Race to the Next Income Frontier
Chapter

Chapter 1. Overview

Author(s):
Ali Mansoor, Salifou Issoufou, and Daouda Sembene
Published Date:
April 2018
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Author(s)
Salifou Issoufou and Ali Mansoor

Senegal has experienced a relatively long period of macroeconomic and political stability, but its per capita GDP growth has been low (Figure 1.1). In response to this unsatisfactory growth performance, a new development strategy, the Plan Sénégal Émergent (Government of Senegal 2014), was adopted in early 2014. The plan is based on three pillars: (1) higher and sustainable growth and structural transformation with the aim of making Senegal a regional economic hub through better infrastructure and private investment in key sectors (including agriculture, agro-business, mining, and tourism); (2) human development, with a focus on certain social sectors and an expansion of the social safety net; and (3) better governance, peace, and security. The three pillars are expected to be the foundation on which Senegal can achieve higher growth on a sustained and inclusive path, ultimately to attain the status of an upper-middle-income, emerging market economy by 2035.1

Figure 1.1.Real Growth in GDP per Capita, Senegal, 1987–2015

(Percent)

Sources: Senegalese authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Senegal has experienced four growth periods over the past 30 years, including the current expansion.2 Economic performance was poor before the 1994 devaluation of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc. The country then recorded a period of higher growth in 1995–2007, with per capita growth averaging about 1.7 percent. This average, however, masks yearly variations that reflected volatility in agricultural output, with growth nearing 4 percent in some years and dropping to negative values in others. In response to a series of exogenous shocks starting in 2007 (including global food and fuel price shocks, the global financial and economic crisis, an electricity sector crisis, and drought in the Sahel), per capita growth decreased to an average of 0.3 percent in 2008–13. The recent growth uptick, averaging 2.2 percent in per capita terms, contains the most rapid growth of the four growth periods, and if sustained it could be a turning point for Senegal. Such sustained growth will in fact be necessary if Senegal is to handle the demographic challenges it is facing, with a population growing at 3 percent per year, and if it is to benefit from the demographic transition that will expand the labor force.

To put Senegal’s growth performance in context, it is worth contrasting it with that of the fastest-growing countries. Table 1.1 lists the average gross national incomes of the fastest-growing comparator countries, by country group, based on data from the following country groups: sub-Saharan Africa, low-income countries, and lower-middle- and upper-middle-income countries. Low- and middle-income countries were selected based on their 1987 World Bank classification. Average real GDP per capita (in 2010 US dollars) over the 1987–2015 period was used to rank countries, excluding resource-rich ones.

TABLE 1.1Gross National Income per Capita of the Fastest-Growing Comparator Countries, by Country Income Group, 1987, 1995, and 2015(US dollars)
198719952015
Low Income≤480≤765≤1,025
Lower Middle Income481–1,940766–3,0351,026–4,035
Upper Middle Income1,941–6,0003,036–9,3854,036–12,475
High Income>6,000>9,385>12,475
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Senegal’s annual per capita growth of only 0.6 percent for the period 1987 to 2015 was significantly lower than that of all the fast-growing countries over the same time period (Figure 1.2). In its previous high-growth episodes, Senegal’s per capita growth averaged 1.8 percent. In its current high-growth episode, it has reached the lower bounds of the top 10 among sub-Saharan African countries at 2.2 percent (equaling Tanzania in the 10th position). This differs from past experience, when growth fell short of the authorities’ targets under successive poverty reduction strategies. If the Plan Sénégal Émergent growth targets were achieved and maintained over the next 20 years, this would place Senegal in the same league as the fastest-growing sub-Saharan African economies of the last two decades, such as Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda (see Annex 2.1).

Figure 1.2.Average Real GDP Growth in GDP per Capita, Low- and Middle-Income Countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Senegal, 1987–2015

(Percent)

Sources: Senegalese authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

Note: The low-income countries in the figure are Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Ethiopia, India, Lao P.D.R., Mali, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, and Uganda; the middle-income countries are Cabo Verde, the Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Mauritius, and Seychelles; and sub-Saharan Africa comprises Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Growth in Senegal has been driven mainly by public investment and remittance-fueled private consumption. Remittances grew by an average of more than 20 percent per year between 1995 and 2007 and have become a major source of financing for Senegal’s economy.3 Public investment also grew substantially, particularly during the 1995–2007 growth period, averaging 12 percent, while private investment registered only 6 percent average growth.

