Race to the Next Income Frontier

Chapter 8. On the Quest for Higher Growth: The Role of Public Expenditure in Senegal

Ali Mansoor, Salifou Issoufou, and Daouda Sembene
Published Date:
April 2018
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João Tovar Jalles and Carlos Mulas-Granados


Growing at about 3 percent per year since 2000 and with per capita income at US$2,311 in 2014, Senegal is at a crucial moment to unlock its growth potential further. While it is already among the fastest-growing low-income countries, Senegal needs to grow at a rate of 5 percent per year during the next two decades if it is to become an emerging market economy. This challenge may be difficult, but the experience of other countries that have successfully made the transition suggests it is feasible. For example, between 2000 and 2014, per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent in Morocco, 5.4 percent in Uruguay, 4.8 percent in Turkey, 4.5 percent in Argentina, and almost 8.5 percent in Korea, a country that managed to transform itself into a high-income economy in just over a generation.

With the overarching objective of transforming Senegal into an emerging market by 2035, in 2014 the government approved the Plan Sénégal Émergent, which rests on three pillars: (1) higher and sustainable growth through structural transformation, (2) human development and social protection, and (3) improved governance, peace, and security. Because financing development requires appropriate fiscal policies, the Plan Sénégal Émergent relies on a new composition of public finances through a strategy that envisages raising additional revenues and rebalancing spending from current expenditures to capital investment. This fiscal strategy contrasts with the experience of Senegal throughout the past decade, which has been characterized by weak revenue performance (see Chapter 6) and substantial increases in public consumption (particularly the wage bill) but has not been accompanied by parallel improvements in economic growth.

This chapter analyzes the composition of public expenditures in Senegal between 2004 and 2014 and highlights some areas for improvement. In particular, it recommends specific measures to reduce the government wage bill and current expenditures on goods and services, in order to improve the quality of spending on education and health. The chapter also reflects on the need to embed the new fiscal strategy into a medium-term budget framework and finishes with a series of recommendations to improve the effectiveness of public investment.

Senegal’s Recent Experience of High Spending and Disappointing Growth

The linkages between public expenditure and growth have been widely studied.1 With few exceptions, studies looking at the economic decomposition of budgetary items usually find evidence that government consumption is negatively correlated with economic growth (Landau 1983; Grier and Tullock 1989; Lee 1995; Barro 1997; Romero-Avila and Strauch 2008; Afonso and Furceri 2010).2Afonso and Jalles (2016) show that the detrimental effect of the size of a country’s government on its economic activity is stronger the lower its institutional quality, while the positive effect of institutional quality on output increases with smaller government sizes.

In Senegal, growth in spending has outpaced growth in revenue (between 2004 and 2014, government spending increased from 23 to 29 percent of GDP), and fiscal deficits were rising until 2011 (Figure 8.1). Such expenditure growth has been mostly driven by investment spending and the wage bill (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.1.Annual Budget Balance, Expenditure, and Revenues in Senegal, 2000–14

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 8.2.Total Annual Expenditure by Major Component in Senegal, 2000–14

(Percent of total expenditure)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Total government spending in Senegal has been relatively high, averaging 26.8 percent of GDP over 2004–14 (Figure 8.3). Despite these relatively high spending levels, average GDP growth has been lackluster and well below the averages for both West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries and emerging market economies.3 Countries in WAEMU such as Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger and, more generally, emerging market economies such as India, Mauritania, Mozambique, Panama, and Vietnam have attained average growth rates higher than Senegal’s while maintaining similar (or lower) levels of public expenditure as a share of GDP (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.3.Total Public Expenditures, Senegal and Emerging Market Economies, 2014

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: EMEs = emerging market economies; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Figure 8.4.Relationship between Total Public Expenditure and Growth in GDP per Capita, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2004–14

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

The Senegalese authorities are fully aware that high relative levels of public spending in the past have not been accompanied by high rates of economic growth. This is why the Plan Sénégal Émergent calls for an ambitious medium-term fiscal consolidation plan and, in this context, the government aims to reduce the headline fiscal deficit from 4.9 percent of GDP in 2014 to the WAEMU target of 3 percent of GDP by 2019. The main objective of this revised fiscal strategy is to pursue an expenditure-based fiscal adjustment based on a better composition of spending to create fiscal space for critical investment projects that can boost economic growth.

