Chapter

II Overview of recent developments

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
December 1995
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Net Official development finance (odf)2 to developing countries,3 including disbursements from both multilateral institutions and bilateral sources, at around $66 billion in 1994, has declined by 16 percent in real terms since its peak in 1990. Net official de-velopment assistance (oda) disbursed by development assistance committee (dac) countries, which constitutes the bulk of odf, rose in u.s. Dollar terms to $58 billion in 1994 (from $56 billion in 1993) but declined in real terms by 2 percent;4 such assistance constituted 0.29 percent of dac countries’ gnp in 1994, the lowest level since 1973 (chart 1). This decline in overall net oda in real terms primarily reflects budgetary constraints in most donor countries, which are likely to continue for the near future. The bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) share of net odf has varied between 66 and 70 percent since 1990, with no discernible trend. Net official financing to countries in transition (not considered as developing countries for this purpose) remained large in recent years at around $12 billion.5

Official Flows

Within developing countries, most heavily indebted poor countries remained highly dependent on inflows of grants and concessional assistance from official donors (box 1 and table 1 describe the country composition of the heavily indebted poor and low-income rescheduling country categories used in this report). For the low-income rescheduling countries, such inflows in 1994 were more than three times actual debt service paid; box 2 summarizes the extremely varied external positions, financing, and debt of the low-income rescheduling countries.

Chart 1a.Net ODA 1 disbursements, 1980-94

Source: organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd), as in Table 11.

1 Official development assistance.

2 Provisional.

Recent Developments in Export Credits

Total export credit exposure to developing countries and economies in transition6 increased from an estimated $380 billion at the end of 1993 to around $420 billion at the end of 1994.7, 8 The most important source of higher exposure in 1994 was a further increase in new export credit commitments, driven in part by more aggressive export promotion as well as a resurgence of import demand in many developing countries. New export credit commitments to developing countries and countries in transition rose from $70 billion in 1993 to $90 billion in 1994. Within this overall increase in new commitments, there was a marked increase in new commitments to certain large low-income countries, particularly to China, India, and Indonesia. While precise data are not available, of the $90 billion in new commitments in 1994 only about $1 billion is reported by agencies to have been extended to heavily indebted poor countries.

Box 1.Country Composition of the Group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

The analysis in this report focuses on three groups of countries, namely

  • All 41 heavily indebted poor countries;1

  • 27 of these that are low-income rescheduling countries for which the effects of a hypothetical stock of debt operation on naples terms on debt service in 1995 are examined below;2 and

  • 14 of the 27 for which the impact of a hypothetical stock-of-debt operation on naples terms on external financing and debt-service over the next 20 years is examined below3

This analysis is preliminary (in the sense that it anticipates more detailed country-specific analysis) and partial (in that it does not consider the possible dynamic effects of a debt overhang on investment and growth). Furthermore, the conclusions drawn become more tentative as they generalize from the 14 countries (for which detailed medium-term analysis was done) to the 27 countries (for which an assessment was made solely on the basis of 1995 debt service) to all 41 heavily indebted poor countries.

1 For a full listing of these countries, see Table 1.2 Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’lvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania. Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia3 Chosen as countries that could be relatively early candidates for a debt-stock operation (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guyana, and Sierra Leone) or because their debt burden is particularly difficult (Cóte d’lvoire. Honduras, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia)

Multilateral Financing

The levels of gross and net multilateral lending to all developing countries9, 10 in 1994, at around $37 billion and $14 billion, respectively, were broadly unchanged in u.s. Dollar terms from the four previous years (Table 2); this includes lending by development banks, the imf, and other multilateral agencies. Following declines in 1993, 11 both gross and net disbursements to heavily indebted poor countries rose by around $1 billion in 1994, partly as a result of support for cfa franc countries’ adjustment programs following the CFA franc devaluation, to reach record levels of over $6 billion and $3 billion, respectively. Virtually all of the heavily indebted poor countries continued to receive positive net disbursements from multilateral institutions in 1994.

