III Recent Experience of Fund Member Countries
- International Monetary Fund
- Published Date:
- January 1987
Frequency of Rescheduling and Amount of Debt Relief
From 1983 through 1987, 41 debtor countries concluded 83 multilateral rescheduling agreements with official creditors for a total amount of debt relief estimated at $69 billion (Chart 3). Over that period the frequency of official multilateral reschedulings quadrupled. During the seven-year period that ended in 1982, official creditors concluded an average of four agreements a year; in the following five years an average of 16 to 17 countries obtained debt relief each year from official multilateral reschedulings, and it appears that the number of reschedulings has stabilized in recent years at this high level. Should there be a sharp increase in the framing of new adjustment programs by countries with unresolved debt problems, the frequency of reschedulings could rise significantly.
Chart 3.Official Multilateral Debt Renegotiations, 1976–87
Sources: Agreed Minutes; and Fund staff calculations.
Reflecting in part a temporary lengthening of consolidation periods, the number of reschedulings declined to 16 in 1986 from the record of 21 in 1985. In 1987, 17 agreements were concluded. Although historically the second highest frequency, the number was still surprisingly low considering the unabated debt-servicing difficulties and the expiration of the consolidation periods of the 1985 and early 1986 agreements, which would have been expected to result in a new wave of reschedulings in 1987. At the beginning of 1986, for example, 17 rescheduling agreements were in effect and 12 other countries had recently expired consolidation periods but no new agreement; at the beginning of 1988, 18 agreements were in effect but 17 countries had expired consolidation periods (Table 2).
|Countries with agreements in effect||17||17||18|
|Countries with recently expired agreements1||12||16||17|
|Agreements concluded during the year||16||17||…|
Within the two preceding calendar years.
Within the two preceding calendar years.
In very few cases did the absence of a new consolidation reflect progress toward balance of payments viability and increased donor support, but in the overwhelming number of cases this development was due to delays in, or problems with, the framing and undertaking of new adjustment programs that could provide the basis for a new consolidation. In addition, a number of countries without a recent prior consolidation and without an adjustment program were also in need of multilateral relief from official creditors. At the beginning of 1988, about twenty-five Fund member countries did not have a Paris Club agreement in effect but could be expected to seek official rescheduling if and when an adjustment program was in place.
The financing of Fund-supported programs also became increasingly dependent on securing relief from official (and other) creditors. In 1986 and 1987, four fifths of programs supported by the Fund through a stand-by arrangement or extended Fund facility and two thirds of those supported under the structural adjustment facility entailed financial support through Paris Club reschedulings. This continued a rising trend that was already observable in 1983-85; prior to 1983, only a small percentage of Fund-supported programs required exceptional financing in the form of a multilateral rescheduling by official creditors.
As indicated earlier, an increasing number of consolidations was accounted for by repeat reschedulings. As late as 1986, 6 of 16 agreements were concluded with countries without a prior rescheduling in recent years; in 1987, only two such cases were among the 17 agreements concluded (Egypt and Guinea-Bissau). This contrasts with the experience in 1981-83 where nearly half of all rescheduling agreements were with countries without a recent prior consolidation. In terms of frequency of rescheduling agreements (but not in volume of debt relief) reschedulings with low-income countries—as, for example, defined in terms of eligibility for assistance under the structural adjustment facility—were dominant, accounting for 18 of the 33 agreements concluded in 1986 and 1987. Twenty-three of these were concluded with African countries, 6 with countries in the Western Hemisphere, 2 with European countries, and 1 each with countries in Asia and the Middle East. This geographic distribution was in line with developments in earlier years.
As regards amounts of total debt relief, the year-to-year variability has been markedly higher than the variation in the frequency of reschedulings, reflecting the concentration of indebtedness on a few very large debtor countries. From 1983 through 1987, rescheduling agreements resulted on average in debt relief of about $14 billion a year. This contrasts with an annual average amount of debt relief of less than $2 billion a year in the period 1976 through 1982. In 1986, the amount of debt relief declined in line with the frequency of reschedulings from the peak of $19 billion recorded in 1985 to $13 billion; about half of this amount was accounted for by the consolidation of the Nigerian debt. Although in 1987 the number of reschedulings inched from 16 to 17, the total amount of debt relief soared to a new peak of $25 billion. Rescheduling agreements with only three countries (Brazil, Egypt, and Poland) accounted for $19 billion of total relief; the remaining 14 agreements accounted for the balance of $6 billion. Most debt relief originated from the rescheduling of arrears. Although countries eligible for assistance under the structural adjustment facility accounted for 55 percent of reschedulings in 1986 and 1987, debt relief accorded to this group amounted to only 12 percent of total relief (Chart 3).
