The Canadian Plan
- International Monetary Fund
- Published Date:
- February 1996
Following discussions between U.S. and Canadian officials in May 1943, the Canadian Government decided to put forward its own plan as an alternative to the White and Keynes Plans. A first draft was sent to Lord Keynes on June 3, 1943 and a slightly revised version was tabled in the Canadian House of Commons by the Minister of Finance on July 12, 1943. It is the latter version which is reproduced below.
Tentative Draft Proposals of Canadian Experts for an International Exchange Union
(July 12, 1943)
Ottawa: June 9, 1943
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF CANADIAN EXPERTS ON PLANS FOR POST-WAR MONETARY ORGANIZATION
1. Officials of the Canadian Government have had an opportunity of examining the United States Treasury Department Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund, and have received explanations of this proposal from American officials. A similar procedure was followed in connection with the paper containing proposals by British experts for an International Clearing Union. The discussions with both British and American officials have been entirely exploratory and the Canadian Government has not been committed to any course of action as a result of these conversations. The American and British experts, for their part, have laid stress on the fact that their proposals are tentative in character, and have made it clear to representatives of the Canadian Government (as well as to those of other governments) that they would welcome critical comment and constructive suggestions. Canadian experts who have been studying the British and the American proposals are, therefore, led to make certain observations of a general character and to submit an alternative plan. Like the British and the American plans, the proposals of the Canadian experts are provisional and tentative in character; they incorporate important features of both the American and the British plans and add to them certain new elements.
2. The main objectives of the American and the British proposals appear to be identical, namely, the establishment of an international monetary mechanism which will aid in the restoration and development of healthy international trade after the war, which will achieve a high degree of exchange stability, and which will not conflict with the desire of countries to carry out such policies as they may think appropriate to achieve, so far as possible, economic stability at a high level of employment and incomes. To aid in the achievement of these objectives, the British and American experts have proposed the establishment of a new international monetary institution. Their proposals are large in conception, but no larger than the problem itself. There is every reason to improve the structure and operation of the monetary mechanism on the basis of experience. But there is no reason why proposals should be based exclusively on the limited, and on the whole, bad experience of the past two decades. Unless dependable exchange and credit relations between countries can be achieved before the stresses and strains of the post-war period begin, there is little likelihood that irreparable damage can be avoided.
3. If plans for international monetary organization are to be successful, other problems—by no means less difficult or less important—will also have to be faced and solved by joint international action. It would, indeed, be dangerous to attach too much importance to monetary organization of and by itself, if this resulted in neglect of other problems which may be even more important and difficult, or in a misguided faith that with a new form of monetary organization the other problems would solve themselves. In the international field alone (to say nothing of the innumerable domestic problems involved in the profound changes in the structure of production and employment which have taken place in all belligerent and many non-belligerent countries due to the exigencies of the war) it will be necessary to attack frontally such problems as commercial policy, international investment, the instability of primary product prices—to name but a few. No international monetary organization, however perfect in form, could long survive economic distortions resulting from bilateralist trade practices, continued refusal of creditor countries to accept imports in payment of the service on their foreign investment or to invest their current account surplus abroad, or enormous fluctuations in food and raw material prices such as characterized the years between the two wars. But the fact that there are many problems to be faced cannot be used as an excuse for facing none. A start must be made somewhere, and for the reasons given in paragraph 5, the problem of international monetary organization is a logical and fruitful starting-place.
4. The establishment of an international monetary organization is no substitute for the measures of international relief and rehabilitation which will be required as the war draws to its conclusion and afterwards; and in the view of the Canadian experts any monetary organization which is set up should not be called upon to finance transactions of this nature. Some continuing and stable arrangements regarding international long-term investment are also clearly essential if equilibrium is to be achieved and maintained. Nor should it be thought that the proposed international monetary institution is merely an instrument of the transition period from war to peace. True, it has special importance in this period, but it should be designed as a permanent institution and not as a stop-gap to function during a relatively short period of time.
5. An important, perhaps the most important, feature of the British and the American proposals is the provision in both plans for the extension of credit between countries. The two plans differ as regards the precise techniques to be used in extending credit and as regards the amounts which may be involved; but both plans provide that foreign credits are to be available under certain conditions to countries having need of them, and that they shall be made available through an international monetary organization rather than through bilateral arrangements between pairs of countries. The provision for credit extension is nothing more nor less than a straightforward and realistic recognition of the fact that at the end of the war a large number of countries, whose import requirements will be considerable, will not have immediately available a sufficient reserve of foreign assets to enable them to expose themselves to the risk of participation in a world economic system. An interval will be needed to give time for adjustment and re-organization. If the penury in foreign means of payment of certain important countries is to be allowed to fix the pattern of post-war trading and domestic policies, then all can look forward to penury—no country, rich or poor, will escape the impoverishment resulting from the throttling of international trade which will result.