External Debt and Debt Service

Despite increasingly concessional reschedulings,12 other bilateral debt relief, and an increasing share of grants in official bilateral flows, official bilateral debt remains the fastest-growing portion of developing countries’ debt.13 The share of official bilateral debt in total medium- and long-term public external debt of all developing countries has risen steadily over the past decade to reach over one third by the end of 1994 (Chart 2 and Table 3). It has risen slightly faster than the share of multilateral debt over this period; both have increased relative to private sector creditors (including commercial banks), whose share declined by 15 percentage points in the decade to 1994 to reach 42 percent. These trends are more pronounced in the case of the heavily indebted poor countries. In the decade to 1994, the share of private sector creditors in the heavily indebted poor countries’ debt fell by some 16 percentage points to 15 percent of total debt as a result of debt-reduction agreements and much reduced new lending. By contrast, the share of official bilateral creditors has risen by 14 percentage points over the same period to reach 55 percent of total debt, while the share of multilateral institutions has risen by 3 percentage points, reaching 31 percent by the end of 1994. Both the composition of debt (by creditor groups) and the debt burden of the low-income rescheduling countries vary considerably from country to country (Box 2).

Table 1.Country Composition of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries1
Included in 14 Low-Income
Included inRescheduling Countries
Paris ClubWorld Bank27 Low Incomefor which Medium-
TreatmentClassificationsRescheduling Countries 2Term Analysis Done 3
AngolaNCR 4SIMIC
BeninCRMILIC
BoliviaCRSIMIC
Burkina FasoCRLILIC
BurundiNRSILIC
CameroonCRSIMIC
Central African RepublicCRSILIC
ChadCRMILIC
CongoNCRSIMIC
Cote d’ivoireCRSILIC
Equatorial GuineaCRSILIC
EthiopiaCRSILIC
GhanaNRSILIC
GuineaCRSILIC
Guinea-BissauCRSILIC
GuyanaCRSILIC
HondurasCRSILIC
KenyaER 5SILIC
Lao People’s Democratic RepublicNRSILIC
LiberiaNCR 4SILIC
MadagascarCRSILIC
MaliCRSILIC
MauritaniaCRSILIC
MozambiqueCRSILIC
MyanmarNRSILIC
NicaraguaCRSILIC
NigerCRSILIC
NigeriaNCRSILIC
RwandaNRSILIC
Sao Tome and PrincipeNRSILIC
SenegalCRMIMIC
Sierra LeoneCRSILIC
SomaliaNCR 4SILIC
SudanNCR 4SILK
TanzaniaCRSILIC
TogoCRMILIC
UgandaER 6SILIC
VietnamER 7SILIC
Yemen. Republic ofNRSILIC
ZaireCRSILIC
ZambiaCRSILIC
Sources: World Bank. World Debt Tables 1994-95; and Paris Club.
Classifications:
Paris clubWorld bank
CR  —Concessional reschedulingSILIC  —Severely indebted low-incomecountries
NR  —Nonrescheduling countrySIMICS —Severely indebted middle-income countries
NCR—Nonconcessional reschedulingMILIC —Moderately indebted low-income countries
ER  —Exit rescheduling (rescheduling arrears only)LILIC  —Less indebted low-income countries
MIMIC —Moderately indebted middle-income countries
Table 2.Multilateral Disbursements to, and Debt Service from. Developing Countries1(In billions oj U.S. dollars except where indicated)
1985-89
Average199019911992199319942
(All developing countries3)
Gross disbursements26.036.439.135.637.137.5
Debt service27.934.536.536.937.439.3
Net transfers-1.91.92.6-1.3-0.3-1.8
Net disbursements9.115.417.713.815.213.7
Debt service (as a percentage of exports of goods and services)4.54.24.14.14.03.9
(Heavily indebted poor countries 4)
Gross disbursements4.55.85.65.44.96.1
Debt service3.24.14.33.63.74.0
Net transfers1.31.71,31.81.22.1
Net disbursements2.53.33.23.42.73.7
Debt service (as a percentage of exports of goods and services)8.78.39.17.48.08.7
Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System: and IMF staff estimates.

