worsened the crisis.||2000: Nonperforming loan–purchase program closed.||35 commercial banks
|Mexico||December 1994: Devaluation of peso.||September 1995: Repayment of central bank liquidity support although capital support and resolution of intervened institutions continued for several years.||32 commercial banks||End-1999:27 commercial banks Of which||19.3|
|Russia||August 1998: Devaluation of of the ruble. Partial government debt default.||1999: Lending growth resumed. Real deposit growth resumed in 2000.||July 1998: 1,547 banks Of which||End-2001:Approximately 1,300 banks (about 100 are considered large) approximately 50 are under foreign control, and 2 of the largest are state owned.||Small|
|Sweden||Fall 1991: Capital injections required for Nordbanken and Första Sparbanken. Economic policy stance became restrictive, puncturing a real estate boom.||1993: Precrisis profitability was restored in 1994, and lending recovered in late 1997–early 1998.||End 1990:
||End-1992: 13 commercial banks (32)
|Thailand||July 1997: Flotation of the Thai baht.|
Capital outflows and liquidity support for many finance companies began between March and June.
|End-2000: Commercial banks registered positive operating profits.||15 commercial banks Of which||End-2000: 13 commercial banks Of which||34.8|
|Turkey||December 2000: Capital market turbulence and political crisis followed conflict between the president and the prime minister. Further market turbulence in February 2001. Trading risk, funded by large, open foreign exchange position, was high.||Ongoing||80 banks Of which||End-2001:61 banks Of which||June 2002: 30.5|
|Venezuela||January 1994: Failure of Banco Latino. Supply shock (oil prices fell) and interest rate rise undermined credit quality. Political instability and expectations that bank regulation reform might reveal insolvencies led to capital flight.||End-1995: Deposits stopped falling and bank closures ceased through second half of 1995.||47 commercial banks Of which||End-1996: 38 commercial banks Of which||12.4|
|Country||Central Bank Liquidity Support||Blanket Guarantee||Capital Controls||Deposit Freezes or Haircuts|
|Argentina||July 2001: Significant liquidity support began. End-April 2002: Stock outstanding was Arg$5.2 billion (5 percent of GDP).||Not provided. A limited guarantee of up to Arg$30,000 per depositor exists.||December 2001: Controls introduced and revised frequently since. Convertibility ended January 2002, with a dual exchange rate regime in place until February 2002. Other controls included the deposit freeze, prior authorization requirements for transfers abroad, and import payment restrictions.||December 2001: Corralito was imposed, which limited cash withdrawals and forced domestic payments into the banking system. February 2002: Forced conversion of dollar accounts into pesos took place.|
|Ecuador||March 1999: Peak stock of support was US$1.7 billion (146 percent of net international reserves, 177 percent of currency in circulation, and approximately 13 percent of GDP). Support was provided through central bank loans (using banks’ loan portfolio as collateral) and rediscounts of recapitalization Deposit Guarantee Agency bonds.||December 1999: Guarantee was approved, replacing a limited guarantee of up to US$8,000 per account. Guaranteed deposit payments reached approximately US$1.8 billion, of which some US$1 billion were still pending in Q2 2002. Guarantee still place.||March 1999: Most bank deposits were frozen. No explicit capital controls were introduced.||March 1999: All bank deposit balances above a certain threshold and all investment fund participations were frozen. Sight deposits were liberalized gradually, a process completed in September 1999. March 2000: Most time deposits were liberalized, although small amounts remain frozen in state-controlled banks.|
|Finland||The central bank supported Skopbank with a total of Fmk 14 billion in 1991 and 1992, in the context of its takeover and restructuring.||February 1993:Announced when the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) was reorganized. The GGF was authorized to use up to Fmk 20 billion to cover deposits and contingent and foreign currency liabilities of the banks, replacing the previous partial deposit guarantee.||…||…|
|Indonesia||August/September 1998: Peak stock of support was Rp 150 trillion (16 percent of GDP). Support was provided through over-drafts with the central bank.||January 1998: Introduced; covered deposits and contingent and foreign liabilities. There was no existing formal deposit insurance. The guarantee is still in place and administered by the central bank.||August 1997: Limits on forward sales of foreign exchange by domestic banks to nonresidents (excluding trade and investment-related transactions) were imposed. November 1997: Limits were removed thereafter.||…|
|Korea||December 1997: Peak stock of support was US$23.3 billion (5 percent of GDP), plus won 11.3 trillion (2.5 percent of GDP). Support was provided through central bank loans and deposits. Fully repaid by April 1999.||August 1997: External liabilities of banks were guaranteed, and a deposit guarantee was extended in mid- November 1997, until the end of 2000. The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, responsible for the existing partial guarantee, also administered the blanket guarantee.||December 1997:Though no formal controls were imposed, foreign private bank creditors agreed to temporarily maintain exposure. January 1998: Short-term debt rescheduling was agreed with foreign creditors.||…|
|Malaysia||January 1998: Peak stock of support was RM 35 billion (13 percent of GDP). Support was provided through central bank deposits, most of which had been repaid by end-1998.||January 1998: Guarantee covering only deposits announced. The guarantee was administered by Danamodal. There was no explicit deposit insurance before the crisis. Guarantee still in place.||September 1998:A number of exchange control measures were introduced, aimed at eliminating the offshore ringgit market and restricting the supply of ringgit to speculators. Also, the exchange rate was pegged at 3.8 ringgit per U.S. dollar.||…|
|Mexico||April 1995: Peak stock of support was US$46 billion. Fully repaid by September 1995.||Implicit protection for all liabilities except subordinated debt existing prior to the crisis through the Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings (FOBAPROA). April 1995:The government ratified the guarantee. Guarantee in place until 2003.||…||…|