6. It is useful to consider what would happen if no action were taken to set up international machinery of the general character suggested by the experts of the United States and the United Kingdom. Theoretically, one alternative would be immediate cash settlement for all international transactions. But how can cash be produced for purchases abroad? Only by selling goods or services abroad, or by disposing of acceptable foreign assets such as securities and gold. The facts regarding the distribution of the world’s monetary gold reserves and the changes which have taken place in the course of the war in various countries’ holdings of foreign securities are too well known to require elaboration. Broadly speaking, and allowing for certain exceptions and time-lags, a cash basis for the settlement of international transactions would mean that any country’s capacity to export would be limited to the amount of its own currency it made available to foreign countries through its imports and other current payments abroad—in other words, trade would in effect be reduced to barter. In point of fact, however, there is no possibility that countries would for long allow themselves to be confined in such a strait-jacket. Faced with the problem of an unsalable surplus of export goods and with consequent domestic unemployment, they would refuse to accept the penalty of disorganization of export trade if that penalty could be avoided, even temporarily, by the extension of credit. Countries would embark on bilateral credit arrangements, no doubt linked with deals relating to the purchase and sale of goods; and as soon as certain countries began to adopt this course others would find that they had to follow suit to protect their trade interests. It is difficult to imagine a more fruitful source of international dissension than a competitive trade and credit extension program of this character.
The Canadian experts believe it to be true, therefore, that the Stabilization Fund or Clearing Union plans do not involve a decision as to whether foreign credits shall be extended or withheld. In some form or other, credit will in fact be extended; and the decision which has to be taken relates primarily to the method employed. For the reasons given above, international arrangements are greatly to be preferred to bilateral deals.
7. This leads to the question, how much credit should be made available through the international monetary mechanism? A vital feature of any plan of this sort is the provision it makes for the borrowing power of each participant and for the contribution to the resources of the organization by the participating countries through the provision of capital, the accumulation of balances or through loans. Some concern has been expressed in regard to the size of the commitment which may be assumed by prospective creditors. It is probable that Canada will be a creditor country on current account, and the Canadian experts have therefore given careful thought to this aspect of the arrangements.
8. There is one preliminary observation which should be made in this connection. It would be a distortion of the realities of the situation for any country, or its citizens, to regard the willingness to provide resources to an international organization of the general character proposed by the British and American experts as an act of generosity which is performed for the sake of foreign countries. Resources are provided to the organization first, because all have a stake in re-creating a functioning international economic system and secondly, because for each individual country the realistic alternatives in the form of trade disorganization are costlier than the provision of resources. Moreover, and most important of all, the resources provided are not given away; they are fully secured by the organization’s holdings of gold and national currencies. It can only lead to confusion of thought to regard participation in such plans as these as in any way similar in character to participation in international relief schemes, important and necessary though the latter may be.
9. It seems apparent that, in one way or another, substantial unregulated movements of capital between countries will be prevented. In these circumstances, countries will, by and large, lose or gain foreign exchange to the extent, but only to the extent, of the unbalance in their current account transactions with the rest of the world. If a country is building up a substantial credit position, it will know that this situation is produced because it is selling more goods and services abroad than it is buying abroad. If it is dissatisfied with this position, if it wishes to reduce its credit balance, it has through participation in the proposed organization lost no single one of the courses of action ever open to it. True, it is by no means easy for a country, acting alone, to solve problems of unbalance. But as a last resort a country can find a solution by unilateral action. It can do the only things it ever could do in these circumstances; it can buy more abroad—goods, services or investments; or it can sell less abroad. It is therefore quite wrong to assume that countries participating in the proposed institution would, because of this participation, be left without control over their international commitments. It may be, and no doubt is, useful to erect danger signals at various stations along the road followed by both debtors and creditors. Such signals are useful reminders. But there is nothing to prevent either creditor or debtor from taking remedial action at any time.