Notwithstanding the buildup of multilateral debt, multilateral debt service has remained broadly unchanged over the last decade at around 4 percent of exports of goods and services for all developing countries, and 8½ a percent for heavily indebted poor countries, as a result of new multilateral lending being provided on increasingly concessional terms (Table 2). The share of concessional debt in total multilateral debt of the heavily indebted poor countries has risen by some 20 percentage points in the last decade to reach 70 percent at the end of 1994 (Table 3).

External debt can also imply a heavy burden from the viewpoint of government budgets; this issue is discussed in Appendix II and summarized in Box 3.

Paris club Reschedulings

Low-income Countries

Paris club creditors agreed on naples terms for low-income rescheduling countries in december 1994 (for a summary of naples terms, see Box 4). During the first seven months of 1995,14, 15 11 reschedulings were agreed under these terms for low-income countries—10 flow reschedulings, for bolivia, cambodia, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-bissau, Haiti, Mauritania, Nicaragua, senegal, and togo—and one stock-of-debt operation, for uganda.16 all of these reschedulings involved a 67 percent net present value (npv) reduction of eligible debt except for that for guinea, which involved a 50 percent npv reduction. In four cases (chad, guinea-bissau, mauritania, and togo), the agreements provided for a topping up17 of certain debt previously rescheduled on toronto terms to a 67 percent npv reduction; this was also the case for the stock-of-debt operation for uganda. In two cases (guinea-bissau and senegal), reflecting extremely difficult financial positions, the agreements provided for an exceptional, but nonconcessional, deferral of arrears on post-cutoff date debt.

Most of the agreements—with chad, guinea-bissau. Mauritania, nicaragua, senegal, and togo—featured a goodwill clause stating that creditors agree to consider a stock-of-debt operation at a later date provided (he debtor implements the agreement in full and continues to have an appropriate arrangement with the imf (Table 5).18 For bolivia, a possible stock-of-debt operation was envisaged in 1995 provided creditors can reach a consensus to choose concessional options. For guinea, the goodwill clause contained in the 1992 agreement continues to apply. The agreements with cambodia and haiti did not contain such a goodwill clause, as both countries have relatively small remaining debts to paris club creditors after the current rescheduling agreements. With these two exceptions, there is little prospect that most low-income rescheduling countries can graduate from the rescheduling process in the absence of stock-of-debt operations (as is discussed further in section III below).

Chart 2.Developing countries: public external debt by creditor groups

(in billions of u.s. Dollars)

Source: Table 3

1 Provisional.

Middle-income countries

Most middle-income countries, by contrast, have graduated from the rescheduling process. Of the 30 middle-income countries that required paris club reschedulings in the past decade, 19 have now graduated, though some of the recent graduates (such as costa rica, the dominican republic, and guatemala) have subsequently run up arrears to paris club creditors (Table 4). Moreover, the majority of the remaining middle-income countries with agreements now in force are expected to graduate at the end of their current consolidation periods. Four middle-income countries—algeria, croatia, the former yugoslav republic of macedonia, and the russian federation—reached rescheduling agreements in the first seven months of 1995. All of these agreements incorporated graduated repayment schedules—involving short grace periods (2-3 years), with total debt-service payments (interest and principal combined) rising steadily over the repayment period (15 years). The agreement with the former yugoslav republic of macedonia—-reflecting its exceptional circumstances-featured a deferral of arrears on post-cutoff date debt over 6 years.

Table 3.Developing Countries: Public Medium- and Long-Term External Debt by Creditor1, 2
All Developing Countries 3Heavily Indebted Poor countries 4
1984199019931994519841990199319945
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
Total external debt6421,1041.2461.33177186191200
(In percent of total)
Of which:
Multilateral18.722.123.323.227.725.529.130.5
IMF5.63.13.13.27.73.73.33.7
Other13.119.020.220.020.021.925.826.8
Official bilateral24.432.234.234.741.054.354.854,7
Private57.045.742.542.131.320.116.014.9
Memorandum item
Share of multilateral debt on concessional terms (in percent)30.930.933.535.650.360.768.069.8
Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System; and IMF staff estimates.