|Russia||Peak support of Rub 105–120 billion (4 percent of GDP) was reached between August and October 1998. Support was provided through central bank loans (mainly to 13 banks) of up to one year.||Blanket guarantee not extended. However, the authorities transferred household deposits from a large number of private banks (which had frozen deposits) to Sberbank (a stateowned savings bank), where deposits were guaranteed by the government.||A 90-day moratorium was declared on private sector payments of external liabilities. Conversion operations for nonresident accounts used for investing in ruble-denominated government securities (S accounts) were suspended. Nonresidents not participating in government securities restructuring operations had their balances on those accounts frozen. The surrender requirement on exports increased to 75 percent from 50 percent, and a 100 percent deposit requirement on advance payments for imports was introduced.||There were no official measures. However, a number of large banks unilaterally froze deposits, while others introduced administrative means of discouraging withdrawals. These measures were permitted, though not officially sanctioned.|
|Sweden||During the currency crisis (September 1992), the central bank deposited part of the foreign exchange reserves in the banks, thereby insuring liquidity against problems with international funding.||Announced in October 1992, it was approved in parliament in December. Deposits, and contingent and foreign liabilities of the banks, their subsidiaries, and some specialized financial institutions were covered. There was no existing formal deposit insurance scheme. The blanket guarantee was fully funded from the budget and administered by the Bank Support Agency (BSA).||…||…|
|Thailand||Peak stock of support was B 1 trillion (22 percent of GDP) in early 1999. Most was given between mid-1997–mid-1998 (B 531 billion in FY 1996/97, of which B 394 billion to 66 finance companies and the remainder to 7 private banks, as well as B 39 billion to 2 public banks in FY 1998/99). Support was provided through loans, most of which were later converted into capital support.||A formal announcement was made in August 1997. Most elements were informally in place beforehand. Deposits, and contingent and foreign liabilities were all covered. There was no existing formal deposit insurance scheme. The guarantee is still in place, administered by the Financial Institutions Development Fund, an entity within the central bank.||The authorities implemented a series of measures limiting transactions that could facilitate the buildup of baht positions in the offshore market, to limit baht lending to nonresidents.||…|
|Turkey||September 2001:The stock of credit amounted to TL 6 quadrillion (US$4 billion, or 3.3 percent of GDP), provided mostly through the Deposit Guarantee Agency and repos with the central bank.||An unofficial guarantee has been in place since 1997. It was officially confirmed in December 2000. All liabilities of deposit taking banks were guaranteed by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Guarantee still in place.||…||…|
|Venezuela||The central bank provided liquidity both directly and through the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Banco Latino alone owed the central bank Bs 23 billion (US$220 million) at the time of intervention (it was the first and largest bank to fail).||No blanket guarantee was extended. The ceiling under the existing partial guarantee was raised (at different times for different institutions) to Bs 10 million by July 1995 from Bs 1 million (US$9,300). Liabilities in off–balance sheet companies related to commercial banks (e.g., offshore subsidiaries) were eventually included in the guarantee in July 1995.||June 1994: Exchange controls were imposed, with all foreign currency purchases frozen for two weeks. After this, foreign currency could be bought for only specified transactions, and exporters were obliged to sell all foreign currency earnings. A fixed exchange rate was adopted.||January 1994: Banco Latino was closed for 77 days; depositors were not able to access their funds. Access to deposits under the guarantee or through deposit transfers to other institutions was more prompt in subsequent interventions. Deposits above Bs 10 million were replaced with long-term nonnegotiable bonds at below market rates.|
|Country||Legal and Judicial Reform||Institutional Arrangements for Restructuring||Resolution Techniques (Closures/Mergers/Sales)|
|Argentina||…||…||End-2002: One foreign bank and two small domestic banks were suspended and subsequently purchased by local banks; a joint-venture bank was absorbed into a fully owned subsidiary; a foreign group withdrew from Argentina and their three banks were taken over; two domestic banks were restructured using public and private funds. No depositor losses were imposed.|
|Ecuador||December 1999:The AGD was created to be in charge of administering the blanket guarantee and bank restructuring. April and June 2000: Changes to the banking law were introduced to provide the legal basis for crisis management, albeit partially. Key issues, such as legal protection for public officers in charge of bank restructuring, have not yet been addressed.||The AGD was in charge of bank restructuring (as well as impaired assets and disposals of intervened banks). Its board was headed by the superintendent of banks; its members also included the president of the central bank and representatives of the ministry of finance and the president of the Republic. September 2001: Main responsibility for bank restructuring (including the presidency of the AGD board) was transferred from the superintendent to the minister of finance.||Fourteen banks (including some initially recapitalized by the government) were closed between August 1998 and August 2001, representing over 50 percent of the system’s total precrisis assets. All eight offshore subsidiaries of closed banks were also closed, as were all trust funds and other financial companies belonging to the closed banks’ groups. Of the three banks intervened in November 1999, two were merged (Previsora with Filanbanco and Pacifico with Continental). The latter is a commercial bank fully owned by the central bank. The third one, Banco Popular, was closed in April 2000.|
|Finland||February 1993: the Banking Supervision Office, which had been part of the ministry of finance, was made an autonomous unit within the central bank (it was renamed the Financial Supervision Authority).||April 1992:The GGF was created to administer the blanket guarantee and deal with restructuring, at first with no full time staff. The ministry of finance, Banking Supervision Office, and central bank were represented on the board.||February 1993:The GGF was reorganized and given full-time staff and a direct reporting line to the government (with only the ministry of finance now on the board). June 1992: Skopbank’s subsidiaries’ loan portfolios were sold to Handelsbanken (Sweden). June 1992: 41 savings banks were merged into the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF), which had been taken over by GGF. April 1993: STS-Bank and KOP Bank were merged, forming the largest commercial bank in Finland. October 1993: Business and share capital of the SBF were sold to four remaining private banking groups. Mid-1994:A majority stake in SBF was purchased by Arsenal asset management company.|