10. If the foregoing is a correct analysis of the situation—and it would appear to be a simple statement of fact—creditors need not be unduly concerned about the possible size of their investment in the Fund, knowing that the ultimate actual size of their stake can be determined by their own course of action from day to day and from year to year. Nevertheless, even the appearance of an unlimited commitment is probably undesirable and in the tentative proposals of Canadian experts, a limit is placed on the obligation of each participant to provide resources to the institution. But there is less real danger to the interests of creditor countries in the establishment of a Fund or a Union whose potential resources are unnecessarily large (and may in consequence never be entirely used) than there is in the establishment of an institution whose resources are obviously too small. The interests of all will best be served by providing a fair degree of latitude, a satisfactory breathing-space—to debtors and creditors alike. If its objectives are to be achieved, the resources must be large enough to permit time for basic re-adjustments to be accomplished; they must be such that the organization will command general confidence in its own stability. For if this is not the case, what will happen? It will be believed that certain currencies are likely to become “scarce” currencies—a belief which will be reinforced by the reduction in the institution’s holdings of that particular currency. Countries which are likely to require a “scarce” currency will hasten to make their purchases which are payable in that currency. As the holdings of the “scarce” currency are used up, as discussions and arguments commence regarding an enlargement of the quota or some other form of extension of credit, grave misgivings in regard to the international situation will arise. The position will be very much akin to that of a bank whose cash reserves are feared to be insufficient. There will be a run on that currency in the institution; and if the currency concerned is an important one, the international effects will be very serious indeed. No form of international monetary organization can continuously compensate for chronic maladjustments in the current account balance of payments of the countries which may be concerned, but it would be most unwise to set up machinery which stood a fair chance of facing a crisis at a comparatively early date.
11. To avoid misunderstanding it should be emphasized that it would be extremely dangerous to use short-term credits as a device to cover up basically unsound positions. This would be no less disastrous in the international than in the domestic field, and any monetary system which made such an attempt on a large scale would inevitably break down. A chronic unbalance in current account balances of international payments which is not matched by voluntary long-term capital movements—lending abroad by creditor countries, and borrowing abroad by debtor countries—is symptomatic of a deep-seated maladjustment which has to be dealt with if equilibrium is to be restored. No debtor country can live beyond its resources indefinitely; and no creditor country can persistently refuse to lend its surplus abroad or make other adjustments to its creditor position without ripping the international fabric. But time is required for adjustments to be made and for remedial measures to have their effects, and the contention of this paper is that the time allowed must be adequate. More time may be purchased at a smaller real cost than less time.
12. There is one final observation of a general character which should be made. The new international monetary institution which it is proposed to establish will be neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Its aim will be to promote conditions in which member countries are free to carry out sound economic policies for the welfare of their own people and in which they will not be induced or forced, for lack of organized co-operation, to pursue policies which impoverish themselves and contribute to the impoverishment of the world. The organization should be international and not super-national. Nations should enter into the proposed agreement for common purposes and advantages, realizing that without such agreement the common purposes cannot be achieved. In their national policies, countries should be limited only by their own will in entering and remaining in the organization. If the proposed institution functions well, it will have at its disposal more information regarding the currents of international financial transactions and the causes of disequilibrium than has ever been available before. It will be in a position to offer informed and disinterested advice to its members. It may be hoped that the quality of the advice offered will be such that it will carry great weight. But no member state should be asked to bind itself in all circumstances to follow the advice given by the organization. Moreover, if a country feels at any time that its national interests are being jeopardized by the actions of the organization, and is willing to sacrifice the advantages of continued membership, it should be free to withdraw, after making provision to liquidate its obligations to the organization or, if the country is a creditor, it should have returned to it its original contribution to the resources of the organization. The proposals here advanced are put forward in the belief that a soundly conceived international agreement can give greater scope for national policies than can exist outside it.
13. To sum up these general observations, it is suggested that:
(a) An international agreement for the establishment of an international monetary organization which involves the extension of credit is essential if international co-operation in the post-war world is to be achieved.
(b) Such machinery will deal with only one of the numerous problems which must be faced, but it is a logical and convenient starting place for joint international action.
(c) The credit made available through the international monetary organization should be adequate to deal with that portion of current account surpluses and deficits which is not met by relief and other concerted international action in the years immediately after the war; it should be sufficient to provide a firm basis on which multilateral world trade can be re-established after the war; and it should provide time to countries which find their international accounts unbalanced to take the necessary corrective measures to adjust their position.
(d) The extension of credit is not a cure-all; it merely provides time for adjustments; and unless unbalanced positions (except those accompanying long-term capital movements) are brought into equilibrium, any arrangements made will break down.
(e) No country participating in the arrangements loses control over the size of its international commitments, since it can determine their size by its own action, if it wishes to do so.
(f) No country participating in the arrangements loses control over its domestic economic policies.
TENTATIVE DRAFT PROPOSALS OF CANADIAN EXPERTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE UNION
I. Purposes of the Union
1. To provide for stability of exchange rates and to provide an orderly method for their determination.
2. To provide a convenient clearing mechanism to settle balances in international payments.
3. To provide to all countries access to foreign exchange resources in order to reduce the danger that economic and commercial policies in the period immediately after the war will be largely determined by a shortage of foreign exchange and to enable countries thereafter to be guided in their economic and commercial policies by long-run considerations when faced with a temporary reduction of foreign markets.