The performance of investments and exports in Senegal during this period, relative to that of the fastest-growing countries (Figure 1.3), helps explain why Senegal has had low per capita GDP growth for 30 years.4 Since our focus is on transformational growth, we have used a more ambitious yardstick than in other studies of growth episodes. In this book, a growth episode is defined as a period of growth in real GDP per capita of 3.5 percent or more for five or more consecutive years for the period 1987–2015. Table 1.2 lists the growth episodes by country for that period. Senegal’s investment (both public and private, including foreign direct investment) and exports, measured as a percentage of GDP, were both much lower than comparators’ averages.

Figure 1.3.Investments and Exports during Growth Episodes Relative to Comparator Country Average, Senegal

(Percent of comparators’ average)

Sources: Senegalese authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

TABLE 1.2Growth Episodes in Senegal and Eight Comparator Countries
Growth EpisodesStartEnd
Comparators
Cabo Verde19942011
Dominican Republic19962002
Malaysia19901997
Mauritius19872001
Seychelles19881993
Tanzania20042008
Uganda19951999
Senegal19952007
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

Against this background, the chapters in this book examine how Senegal can achieve per capita growth rates of 4 to 5 percent per year over a 20-year period to become an upper-middle-income and emerging market economy. A common theme in the chapters is the need to implement key structural reforms by learning from countries that have successfully graduated from low-income status while navigating political economy constraints. The book touches on revenue mobilization; expenditure rationalization; financial stability and inclusion; and structural reforms to improve the business environment and attract private investment, including foreign direct investment, for globally competitive production and a reduction in poverty.

Beyond the confines of Senegal, the discussions in this book may offer lessons to low-income countries aspiring to reach their next income frontier. Many low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa face similar challenges in their aspiration to move to upper-middle-income status; this book has broader application to the sub-Saharan Africa region as it attempts to provide policymakers with possible reforms to be completed to reach that objective.

Setting the Stage

The four chapters that make up Part I portray the macroeconomic environment in Senegal and explore what it means to be an upper-middle-income emerging market economy. These four chapters review Senegal’s industrial framework, look at whether and how Plan Sénégal Émergent growth targets can be achieved, discuss the concepts of upper middle income and emerging market, and review dimensions of inclusive growth. Their main conclusion is that Senegal’s goal of becoming an upper-middle-income emerging market economy by 2035 is attainable, provided that there is strong macroeconomic policy implementation as well as deep and front-loaded macro-structural reforms in key areas.

In Chapter 2, Ali Mansoor and Salifou Issoufou review the international experience in attaining and sustaining high growth for extended periods. They argue that a new approach to special economic zones along the lines taken by China and Mauritius may offer a way to create a space where new wealth can be created without having to tackle head-on the problems of rent seeking in the rest of the economy. A new special economic zone policy would rapidly put in place the institutional and regulatory framework required to unlock private investment, including foreign direct investment, and open economic space to small and medium-sized enterprises for a high, sustained, and inclusive growth. The authors warn that trying to achieve the Plan Sénégal Émergent objectives based mainly on expanded public investment is unlikely to succeed, because sustaining high growth also requires continued private investment, including foreign direct investment. As indicated by Senegal’s own experience and consistent with international experience, investment booms in themselves do not unlock sustainable growth.

Success requires enacting reforms that break with the past to open economic space for new, globally competitive wealth creation. In turn, supporting this new economic activity will require a combination of efficient investment in public infrastructure and human capital with structural reforms.

In Chapter 3, Mor Talla Kane chronicles the evolution of Senegal’s industrial policy from its independence to the inception of the Plan Sénégal Émergent. With the growth of its services sector, Senegal skipped the industrialization phase, evolving from a predominantly agrarian economy to a predominantly tertiary economy. Kane argues that Senegal’s industries are burdened by considerable constraints derived from high production factor costs and competition from imports by the informal sector. To forge a modern industrial sector in Senegal that capitalizes on the region’s opportunities, Kane proposes involving the private sector at every stage and improving human capital, in line with the Plan Sénégal Émergent.

Alexei Kireyev argues in Chapter 4 that Senegal’s aspirations to become an emerging market economy in 20 years can be fulfilled subject to strong policy implementation and macro-critical reforms focused on unlocking growth in key sectors. A fundamental upgrading of the business environment, Kireyev argues, is the single most important factor for accelerating growth. Senegal and other low-income countries aspiring to become emerging market economies can improve their business environment by learning from the experience of other countries that had similar initial conditions and have already reached upper-middle-income status. Possible mechanisms for experience sharing include peer learning efforts, regional capacity building, and direct support in policy design and implementation by peers.