|Indonesia||August 1998: New bankruptcy law was introduced and special commercial court established. December 1998: Strengthened prudential regulations were passed addressing loan loss provisioning, connected lending, liquidity management, and foreign currency exposure.1999: Legislation was passed to enhance the independence of the central bank.||January 1998:The Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was created to restructure banks and manage assets of closed banks, nonperforming loans of banks under restructuring, and assets pledged by shareholders as part of settlements. However, lack of clear legal foundations hampered IBRA’s initial activities. October 1998:The IBRA was given powers to resolve banks without shareholder consent. February 1999: Implementing regulation for IBRA was enacted. The Financial Sector Policy Committee, with ministerial and central bank representation, was created to oversee the IBRA.||Between October 1997 and September 1998: 26 commercial banks were closed. March 1999: 38 banks (5 percent of liabilities) were closed.1999: Four state banks (holding about 25 percent of total bank deposits) were merged to create Bank Mandiri.|
|Korea||December 1997: Laws were passed to strengthen the independence of the central bank and consolidate all financial sector supervision in one agency, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)—later Financial Supervisory Service. June 1998: New, stricter regulations were adopted on connected lending, loan classification, and accounting standards.||April 1998:The FSC was established. Gradual unification of supervisory powers were completed in January 1999. Licensing and delicensing powers were granted in April 1999. Early 1998:The Financial Restructuring Unit was established within the FSC.||December 1997: Two large commercial banks were taken over and 14 merchant banks suspended, of which 10 permanently closed in January 1998. June 1998: Five small- to medium-sized banks were closed through purchase and assumption operations, and 12 weak institutions were encouraged to merge or find foreign shareholders.|
|Malaysia||1998: The Danaharta Act was passed.||June 1998: Danaharta (an asset management company) was established with powers to acquire nonperforming loans through statutory vesting and to appoint administrators to manage the assets.||1999: A program was instituted to consolidate domestic banks, merchant banks, and finance companies into 10 banking groups.|
|August 1998: Danamodal was established to recapitalize financial institutions.||End-2000: Merger negotiations were concluded for 50 of 54 banking institutions, with one merge fully completed in March 2001.|
|These organizations and the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) are represented on the steering committee on restructuring, a coordinating body chaired by the central bank governor.||No financial institutions were closed outright.|
|Mexico||March 1995: New provisioning regulations requiring higher reserves were adopted. January 1996: New, stricter regulations on connected lending and loan classification were adopted.||The banking and securities supervisory agencies merged into the National Banking and Securities Commission (NBSC), which handled the crisis. No special powers were granted, but the NBSC had de facto enough authority.||Two banks were intervened in 1994 and a third bank in March 1995. Resolution is ongoing; bank viability is decided on a case-by-case basis as part of a gradualist approach.|
|Russia||March 1999:A bank insolvency law was passed. July 1999: A bank restructuring law was passed, permitting revocation of bank licenses on the basis of insolvency. Further legal reforms were implemented, including amendments to the banks and banking activities law and more recently on anti money laundering.2002: The central bank and government adopted a joint strategy paper for the reform of the banking sector.||November 1998: The Agency for Restructuring Credit Organizations (ARCO) was established. Institutional changes were made in the central bank, reforming and consolidating supervisory functions.||Six of the larger banks were intervened after the bank restructuring law passed, of which three (now under ARCO control) are currently in liquidation. A number of other banks were required to submit restructuring plans, and still others were transferred to ARCO.|
|Sweden||December 1992: The Bank Support Act was passed, providing support at the lowest cost to the state in the form of guarantees or capital.||May 1993: The Bank Support Agency was formally created. Analyses of the loan portfolios and financial prospects of banks were used to determine the form and conditions under which support would be provided. Operations wound down in 1996.||No banks were closed at the containment stage.1993: Gota Bank was taken over after becoming insolvent, and then merged with Nordbanken; Gota’s nonperforming loans were transferred to the asset management company Retriva.|
|Thailand||October 1997: An amendment to the Commercial Banking Act gave the central bank specific powers to write down capital and change management in troubled banks.||The FIDF, established during the previous crisis in the 1980’s, was used to provide liquidity support. October 1997: The Financial Sector Restructuring Authority was established to liquidate insolvent finance companies. August 1998: Comprehensive financial sector restructuring package was announced. A high-level financial restructuring advisory committee was created to advise the ministry of finance and the central bank. De facto authority for restructuring lies with the finance ministry.||June and August 1997: 58 finance companies were suspended, of which 56 were closed in December 1997; a further 13 were merged at this time. Three banks were intervened from December 31, 1997 to end-January 1998. A further two banks were intervened in August 1998 and one more in July 1999. Since June 1997, one of these banks has been closed and another three merged with stateowned banks.|
|Turkey||The legal and regulatory framework has undergone major reforms since 1999 and was found to conform to EU and international standards by end-2001. A new banking law was passed, as were prudential regulations on loan loss provisioning, large exposure limits, connected lending, foreign exchange exposures, consolidation, risk management, fitness and propriety criteria for owners and bank managers, and new accounting standards.||The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency was established just before the crisis; it also manages the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). A collection department has been set up within the SDIF to maximize loan recoveries on bad assets from banks in resolution. An intervened bank is being used as a bridge bank to deal with performing assets.||As of end-November 2002, twenty private banks have been taken over by the SDIF (two in 1997/98, six in late 1999, three in 2000, two in early 2001, six in mid-2001, one in November 2001, and one in June 2002). Of these, twelve banks have been resolved through merger, five were sold, while one was put under liquidation and two remain under the management and control of the SDIF. In addition, the banking licenses of one state bank and three investment banks have been revoked. The number of mergers among private banks has been limited.|