4. To aid in the achievement of international equilibrium by measures designed to prevent excessive short-term borrowing through the Union or the excessive accumulation of uninvested foreign surpluses.
5. To contribute to the re-establishment and development of a multilateral trading system and to the elimination of discriminatory trading and currency practices.
II. Resources of the Union
Member countries shall agree to make the following resources available to the Union:
1. A capital subscription to the amount of the quota assigned to each member country, the aggregate of such quotas to be $8,000 million.
Regarding 1—quotas and capital subscription
(a) Determination of Quotas
The quota for each member country shall be determined by a formula which will give due regard to factors such as international trade, national income, and holdings of gold and foreign exchange convertible into gold. A special assessment may be levied in any case where this formula would be inappropriate.
(b) Payment of Capital Subscriptions
The capital subscription of each member country shall be paid up in full on or before the date set by the Governing Board of the Union on which the Union’s operations are to begin. Each member country shall pay in at least 15 per cent. of its quota in gold and the balance in national currency; a country may substitute gold for national currency in meeting its quota requirements. The Union may make such arrangements as it deems appropriate to provide a period of time within which countries having less than $300 million in gold or foreign exchange convertible into gold in official exchange reserves may pay up their gold contribution in full, the equivalent in national currency to be paid in the interval. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsequent paragraphs, the Union shall sell foreign exchange to such member countries for the purpose of acquiring gold to pay their capital subscriptions.
(c) Change in Quotas
The Board may from time to time change the quotas of particular member countries, provided, however, that in voting on proposals to increase quotas the voting strength of each member shall be increased or decreased to take account of the Union’s net sales or purchases of the currency of each member country in accordance with the weighted voting formula set out in paragraph IX.3 below. No increase shall, however, be made in the quota of any country without the consent of the representative of the country concerned.
2. Loans to the Union, as required, in amounts not exceeding 50 per cent. of the quota of each member country.
Regarding 2—loans to the union
(a) Conditions of Borrowing
The terms and conditions of loans made by member countries to the Union under the provisions of paragraph II.2 shall be set out in the rules and regulations of the Union. The Union’s authority to borrow domestic currency from member countries in amounts up to 50 per cent. of their quotas shall be a revolving authority. The Union shall not exercise its right to borrow until it has used its available gold resources to acquire additional supplies of the currency in question. Subject to the provisions of the preceding sentence, the Union must exercise its right to borrow when its holdings of the currency of any member country have been reduced to 10 per cent. of the quota of that member country. When the Union exercises its right under the provisions of paragraph II.2 to borrow additional supplies of the currency of any member country it shall have the duty to attempt to improve its position in the currency concerned by acquiring the currency or gold from the holdings of other member countries for payment in their national currencies or in other foreign exchange they need.
(b) Conditions of Repayment
The Union shall have the right to repay loans contracted under the provisions of paragraph II.2 at any time. The member country making the loan shall have the right to demand repayment in gold to the extent of the Union’s gold holdings at any time and shall also have the right to demand repayment in its national currency provided that such repayment does not reduce the Union’s holdings of that currency below 50 per cent. of the quota of the member country. Member countries shall agree to give 30 days’ notice of demand for repayment of loans made to the Union under the provisions of the present article.
III. Monetary Unit of the Union
1. The monetary unit of the Union shall be an international unit of such name as may be agreed (hereafter referred to as the Unit) and it shall consist of 137 1/7 grains of fine gold. The accounts of the Union shall be kept and published in terms of the Unit.
2. The value of the Unit in terms of gold shall not be changed without the approval of four-fifths of member votes.
3. Member countries shall agree with the Union the initial values of their currencies in terms of gold or the Unit and, except as provided in paragraph IV.2 below, shall undertake not to alter these values without the approval of the Union.
4. Deposits in terms of the Unit may be accepted by the Union from member countries upon the delivery of gold to the Union. Such Unit deposits shall be transferable to other member countries. They shall be redeemable in gold and the Union shall maintain at all times a 100 per cent. reserve in gold against all Unit deposits.