Coverage of Debt Consolidation
Typically, official debt reschedulings cover both principal and interest payments on medium- and long-term loans falling due during a given period (the consolidation period); where necessary, payments already in arrears (i.e., having fallen due before the beginning of the consolidation period) have also been rescheduled, especially in the case of countries undertaking a rescheduling with official creditors for the first time. In general, the practices with regard to coverage have reflected concerns about (a) efficiency,4 (b) equitable burden sharing among official creditors, (c) restoring and preserving the flow of new export credits, and (d) progressing toward normal creditor-debtor relations.
Paris Club agreements always exclude debts contracted by binational or multinational entities or guaranteed by a third party, for example, a nonresident corporation or a government other than that of the debtor or creditor. Apart from these, Paris Club principles do not permit the exclusion of any other types of bilateral debt from the rescheduling agreement. In the past, some debtor countries have requested various other types of exclusion but, primarily for reasons of precedent and intercreditor equity, official creditors have always refused to accede to such requests. In particular, creditors have reaffirmed that secured debts, debts repayable in commodities, and debts covered by special payments mechanisms are subject to the provisions of the Agreed Minute and that no distinction is to be made between buyers’ and suppliers’ credits. Also, creditors have refused requests by debtors to set the de minimis amount at an exceptionally high level to limit the number of creditors participating in the rescheduling. Creditors, however, because of technical difficulty, have not generally attempted to include insignificant categories of debt service (such as rental and lease payments).
Increased recognition among debtors and official creditors of the link between Paris Club reschedulings and the stance of cover policies of export credit agencies has resulted in major changes in the provisions regarding the types of debt included in the reschedulings. A strategy was devised to protect certain types of debt from reschedulings so as to minimize the interruption of regular debt service on the export cover stance. First and foremost was the firm maintenance since May 1984 of the cutoff date in all official rescheduling agreements for Fund member countries seeking successive reschedulings. Second, the longstanding policy of the Paris Club with regard to excluding service on short-term debt falling due during the consolidation period was applied more strictly; since 1983 short-term debt service (not in arrears) was excluded from reschedulings in all cases without exception. Third, debtor countries have asked increasingly to exclude debt contracted by their private sector from rescheduling.
Creditors also continued their long-standing policy of seeking to exclude from rescheduling debt service previously consolidated. Owing to increasingly frequent successive reschedulings and the difficult debt situation, this was often not feasible. At times, creditors elected to include debts previously rescheduled in an earlier agreement while maintaining the exclusion of debts rescheduled in more recent agreements.
Restoring and Safeguarding the Flow of Export Credits Through Subordination
The increased sensitivity among debtors and official creditors to the implications of Paris Club rescheduling terms for the cover policy stance of export credit agencies continued, and creditors’ policies in 1986 and 1987 were an extension and intensification of those previously identified. Since May 1984, all 43 official rescheduling agreements for countries seeking successive consolidations, without exception, have maintained the cutoff date unchanged.
Debtor countries themselves did not generally seek a change in the cutoff date. This reflected several factors. One, where there had been a substantial new flow of export credit, the debtor country judged that the likely negative impact on new lending and guarantees by export credit agencies would outweigh any increase in debt relief. Two, where there had not been substantial new lending—perhaps because new arrears had emerged or the conclusion of the bilateral agreements had been delayed—changing the cutoff date would not enlarge significantly the amounts of debt covered by the rescheduling. Three, creditors were agreeable to rescheduling a higher percentage of principal and interest and also to include previously rescheduled debt, when necessary, to compensate for the exclusion of debt service on post-cutoff date debt from the rescheduling. The Paris Club’s strict adherence to this strategy of not changing cutoff dates was the main factor behind export credit agencies’ increased willingness to restore and maintain cover for countries that were expected to need a series of reschedulings.5 To underscore creditors’ intentions with regard to the cutoff date, all rescheduling agreements concluded in 1986 and 1987 that contained a reference to creditors’ willingness to consider additional debt relief in the future (the goodwill clause) explicitly indicated that a future rescheduling would be granted on the basis of the same cutoff date as that of the rescheduling then being undertaken.