In Chapter 5, Kireyev examines Senegal’s growth performance from the perspective of its poverty-reducing and distributional characteristics and discusses policies that might help make growth more inclusive. The main finding is that poverty has fallen in the last two decades but progress has slowed in recent years. Although available indicators sometimes give conflicting signals on distributional shifts, people in the middle of the income distribution have received the most benefit, mainly in urban areas. Further progress in poverty reduction and inclusiveness will require sustained high growth and an exploration of growth opportunities in sectors with high earnings potential for the poor. Better-targeted social policies and more attention to the regional distribution of spending would also help reduce poverty and improve inclusiveness.

Establishing a Sound, Balanced, and Efficient Fiscal Framework

To crowd in private investment and sustain long-term growth, the Plan Sénégal Émergent calls for a shift away from public consumption to boost investment in human capital (especially in education, health, and social protection) and public infrastructure (particularly electricity, highways, water systems, sewers, ports, and airports). In addition to expenditure rationalization and improvement of the public financial management system, revenue mobilization is also needed to finance Senegal’s development efficiently without hampering fiscal and debt sustainability. The five chapters in Part II examine revenue mobilization, public expenditure efficiency and rationalization, and debt sustainability.

In Chapter 6, Patrick Petit and João Tovar Jalles examine the need for a significant revenue mobilization effort in Senegal with a focus on what Senegal can learn from countries that have successfully reached upper-middle-income status. They argue that Senegal can learn from countries such as Argentina, Korea, Morocco, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay, all countries that have successfully increased the mobilization of direct taxes (corporate and personal income taxes, social contributions) through significant reforms in tax administration and in base broadening. These comparator countries have managed to better control a wider tax base, with measures that have included increasing the number of taxpayers, which in turn implies a greater formalization of the economy. Petit and Jalles show that such changes tend to go hand in hand with higher-quality spending (notably on health and education, which fall within the more general Plan Sénégal Émergent–inclusive objectives) that benefit wide segments of the population and thus help legitimize the revenue mobilization effort.

Chapters 7 and 8 both look at public spending. In Chapter 7, Serigne Moustapha Sène reviews in detail the evolution of the composition of public expenditure in Senegal. He concludes that although Senegal spends as much as the countries it aspires to emulate, the impacts remain mixed. Regarding progress on poverty, life expectancy, productivity, and such quantitative needs of the economy as infrastructure and human resources, Sène finds that current expenditures lag in effectiveness behind those made in other aspiring countries, even though on average Senegal spends as much as those countries do. An improvement in the technical efficiency and in the allocation of government spending is therefore essential. Sène proposes government spending reforms aimed at complementing the innovations that are underway, in particular within the context of economic, fiscal, and financial reforms. These reforms fall under the umbrella of reducing waste in spending through improved efficiency and include (1) ensuring that wage increases are tied to performance, (2) widely publicizing the conclusions of the 2014 government-commissioned study on remuneration in the civil service to create strong consensus on the need to rationalize the wage bill, and (3) continuing the use of the precautionary reserve envelope. The precautionary reserve envelope was introduced in 2015 and requires that yearly additional current spending be tied to reforms and that additional capital spending be used only for projects that have been subjected to proper cost-benefit analysis.

Chapter 8 looks closely at what Senegal needs to make public expenditure more growth friendly. João Tovar Jalles and Carlos Mulas-Granados conclude that Senegal needs to bring the wage bill under control and eliminate redundant spending on goods and services while improving operations and maintenance spending. Jalles and Mulas-Granados’ view is that investment in human capital in education and health needs to grow more in quality than in quantity, while investment in physical capital requires a careful selection and evaluation of projects to make sure Senegal gets a high economic and social return from every infrastructure project it undertakes in the years to come. They believe that the fiscal strategy associated with the Plan Sénégal Émergent could be given a greater chance of success if current budget institutions are strengthened. This could be accomplished by moving to robust medium-term budget frameworks, making greater use of expenditure reviews, and having stronger intergovernmental fiscal coordination.