IV. Exchange Rates
1. The Union shall fix, on the basis of exchange rates initially agreed between it and each member country, the rates at which it will buy and sell one member’s currency for another’s and the rates in local currencies at which it will buy and sell gold. The spread between the Union’s buying and selling rates for member currencies and for gold shall not exceed 1 per cent. Except as provided in paragraph IV.2 below, member countries shall agree not to change the initially agreed exchange rates without the approval of the Union and any country which alters the value of its currency without the consent of the Union shall be declared in default of its obligations and become subject to the penalties provided in paragraph XI.1 below.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph IV.1 above, any member country which is a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union (arising from other than capital account transactions) to the extent of at least 50 per cent. of its quota and has so been on the average of the preceding 12 months shall be entitled to depreciate its exchange to the maximum extent of 5 per cent.; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any country which holds independent official reserves of gold and foreign currencies freely convertible into gold in amounts exceeding 50 per cent. of its quota. No country shall be entitled to repeat the exchange depreciation provided for in this paragraph without the specific approval of the Union.*
3. No change in the value of the currencies of member countries shall be permitted to alter the value of the assets of the Union in terms of gold or the Unit. Thus, if the Union approves a reduction in the value of the currency of a member country, or if a country depreciates its exchange under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, or if a significant depreciation in the value of the currency of a member, as determined by quotations on the exchange markets of other member countries, has in fact occurred, that country must on request deliver to the Union an amount of its local currency equal to the decrease in the value of that currency held by the Union. Likewise, if the currency of a particular country should appreciate, the Union must return to that country an amount in the currency of that country or in gold equal to the resulting increase in the value of the Union’s holdings.
V. Operations of the Union—Provisions of Special Applicability to Deficit Countries
1. The Union shall have the power to sell to the Treasury of any member country (or exchange fund or central bank acting as its agent for the purpose) at the rate of exchange established by the Union, currency of any country which the Union holds, subject to the following provisions:
(a) Without special permission, no country shall be a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union except for the purpose of meeting an adverse balance of payments on current account and the Union may at any time limit the amounts of foreign exchange to be sold to any member country which is permitting significant exports of capital while having an adverse balance of payments on current account.
regarding (a)—restriction of right of deficit countries to purchase foreign exchange to amounts required to meet an adverse balance of payments on current account.
(i) A country shall be regarded as a net purchaser of foreign exchange if as a result of the Union’s purchases and sales of currencies the Union’s holdings of its currency rise above the amount originally provided to the Union by way of capital subscription.
(ii) The Union may require any member country to furnish at periodic intervals statistics of its balance of international payments on current account and on capital account and statistics of gold and foreign exchange holdings, public and private. Each such member country shall agree to furnish officers of the Union with detailed explanations of the basis on which such statistics are computed. If at any time the Governing Board has reason to believe that an overflow of capital from any member country is resulting directly or indirectly in net purchases of foreign exchange by that country from the Union, it shall have the right to request a control of outward capital movements as a condition of making additional sales of foreign exchange to such country. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Union shall normally require any member country which has been a net purchaser of foreign exchange to the extent of 25 per cent. of its quota to impose restrictions on outward capital movements if none exist.
(iii) In considering applications from countries which have been net purchasers of foreign exchange from the Union for the special permission referred to in paragraph V.1 (a) to purchase foreign exchange for purposes other than the meeting of an adverse balance of payments on current account, the Governing Board shall give careful attention to applications for foreign exchange to facilitate the adjustment of foreign debts where this is deemed to be desirable from the point of view of the general economic situation and shall also give special attention to applications for foreign exchange by member countries not in default on their foreign obligations for the purpose of maintaining contractual principal payments on foreign debt.
(b) In order to promote the most effective utilization of existing stocks of gold and foreign exchange, no member country shall have the right to be a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union so long as that country’s holdings of gold and foreign currencies freely convertible into gold (including private as well as official holdings) exceed its quota.
regarding (b)—restriction of right of countries holding large independent gold and foreign exchange reserves to purchase foreign exchange from the union
In interpreting this provision the Governing Board shall give special consideration to the position of certain Asiatic countries where gold has long been used as private treasure.
(c) In general, the Union shall have the power to sell foreign exchange for domestic currency to member countries up to 200 per cent. of the quota of each such member country. Net sales of foreign exchange shall not exceed 50 per cent. of the quota of each member country during the first year and the cumulative net sales shall not exceed 100 per cent., 150 per cent. or 200 per cent. during the first two, three and four years of the operation of the union.
regarding (c)—restriction of sales of foreign exchange to specified limits
On special vote of the Governing Board, in which voting strength shall be weighted to allow for the Union’s net purchases and sales of each member country’s currency in accordance with the provisions described in paragraph IX.3 below, the Union may purchase any currency in excess of these limits provided that (a) the country whose currency is being acquired by the Union agrees to adopt and carry out measures recommended by the Union to correct the disequilibrium in its balance of payments, or (b) it is the view of the Governing Board that the country’s prospective balance of payments is such as to warrant the expectation that the excess currency holdings of the Union can be disposed of in a reasonable time.