In the past, once it became known that a country was seeking a first rescheduling, export credit agencies generally halted new lending and reduced or eliminated cover to avoid having new credits included in the forthcoming consolidation and in future reschedulings. More recently, debtors and official creditors have sought to prevent a potential interruption in financing flows by setting the cutoff date for countries seeking a first rescheduling well before the beginning of the consolidation period. Thus, credits contracted in the immediately preceding months would be protected from the rescheduling and from further consolidation.
The recent policies on the cutoff date in cases of initial and successive reschedulings are reflected in the evolution of the average cutoff interval, which is the period (in months) between the cutoff date and the beginning of the consolidation period (Chart 4). For countries requesting successive reschedulings, the 1982–83 period evidenced a low average cutoff interval, as creditors had agreed to a change in the cutoff date in an increasing number of cases. In view of the adverse effects on new export credit flows, this practice was discontinued in 1984 and the average cutoff interval in cases of successive reschedulings increased from 8 months in 1983 to 32 months in 1986 and 39 months in 1987. The second change in cutoff date policy discussed above was evident for countries that had not had a prior consolidation in recent years. Although for this group of countries the average cutoff interval was as low as one month in 1981 and three months in 1982–83, it averaged seven months in 1984–85; however, in 1986–87 the average for these cases declined to five months.
Sources: Agreed Minutes; and Fund staff calculations.
1The cutoff interval is defined as the average number of months between the cutoff date and the beginning of the consolidation period.
2For this chart, repeat reschedulings are defined as cases where the country had a previous consolidation since 1976; initial reschedulings are cases where there was no rescheduling since 1976.
Exclusion of Short-Term Debt
Debtors and official creditors have generally sought to exclude the rescheduling of service on short-term debt (with an original maturity of one year or less), since such exclusion was seen to facilitate in most instances the maintenance of crucial short-term trade credits and cover by export credit agencies. As a result, short-term trade finance has often been preserved even where export credit agencies were off cover for medium- and long-term business; such maintenance of the flow of regular short-term trade credits can be essential to the financing of adjustment programs. The importance attached to this policy by debtors and creditors is underscored by the fact that since 1983 there have been no agreements in which obligations on short-term debt falling due during the consolidation period were rescheduled. Short-term debt already in arrears has been rescheduled somewhat more often. Three countries in the second half of 1986 approached the Paris Club for the first time, and the rescheduling of their short-term arrears was deemed unavoidable by creditors considering the difficult cash flow situation and the long-standing nature of the problem. In these instances short-term cover had generally been withdrawn and little additional harm, if any, was seen from including these arrears in the rescheduling agreement.
Exclusion of Private Sector Debt
Until recently, Paris Club rescheduling agreements have generally covered debts6 of both the public and private sectors in the debtor country, except when the country belonged to a currency union and the problem of foreign exchange transfer is not relevant (as an inability of a private debtor to meet debt service payments would reflect a purely commercial risk). In July 1985, at the request of the debtor country, private sector debt was excluded from the rescheduling agreements in two instances. Subsequently, exclusion of debts of the private sector from reschedulings became more frequent, particularly in the second half of 1986 and in 1987.
The increased tendency for debtor countries to request that private sector debt not be included in Paris Club reschedulings reflects several factors. On policy grounds, the exclusion of private sector debt can contribute to the maintenance of or renewed access by the private sector in these countries to new loans extended or guaranteed by export credit agencies, as these agencies and their authorities are generally willing to stay on cover for the private sector if such debt has been excluded from the rescheduling and is being serviced on a current basis. Operational considerations, however, were also frequently behind the decision by debtor country governments to seek an exclusion of private sector debt to simplify the rescheduling process. It has often been difficult in practice for the debtor country’s authorities to identify eligible private sector debt and to separate clearly cases of commercial default, which are not covered by Paris Club reschedulings. That debtor country governments are arguing more often for an exclusion from rescheduling of their private sector debt may also indicate that the establishing and maintaining of domestic currency counterpart deposit schemes have posed a not insignificant administrative burden. Official creditors too found it convenient to agree to the exclusion of private sector debt as it avoided dealing with a large number of often very small claims.