Box 2.External Positions of Low-Income Rescheduling Countries, 19941

In aggregate

  • noninterest current account deficits2 averaged over 40 percent of exports (of goods and services);

  • while scheduled debt service averaged around 55 percent of exports, actual debt service, as a result of reschedulings and in some cases the accumulation of arrears, averaged around 20 percent of exports;

  • new external inflows3 (including grants), at almost 70 percent of exports, averaged more than three times actual debt service paid (chart 3, see p. 16);

  • hence, even if these countries had no external debt at all, they would remain heavily dependent on further concessional inflows. This applies to nearly all of the low-income rescheduling countries in the sense that new inflows exceeded debt service paid in 1994 (chart 3).4 The position differs widely from country to country. Thus in 1994

  • noninterest current account balances varied from surpluses (cameroon, cote d’lvoire, guyana, and zaire) to deficits exceeding 100 percent of exports (mozambique and nicaragua);

  • scheduled debt service varied from less than 20 percent of exports (burkina faso and chad) to more than 100 percent (mozambique and nicaragua);

  • actual debt service ranged from less than 5 percent of exports (chad and zaire) to more than 50 percent (nicaragua and uganda); and

  • countries are indebted to a variety of creditors, including paris club creditors, non-paris club bilateral creditors (notably russia), commercial banks, and multilateral creditors (imf, world bank, and other multilateral institutions).

Source: fund staff estimates1 For country coverage see box 1 and table 1.2 Used as an indicator of a country’s capacity to service debt out of its own resources.3 Excluding those from imf.4 cameroon and guyana are exceptions; for guyana, new flows exceeded actual debt service paid in 1993 (although not in 1994).

Box 3.Fiscal Burden of External Debt

An issue of increasing concern has been the fiscal burden of external debt. Appendix II examines this issue for the heavily indebted poor countries. Its principal conclusions are:

  • Based on 1994 data, around half of these countries face scheduled debt-service payments on public sector debt exceeding one half of government revenue. For more than one quarter of the countries, scheduled debt service exceeds total government revenue.

  • Actual debt service paid on average was only one third of scheduled debt service as a result of debt relief or the accumulation of arrears.

  • In most cases, receipts of foreign grants—which are mostly project related—exceeded actual debt service paid.

  • For most of the countries, the assessment based on fiscal debt indicators parallels that on external indicators such as the debt service-to-exports ratio.

  • A minority of countries—such as cameroon, the central african republic, chad, equatorial guinea. Niger, senega!, and tanzania—face relatively higher external debt burdens measured against government revenues than against exports. In some of these countries, this reflects relatively low re venue-to-gdp ratios.

A more thorough assessment of the fiscal sustainability of external debt would need to be made on a country-specific basis.

Box 4.Paris Club Naples Terms

Key elements of naples terms, which have replaced the previous concessional (toronto or london) tenns, for low-income countries are:

Eligibility. decided by creditors on a case-by-case basis, based primarily on a country’s income level, counuies that have previously received concessional reschedulings {on toronto or london terms) are eligible for naples terms.

Concessionality. Most countries receive a reduction in eligible non-oda debt of 67 percent in net present value (npv) terms. Some countries with a per capita income of more than $500 and a ratio of debt to ex-ports in present value terms of less than 350 percent—decided on a case-by-case basis—receive a 50 percent npv reduction.