(d) In order to promote the most effective utilization of existing stocks of gold and foreign exchange, the Union may, as a condition of making further sales of foreign exchange to any member country which would bring its net purchases to an amount in excess of 50 per cent. of its quota, require such country to sell the Union, for domestic currency, appropriate amounts of any reserves it (or its residents) may hold of gold or foreign exchange acceptable to the Union.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c) above, whenever a member country is exhausting its quota more rapidly than is warranted in the judgment of the Governing Board, the Board may make such recommendations to that country as it thinks appropriate with a view to correcting the disequilibrium, and may place such conditions upon additional sales of foreign exchange to that country as it deems to be in the general interest of the Union.
2. A charge of 1 per cent. per annum payable in gold shall be levied against member countries on the amount of their currency held by the Union in excess of the quotas of such countries.
VI. Operations of the Union—Provisions of Special Applicability to Surplus Countries
1. In order to promote the most effective utilization of the available and accumulating supply of gold and foreign exchange resources of member countries, each member country shall, on request of the Union, sell to the Union, for its local currency or for foreign currencies which it needs, all gold and foreign exchange it acquires in excess of the amounts held immediately after joining the Union.
regarding 1—accumulating supplies of gold and foreign exchange
For the purpose of this provision, only free foreign exchange and gold are considered. Each member country shall agree to furnish the Union with periodic reports of gold and foreign exchange holdings, public and private.
2. When the Union’s operations have resulted in net sales of the currency of any member country to the extent of 75 per cent. of the quota of that country the Union may, in order to increase its resources of the currency in question, attempt to arrange, in co-operation with such agencies as may be established to promote international investment, with the member country a program of foreign capital investment (or repatriation) and may sell foreign exchange to facilitate such capital movements.
3. When the Union’s holdings of the currency of a member country are being exhausted more rapidly than is warranted in the judgment of the Governing Board, the Board may make a report on the situation. Without restricting the generality of the foregoing, whenever the Union’s operations have resulted in net sales of the currency of any member country to the extent of 85 per cent. of the quota of that country, the Union has the authority and the duty to render to the country a report embodying an analysis of the causes of the depletion of its holdings of the currency and recommendations appropriate to restore the equilibrium of the international balances of the country concerned. Such recommendations may relate to monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate, commercial policy and international investment.
REGARDING 3—REPORT ON COUNTRIES WHOSE CURRENCY IS BECOMING SCARCE
The Board member of the country in question shall be a member of the Union Committee appointed to draft the report. The report shall be sent to all member countries and, if deemed desirable, made public.
4. The Union shall have the right at any time to enter into arrangements with any member country to borrow additional supplies of its currency on such terms and conditions as may be mutually satisfactory.
5. The Union shall have the right at any time to enter into special arrangements with any member country for the purpose of providing an emergency supply of the currency of any other member country on such terms and conditions as may be mutually satisfactory.
6. Whenever it becomes apparent to the Governing Board that the anticipated demand for any currency may soon exhaust the Union’s holdings, the Governing Board shall inform the member countries of the probable supply of this currency and of a proposed method for its equitable distribution together with suggestions for helping to equate the anticipated demand and supply.
regarding 6—rationing of scarce currencies
(a) The provisions of paragraph VI.6 shall come into force only after the Union has exercised in full its right under paragraph II.2 to borrow additional supplies of the currency of the member country and after the Union has taken such further steps to increase its supply of this currency as it has deemed appropriate and found possible.
(b) The provisions of paragraph V.1 (c) shall, if necessary, be restricted by the duty of the Union to assure an appropriate distribution among various members of any currency the Union’s supply of which is being exhausted.
(c) In rationing its sales of any scarce currency the Union shall be guided by the principle of satisfying the most urgent needs from the point of view of the general international economic situation. It shall also consider the special needs and resources of the various countries making the request for the scarce currency.
(d) Member countries shall agree that restrictions imposed by other member countries on the importation of goods from a country whose currency is being rationed by the Union shall, for the duration of such rationing, not be regarded as constituting an infraction of the most-favoured nation obligations of commercial treaties except in the case of countries holding official reserves of gold and the currencies of member countries in amounts exceeding 50 per cent. of their quotas.*
7. Whenever the Governing Board has, under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, taken steps to ration the Union’s supply of the currency of any member country, it may require the remaining member countries to prevent the sale by their residents of each other’s currencies, including bills of exchange, in the country whose currency is being rationed and to prevent the purchase by their residents of the rationed currency through the exchange markets of non-member countries. In addition, whenever the Board has taken steps to ration the Union’s supply of the currency of any member country, it shall have the duty to re-examine the prevailing exchange rates and to recommend such changes as it may regard as appropriate to the changed circumstances.