Where official creditors have provided cover with respect to commercial risk on loans to private borrowers, they retain the risk under the terms of the original insurance contract. Official creditors have therefore required that private debtors be permitted to make debt-servicing payments according to the original payments schedule. For countries whose private debt is rescheduled, creditors have therefore generally insisted on a clause in the Agreed Minute whereby the government of the debtor country undertakes to establish or maintain the necessary mechanisms to ensure that private debtors are permitted to pay the local currency counterpart of their debt service obligations that are falling due into an account with the central bank or other appropriate institution on the due date. Thereafter, the official creditors’ claim is on the debtor government under the rescheduling agreement. Where private sector debt has been excluded from the rescheduling, an undertaking is contained in the Agreed Minute whereby the debtor government agrees to guarantee the immediate and unrestricted transfer of foreign exchange in all cases where the private sector debtor pays the local currency counterpart for servicing its debt to Paris Club creditors.
A generalized exclusion of private sector debt from official multilateral rescheduling agreements has not appeared to be in the interest of either debtor or creditor countries. First of all, private sector debt may be relatively large compared with the country’s total financing needs and its exclusion would open up a large unfinanced gap in the balance of payments where even a comprehensive rescheduling of public sector debt could not provide sufficient debt relief. Second, various Paris Club creditors typically register different relative exposures with regard to the public and private sectors of a debtor country, and the exclusion of private sector debt from the rescheduling could raise issues of intercreditor equity and burden sharing in the provision of debt relief. Third, official creditors have in some cases benefited from the inclusion of private sector debt in Paris Club rescheduling as this enabled private debtors to obtain preferential access to foreign exchange—at times, at a preferential exchange rate—when the authorities had put in place a more general scheme of preferences for deferred debts. Access to a preferential exchange rate, of course, reduces the commercial risk to which foreign lenders are exposed.
Practices to Foster Graduation from Debt Problems
Official creditors’ practices have led to the emergence of a general hierarchy among the various categories of debt service consistent with the objectives of providing adequate relief and fostering the debtor country’s graduation from debt-servicing difficulties. At the same time, official lenders, for example, export credit agencies, view the composition of the debt service consolidated as an indication of progress made toward graduation and thus indicative of a country’s creditworthiness. Although the absence of a need for a new Paris Club consolidation (and for other forms of exceptional finance) is the clearest signal that a country has achieved a viable payments position, countries that are seeking a rescheduling of principal only are generally viewed as close to resuming normal relationships with creditors. The fact that interest was excluded from the rescheduling is seen by creditors as evidence that the country has largely completed its current account adjustment.
While creditors have traditionally included interest in their rescheduling, they have also recognized that a comprehensive and repeated consolidation of interest results in an exponential growth of indebtedness. This danger particularly arises in series of successive reschedulings where previously rescheduled debt is not excluded from subsequent reschedulings. One of the objectives of excluding previously rescheduled debt from a new agreement (when possible) is that eventually the debtor country would graduate from successive reschedulings, as the base to which new reschedulings would apply would become progressively smaller in view of the firmly established cutoff date policy. The need to include previously rescheduled debt in successive reschedulings is seen as a sign of a difficult debt situation.
Before mid-1982, official creditors had generally excluded from a consolidation all principal and interest due under previous reschedulings; however, with the continuing trend toward successive rescheduling agreements, the share of previously rescheduled debt in debt service has risen. In 1986 and 1987, previously rescheduled debt was rescheduled in 11 of the 25 cases where the debtor country had obligations due under previous reschedulings, that is, slightly more frequently than had been observed in the period immediately following the onset of the debt crisis.
The rescheduling of late interest (i.e., interest charged on obligations in arrears) had remained highly exceptional even after the onset of the debt crisis; however, from the second half of 1986 onward, a marked increase in rescheduling agreements that included late interest has occurred. Most of these debtor countries had accumulated large arrears that had been outstanding for a number of years so that late interest had grown to quite sizable amounts. Typically, the debtor countries concerned had long-standing debt difficulties and no recent previous consolidation. In these circumstances, the relatively large amounts of accumulated late interest and the debtor country’s difficult cash flow position made the rescheduling of late interest unavoidable. Creditors and debtors alike remain concerned, however, about the implications for regaining viability of consolidating not only arrears on interest and principal but also late interest.