|Venezuela||November 1993: Before the crisis began, legal reforms strengthening the supervisory framework and powers of intervention and resolution of the supervisory authorities were passed. They were not properly implemented at that time, however. July 1995: The Financial Emergency Law was passed, clarifying the institutional structure for dealing with the crisis and eliminating obstacles for liquidation of assets transferred to the state.||Responsibility was at first shared (in ill-defined ways) between the supervisory authorities, the Deposit Guarantee Fund (which also had recapitalization powers), and the central bank, with the finance minister having the final authority on closures and resolutions. June 1994: The Financial Emergency Board was created to manage the crisis. It included representatives of the three institutions, and was chaired by the minister of finance.||From January 1994 to August 1995, 17 commercial banks were taken over, of which II were eventually closed, and 2 were merged and subsequently sold to a private bank. Also closed during the crisis were 8 mortgage banks, 14 investment banks, 13 leasing companies and I finance company.|
|Country||Publicly Funded Recapitalization/Restructuring||Gradualism in Meeting CAR/ Provisioning Rules||Corporate Restructuring|
|Argentina||U.S. dollar and peso bonds were issued to compensate banks for asymmetric currency redenomination (from U.S. dollars to pesos) of assets and liabilities.||…||…|
|Ecuador||December 1998: Filanbanco, the largest bank in the country, was intervened. Shareholders equity was reduced to zero, and the bank was recapitalized with government bonds. August 1999: Four banks were recapitalized with subordinated loans from Filanbanco (which had to be recapitalized anew). Only the smallest bank repaid; the other three were intervened and recapitalized in November 1999. May 2001: Filanbanco was recapitalized, for the third time, with nonnegotiable bonds. Liquidity problems persisted leading to closure in August 2001. December 2001: Banco del Pacifico was recapitalized again by the central bank.||December 2001: Banco del Pacifico was recapitalized again by the central bank. November 2001: New CAR regulations were approved, and banks were given two years to adjust their asset weighting and tier capital composition to the new requirements.||An initial debt-restructuring program was implemented for debtors with total debts to the financial system of up to US$50,000. These represented 92 percent of debtors but only 12 percent of system assets. The program extended loan maturities and introduced gradually increasing payment schedules. A program for debts over US$50,000 was introduced, on the basis of voluntary agreements, avoiding bailouts or direct fiscal subsidy. January 2001: A program began that provided incentives for the use of automatic out-of-court foreclosure procedures in cases of failure to restructure nonperforming loans. November 2001: A further modification was introduced when an international debt negotiator was hired to represent the interests of all closed banks.|
|Finland||September 1991: The central bank took over Skopbank, committing about Fmk 14 billion in liquidity support and restructuring costs. June 1992: The GGF acquired Skopbank. Asset management companies for real estate and industrial holdings remained with the central bank. Also, the GGF took over the SBF. Nonperforming assets were transferred to Arsenal, an asset management company, in October 1993.1992: The government injected Fmk 7.9 billion into deposit banks to increase Tier I capital.||…||…|
|Indonesia||April-May 1998: Four banks were taken over by IBRA. March 1999: Eight banks were taken over. Nine private banks became eligible for joint public/private recapitalization. Of these, eight were recapitalized and one was taken over in 2001. A total of Rp 649 trillion of recapitalization bonds were issued, of which Rp 431 trillion to recapitalize state banks and banks taken over, as well as to support joint public/private recapitalization. The remaining Rp 218 trillion was used for liquidity support and the blanket guarantee.||4 percent CAR until end-2001, when banks had to reach 8 percent Phase-in of loan-loss provisioning requirements, end-December 1998 to end-June 2001Phase-in of legal lending limits from 1998 to end-2002Phase-in of net open position limits from end-June 1999 to end-June 2000||August 1998: The Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency was established to settle foreign currency–denominated debts at an agreed exchange rate. It became inactive due to lack of agreement on exchange rate and grace period. September 1998: The Jakarta Initiative Task Force was established to facilitate out-of-court settlements in joint creditor negotiations with debtors (London Club rules).|
|Korea||The government injected US$36 billion into nine commercial banks; five out of six major banks ended up 90 percent controlled by state. Bonds, cash budgetary allocations, and asset swaps were used to purchase shares, subordinated debt and nonperforming loans, and to repay depositors.||No gradualism. Recapitalization of surviving banks was sufficient for them to meet CARs.||Creditor-led, extrajudicial resolution framework was established based on the London Approach.|
|Malaysia||Danamodal injected US$1.7 billion into 10 institutions. Bonds and cash budgetary allocations were used.||January 1998: New rules for loan classification came into effect. March 1998: CAR of finance companies rose to 9 percent from 8 percent, to be implemented by end-1998, and then to 10 percent by end-1999.||The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) provided a platform based on the London Approach for borrowers and creditors to work out debt-restructuring schemes. The CDRC was set up to mediate restructurings (based on London Club rules) of large corporate sector loans.|
|Mexico||March 1995: A program for temporary recapitalization was started. All amounts were repaid promptly and in full. Bonds and cash budgetary allocations were used.||…||December 1995: A debt-restructuring scheme based on out-of-court agreements for large debtors was implemented. There are several specific programs for diverse categories of small debtors, including households.|
|Russia||July 1999: The central bank referred nine banks to ARCO for examination;ARCO took control of six. Of the three not under liquidation, two reached settlements, and the other had its license revocation overturned in court. A further 46 banks volunteered for consideration by ARCO, of which 15 received approval for the restructuring program. As of mid-January 2003, two banks remained in restructuring processes under ARCO control.||Since January 1, 2000, risk-weighted capital ratio for banks with capital in excess of €5 million is 10 percent; for those with capital of less than €5 million, the ratio is 11 percent.||…|