Options for Improving the Quality of Consumption Expenditures

Unleashing the country’s growth potential, in the spirit of the Plan Sénégal Émergent, will require achieving budgetary savings, and three key spending areas in which such savings may be likely are the wage bill, nonpriority goods, and services. While efforts to rationalize spending and improve its efficiency are underway, more needs to be done.

The central government wage bill continues to be high by international comparisons, and it threatens medium-term fiscal sustainability. As a share of domestic revenue, the wage bill stood at about 40 percent in 2014, well above the averages for both emerging market economies and WAEMU countries (Figure 8.5).4 Most countries with similar GDPs per capita have a much smaller share of the wage bill component (Figure 8.6). Against the backdrop of recurrent revenue shortfalls and the warranted caution regarding medium-term revenue prospects (see Chapter 6), the large consolidated wage bill remains a source of concern.

Figure 8.5.Wage Bill as a Share of Domestic Revenue, Senegal and Comparator Country Averages, 2014

(Percent of domestic revenue)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union

Figure 8.6.Public Wage Bill as Share of Revenue and GDP per Capita, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2014

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

In addition, the high wage bill has crowded out nonwage outlays, thus impinging on the efficiency of public services’ delivery. Overall, personnel costs were almost 60 percent of current spending, excluding interest, in 2014. However, efficiency in the provision of government services depends not only on the labor input, but also on the optimal mix of other inputs.

The main drivers for such continued increases in the wage bill have been high levels of public employment and compensation. Although the central government’s workforce size (at 1.1 percent of the population) is not high relative to that of comparator countries, the growth of the public workforce in the past few years has outpaced that of the population (increasing by 4 percent compared to 3 percent, respectively). Similarly, average total compensation grew at about 4.5 percent on average between 2002 and 2014, mostly driven by increases in wage supplements (Figure 8.7).

Figure 8.7.Growth Rate of Wage Bill Components, Senegal, 2002–14

(Index, 2012 = 100)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

On public employment, the lack of centralized control over recruitment undermines the management of the wage bill.5 While efforts to improve the payroll management system continue (including a hiring freeze), a publicized medium-term overall strategy is needed with time-bound intermediate actions that have the agreement of social partners. Wage supplements and other forms of compensation accounted for almost half the total nominal compensation in 2014.6 The heavy reliance on wage supplements in the compensation system raises three issues: lack of transparency, lack of control (that is, duplicative benefits), and lack of targeting, which in turn generates inequities. The relatively low (in international terms) compression rate of 3.2 in 2014 suggests that low-skilled workers are overpaid. Ultimately, the wage-setting mechanism continues to be employed outside the budget preparation process, thus compromising fiscal sustainability as well as an efficient spending composition.

In the face of this, in the short term the government should consider a cut in the level of wage benefits, supplements, and allowances and review their legal basis and the underlying criteria for eligibility to eliminate undue and illegal payments.7 Tackling the high wage bill also involves containing the growth in the base wage by adjusting it at a rate less than inflation. Moreover, it is important to tighten eligibility for and control of overtime by (1) reinstating the control of the Ministry of Finance to prevent abuses, (2) strictly limiting the use of overtime to the priority sectors (education, health, and defense), (3) suspending the premium on the hourly wage, and (4) substituting leave time for monetary compensation.

In the medium term, international experiences suggest that countries that were able to reduce the size of the wage bill in a sustained way relied more on structural measures and extensive social dialogue. In this context, better control of the size of the public workforce through effective gatekeeping and reforming central government compensation are key to promoting an efficient and competitive public sector with equal pay.8 Furthermore, both a careful sequencing of reforms of the country’s ownership and broad-based consultation are critical for success.

