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IMF History (1972-1978) Volume 3
Chapter

Increases in Quotas of Members—Seventh General Review

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
February 1996
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To facilitate agreement on the Seventh General Review of Quotas, the Managing Director, in August 1978, sent to the Executive Board an aide-mémoire proposing a solution to the issues that were still unsettled. This aide-mémoire is published as (A) below.

In November 1978, the Executive Board sent to the Board of Governors its report on the Seventh General Review of Quotas. In December 1978, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution approving the report. The report and the resolution are reproduced as (B) below.

(A) Aide-Mémoire from the Managing Director on the Seventh General Review of Quotas (August 4, 1978)

1. Introduction

During my recent discussions with Executive Directors about the SDR package, many Directors emphasized the importance that their authorities, for various reasons, attach to a close interrelationship between reaching a consensus on the SDR package under consideration and the quota increases envisaged under the Seventh Review. I agree with this view as many of the factors that influence the allocation of SDRs also bear on the need for conditional liquidity in the form of an increase in Fund quotas. It would indeed be important to reach simultaneous agreement in the Board of Governors on the SDR package and on the Seventh Review of Quotas. It will also be recalled that the Board of Governors at the last Annual Meeting requested that the Seventh Review of Quotas should be completed by February 9, 1978, and that the Interim Committee expressed concern last April at the delay in completing the review.

In view of these aspects, I recommend that the Executive Directors aim at settling the issues relating to the Seventh Review of Quotas, together with the SDR package, so that a positive report on the Seventh Review can be submitted to the Interim Committee, together with the report on the SDR package.

In order to facilitate progress toward early agreement, and after informal discussions with Executive Directors, I am putting forward the following interrelated proposals on the Seventh Review of Quotas. The main elements are based on the wide consensus reached on each of them at the last meeting of the Interim Committee. I am aware that at that meeting some members had proposals about the size of the first credit tranche depending on the size of the overall quota increase. I am not making proposals in this Aide-Mémoire on the size of the first credit tranche because they have so far not commanded a wide consensus.

2. Size of the Overall Increase

On the need for a quota increase, the communiqué of the last Interim Committee meeting states:

The Committee reaffirmed its view that there was a need for an increase in total quotas under the Seventh Review that would be adequate to meet the expected need for conditional liquidity over the next five years and that would strengthen the available sources of balance of payments financing by enhancing the ability of the Fund to provide such financing without heavy recourse to borrowing and by furthering the process of international adjustment. Most members of the Committee were of the view that an increase in the order of at least 50 per cent of the quotas approved under the Sixth General Review would be appropriate in view of the present and prospective circumstances of the international economy.

In the context of the role of the Fund, the Annual Report for 1978 discusses the international capital market as a source of balance of payments financing in the following terms:

In the first place, a number of countries are not able to borrow readily in these markets, and their authorities understandably consider a system that places too heavy a reliance on private markets as being inequitable. Second, commercial banks do not find it practicable to apply conditions with respect to macroeconomic performance that will promote effective international adjustment. Indeed, competitive pressures may sometimes lead banks to continue to lend until a point is reached where the borrower’s credit is in question, and there can then be an abrupt decline in the availability of funds.

The Report went on to consider the strength and weaknesses of the Fund as a conditional lender.

As a supplier of conditional liquidity, the Fund’s position as an official organization, and its long experience in lending under internationally agreed conditions, give it certain advantages in dealing with international adjustment problems. Conditionality may, of course, pose problems for countries, even when the proposed steps to adjustment are ones that cannot be avoided. Some of the difficulties could be lessened if resort to the Fund came earlier, before the situation had worsened to the point where drastic action is required. To be encouraged to do this, however, members must find the resources of the General Department of the Fund available to them in sufficient volume to warrant the administrative and political effort that is often involved in the use of conditional liquidity.