|Sweden||State support amounted to SKr 65 billion (4.4 percent of GDP) in the form of cash allocations from the budget. Of this, 98 percent went to two banks Nordbanken and Gota Bank) and their respective asset management companies, Securum and Retriva; 86 percent of total support was used for capital injections and 10 percent for share purchases.||No gradualism. Recapitalization of surviving banks was sufficient for them to meet CARs.||…|
|Thailand||Two capital support schemes were used:Tier 1: After existing shareholders made full provisions for loan losses and presented an operational restructuring plan, the government injected capital sufficient to raise the Tier 1 ratio to 2.5 percent. Thereafter, the government matched private capital injections. Tier 2: Nontradable bonds (in return for debentures) were given in cases of voluntary corporate debt restructuring. Support was in proportion to the debt writedown or new net lending, and conditions and maxima applied The FIDF has been financed through the central bank, borrowing on the money market, including through repo operations, and recoveries from FRA’s sales of assets.||October 1997: A requirement was imposed to first write down and then increase capital, and to meet new, more stringent rules. March 1998: New rules were issued on loan loss classification, loss provisioning, and interest suspension. Loss provisioning requirements were tightened by 20 percent every six months starting July 1998, to be fully implemented by end-2000.||August 1998: A framework for voluntary workout (Bangkok Approach) was announced. April 1998: The Bankruptcy Act was amended to permit court-supervised reorganizations. June 1998: The Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee was established. March 1999: The Bankruptcy Act was amended to facilitate court-supervised reorganizations, and a model debtor-creditor agreement was issued. The law establishing the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) emphasizes its role in promoting the continuation and revival of businesses by enabling debt repayment. Extensive and flexible powers to resolve problem loans through debt restructuring, business reorganizations, and foreclosure were granted under the law.|
|Turkey||By end-2002, financial restructuring of state banks was completed. They had returned to profit, and operational restructuring was well advanced, with significant branch closures and personnel reductions. Public support for private bank recapitalization is provided with certain safeguards through the SDIF, matching private sector injections of Tier 1 capital up to a Tier 1 CAR of 5 percent, and then Tier 2 capital up to a combined CAR of 9 percent. No Tier 1 capital has been provided and only one bank has applied for Tier 2 support, given in the form of seven-year, market rate–bearing bonds.||As of end-2002, there has been no supervisory forbearance, such as phasing in of CAR or provisioning requirements.||As of October 2002, 169 firms had applied for financial restructuring of their debts (approximately US$2.9 billion) under an Istanbul Approach framework for large debts. Of these, the debts of 28 firms had been restructured.|
|Venezuela||Five of the banks in which the state intervened remained open and received substantial state funds for recapitalization. Four were eventually privatized, and the fifth, Banco Latino, was finally liquidated in June 1997.||November 1993: A banking law was passed that called for increases in risk-weighted capital/ asset ratios as follows:
||No explicit corporate restructuring programs were adopted, but over 1,000 nonfinancial enterprises fell into state hands as a consequence of the crisis. Most were closed.|
|Country||Strategy and Objectives of Centralized Asset Management Companies, Where Relevant||Funding for Asset Management Company Purchases||Criteria for Asset Transfer||Transfer Price||Outcome|
|Ecuador||The assets of the intervened banks were never transferred to a centralized asset management company. The Deposit Guarantee Agency (AGD) manages the assets of the 11 banks closed in 1998 and 1999, and some of those of the bank closed in 2000 (the rest were transferred to an acquiring bank), but these assets remain the property of each bank and are not managed jointly. It is unclear which strategy will be followed to manage the assets of the merger of Filanbanco and Previsora, closed in 2001.||The AGD funded recapitalization by issuing bonds.||Intervention: Open banks managed their own impaired assets.||…||Only some 3 percent of impaired assets have been sold by the AGD in exchange for certificates of frozen deposits at closed banks. Other closed banks sold assets prior to their closure, amounting to some 10 percent of total impaired assets. Open bank nonperforming loan levels fell to precrisis levels (below 10 percent) by 2001. By end-2001, nonperforming loans at the only open intervened bank (Pacifico) had risen to over 60 percent, while nonperforming loans accounted for over 90 percent of the AGDmanaged portfolio.|
|Finland||Initially, the central bank, and then the GGF, managed the impaired assets of intervened institutions. Arsenal asset management company took over remaining assets in mid-1994. June 1992: Skopbank’s loan portfolio was sold to Handelsbanken of Sweden. The central bank retained real estate and industrial portfolios. April 1993: STS and KOP banks merged; the former became the asset management company for the merged bank, retaining all nonperforming loans and other bad assets. Though the merged bank owned STS and was liable for some of its losses, effective control was held by the GGF. October 1993: Arsenal was created to manage impaired assets of the SBF, valued at Fmk 40 billion.||Arsenal received government funding (Fmk 23 billion), and guarantees Fmk 28 billion). The GGF was funded by the government.||Intervention: Open banks managed their own impaired assets.||…||Arsenal continues in operation. Recoveries have been poor.|
|Indonesia||Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency’s mandate included management and disposal of assets from recapitalized and closed banks and nonbanks, and assets pledged by shareholders in settlement agreements.||Asset recoveries||Loss loans of recapitalized and state banks; all assets of closed institutions||Zero||Cash collections, auction of loan portfolios Recoveries at end-2001 amounted to about 8 percent of face value of assets transferred (which totaled Rp. 550 trillion), with a further 5 percent received in interest and fees. Fair value of the assets transferred from closed banks (about 50 percent of the total, all nonperforming) was estimated by IBRA to be only 22 percent of book value at end-2000.|