VII. Powers of the Union—General
1. The Union shall have the powers to take such actions as are required to carry out the operations enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. For greater clarity, the Union shall have the power to buy, sell and hold gold, currencies and government securities of member countries; to accept deposits and to earmark gold; to issue its own obligations and to discount or offer them for sale in member countries; and to act as a clearing house for the settling of international movements of funds and gold.
regarding 1—general powers of the union
Member countries agree that all of the Union’s local currency holdings shall be free from any restrictions as to their use for payments within the country concerned.
2. When the Union’s holdings of the local currency of a member country exceed the quota of that country the Union shall have the power to resell to the member country, upon its request, the Union’s excess holdings of its currency for gold or acceptable foreign exchange.
3. The Union shall have the power to invest any of its currency holdings in government securities of the country of that currency, provided that the Board representative of the country concerned approves.
4. The Union shall have the power to buy and sell currencies of non-member countries, but shall not normally hold the currencies of non-member countries beyond 60 days after the date of purchase.
5. The Union shall have the power to levy upon member countries a pro rata share of the expenses of operating the Union, such levy to be made, however, only to the extent that the earnings of the Union are inadequate to meet its current expenses.
6. The Union shall make a service charge of one-quarter per cent. on all gold transactions.
7. In conducting its own operations, the Union shall have the power to deal only with or through (a) the Treasuries, exchange funds or fiscal agents of governments, (b) central banks, with the consent of the member of the Board representing the country in question, and (c) any international banks owned predominantly by member countries. The Union may, nevertheless, with the approval of the member of the Board representing the country concerned, sell its own securities directly to the public or to institutions of member countries.
8. The Union shall have the power and the duty to co-operate with such other institutions of an international character as may exist or be established to deal with matters of international concern, including but not restricted to international investment and commercial policy.
VIII. Abnormal War-time Balances
During the first two years of operation the Union shall have the right to purchase abnormal war time balances held by member countries in other member countries for the national currency of the country selling such balances or for foreign exchange needed to meet current account deficits in such country’s balance of international payments; in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate 5 per cent. of the quotas of all member countries. At the end of two years of operation the Governing Board shall propose a plan for the gradual further liquidation, in whole or in part, through the Union, of abnormal war time balances lying to the credit of member countries in other member countries and other financial indebtedness of a similar character. If the Governing Board feels unable to recommend that the Union’s resources be used for this purpose it shall have the duty to propose some other method by which the problem can be considered.
IX. Voting Power
1. Each member country shall have 100 votes, plus one vote for the equivalent of each 100,000 Units of its quota.
2. All decisions, except where specifically provided otherwise, shall be made by majority of the member votes.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I above, in any vote on a proposal to increase the quota of any member country, member countries shall acquire one additional vote for each 100,000 Units of its contribution to the resources of the Fund (by way of original capital subscription or by way of loans made under the provisions of paragraph II.2) which has been utilized, net, on the average of the preceding year by the Union for sale to other member countries; and member countries shall lose one vote for each 100,000 Units of their net utilization of the resources of the Union on the average of the preceding year.
1. The administration of the Union shall be vested in a Governing Board. Each government shall appoint a representative and an alternate who shall serve on the Board for a period of three years subject to the pleasure of their government. Representatives and alternates may be re-appointed.
2. The Governing Board shall select a Governor of the Union and one or more assistants. The Governor shall become an ex officio member of the Board and shall be chief of the operating staff of the Board. The Governor and his assistants shall hold office for five years and shall be eligible for re-election and may be removed for cause at any time by the Board.
3. The Governor of the Union shall select the operating staff in accordance with regulations established by the Governing Board. Members of the staff may be made available upon request of member countries or of other institutions of an international character for consultation in connection with economic problems and policies.
4. The Governing Board shall appoint from among its members an Executive Committee to consist of not fewer than eleven members. The Chairman of the Board shall be the Chairman of the Executive Committee and the Governor of the Union shall be ex officio a member of the Executive Committee. Meetings of the Executive Committee shall be held at least once every two months and more frequently if the Executive Committee shall so decide.
5. The Governing Board shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as it may be desirable to convene. On request of member countries casting one-fourth of the votes the Chairman shall call a meeting of the Board for the purpose of considering any matters placed before it.
6. Net profits earned by the Union shall be distributed in the following manner:
(a) 50 per cent. to reserves until the reserves are equal to 10 per cent. of the aggregate quotas of the Union;
(b) 50 per cent. to be divided each year among the members in proportion to their quotas.