The extent of this financing need is difficult to gauge, but the following points may be noted. First, in recent years, the ratio of quotas to imports has declined to less than one half of what it was in the 1960s, and in 1978, following the Sixth Review of Quotas, this ratio is about 4 per cent. Even after allowance is made for the fact that the Fund has, partly on a temporary basis, expanded access to Fund credit beyond the earlier norm of 100 per cent of quota, the reduction in the ratio of credit available in the Fund to world imports is still substantial. Second, the nominal value of international transactions is conservatively estimated to rise fairly rapidly in the next few years—of the order of 60 per cent from 1978 to 1983. Third, given the large indebtedness that countries have contracted with commercial banks in recent years, the Fund should be in a position to finance a larger share of the balance of payments deficits that members may incur. Over the coming years, the non-oil developing countries and the more developed primary producing countries could be in a particularly difficult position in this respect.

The size of the quota increase also has important implications for the liquidity of the Fund, although these are also difficult to quantify. First, while there has been an increase in the Fund’s holdings of usable currencies in recent months, the Fund continues to rely heavily on borrowing. Borrowing by the Fund has averaged over the last two financial years close to 58 per cent of outstanding credit, while the average for seven of the preceding ten years, during which the Fund actually borrowed, was 44 per cent. In addition, the activation of the supplementary financing facility will mean continued heavy recourse to borrowing. It will be recalled that this facility was essentially designed to meet potentially large financing needs in the interim period between the completion of the Sixth and the completion of the Seventh Reviews of Quotas. Reliance on borrowing to such a great degree is to be viewed as a temporary feature to help cope with extraordinarily large financing needs and not as a full substitute for resources in the form of quotas. The Fund needs to have adequate resources of its own to be able, on a lasting basis, to assist those of its members that are faced with balance of payments deficits. Second, the improvement in the Fund’s liquidity from a quota increase is difficult to quantify because of uncertainties in forecasting the amount of financing members might require from the Fund for up to five years ahead, and in forecasting the distribution of balance of payments surpluses and deficits and hence the amounts of usable currencies. Furthermore, the improvement in the Fund’s liquidity would be less if the Fund were not able to use its holdings of the liquidity currencies of one or more major members because they were encountering balance of payments difficulties. Fund quotas should therefore be sufficient to provide assurance that unforeseen payment imbalances can be financed without undue reliance on borrowing.

Taking all these factors into account, I have come to the conclusion that a quota increase in the order of 50 per cent (SDR 19.5 billion) would be a minimum required to restore a reasonable relationship between the size of the Fund and the balance of payments financing needs of all members over the next five years.

As regards the period to which this quota increase would apply, I propose that Executive Directors reach an understanding that, unless there is a major change in the world economy and its financing needs, there would be no further general adjustment in quotas for five years after the Board of Governors approved the increase in quotas under the Seventh Review.

3. Selective Increases of Quotas

On the issue of selective quota adjustments, the views that emerge from the Interim Committee also provide some guidelines to a possible agreement. Taking account of the discussions of this matter by the Executive Directors prior to the last Interim Committee meeting, and my recent informal exchange of views with them, I would propose that the increase be mainly equiproportional, with a very limited number of selective increases for those members whose present quotas can be regarded as being seriously out of line with their relative economic size.

The customary measures to determine the extent by which quotas are out of line is the relationship between the so-called calculated quota and a member’s actual quota. In order to limit the number of selective increases, I propose that only those countries with a calculated quota four times greater than the actual quota are included in the list of members to whom selective increases would be offered. This approach would seem to have the merit of simplicity which may be most conducive to reaching an early agreement. On this basis, I would envisage some selective quota adjustments for 11 developing countries. While two industrial countries also meet this criterion, it would not seem possible to include them in the list because of the limited amount available for selective increases. Following the discussion of this matter in the Interim Committee and by the Executive Directors, and on the basis of a 50 per cent increase in quotas, the amount available for selective increases for developing members would not exceed SDR 388 million. This amount would be composed by maintaining unchanged the quotas of China and Democratic Kampuchea and by adding the amounts of the quota increases to which Singapore and Democratic Kampuchea were entitled under the Sixth Review, but which were not taken up by them.

The attached two tables show the allocation of this amount to the 11 developing members. In Table 1, the allocation is base solely on the extent to which quotas are out of line, i.e., in proportion to the excess of the calculated quota over the present quota of the members on the list. In Table 2, a second criterion has been added, in the proportion to the first criterion of one fifth to four fifths, to take account of recent contributions to the Fund’s liquidity as measured by the credit extended to the Fund.