|Korea||Late 1997: The (preexisting) Korea Asset Management Corporation was given enhanced resources and powers to purchase, manage, and dispose of impaired assets from open banks and dispose of state-owned assets.||Government-guaranteed bonds, contributions from financial institutions, and loans from state development bank||All nonperforming loans and loans approved in court for restructuring||Secured assets: 45 percent of collateral value Unsecured: 3 percent of face value Restructuring: Net present value of future cash flow Discount as of December 2001: 62 percent||Cash collections About one-third of the stock of assets acquired was sold between December 1997 and June 1999, rising to half by December 2001. The average recovery rate was 46 percent of face value.|
|Malaysia||June: 1998: Danaharta was created to purchase, manage, and dispose of impaired assets from open banks, finance companies, and merchant banks, and to manage nonperforming loans of closed public banks and intervened banks.||Government funding, loans from state holding company, and government-guaranteed bonds||Nonperforming loans over RM 5 million at market value Assets managed for recapitalized banks: Nonperforming loans over RM 1 million||Secured: Collateral value Unsecured: 10 percent of principal Recovery surplus shared with bank 20/80Recovery surplus shared with bank 20/80Average discount as of June 2002: 54 percent||As of March 31, 2001, Danaharta had restructured or disposed of loans and assets with a gross value of RM 38.7 billion (of a total acquired or under management of RM 48 billion) with an average recovery rate of 60 percent of face value. Expected recovery rate as of June 2002: 57 percent, of which 25 percent restructuring, 16 percent foreclosures, and 8 percent superpowers.|
|Mexico||Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings’ (FOBAPROA’s) mandate included purchase, management, and disposal of impaired assets from open banks from 1990–98. When Bank Savings Institute (IPAB) was created (replacing FOBAPROA as deposit guarantee agency), it became a trustee for FOBAPROA assets, and was given authority to manage and dispose of closed banks’ assets.||FOBAPROA: Fees from financial institutions, central bank loans, bonds IPAB: Fees, government-guaranteed bonds||Nonperforming loans selected by selling banks IPAB inherited assets and cannot acquire new loans.||To FOBAPROA at book value IPAB assumed FOBAPROA’s debts.||Cash collections from auctions of loan portfolios and other assets Only 0.5 percent of transferred assets have been sold (at 15 percent average recovery).|
|Russia||No official action was taken. The nonperforming loans of banks being restructured by Agency for Restructuring Credit Organizations were not managed separately or sold.||…||…||…||…|
|Sweden||Two asset management companies were created. In the spring of 1992, Nordbanken was split into a “good bank” that retained performing assets and an asset management company, Securum, which took over SKr 67 billion of bad loans. In 1993, the nonperforming loans of Gota Bank were transferred to a specially created asset management company, Retriva. The two asset management companies were merged in December 1995 (becoming Securum).||Government and intervened bank funding||Nonperforming loans over SKr 15 million at book value||Book value, partial state guarantee||Securum was dissolved at the end of 1997. The process of selling the bad assets was much faster than initially anticipated. All assets and intervened banks sold within five years (at 56 percent average recovery).|
|Thailand||October 1997: The Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) was established to liquidate insolvent finance companies and dispose of their assets. A scheme encouraging creation of private asset management companies to purchase, manage, and dispose of banks’ own impaired assets met with little success. A public AMC was set up to handle impaired assets from the FRA and intervened banks. June 2001: The TAMC was established to purchase, manage, and dispose of assets from open banks and private asset management companies. TAMC can acquire nonperforming loans from private banks on a voluntary basis. If private banks do not transfer eligible loans, they must submit to an independent revaluation of loan collateral and make up any provisioning shortfall.||The FRA was financed by the government. TAMC is financed through government funding, bank fees, government-guaranteed bonds, market loans, and asset recoveries.||For the FRA, all assets of closed finance companies TAMC may purchase any nonperforming loan of the state banks and large, collateralized, multicreditor nonperforming loans from private banks on a voluntary basis.||FRA took the assets at book value minus provisions. TAMC buys assets at the lower end of independently verified collateral value or book value minus provisions. Revenue/loss-sharing: Maximum bank loss is 30 percent of transfer price.||Of the B 860 billion in finance company assets managed by the FRA, B 206 billion were sold to the private sector, and B 185 billion to the government asset management company. Total recoveries to the FRA were about B 96 billion (25 percent of face value), and auctions were completed in four years. About one-half of the financial sector’s nonperforming loans (of which 80 percent from the state banks) are expected to be acquired by TAMC. As of June 2002, one-third of transferred assets had been restructured or were under liquidation.|
|Turkey||A collection department was set up within SDIF to manage the bad assets of banks in resolution. A bridge bank is used for performing assets. The authorities have also passed regulations enabling the creation of private asset management companies to purchase nonperforming loans from operating banks.||SDIF was capitalized with government bonds and receives deposit insurance fees from banks.||Intervention: As of November 2002, private asset management companies were not yet in operation.||SDIF considered impaired assets based on book value.||The process is still at an early stage, although SDIF aims to dispose of assets rapidly.|
|Venezuela||The FOGADE, a deposit guarantee fund, was responsible for managing and selling the assets of banks that had been taken over.||FOGADE was financed by the government and the central bank.||Intervention: Open banks retained their impaired assets.||Not available||The last part of the process began with the final closure of Banco Latino in June 1997, with Bs 100 billion of nonperforming loans and other assets on its books. Recovery rates appear to have been low throughout.|
|Country||Exit from Blanket Guarantee||Status of Reprivatization||(New) Deposit Insurance Scheme||Fiscalization of Costs1|
|Ecuador||April 2000: The law was changed to phase out the blanket guarantee starting in April 2001.||All banks under public control were eventually closed except Banco del PacificoNovember 2001: A firm was appointed to manage and restructure the bank, but no dates have been given for the intended sale.||April 2004: A limited guarantee of up to US$8,000 per account will be reintroduced.||Not all central bank costs have been fiscalized, although the majority have through the issue of AGD bonds.|