XI. Withdrawal and Expulsion from the Union
1. A country failing to meet its obligations to the Union may be suspended provided a majority of the member votes so decides. While under suspension the country shall be denied the privileges of membership but shall be subject to the same obligations as any other member of the Union. At the end of one year the country shall be automatically dropped from membership unless it has been restored to good standing by a majority of the member votes.
2. Any country which has been a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union may withdraw from the Union by giving notice and its withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of such notice. During the interval between notice of withdrawal and the taking effect of the notice such country shall be subject to the same obligations as any other member of the Union.
3. Any country which has not been a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union may withdraw from the Union by giving notice and its withdrawal shall take effect 30 days from the date of such notice. During the interval between notice of withdrawal and the taking effect of notice such country shall be subject to the same obligations as any other member of the Union; except, however, that no country which has given notice of withdrawal shall be required to make loans to the Union under the provisions of paragraph II.2 above.
4. A country which is dropped or which withdraws from membership shall have returned to it an amount in its own currency equal to its contributed quota plus other obligations of the Union to the country and minus any sums owed by that country to the Union. The Union shall have 5 years in which to liquidate its obligation to such country.
XII. Policies of Member Countries
In addition to the obligations assumed under the preceding paragraphs, each member country shall undertake the following:
1. To maintain by appropriate action the exchange rates initially agreed with the Union on the currencies of other countries and not to alter exchange rates except under the provisions of paragraph IV.2 above, or with the consent of the Union and only to the extent and in the direction approved by the Union. Exchange rates of member countries may be permitted to fluctuate within a range not exceeding the spread fixed by the Union itself for its own purchases and sales of foreign exchange.
2. To abandon, as soon as the member country decides that conditions permit, all restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, other than those required effectively to control capital movements, with other member countries; and not to impose any additional restrictions, except for the purpose of controlling capital movements, without the approval of the Union.
regarding 2—abandonment of exchange control other than on capital movementsd
The Union may make representations to member countries that conditions are favourable for the abandonment or relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions other than those required effectively to control capital movements and each member country shall agree to give consideration to such representations.
3. To co-operate effectively with other member countries when such countries, with the approval of the Union, adopt or continue controls for the purpose of regulating international movements of capital.
regarding 3—co-operation in enforcing approved exchange controls on capital movements
Co-operation shall include, upon recommendation by the Union, measures that can appropriately be taken
(a) not to accept or permit acquisitions of deposits, securities or investments by residents of any member country imposing restrictions on the export of capital except with the permission of the government of that country and the Union;
(b) to make available to the Union or to the government of any member country full information on all property in the form of deposits, securities and investments of the residents of that country; and
(c) such other measures as the Union may recommend.
4. Not to enter into any new bilateral foreign exchange clearing arrangements nor engage in multiple currency practices except with the approval of the Union.
5. To give careful consideration to the views of the Union on existing or proposed monetary or economic policy the effect of which would be to cause a serious disequilibrium in the balance of payments of the country adopting such policy or of other countries.
6. To furnish the Union with all information it needs for its operations and to furnish such reports as it may require in the forms and at the times requested by the Union.
7. To adopt appropriate legislation or decrees to carry out its undertakings to the Union and to facilitate the activities of the Union.
It might be preferable to refer to the proposed organization as the International Exchange Fund. However, to avoid any possible misunderstanding which might arise through the use of the term Fund to describe both the association of members and the resources of the institution, the term Union has been used throughout this document to describe the organization itself.
In the course of conversations in Washington the Canadian experts expressed the view that it might be desirable to provide for a somewhat greater permissive range of depreciation in exchange rates with somewhat different safeguards than those incorporated in paragraph IV.2. The following is a draft of a paragraph which might be substituted for paragraph IV.2 of the text:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph IV.l above, any member country which has had an adverse balance of payments on current account during a two year period of such magnitude that it has utilized, to cover this deficit, 50 per cent, of its independent gold and foreign exchange reserves and is, in addition, a net purchaser of foreign exchange from the Union to the extent of 50 per cent, of its quota shall be entitled to depreciate its exchange rate to the maximum extent of 10 per cent. The provisions of this paragraph shall only be applicable once in respect of each member country unless the specific approval of the Union has been obtained. Any member country intending to depreciate its exchange rate under the provisions of this paragraph shall inform the management of the Union in advance and shall afford it an opportunity to make such observations as it deems appropriate before taking such action.”
This proposal will clearly have to be reviewed in the light of such general arrangements as may be made regarding international commercial policy and co-ordinated with those arrangements.