Contrary to the growth in the wage bill, spending on goods and services (3 percent of GDP in 2014) has been trending downward in recent years (Figure 8.8). Moreover, while investment and capital stock in Senegal have been increasing, spending on operations and maintenance—those recurrent outlays that are necessary to sustain programs at the intended level—has remained relatively flat (Figure 8.9).9 The problem is that higher growth depends heavily on efficient use of the existing capital stock, so poorly maintained and unreliable infrastructure and service delivery hamper economic activity.

Figure 8.8.Spending on Goods and Services and on Operations and Maintenance, Senegal, 2011–14

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 8.9.Average Growth Rates of Capital Stock, Public Investment, and Operations and Maintenance, Senegal, 2011–14


Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Unfortunately, inadequate operations and maintenance spending appears to have contributed to the weak growth impact of high public spending in Senegal. The inadequate provision for operations and maintenance expenditure can be explained by the shortage of funds owing to limited resources and excessive levels of expenditure on other components (such as the wage bill). Also, operations and maintenance expenditures often have a low priority in government budgets, since they are politically less appealing and less visible than new investment projects.

In the face of this, the government needs to formulate an operations and maintenance strategy to overcome the existing poor planning and budgeting. First, goods and services have been driven by subitems (such as telephone, fuel, and other expenses) that could be rationalized with no measurable impact on the output in favor of those items that are essential operations and maintenance spending (such as road maintenance). Second, savings achieved in the rationalization of the wage bill could be partly reallocated to operations and maintenance. Doing these things would improve the relative mix of wages and operations and maintenance for efficient and better public service delivery.

Finally, while reducing inefficient current expenditures is difficult, the major challenge that Senegalese authorities face is to improve the quality of public investment in both human and physical capital. The following two sections deal with these in turn.

Investing in Human Capital: Education and Health

The relationship between human capital, including education and health, and economic growth is well established (Baum and Lin 1993; Afonso and Alegre 2011; Afonso and Jalles 2014). This is why the Plan Sénégal Émergent stresses the critical role of education in enabling high-quality human capital to alleviate poverty and boost productivity and growth in the labor-intensive sectors.

Senegal has a strong record in education spending, which has increased in recent years. It has risen from about 6.8 percent of GDP in 2011 to about 8.0 percent in 2014, reflecting the government’s priority of enhancing human capital and making it a standout in international comparisons among emerging market economies (Figure 8.10). The government’s spending on tertiary and vocational education has begun to make up a larger proportion of the total education budget (Figure 8.11). This shift reflects the unprecedented increase in university students since 2010, which was the direct consequence of the introduction of universal primary schooling in the early 1990s.

Figure 8.10.Average Government Education Spending, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2008–13

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 8.11.Public Expenditure on Education, by Level, Senegal, 2011–14

(Percent of total education spending)

Source: Country authorities.

Today, the education sector is the main driver of total government spending in Senegal. This sector claimed about 26 percent of total government spending in 2014, while health spending accounted for a relatively smaller share of about 8 percent (Figure 8.12). The expansion of education usually requires an intensive policy of public employment involving new teachers and administrative staff linked to the schooling of new student cohorts. This partly explains why the education sector represents the largest share of public employment in Senegal; with about 93,000 employees it represents 60 percent of total public employment (Figure 8.13) and accounts for 56 percent of the public wage bill.