|Finland||1998: The guarantee was rescinded (unannounced). Virtually all remaining guarantees arising from the crisis had expired by end-2000.||October 1993: The SBF was sold to the remaining Finnish banking groups. Skopbank remains state owned (directly and through Arsenal). It now functions as an asset management company for real estate assets acquired during the crisis.||1998: A new limited insurance scheme to replace the blanket guarantee was created with coverage up to approximately US$27,000 per depositor.||Central bank liquidity support totaled Fmk 13.7 billion in 1991 and 1992, of which Fmk 1.4 billion was fiscalized from the sale of Skopbank to the GGF. More income accrued to the central bank from the sale of Skopbank’s corporate and real estate portfolio that had remained with the central bank. The remainder of the central bank’s outlays were not explicitly fiscalized.|
|Indonesia||Guarantee still in place; no removal date has been announced.||March 2002: A majority stake in Bank Central Asia (about 9 percent market share by deposits) was sold to a foreign investor. November 2002: Bank Niaga (about 2.5 percent market share) was sold to a foreign bank.||Under development||Although the government has issued bonds to the central bank, a final burden-sharing agreement has not been reached. End-January 1999: The government issued bonds to repay liquidity support outstanding of Rp 144.5 trillion. December 2002: A further agreement swapped bonds on the central bank’s balance sheet that resulted from provision of liquidity support for redeemable government debt.|
|Korea||December 2000: The guarantee was rescinded on schedule.||Government ownership reduced to below 50 percent for three banks, with partial sales achieved for a number of others.||January 2001: Partial deposit insurance was reintroduced, managed by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.||Central bank support was repaid in full by April 1999.|
|Malaysia||A blanket guarantee is still in place; no removal date has been announced.||…||A new deposit insurance scheme to replace the blanket guarantee is being considered under the first 3-year phase of a 10-year financial sector master plan.||Liquidity support was provided in the form of central bank deposits to banks. Most of the loans had been repaid by end-1998, and therefore central bank liquidity support was not fiscalized.|
|Mexico||A blanket guarantee is in place until end-2003.||…||1999: A new deposit insurance law was passed and a new agency, IPAB, was created. The intended deposit insurance reform (discussed before the crisis) was postponed.||Central bank support was repaid in full by September 1995, so it was never fiscalized.|
|Russia||…||As of mid-January 2003, ARCO had sold its shares in 11 banks in open auctions and transferred another to the Russian Federation Property Fund. ARCO retains shares in two banks.||A deposit insurance scheme is being introduced selectively for banks completing the restructuring process. Five banks were covered as of July 2002.||Costs were not fiscalized.|
|Sweden||July 1996: The blanket guarantee was repealed by parliament and replaced by a limited deposit insurance scheme.||October 1995: The government sold 34.5 percent of its ownership stake in Nordbanken, retaining 59.4 percent.||July 1996: A new deposit insurance scheme was introduced.||Costs were fiscalized: when liability guarantee—the main mechanisms of support—were called, they were honored through payments directly from the budget.|
|Thailand||A blanket guarantee is still in place.||August 1998: The authorities decided to merge one of the intervened banks with an existing state-owned bank. As of end 2002, two of the intervened banks have not been privatized.||The authorities are working on the introduction of a limited deposit insurance scheme.||The FIDF borrowed from the central bank to provide loans and inject capital to troubled institutions. The stock at peak amounted to B 1 trillion in early 1999, of which B 500 billion was fiscalized. FIDF claims on financial institutions had declined to B 227 billion by end-1999.|
|Turkey||A blanket guarantee is still in place. It has been agreed to give market participants a one-year advance notice before removing the guarantee.||As of mid-2003, out of 20 intervened banks, one has been put up for sale, and two are in the process of being liquidated. The remaining 17 have been liquidated.||When the blanket guarantee is abolished it will be replaced by a limited deposit insurance scheme, expected to be in line with EU standards.||The cost was initially covered by the government, who provided the necessary securities to the SDIF. SDIF will partially repay the government through selling of shares as part of the recapitalization and by using fees that banks have to pay for the limited deposit insurance scheme.|
|Venezuela||…||The process is complete. Banks were sold between December 1996 and December 1997 (four to foreign banking groups); two were merged and sold to Banco Provincial, which was bought by a foreign group in December 1996. Banco Latino’s branches were sold, and the remainder of the bank was liquidated.||The limited insurance scheme envisioned in the November 1993 law has been implemented.||The central bank provided support to banks directly and through Fund/FOGADE. Government debt was issued to capitalize FOGADE on two occasions: Bs 400 billion (US$3.5 billion) in 1994 and Bs 200 billion (US$0.5 billion) in 1996. FOGADE issued a further Bs 367 billion (US$1.5 billion) in December 1995, allowing partial repayment of the debt to the central bank. Central bank outlays had, however, been considerably higher, and the difference was never explicitly fiscalized.|
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There is some debate about the definition of a systemic crisis. Systemic crisis is generally considered one in which the stability of the banking system and, as a consequence, the payments system and real sector, are threatened.
A joint IMF/World Bank project is developing guidelines for the legal and institutional aspects of dealing with bank insolvencies (forthcoming IMF/WB paper). On this topic, see also Asser (2001).
Appendix Table AI.2 provides these data and a fuller discussion of methodology used, as well as data sources and important country-specific information.
See IMF and World Bank (2001) and World Bank (2001).
Country-specific factors also include ownership structures of the banking system and the corporate sector; human resource constraints; the legal, regulatory, judicial, and administrative frameworks; traditions of transparency; as well as political cohesion and the quality of leadership. These factors will influence the pace and success of the resolution strategy.
The proposal is not to identify and protect a core banking system; in principle, market forces should determine the winners and losers among financial institutions. Rather, the authorities should adopt uniform and transparent rules that apply to all banks. If faced with the need to consolidate the banking system, prudential rules must be sufficiently strong to ensure continued financial intermediation.