Table 1.Seventh Review of Quotas Special Quota Increases—Developing Countries1(In millions of SDRs)
Sixth Review Quotas50 Per cent

General Increase

(3)
Special Increases2

(4)
Seventh Review Potential Quotas
Quota

(1)
Per cent

share in Fund

(2)
Quota

(5)
Increase over

Sixth Review

agreed quota (Per cent)

(6)
Per cent share

in Fund

(7)
Iran6601.6933083.21,073.262.61.83
Saudi Arabia6001.54300121.51,021.570.31.74
Kuwait2350.60117.533.5386.064.30.66
Libya1850.4792.526.2303.764.20.52
Korea1600.418019.9259.962.40.44
Iraq1410.3670.528.3239.870.10.41
United Arab
Emirates1200.316025.8205.871.50.35
Singapore490.1324.523.697.198.230.17
Qatar400.10207.767.769.30.12
Oman200.05105.935.979.50.06
Lebanon120.03612.430.4153.30.05
Total2,2225.701,111.0388.03,721.06.35
Total Fund39,001.4100.0019,534.2388.058,602.650.0100.00

The list of 11 countries eligible to receive special increases is determined by including all developing member countries with a calculated Seventh Review quota that is at least four times greater than the accepted Sixth Review quota.

The amount available for distribution (SDR 388 million) is derived by increasing the quotas of China, Democratic Kampuchea, and Singapore agreed under the Sixth Review by 50 per cent, less present quotas of China and Democratic Kampuchea, and the present quota for Singapore increased by 50 per cent. Special increases have been allocated 100 per cent on the basis of the excess of the calculated quotas over actual quotas.

Increase over the quota accepted under the Sixth Review.

The list of 11 countries eligible to receive special increases is determined by including all developing member countries with a calculated Seventh Review quota that is at least four times greater than the accepted Sixth Review quota.

The amount available for distribution (SDR 388 million) is derived by increasing the quotas of China, Democratic Kampuchea, and Singapore agreed under the Sixth Review by 50 per cent, less present quotas of China and Democratic Kampuchea, and the present quota for Singapore increased by 50 per cent. Special increases have been allocated 100 per cent on the basis of the excess of the calculated quotas over actual quotas.

Increase over the quota accepted under the Sixth Review.

Table 2.Seventh Review of Quotas Special Quota Increases—Developing Countries1(In millions of SDRs)
Sixth Review Quotas50 Per cent

General Increase

(3)
Special Increases2

(4)
Seventh Review Potential Quotas
Quota

(1)
Per Cent

share in Fund

(2)
Quota

(5)
Increase over

Sixth Review

agreed quota (Per cent)

(6)
Per cent share

in Fund

(7)
Iran6601.6933085.01,075.062.91.83
Saudi Arabia6001.54300140.11,040.173.31.77
Kuwait2350.60117.540.8393.367.40.67
Libya1850.4792.520.9298.461.30.51
Korea1600.418015.9255.959.90.44
Iraq1410.3670.522.6234.166.00.40
United Arab
Emirates1200.316022.6202.668.80.35
Singapore490.1324.518.992.488.630.16
Qatar400.10206.266.265.50.11
Oman200.05105.135.175.50.06
Lebanon120.0369.927.9132.50.05
Total2,2225.701,111.0388.03,721.06.35
Total Fund39,001.4100.0019,534.2388.058,602.650.0100.00

The list of 11 countries eligible to receive special increases is determined by including all developing member countries with a calculated Seventh Review quota that is at least four times greater than the accepted Sixth Review quota.

The amount available for distribution (SDR 388 million) is derived by increasing the quotas of China, Democratic Kampuchea, and Singapore agreed under the Sixth Review by 50 per cent, less present quotas of China and Democratic Kampuchea, and the present quota for Singapore increased by 50 per cent. Special increases have been allocated 4/5 on the basis of the excess of the calculated quota over the actual quota and 1/5 on the basis of average credit extended to the Fund in the period August 1, 1976 to June 30, 1978.

Increase over the quota accepted under the Sixth Review.

The list of 11 countries eligible to receive special increases is determined by including all developing member countries with a calculated Seventh Review quota that is at least four times greater than the accepted Sixth Review quota.