Figure 8.12.Share of Total Public Expenditure by Economic Sector, Senegal, 2010–14


Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 8.13.Distribution of Government Employment by Sector, Senegal, 2011–14

(Percent of total government wage bill)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

The other factor contributing to education’s prominent role in total public employment is unrelated to either the increase in students or the pursuit of universal schooling. Instead, it has to do with an overly generous system of recruitment. Under the corps émergents recruitment program, significant increases in staffing have occurred in the education sector.10 Every year, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 contracted teachers and other pedagogical support staff, initially recruited as corps émergents, are integrated into the civil service after completing a minimum two-year on-the-job training program and earning a pedagogical certificate. This happens automatically, with no further evaluation of long-term needs, generating a tremendous upward pressure in education spending that may become unsustainable. This is why the government needs to adopt a comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem of corps émergents by discontinuing the automatic conversion into the public service, streamlining the process of conversion to shorten the time between eligibility and effective payments of benefits, and designing and publicizing a binding plan to gradually absorb the existing stock of contracted workers.

Higher public education spending has not translated into commensurate outcomes, thus pointing to underlying inefficiencies. Senegal’s education outcomes have fallen short of the achievements of other countries with similar levels of spending in terms of enrollment rates at all levels of education, years of total schooling, and dropout rates (Figures 8.14 and 8.15). Moreover, the unbalanced distribution of resources between the tertiary and lower levels of education raises equity issues. Since primary and secondary education are likely to benefit the poor more than others, especially in rural areas, the progressivity of public education spending might have declined. The government should implement a reform of the education sector that tackles its low completion rates and high dropout rates. Based on cross-country experiences, the authorities could explore ways to introduce performance-based pay for teachers, linking their benefits in part to students’ performance, and it could consider well-targeted conditional cash transfer programs to improve school enrollment in primary and secondary education for the poorest.

Figure 8.14.Gross Secondary School Enrollment, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2008 versus 2011 (or Latest Year Available)

(Percent of gross enrollment)

Sources: Barro and Lee 2010 data set, updated; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Note: If there is late enrollment, early enrollment, or repetition, the total enrollment can exceed the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education—leading to ratios greater than 100 percent.

Figure 8.15.Average Years of Total Schooling, Ages 15 and Older, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2010

Sources: Barro and Lee 2010 data set, updated; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Although investment in education has increased recently, the high wage bill continues to crowd out nonwage outlays, thereby impinging on the efficient delivery of education services. At the primary school level, the World Bank (2012a) reports that high personnel costs leave only 9 percent of the budget for other outlays, such as pedagogical materials, well below the internationally recommended 20 percent share. Likewise, at the university level very little is left to operational expenses (Figure 8.16). Given the resulting limited fiscal space for capital expenditure, critical education infrastructure has been consistently postponed. Improving the expenditure composition mix to free resources for operations and maintenance and other investment in the education sector is critical both to achieve better education outcomes and to address inequality issues.

Figure 8.16.Composition of Spending on Universities, Selected West African Countries, 2012


Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Human capital formation is a matter of both high-quality education and strong health status. In the field of health services, Senegal has recently improved, but here too it faces important challenges.

After a significant increase in 2012, public health spending has stabilized.11 At 2 percent of GDP, health spending is low relative to that in comparator countries (Figure 8.17). The government intends to boost public health expenditure, notably with the rollout of the national universal health care program. This new initiative aims to increase coverage of the population by the end of 2017 from the current 20 percent to reach 75 percent. This is an important effort since there is no public health insurance in Senegal, with the exception of a few specific programs that provide free drugs for targeted diseases (such as HIV) and free health care to vulnerable groups such as children, women, and senior citizens. While the government estimates an annual cost for this program of about US$67 million (0.4 percent of 2015 GDP), it has become clear that there is a need for greater efficiency in health spending to ensure fiscal sustainability.

Figure 8.17.Public Health Expenditure in Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2013

(Percent of GDP)

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Despite notable improvements in absolute terms, Senegal’s health outcomes have underperformed relative to those in emerging market economies with comparable public health spending levels (Figure 8.18). This suggests some inefficiency in health expenditure. In particular, the high wage bill has crowded out nonwage outlays, thus impinging on the efficient delivery of health spending.12 Like the education sector, the health sector is also burdened by relatively high personnel costs relative to other vital inputs. A study (using data envelopment analysis) of Senegalese hospitals found that a 27 percent cut in labor input would have no measurable negative impact on hospitals’ health care output (World Bank 2012b). Moreover, in hospitals, the lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms has led to the creation of numerous bonuses for staff, financed from own-source revenue (Lemiere, Turbat, and Puret 2012).