Also, the government needs to factor in the possible pitfalls of prolonged government management of a bank, e.g., political influence, lack of managerial capacity, and so forth.
This process is similar to what Hirschman (1963) has referred to as “reform mongering.”
Creditors can refuse to roll over lines of credit, and depositors can withdraw their funds.
The use of a blanket guarantee may also be constrained under different private sector involvement scenarios, especially related to nonresident creditors.
Dollar deposits, however, usually would be paid out in the local currency, converted at the market exchange rate.
Derivatives and other off-balance-sheet contracts cannot be excluded, if a bank continues operations, as derivatives convert into plain on-balance-sheet liabilities in case of defaults.
In Indonesia, such transactions were included if contracted at “arm’s length.”
In República Bolivariana de Venezuela, the absence of a guarantee led to waves of bank failures in 1994. In the often-cited case of Indonesia (see Box 5) a poorly managed closing decision contributed to a general run on banks and required the retroactive introduction of a blanket guarantee.
In Malaysia, capital controls introduced in September 1998 contributed to the containment of capital outflows and the stabilization of the new sharply depreciated fixed exchange rate. In Thailand, exchange controls introduced in June 1997 to support the exchange rate were not successful in preventing the collapse of the baht and played no role in dealing with the subsequent banking problems.
Losses would be allocated in accordance with the legal preferences stipulated in banking, bankruptcy, and deposit insurance laws, as applicable: shareholders typically lose their capital, and creditors and depositors lose all or part of their claims according to a legally stipulated ranking.
Legal issues in bank restructuring are extremely complex and depend to a considerable degree on the legal and institutional framework in each country. This topic is too broad to be covered adequately in this paper. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank staff are writing jointly a report on the legal and institutional framework for bank restructuring.
In some countries, supervisors have been unable to take over insolvent banks because shareholders have been able to impede loss recognition and capital dilution, thus stalling the restructuring process. The process can be hindered by any combination of issues, including lack of authority to intervene banks, deficient operational definitions of insolvency, a judicial stay on interventions, or a lack of protection for supervisors from personal lawsuits.
Undercapitalized banks are those operating below the legal minimum CAR. Insolvency is often defined as operating with a CAR of zero or less. In some countries with prompt corrective action regimes, the law may oblige supervisors to intervene in a bank when its CAR falls below a certain threshold (2 percent in some countries).
This gradual but monitored approach is not forbearance. Forbearance is defined as permitting banks to operate below prudential norms without a plan or without close monitoring.
The former method was used in Thailand, the latter in Indonesia and Korea.
Klingebiel (2000) and Woo (2002).
In some legal jurisdictions, the asset management company may have to be a financial institution in order to accept transferred assets, although it should not be allowed to collect deposits or extend loans.
Centralized asset management companies with an expanded mandate have also been set up in the past to facilitate the privatization of government-owned banks and intervened banks.
In the Asian crises, large amounts of liquidity support were effectively sterilized in Korea and Thailand, which allowed the exchange rates to stabilize and interest rates to be brought down. Sterilization was not successful in Indonesia due to administered central bank interest rates but also, perhaps more importantly, to broader factors that lead to a loss of monetary control.
See Quintyn (1994).
For a description of the reform of monetary policy instruments, see Alexander, Baliño, and Enoch (1995).
For an analysis of experience with capital controls, see Ariyoshi and others (2000).
Some empirical support for the interpretation offered here is found for the Asian crisis countries by Cerra and Saxena (2003). The authors use a regime-switching model, decomposing recessions into permanent and temporary components. Their results suggest that the Asian countries suffered Hamilton-type recessions with permanent output loss rather than the Friedman-type recessions that include a rapid postcrisis growth phase resulting in catch-up to the initial trend.
In this context it is important to emphasize that conditions should be created so that banks can contribute to the growth resumption. Such policies include swiftly taking care of (a) the problem of nonperforming assets; (b) provisioning; and (c) recapitalization of banks.
The Asian countries entered the crisis (1997) with relatively solid fiscal positions and little public debt. This allowed them to issue a credible blanket guarantee and play a central role in bank recapitalization and resolution. The situation was more delicate in Turkey (2000), and outright unsustainable in cases like Ecuador (1998) and Argentina (2002).
For instance, if all or most of the debt is denominated in local currency, inflation may be a viable alternative to debt restructuring.
According to International Accounting Standards 32 and 39, banks must disclose the fair value of assets in financial statements.
In this case, the benefits derived from the reduction in the full stock of debt will not be offset by the issuance of new debt for bank recapitalization.
Nonbank financial institutions would also be affected, with pension funds and mutual funds collapsing.
The one exception is in the case of currency reforms (a new currency is introduced to replace the old currency). Currency reform often entails only redenomination of the currency. In some cases, however, the reforms have had a confiscating element. Few countries have applied nominal haircuts and, where tried, they have been challenged frequently on constitutional grounds.
However, it can be objected that in considering other public expenditures that generate debt, the net present value of interest payments thus incurred is rarely included in the costing of the activity.
See Frydl and Quintyn (2002) for a full discussion of the economic benefits and costs of intervening in crises.
See Frécaut (2002) for a detailed discussion with reference to Indonesia.
In some cases, part of the cost of debt service is reflected in the discount-to-face value of the funds raised through the debt issued. In Malaysia, for example, zero-coupon bonds were issued, with the discount therefore fully reflecting the servicing costs. This observation serves to highlight one difference in coverage between countries considered here.
Nonetheless, where possible cash flows have been divided by the GDP of the year in which they occurred. This provides some measure of discount because GDP typically rises in the postcrisis period, while the resale values of assets taken over rarely rise above the price at which they were acquired.
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Note: For information on the titles and availability of Occasional Papers not listed, please consult the IMF’s Publications Catalog or contact IMF Publication Services.