Official debt relief applies to current debt service payments on debts covered by the agreement and falling due during a specified period of time (consolidation period) and, at times, also to debt service that fell due earlier but was not paid, that is, arrears. There was a lengthening of the average consolidation to 15 months in 1985; however, in 1986, the average length declined to 14 months. In 1987, the average consolidation period rose to 16 months, partly because, in a new departure, consolidation periods were extended in a few cases beyond the period covered by the Fund arrangements, inter alia, to assist debtor countries with parallel financing packages with commercial banks.
When Fund arrangements have covered two or more years, it has generally not been possible to determine at the outset the precise amount of debt relief needed for the second and third years of the adjustment program. In these instances, prior to the emergence of multiyear rescheduling agreements (MYRAs) in 1985 and 1986, official creditors had relied on a flexible approach of tranching that left certain conditions to be determined at a later stage. By contrast, the MYRAs agreed in 1985 and 1986 predetermined from the outset the (declining) percentage of debt relief for each year of the consolidation period.
Although there were no further MYRAs or other forms of agreements with extended consolidation periods after the first half of 1986, official creditors have continued to provide long effective consolidation periods to countries seeking successive rescheduling agreements. Overall, of the 42 countries that undertook debt renegotiations since 1976, 30 did so on more than one occasion and, as noted earlier, 15 of 17 agreements in 1987 related to countries with recent prior consolidations. As illustrated in Chart 5, there are a significant number of countries for which successive reschedulings effectively provided long consolidation periods either through a seamless sequence of consolidation periods or through the rescheduling of arrears that had arisen in between agreements. Nineteen debtor countries have concluded three or more reschedulings since 1976 and in nine cases the cumulative consolidation period was five years or more, even without the inclusion of periods for which arrears were consolidated.
Chart 5.Official Multilateral Debt Renegotiations with Fund Member Countries, 1976–87
(Consolidation periods of successive rescheduling agreements)1
Sources: Agreed Minutes of debt reschedulings; and Fund staff calculations.
Note: The numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. indicate the start of successive consolidation periods; an asterisk denotes conditional future rescheduling or extension of consolidation period; the symbol < indicates the consolidation date of arrears.
1The number of consolidation periods may, in some cases, exceed the number of rescheduling agreements owing to conditional future consolidations becoming effective. Representation of dates is approximate.
2For rescheduling agreements 2 and 3, the consolidation period overlaps previous consolidation periods.
3The 1978 rescheduling for Gabon consolidated only arrears.
4Conditional consolidation period of second agreement did not become effective.
The determination of the beginning date of the consolidation period has important implications, particularly in successive reschedulings. Since official creditors do not consider a subsequent rescheduling request until a new adjustment program is in place, debtors often have incurred de facto arrears in the interval as there are frequently delays in the formulation of new adjustment efforts that can be supported with arrangements from the Fund. Creditors have in the majority of the agreements concluded in 1986 and 1987 set the beginning of the consolidation period several months before the date of the Paris Club Agreed Minute, partly to avoid dealing separately with small amounts of arrears that may have arisen. How far back the beginning of the consolidation period is set has direct cash flow implications for debtor countries with arrears in instances where either late interest is rescheduled or a different percentage of arrears is rescheduled than of current maturities.
Amounts Restructured and Repayment Terms
Paris Club agreements do not provide for the rescheduling of the full amount of debt service payments falling due during the consolidation period. First of all, as already noted above, certain debts are generally not covered (such as service on short-term and on post-cutoff date debts). For covered debt service, a large portion is usually rescheduled on a medium-term basis according to the repayment terms specified in the Agreed Minute. Remaining debt service payments are either to be made according to the terms of the original contract or else they are granted a short deferral.
The percentage of debt service rescheduled and the repayment terms have traditionally tended to vary with the types of debt concerned. This tendency became temporarily more pronounced after the onset of debt-servicing difficulties in mid-1982 and the subsequent large accumulation of arrears. Creditors have, for example, sought to apply more stringent terms to arrears in order to give debtor countries an incentive to undertake prompt remedial action. At times creditors also applied stricter terms (such as shorter grace and repayment periods) to previously rescheduled debt. The terms granted have also varied widely among debtor countries, depending on the gravity of their payments difficulties. In 1986 and 1987, however, there was an increasing number of cases where creditors judged that the debtor country’s cash flow position did not permit the application of more stringent terms to arrears or previously rescheduled debt, as the rescheduling of these categories often accounted for most of the debt relief provided.