Figure 8.18.Infant Mortality, Senegal and Selected Emerging Market Economies, 2013 versus 2008

(Per thousand births)

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health could play a larger oversight role to prevent spending excesses and compensate for the lack of budgetary authority over hospitals. In practice, this would involve aligning recruitments with available fiscal space, starting with support staff, and subjecting budgetary resources to clearly defined and monitorable performance indicators. Stricter control over the use of own-source revenue, notably by containing the share devoted to wage supplements and allowances, is also warranted. More generally, developing an effective system to monitor expenditures at the hospital level might provide incentives for the delivery of cost-effective health care services.

Making Public Investment More Efficient

This last section analyzes public investment in physical capital, given that this is the main instrument that the Plan Sénégal Émergent wants to use to transform Senegal into an emerging market economy.13 Theories of investment and economic growth date back to John Maynard Keynes (1936/1973), who first called attention to the existence of an independent investment function in the economy. Most empirical studies have found a positive, significant, and robust relationship between higher investment ratios and stronger economic growth. For example, Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and De Haan and Sturm (2000) all find that the ratio of total investment to GDP is among the few variables most robustly correlated with growth for a diverse group of countries.14

In the context of developing economies, it is important to distinguish between private and public investment, because the empirical evidence offers mixed results.15 On the one hand, public investment may crowd out private expenditures on capital goods as individuals seek to reestablish an optimal intertemporal allocation of resources.16Pritchett (1996) suggests the so-called “white-elephant” hypothesis, according to which public investment in developing countries is often used for unproductive and inappropriate projects. On the other hand, public capital—particularly infrastructure capital such as that for highways, water systems, sewers, and airports—is likely to bear a complementary relationship to private capital in the private investment function.17 Thus, higher public investment may raise the marginal productivity of private capital and thereby crowd in private investment, positively affecting output growth in net terms (Afonso and St. Aubyn 2009).

Senegalese authorities have been more identified with the second set of arguments mentioned, according to which public investment can be a powerful instrument to boost economic growth. This is why public investment in Senegal has increased substantially in the last decade. As a share of GDP, public investment doubled during the period 2000–14, reaching about 11 percent of GDP in 2014 (Figures 8.19 and 8.20). Most of the investment took place in urbanism and sanitation, in transport infrastructures, and in the social sectors (education and health).

Figure 8.19.Public Investment in Senegal by Funding Source, 2000–14

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 8.20.Public Investment in Senegal and Selected Comparator Countries, 2000 versus 2014

(Percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: EMEs = emerging market economies (frontier markets); LICs = low-income countries; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

While the investment effort has been increasingly financed through domestic resources, its composition has varied with the source of financing. Between 2008 and 2012, domestically financed public investment was largely devoted to projects related to habitat and urbanism. On the other hand, the externally financed investment projects gave priority to education and health sectors, leaving an insignificant amount for office equipment needed for the projects.

Cross-country comparisons point to serious deficiencies in Senegal’s public management system. Based on 2010 data from the Public Investment Management Index (PIMI), Senegal has one of the lowest scores among West African and other comparator countries (Dabla-Norris and others 2011). Notably, Senegal had a score of zero on project evaluation (Figure 8.21). Not surprisingly, the improvement in the stock of public capital was not commensurate with the increase in public investment between 2000 and 2014. Indeed, the accumulation of public capital stock was half of what it should have been, given the increase in public investment.18

Figure 8.21.Public Investment Efficiency, Senegal and Selected Comparator Countries

(Overall PIMI Score, 0–4 scale)

Source: Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) (Dabla-Norris and others 2011).