Senegal’s development needs require efficient management systems for public investment to help ensure a higher growth impact from public investment spending and fiscal and debt sustainability. Consistent with the logic of Collier (2007), Chapter 9 emphasizes improved management of public investment in Senegal in connection with the Plan Sénégal Émergent. Salifou Issoufou, Mouhamadou Bamba Diop, and Rajesh Anandsing Acharuz show that on paper, Senegal’s public investment management system appears adequate. In practice, however, that system does not follow international best-practice standards. To reach the goal of becoming an emerging market economy by 2035, Senegal’s public investment management system needs to be improved at every stage, from ex ante to ex post evaluations. Issoufou, Diop, and Acharuz’s belief that Senegal’s public investment management system could be improved draws from the experiences of countries such as Mauritius. A first step would be to strengthen the coordinating role of the central planning body and bring together the different government structures responsible for public investment planning and programming to help eliminate or minimize the risks of bypassing the system. Another important step would be to provide enough financial and human resources to government structures in charge of conducting systematic ex ante assessments of public investment projects. Other areas recommended for improvement include better coordination between the national strategy and sectoral policy, a reactivation of the project selection function while systematizing midterm reviews of public investment projects, and making ex post assessments of programs and projects mandatory.

In the presence of revenue shortfalls, when ambitious development plans such as the Plan Sénégal Émergent are financed, public borrowing is inevitable. If used to finance productive investment, borrowing has been shown to have a positive impact on growth, consistent with the neoclassical growth theory. As Senegal and many low-income countries embark on debt-financed development and in light of rising ratios of public debt to GDP in the wake of the completion of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives, care needs to be taken to ensure that public debt does not spiral out of control.

In Chapter 10, Birahim Bouna Niang reviews the structure of Senegal’s public debt and indebtedness since early 2000 and provides policy recommendations that would help ensure public debt sustainability. Niang warns that financing significant infrastructure projects relying on commercial external borrowing would put further pressure on debt sustainability, raising debt service in the medium term. The rapid accumulation of debt observed during the past 10 years, attributable primarily to the persistence and relatively high level of the primary budget deficit, would suggest the adoption of new fiscal rules and a broadening of the fiscal space through improved fiscal performance. To ensure the sustainability of public debt while allowing for a countercyclical fiscal policy, Niang proposes a few fiscal rules. These include (1) replacing the basic budget balance, which does not take into account all resources and all public spending, with a cap on the overall budget balance as a percentage of GDP;5 (2) adopting a British-type golden rule, stating that borrowing should be undertaken for investment purposes only, to serve as a safeguard for the appropriate use of public debt; and (3) capping the share of debt service in budget resources, as is done in Argentina, where the ceiling is set at 15 percent (Berganza 2012), to avoid a situation in which debt repayment crowds out investments (infrastructure, education, health) in the future.

Promoting an Inclusive, Stable, and Deeper Financial Sector

The financial system in Senegal, while growing rapidly, is typical of that in low-income countries, being concentrated in and dominated by the banking sector, with commercial banks representing about 90 percent of the financial system. A large number of microfinance institutions supply limited financial services targeting lower-income households. Insurance companies account for most of the remainder of the domestic financial system. The regional securities and equity market is a marginal source of funding, except for funding obtained by the government. The interbank market remains underdeveloped. Pockets of vulnerability exist in banking operations, including the operations of public banks.

As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Senegal follows a number of key macroeconomic and financial policies designed and implemented at the union level, while responsibility for others rests with national authorities. The role of national authorities within the WAEMU system is particularly important for growing the financial system, though these authorities play a smaller role in guarding financial stability. The two chapters in Part III look at ways to make Senegal’s financial system more stable, deeper, and more inclusive in the context of WAEMU.

Chapter 11 provides a general overview of the financial stability arrangements facing Senegal and other low-income countries and highlights some issues for further consideration. Patrick Imam examines the characteristics of the financial stability framework in WAEMU, contrasting the role of Senegal’s authorities with that of the regional supervisor. He then provides an overview of the financial stability risks in Senegal before proposing ways to analyze systemic risk, policies to mitigate systemic risk, and how to improve the crisis management system.

In Chapter 12, Bamba Ka examines financial inclusion in Senegal as a catalyst for emergence. He first notes that the status of financial inclusion in Senegal has improved during recent years, in terms of the various initiatives the government has undertaken at the domestic and subregional levels. Accordingly, a greater proportion of the adult population now has access to basic financial services, through credit institutions, microfinance institutions, or electronic money issuers. Ka argues, however, that because Senegal still lags behind its peers, programs tailored to the different segments of the population must be developed. The author proposes policy recommendations aimed at awareness raising, consumer protection, and financial education, to ensure that the territory is adequately covered and to develop the microinsurance sector in rural areas.