For this paper, it is useful to distinguish three different segments in the repayment structure of debt service covered by the agreement: (i) a formally rescheduled portion (i.e., consolidated debt service payments); (ii) a deferred portion, which includes that part of the unconsolidated obligations for which payment is postponed until after the end of the consolidation period; and (iii) a down payment, which is to be paid during the consolidation period. The formally rescheduled portion plus the deferred portion constitute the amount effectively rescheduled, that is, payable after the end of the consolidation period.7
The percentage formally rescheduled for current maturities covered by the agreement jumped from an average of about 85 percent in 1983-85 to 95 percent in 1986 and climbed further to over 97 percent in 1987. This resulted in a general disuse of the traditional short-term deferrals of part of the nonconsolidated maturities, as the remaining, normally very minor, amounts typically were to be paid on the original due dates. Since mid-1986, 100 percent of principal and interest was rescheduled in two thirds of the agreements. To some extent, this reflected the increasingly difficult debt situation of a number of countries. For some debtors the rescheduling of a higher percentage of debt service on covered debts was required because of the shrinking base for reschedulings owing to the exclusion of previously rescheduled debt. The exclusion of post-cutoff date credits from the base also contributed, but to a lesser extent, as debt service on new loans was often small because grace periods had not yet expired and, for low-income countries, because new financial flows typically carried highly concessional terms. While the average grace period and average maturity in 1986 were very close to those recorded for the period 1983–85, there was a marked lengthening in 1987 with the emergence of extended rescheduling terms for low-income countries (as discussed in Section II above).
The new policy of the Paris Club regarding the poorest and most heavily indebted countries adopted in 1987 contributed to a more extended repayment pattern for current maturities, although the tendency was discernable already in 1985 (Charts 6 and 7). The shift was even more pronounced for arrears, as there was less insistence on large repayments during the first year following the agreement.
Chart 6.Average Repayment Schedule for Current Maturities and Arrears, 1976–87
Sources: Agreed Minutes; and Fund staff calculations.
Chart 7.Average Repayment Schedule for Current Maturities and Arrears for Countries Eligible for Assistance Under the Structural Adjustment Facility, 1985–87
Sources: Agreed Minutes; and Fund staff calculations.
Large down payments and short deferral periods were in most instances not consistent with the need to close financing gaps. As a result, the average repayment pattern for arrears became close to that for current maturities.8 Reflecting the same basic considerations was the reversal of the tendency for applying more stringent terms to previously rescheduled debt. Where creditors judged that a rescheduling of previously rescheduled debt was unavoidable, service on such debt was generally rescheduled on the same terms as on debts not previously consolidated.
To avoid the need to negotiate bilateral agreements for small amounts of possible relief, in each Agreed Minute a “de minimis” level is specified; creditors for which debt service covered by the Agreed Minute, both arrears and current maturities, is below that level are excluded from the rescheduling, and obligations to these creditors are to be paid on the due date. The de minimis level is traditionally set at SDR 250,000, SDR 500,000, or SDR 1 million, depending on the size of the debtor’s economy and its debt service obligations.
As noted in Dillon and Duran-Downing, Officially Supported Export Credits: Developments and Prospects.
Arising from loans extended by, or guaranteed by, the governments or the official agencies of the participating creditor countries.
As an illustration, consider the case where total debt service covered by the agreement amounts to $100 million, and where creditors agree to reschedule 85 percent of it, with the remainder to be paid as follows: 5 percent before the end of the consolidation period and 10 percent in four equal semiannual installments starting the day after the end of the consolidation period. In this case, the amount formally rescheduled is $85 million, the down payment is $5 million, and the deferred portion is $10 million, to be paid at the rate of $2.5 million semiannually starting the day after the end of the consolidation period. The percentage of debt service effectively rescheduled is 95 percent.
If grace and maturity for arrears are measured from the date from which those arrears are consolidated, that is, the beginning of the consolidation period for current maturities, the grace period and maturity for arrears exceed that granted for current maturities in a number of cases. For this paper, maturity and grace period on rescheduled amounts of current maturities are measured from the end of the consolidation period, and for arrears and late interest from the beginning of the consolidation period. For analytical reasons, however, Charts 2-6 show repayment patterns for rescheduled current maturities and arrears relative to the date of the Agreed Minute.