The amount available for distribution (SDR 388 million) is derived by increasing the quotas of China, Democratic Kampuchea, and Singapore agreed under the Sixth Review by 50 per cent, less present quotas of China and Democratic Kampuchea, and the present quota for Singapore increased by 50 per cent. Special increases have been allocated 4/5 on the basis of the excess of the calculated quota over the actual quota and 1/5 on the basis of average credit extended to the Fund in the period August 1, 1976 to June 30, 1978.

Increase over the quota accepted under the Sixth Review.

It will be noted that the results of these calculations do not differ materially from each other. Thus, in the interest of simplicity, it may be preferable to use only the first criterion for the allocation of special increases. The possibility has been suggested of modest special increases for two developing countries (Nigeria and Venezuela), solely on the basis of their relatively large contributions to the Fund’s liquidity, by allocating in a suitable manner a modest share of the SDR 388 million to them. Such an approach might be considered if it helped to achieve an early consensus on the Seventh Quota Review.

(B) Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors

(October 25, 1978)

1. Article III, Section 2(a) of the Articles of Agreement [Second Amendment] provides that “The Board of Governors shall at intervals of not more than five years conduct a general review, and if it deems it appropriate propose an adjustment, of the quotas of the members. It may also, if it thinks fit, consider at any other time the adjustment of any particular quota at the request of the member concerned.” This report and the attached Resolution on increases in quotas under the current, i.e., the seventh, general review are submitted to the Board of Governors in accordance with Article III, Section 2. [Second Amendment]

In their Resolution of March 22, 1976, the Board of Governors decided that “The seventh general review of quotas shall be completed by February 9, 1978.” The review was not completed by that date. At its meeting in Mexico City in April 1978, considerable progress was made by the Interim Committee toward achieving a consensus on the Seventh Review as reflected in the communiqué issued at the end of its meeting on April 30, 1978.

2. At the last meeting of the Interim Committee in Washington in September 1978, understandings were reached on all major issues of the Seventh Review, as reflected in the relevant passages from the Committee’s communiqué of September 24, 1978, as follows:

The Committee resumed its discussion of the Seventh General Review of Quotas and considered three major issues relating to it: the size of the overall increase in quotas, selective quota adjustments, and the method of payment of the increases in quotas. These issues were considered by the Committee in conjunction with the various issues relating to the SDR with which they are regarded as interrelated. The Committee recalled its view that there was a need for an increase in total quotas under the Seventh Review that would be adequate to meet the expected need for conditional liquidity over the next five years. The Committee also recalled its view that an adequate increase would strengthen the available sources of balance of payments financing by enhancing the ability of the Fund to provide such financing without heavy recourse to borrowing and by furthering the process of international adjustment.

The Committee’s view was that an increase in the overall size of quotas of 50 per cent would be appropriate to bring about a better balance between the size of the Fund’s resources and the need of members for balance of payments financing over the medium term. The Committee noted that the Executive Board does not intend to propose a general adjustment in quotas for five years after the Board of Governors approves the increase in quotas under the Seventh Review, unless there is a major change in the world economy and its financing needs.

The Committee noted with satisfaction that agreement had been reached on selective quota increases for 11 developing member countries: Iraq, Iran, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.

Taking into account the conclusions reached on the issues relating to SDRs, including allocations of SDRs, the Committee was of the view that, for the quota increases proposed as a result of this review, participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department should pay 25 per cent of the quota increase in SDRs and that nonparticipants should pay the equivalent of 25 per cent of the increase in foreign exchange.

The Committee agreed to request the Executive Board to prepare and complete by November 1, 1978, for final decision and vote by the Board of Governors before the end of the year, a proposed resolution on increases in the quotas of members, which would include necessary provisions dealing with participation, the effective date of quota increases, and the method of payment of the increases in accordance with the understandings reached in the Committee.

The communiqué also included the following passage:

The Committee reached the conclusions … [on the issues related to SDRs] … with the understanding that these conclusions are interrelated and must be adopted in their entirety together with the understandings reached by the Committee on the Seventh General Review of Quotas. In the view of the Committee, therefore, decisions on all these issues relating to SDRs and on the Seventh General Review should be taken at the same time.