Structural Reforms to Relieve Constraints on Doing Business and Promote Private Investment, Including Foreign Direct Investment

A large body of empirical research finds that structural reforms can lead to better resource allocation and greater productive capacity. At the cross-country, industry, and firm levels, economic institutions that promote competition, facilitate entry and exit, and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation have been found by various authors to increase productivity growth.6 The chapters in Part IV examine various facets of structural reform in Senegal and, by drawing from other countries’ experiences, propose ways to successfully implement reforms needed for countries like Senegal to achieve robust and sustained growth and to foster convergence to higher income levels.

Chapter 13 examines the structural reforms associated with emergence in countries that have successfully navigated the journey and draws lessons for Senegal. Because Senegal has a history of sluggish reform implementation, Aliou Faye, Bertrand Belle, and Nyasha Weinberg argue that Senegal must, among other efforts, focus on structural reforms that change incentive structures, that is, moving away from patronage and rent seeking toward greater risk taking to create new wealth. It must also enhance the quality of its institutions to deliver economic governance consistent with this shift and improve the business environment. Faye, Belle, and Weinberg believe that a system that allows a minimum of discretion and has clear and transparent rules that are easy to comply with and in which ex post verification replaces prior authorization would provide space for small and medium-sized enterprises to emerge from the informal sector, grow, and attract foreign direct investment.

Governance is taken up in Chapter 14. Daouda Sembene reviews the evolution of governance and institutional characteristics in selected groups of countries, with a special focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing from the lessons learned by these countries, he then analyzes ways to help ensure that governance reforms can succeed in Senegal. Sembene believes that for Senegal’s emergence to become a reality, there needs to be improvement in the credibility of policies and accountability of government officials, an increase in transparency, and better predictability in decision making. Achieving all of this will, in turn, require coalition building to advance reforms with domestic and external stakeholders, particularly those with potentially opposing interests.

Senegal’s business environment is analyzed in Chapter 15. Mamadou Lamine Ba and Tom O’Bryan review the determinants of attractiveness to investors, outline the policies and reforms already undertaken by the government of Senegal to support the private sector, and draw lessons from the country’s experiences with those reforms. The authors argue for drawing on and making use of tools and methods tested in countries such as Morocco and Mauritius, which over the past 10 years have managed to at least double their per capita income and joined the ranks of emerging market economies. The authors believe it will be necessary for the various stakeholders to build and consolidate coalitions that will enable Senegal’s economy to prosper and remain competitive over the medium and long terms by upholding the principles of free enterprise and of widely recognized economic and democratic governance.

Chapter 16 explores policies regarding the informal economy. Informal firms have been found consistently to have lower productivity than formal firms, although the largest productivity gaps are found among small informal firms. Ahmadou Aly Mbaye and Nancy Benjamin find that the prevalence and behavior of informal firms is strongly influenced by the investment climate and discuss options that exist for reforms in labor regulations, infrastructure, and energy costs that could bring down the cost of doing business. They argue that improvements in the judiciary, in tax systems, and in public expenditures have the potential to increase the incentives for these firms to modernize their practices and raise productivity. Mbaye and Benjamin conclude by cautioning that large informal firms are unlikely to increase their public contributions without a public-private accord that ensures that other firms like themselves will observe such an agreement, as well as assurance that the government will deliver better public services, a better business climate, and better use of public resources in exchange for higher tax payments from the informal sector. Furthermore, even though small informal firms have little to offer in public funds, programs to improve worker training and entrepreneurship skills can improve their business practices and the climate for competition among small and medium-sized enterprises.

The industrial fabric of a country is crucial to its development. Large enterprises in Senegal include the sugar, vegetable oil, and wheat-flour bread industries. In Chapter 17, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Stephen S. Golub, and Philip English analyze the performance and pricing in these industries, assess current policies, and make recommendations for policy reforms. The reforms they recommend are aimed at serving the general interest of Senegalese society, as outlined in the government’s Plan Sénégal Émergent. The sugar, edible oil, and flour sectors in Senegal are fraught with controversy, with the government facing difficult choices and pressures from competing interest groups, each driven by its own rent seeking. The government faces intractable trade-offs between conflicting objectives, namely maintaining employment in these industries, keeping the prices of these basic consumer items low to help the poor and head off social unrest, limiting incentives to smuggle cheaper products from neighboring countries, and obtaining fiscal revenues to finance public goods. The authors believe that the battles over rents in these industries are a sideshow to the deeper issues of reducing poverty and raising incomes. They argue that to raise incomes, labor-intensive economic growth is required. Growth in turn depends on developing a competitive economy that can export goods and services that other countries’ consumers want to buy. Rather than protecting import-competing industries, Mbaye, Golub, and English suggest that Senegalese policy should focus on export competitiveness. Industries with export potential include edible groundnuts, fisheries, tourism, horticulture, mining, telecommunications, and possibly light manufacturing.