Coverage. The coverage (inclusion in the rescheduling agreement) of non-oda pre-cutoff date debt is decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of balance of payments needs. Debt previously rescheduled on concessional (either toronto or london) terms is potentially subject to further rescheduling, to top up the amount of concessional ity given.1

Choice of options. Creditors have a choice of two concessional options for achieving a 67 (or 50) percent npv reduction,2 namely a debt reduction (dr) option (repayment over 23 years with 6 years’ grace), or a debt-service reduction (dsr) option, under which the npv reduction is achieved by concessional interest rates (with repayment over 33 years).3-4

There is also a commercial or long maturities (lm) option, providing for no npv reduction (repayment over 40 years with 20 years’ grace).5

ODA credits. Pre-cutoff date credits are rescheduled on the original concessional interest rates over 40 years with 16 years’ grace (30 years’ maturity with 12 years’ grace for 50 percent npv reduction).

Flow reschedulings provide for the rescheduling of debt service on eligible debt falling due during the consolidation period (generally in line with the period of the imf arrangement).

Stock-of-debt operations, under which the entire stock of eligible pre-cutoff date debt is rescheduled conces-sionally, are reserved for countries with a satisfactory track record for a minimum of three years with respect to both payments under rescheduling agreements and performance under imf arrangements. Creditors must be confident that the country will be able to respect the debt agreement as an exit rescheduling (with no further reschedulings required) and there must be a consensus among creditors to choose concessional options.

1 Under such topping up. The npv reduction is increased from the original level given under toronto or london terms to the new level agreed under naples terms, namely 67 or 50 percent.2 For a 50 percent npv reduction, the dsr option provides for repayment over 23 years with 6 years’ grace and the lm op-don for repayment over 25 years with 16 years’ grace.3 For flow reschedulings, there is no grace period, and for stock-of-debt operations the grace period is three years.4 There is, in addition, a capitalization of moratorium interest (cmi) option, which also achieves the npv reduction by a higher interest rate over the same repayment period as the dsr option.5 Creditors choosing this option undertake best efforts to change to a concessional option at a later date when feasible.
Table 4.Status of Paris Club Rescheduling Countries Since 1980

(as of July 31, 1995)1

Low-IncomeLower Middle-Income 2Other Middle-IncomeTotal
Countries that have graduated from reschedulings
Gambia. The9/87Dominican Republic3/93Argentina3/95
Malawi5/89Ecuador12/94Bulgaria4/95
** Uganda2/95Egypt5/91 3Brazil8/93
* Vietnam12/93 4El Salvador9/91Chile12/88
Guatemala 43/934Costa Rica6/93 4
Kenya1/96 45Mexico5/92
Morocco12/92Panama3/92
Philippines7/94 6Romania12/83
Poland4/91Trinidad and Tobago3/91
Turkey6/83
Subtotal491023
Countries with rescheduling agreements in effect
* Benin12/95Jamaica9/95Algeria5/98
** Bolivia12/97Jordan5/97Croatia12/95
* Burkina Faso12/95Peru3/96Former Yugoslav
** Cambodia3/97Republic of Macedonia 76/967
* Cote d’lvoire3/97Russian Federation12/95
* Ethiopia10/95
* Equatorial Guinea2/96
** Guinea12/95
** Guinea-Bissau12/97
** Haiti3/96
* Honduras7/95
* Mali8/95
** Mauritania12/97
** Nicaragua6/97
** Senegal8/97
* Sierra Leone12/95
** Togo9/97
Subtotal173424
Countries with previous rescheduling agreements, hut without current rescheduling agreements.
which have not graduated from reschedulings
Angola9/90Congo5/95Gabon3/95
* Cameroon9/95 8Nigeria3/92Yugoslavia 96/89
* Central African Republic3/95
** Chad3/95
* Guyana12/94 10
Liberia6/85
Madagascar6/91 11
* Mozambique6/95 12
* Niger3/95
Somalia12/88
Sudan12/84
* Tanzania6/94
Zaire6/90 11
* Zambia3/95 13
Subtotal142218
All countries35141665
Source: Paris ClubNote: Dates refer to end of current or last consolidation period. In the case of a stock-of-debt operation, canceled agreement, or arrears-only rescheduling, date shown is that of relevant agreement. An* denotes rescheduling on London terms, and ** denotes rescheduling on Naples terms (stock treatment underlined).
Table 5.Low-income rescheduling countries: consolidation periods and dates for actual or possible debt-stock operations.1
Date of actual/possibleEnd of currentPeriod between end of consolidationCurrent and prospective (…)
Debt stock operationOr lastPeriod and stock ofImf arrangement
Specified in latestConsolidationDebt operationEnd of arrangement
Agreed minute 2Period(in months)typeperiod 3
uganda2/95 4stock 4-esaf9/97
bolivia1/95 512/97-esaf12/97
tanzania1/956/947
zambia7/953/954rap11/95
mali10/958/952esaf8/95
honduras10/957/953esaf7/95 6
guinea11/95 712/95esaf9/96 8
benin12/9512/95-esaf1/96
elhiopia12/9510/952saf10/95
sierra leone12/95 212/95-esaf3/97
mozambique3/966/95 99esaf5/9310
burkina faso5/9612/955esaf3/96
guyana5/9612/9417esaf7/97
cameroon3/9729/9518sba9/95
chad3/973/9524esaf9/97 11
niger3/973/9524
cole d’ivoire3/973/97-esaf3/97
central african republic-4/973/9525
nicaragua6/9726/97-esaf6/97
senegal8/9728/97-esaf8/97
equatorial guinea12/972/9622esaf5/96
mauritania12/97212/97-esaf1/98
guinea bissau2/9812/972esaf1/98
togo2/98 29/975esaf9/97
sources: paris club: and imf staff estimates.