Note: LIC = low-income country; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

This calls for an urgent reform of the public investment management system. Several measures could help generate better value for public money on investment projects. In the short term, the linkages between the Plan Sénégal Émergent, the macroeconomic framework, and the sectoral strategies of the ministries should be strengthened. In addition, the method employed to calculate the execution rate of investment should be revised and strict limits introduced to reduce unexpected changes in the composition of public investment. Most importantly, a proper appraisal mechanism is needed to enhance project selection, including systematic application of cost-benefit analyses for large projects. Finally, projects need to be better classified and integrated into a new comprehensive database, in order to enhance the monitoring of new investment.


Senegal has set for itself a great goal: becoming an emerging market economy in the next two decades. In order for it to do so, the government has designed a comprehensive action plan, which relies heavily on a renewed fiscal strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to reduce the existing budget deficit, while increasing (good-quality) public investment to boost economic growth. For this renewed strategy to succeed, the only viable option is to reform the structure of public spending completely. This is a daunting task that will require decisive action by the government and the participation of other key political stakeholders (such as unions, social partners, and other parties in parliament).

Senegal needs to put the wage bill under control and eliminate redundant spending on goods and services while improving operations and maintenance spending. Investment in human capital in education and health needs to grow more in quality than in quantity, while investment in physical capital requires a careful selection and evaluation of projects to make sure Senegal gets a high economic and social return from every infrastructure project it undertakes in the years to come.

Finally, the probability of success for this new fiscal strategy, associated with the Plan Sénégal Émergent, could be raised by strengthening current budget institutions. In this respect, Senegal needs to move to robust medium-term budget frameworks, greater use of expenditure reviews, and stronger intergovernmental fiscal coordination.


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See Zagler and Dürnecker 2003 and Gemmel 2004 for recent surveys.

A notable exception is the work by Slemrod, Gale, and Easterly (1995), who find a positive correlation between government expenditure and real GDP per capita across countries.

In this chapter, we consider a set of 33 emerging market economies as relevant comparators to Senegal.

This ratio breaches by a large margin the WAEMU convergence criterion ceiling of 35 percent of domestic revenues.

While civil servants accede to jobs through a competitive process administered by the central civil service, contract workers are recruited outside the direct control and awareness of central authorities.

This is above the pay breakdown typically found in economies of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries, where the basic wage component averages nearly 90 percent of the total wage packages of civil servants (see http://bit.ly/1QaejuV).

The biometric survey recently conducted provides a good basis for this exercise.

The ongoing review of central government compensation could provide specific reform options to enable a more streamlined, performance-based, and merit-based government compensation system.

Operations usually refers to activities involved in the actual delivery of services to the public, while maintenance refers to the wide range of activities aimed at keeping the infrastructure in a serviceable condition.

Recruitment by the Ministry of National Education accounts for the great bulk of corps émergents.

Health services in Senegal are predominantly publicly provided, with the Ministry of Health being responsible for setting national health policies and overseeing the health sector. Health facilities are almost entirely owned by the government, but unlike lower-level health centers, hospitals have acquired considerable autonomy in all management areas since the 1998 reforms.

Note that the share of the wage bill is much higher than what the data suggest, since the bulk of the transfers (notably to hospitals) are used for wage payments.

Chapter 10 looks into this in more detail.

Other classical references in this field are Savvides 1995, Barro 1991, Khan and Kumar 1993, and Khan and Reinhart 1990.

Nelson and Singh (1994), looking at 70 developing countries for two distinct time periods (1970–79 and 1980–89), find that the effects of public investment on growth are mixed.

As there is a finite limit for domestic savings, public investment can in some cases pose a severe constraint for private investment and would crowd out private investment (Balassa 1988). Also, Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2010) find that government investment has a sizable negative effect on growth.

Bljer and Khan (1984) and Greene and Villanueva (1991) show that public investment in physical infrastructure is complementary to private investment.

The stock of public capital was estimated using the perpetual inventory method (see IMF 2014a, 2014b).

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