Part IV, and indeed the book itself, ends with a study of social inclusion and protection in Senegal, essential components of any sound development policies and programs. Oumar Bassirou Diop examines social protection in Chapter 18 and recommends a set of policies that can help Senegal achieve greater social justice and equity in connection with its development effort. Diop finds that the social protection system in Senegal is excessively narrow and that it is experiencing serious performance problems, with limited capacity to meet various social protection and risk management requirements. Diop argues that complementary policies and programs to reduce poverty and vulnerability and promote social cohesion should encompass strategies for education, health, nutrition, population, water purification and supply, and food security and specifically should seek to develop irrigation, inclusive finance, women’s autonomy, environmental protection, climate change management, disaster management, and social protection.

References

    BerganzaJuan Carlos.2012. “Fiscal Rules in Latin America: A Survey.Banco de España Occasional Paper 1208Banco de EspañaMadrid.

    BettinGiuliaAndrea F.Presbitero andNikola L.Spatafora.2015. “Remittances and Vulnerability in Developing Countries.World Bank Economic Review31(1): 129.

    ChristiansenLoneMartinSchindler andThierryTressel.2013. “Growth and Structural Reforms: A New Assessment.Journal of International Economics89(2): 34756.

    CollierPaul.2007. The Bottom Billion.New York: Oxford University Press.

    GiulianoPaola andMartaRuiz-Arranz.2009. “Remittances, Financial Development, and Growth.Journal of Development Economics90(1): 14452.

    Government of Senegal. 2014. “Plan Sénégal Émergent.Dakar.

    International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2017. “Growth Performance over the Past Thirty Years.” In Senegal: Selected IssuesIMF Country Report 17/2. Washington, DC. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2017/cr1702.pdf

    NicolettiGiuseppe andStefanoScarpetta.2003. “Regulation, Productivity, and Growth: OECD Evidence.Policy Research Working Paper 2944World BankWashington, DC.

    PratiAlessandroMassimiliano GaetanoOnorato andChrisPapageorgiou.2013. “Which Reforms Work and under What Institutional Environment? Evidence from a New Data Set on Structural Reforms.Review of Economics and Statistics95(3): 94668.

    RayNikhilAgustinVelasquez andIyanatulIslam.2015. “Fiscal Rules, Growth and Employment: A Developing Country Perspective.ILO Employment Working Paper 184International Labor OrganizationGeneva.

    RestucciaDiego andRichardRogerson.2013. “Misallocation and Productivity.Review of Economic Dynamics16(1): 110.

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This chapter draws on IMF 2017.

To reach upper-middle-income status in 20 years, Senegal would need to quadruple its current US$1,000 gross national income per capita. To achieve this goal, a 7 percent average annual growth combined with no more than 3 percent in population growth would be needed. It should be noted that in the World Bank’s income classification, the lower bound for upper-middle-income countries increased by about 30 percent between 1995 and 2015, which means that Senegal’s current gross national income per capita may need to grow to about US$5,320 by 2035 to reach that status; this implies that growth rates higher than 7 percent may be required.

Senegal’s growth periods are derived by computing five-year moving averages of the growth rates of real GDP per capita in 2010 US dollars.

The jury is still out on the impact of remittances on growth, but Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) show that remittances can boost growth in countries with less-developed financial systems by providing alternative options to finance investment and by helping overcome liquidity constraints. This latter finding is corroborated by Bettin, Presbitero, and Spatafora (2015).

Five-year averages before and after the start of an episode are compared with averages during the episode to assess the role played by certain variables on growth.

This rule should be flexible, however; that is, it should be adjusted depending on the state of the economy. During periods of slow growth, the authorized deficit can be set at a higher level in order to avoid a stronger downturn or a loss of growth as experienced by European Union countries (Ray, Velasquez, and Islam 2015).

This is in addition to higher quality and quantity of infrastructure and human capital, trade openness, and efficient and well-developed financial systems. See for example Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003; Syverson 2011; Christiansen, Schindler, and Tressel 2013; Prati, Onorato, and Papageorgiou 2013; and Restuccia and Rogerson 2013.

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