Non-paris Club Bilateral Creditors

Less progress has been made by debtors in negotiations with non-paris club official bilateral creditors. Section vii describes the agreements that have been reached over the past year. The largest single creditor in this group is the russian federation (for a description of russia’s claims on developing countries, see box 5). For debtor countries that have reached rescheduling agreements with paris club creditors, the terms of these agreements prevent the debtor from reaching agreement with any other bilateral creditor that does not provide at least comparable treatment; however, they do not prevent the creditor offering, and the debtor agreeing, more generous terms.19 for a number of countries facing particularly severe debt and financing problems and with very large obligations to non-paris club official bilateral creditors, debt restructuring by these creditors would need to take fully into account these countries’ limited payments capacity.20 early agreement would also be highly desirable so that normal relations with all creditors can be restored and the resulting debt-service obligations can be fully incorporated into medium-term macrocconomic frameworks.

Box 5.Developing Countries’ debt to the Russian Federation

Based on the russian authorities* data,1 russia is among the largest official bilateral creditors of developing countries.

  • According to the russian valuation, russian claims on developing countries inherited from the former soviet union exceeded $170 billion at the end of 1993.

  • On this valuation basis, russia is a particularly important creditor of the heavily indebted poor countries. Two thirds of the heavily indebted poor coun-tries are indebted to russia. Russia’s claims account for around one quarter of these countries’ total debt.

  • Many of russia’s claims are disputed by debtors in terms of both coverage and valuation.

  • Partly in consequence, only small payments have been received on this debt during the last five years.

  • Russia has reached rescheduling and restructuring agreements, some involving substantial discounts, with several debtors (such as bolivia in 1990, jordan in 1992, and india in 1993).2

1 According to the russian authorities, their debt should be valued at the u.s.s.r. Gosbank official ruble exchange rate (rub 0.5854 per u.s. Dollar as at the end of 1993) as was provided for in many of the debt agreements. For further details see Appendix II.2 For details, see box A18.

Box 6.External Debt of Certain Countries of the Eormer Sovietunion

There has been a rapid buildup of external debt by certain countries of the former soviet union1 such as armenia, georgia, the kyrgyz republic, and tajikistan. In summary:

  • The buildup of debt to creditors outside the former soviet union reflects bilateral and multilateral assistance in support of stabilization efforts and structural reforms as well as the use of import finance and, for russia, the capitalization of interest on existing debt.

  • The buildup of debt within the former soviet union, mainly to russia and turkmenistan, reflects the conversion by russia of correspondent account balances to state debts, the provision of new state credits, and the conversion of trade arrears to state debts.

  • The sharp buildup of trade-related arrears results from the large rise in the price of energy imports (toward world market prices) in a system of traditional trade relations under which suppliers continued to deliver goods without payments.

  • A factor in the debt buildup was inadequate debt-monitoring and control systems: many countries have taken steps to set up and strengthen such systems.

  • The profile of scheduled debt service for the medium term of several of these countries (notably georgia and tajikistan) raises the prospect of further debt reschedulings to reduce actual debt service to the country’s payments capacity.

1 For further details, see appendix III.

An issue that has arisen over the last year or two was the need for certain countries of the former soviet union to secure rescheduling agreements with their creditors, as a result of their extremely rapid buildup of external debt (described in box 6). Paris club rescheduling was not an option, as the debtors con-cerned generally had limited, if any, eligible debts to paris club creditors.21 thus, the debtor was left to seek bilateral rescheduling agreements with its official creditors in the absence of the multilateral framework provided by the paris club. In some cases, such as ukraine, with a limited number of creditors involved, this process worked well. In others, such as georgia, with a larger number of official creditors involved, in order to facilitate the process and obtain the financing assurances required for imf support, the imf staff held meetings with concerned creditors. Most, though not all, official creditors agreed to undertake bilateral negotiations on the basis of the financing assumptions underlying the program. This is an evolving process—and not always a smooth one—where the imf staff is seeking to secure the financing assurances necessary for program approval with the cooperation of debtors and creditors concerned, in the absence of the established multilateral framework provided by the paris club.

This section is based on data from the development assistance committee of the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd). These data are not consistent with the international union of credit and investment insurers (the berne union) and world bank data used below. Data on development flows exclude export credits, as these are primarily trade related (discussed below); international monetary fund (imf) financing from the general resources account (gra) is excluded while that from the trust fund, structural adjustment facility (saf), and enhanced structural adjustment facility (esaf) is included. See box 11.

The definition of developing countries used here and immediately below depends on the data source: see footnote 2 and box 11.

Adjusted by the OECD for inflation and currency movements; for a full explanation see Section IV

For details and country coverage see Section IV.

This subsection is based on commitment data supplied by the berne union; the disbursements of insured credits arising from these commitments often occur months or years later, and the berne union does not collect total data on repayments. Hence, it is not possible to assess net flows clearly from berne union data. For more detail, see section v. For a detailed description of the role of export credit agencies in financing developing countries and economies in transition, see officially supported export credits: Recent Developments and Prospects, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington: International Monetary Fund, March 1995); Appendix I of that document contains a glossary of terms.

Net ODF data from OECD (DAC) sources used above exclude export credits.

About a quarter of this increase is attributable to the broadening of the Berne Union’s country coverage.

This subsection is based on data from the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System that are not consistent with the OECD (DAC) data used above. The coverage of developing countries is also not the same—for further details seebox 11.

For the multilateral institutions covered, see Section VI. Grants from multilateral agencies—mainly the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN)—are excluded as non-debt-creating flows (totaling around $10 billion in 1993, according to OECD data).

Attributable to lower net disbursements to several large countries, including CFA frane countries.

For details see below and Section VII.

This subsection is based on World Bank Debtor Reporting System data.

There were no reschedulings in the last five months of 1994, except for equatorial guinea in december, partly because naples terms were under consideration by paris club creditors. For details, see section vii.

table 4 summarizes the status of paris club rescheduling countries as at the end of july 1995.

For details of reschedulings, including coverage and terms, see section vii.

For an explanation, see box 4(“coverage”).

The date provided is either three years from the agreed minute, or, for countries with prior track records, at the end of the consolidation period.

Paris club creditors also take into account the provision of new money by respective creditor groups in assessing comparability.

Examples of such agreements already exist, such as russia’s 1992 agreement with jordan (sec box A18).

Much of the debt also arose from the consolidation of paymeats arrears rather than from formal lending by government agencies (see box 6).

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