3. The Executive Board has considered a number of factors, both of a qualitative and quantitative nature, that affect the expected need for conditional liquidity and the Fund’s ability to finance that need over the medium term without heavy reliance on borrowing. One factor is the extent of the growth of, and possible fluctuations in, the value of international transactions; another factor is the likely continuation of relatively large payments imbalances for many countries in the next few years. In these circumstances, the demand for balance of payments financing may well rise, and the Fund’s resources should be sufficient to permit the Fund to finance a reasonable share of that demand.

Furthermore, the Executive Board, while acknowledging the contribution made by the international capital markets to the effective functioning of the international monetary system over the last few years, believes that an increase in Fund quotas can promote the process of international adjustment in ways that could not be achieved through the private markets. The Fund provides its members with balance of payments financing on the understanding that these members will follow appropriate policies of economic adjustment. In these circumstances, members’ access to the Fund’s resources must be sufficiently large to induce members with substantial balance of payments needs to use those resources and to pursue economic policies and programs which the Fund is able to support. While access to the Fund’s resources in terms of quota is now considerably in excess of the traditional policy norm of 100 per cent of quota under the credit tranche policy, the ratio between access to Fund credit and payments imbalances is considered to be lower than a decade ago.

In recent years, the Fund has established or expanded a number of special facilities to help deal with certain balance of payments problems of its members. Some of them, notably the extended Fund facility and the expanded Compensatory Financing Facility, which are of a continuing character, have increased access to Fund resources in relation to quota without additional financing being available to the Fund. On the other hand, borrowing by the Fund for the oil facilities of 1974 and 1975 and the supplementary financing facility, which is expected to come into operation shortly, entailed, or will entail, the creation of claims on the Fund’s general resources which are encashable on demand if a lender has a balance of payments need. Moreover, as was the case with the oil facilities, the resources provided under the supplementary financing facility will augment member’s access for a limited period of time only. At the end of that period, the Fund will be faced with both a reduction in the resources available to meet the needs of members and possibly large liquid liabilities to its quotas.

In view of the possibility of large payments imbalances over the next few years and the distribution of such imbalances, the Fund’s liquidity position is likely to be vulnerable, even though the volume of usable currencies available to the Fund has recently increased. Resources made available through increases in quotas give the Fund a more assured access to resources than borrowing.

In light of the above considerations, the Executive Board is of the view that, in general, increased access to the Fund’s resources should, over the longer run, normally result from an increase in Fund quotas.

4. For these reasons, and in accordance with the understandings reached by the Interim Committee at its meeting on September 24, 1978, the Executive Board now proposes to the Board of Governors increases in Fund quotas of 50 per cent for most members and special increases for 11 members. The Executive Board does not intend to propose a general adjustment of quotas for five years after the Board of Governors adopts this Resolution, unless there is a major change in the world economy and its financing needs.

5. The Executive Board will review the customary method of calculating quotas after the Seventh General Review of Quotas has been completed. In the context of the next general review of the quotas, the Executive Board will examine the quota shares of members in relation to their positions in the world economy with a view to adjusting those shares better to reflect members’ relative economic positions while having regard to the desirability of an appropriate balance in the composition of the Executive Board.

6. Under the proposed Resolution, a member will be able to consent to the increase in its quota at anytime on or before November 1, 1980. Therefore, unless this period is extended by the Executive Board, members will have until November 1, 1980 to take whatever action may be necessary under their laws to enable them to give their consent.

7. It is proposed that the increase in a member’s quota will take effect on the latest of the following three dates:

(a) The date on which the Fund receives the member’s consent to the increase in quota;

(b) The date of the payment of the increase in subscription; and

(c) The date on which the Fund determines that the participation requirement in paragraph 2 of the proposed Resolution has been satisfied. The proposed Resolution provides, however, that if the participation requirement in paragraph 2 has not been met by June 30, 1980, no increase in quotas under the Seventh Review would become effective until after October 5, 1980, so that there would be no changes in quotas during, or shortly before, the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, when the next election of Executive Directors will take place. If the participation requirement were met during the period July 1 to October 5, 1980, increases in quotas would become effective only after October 5, 1980.

The participation requirement in paragraph 2 is reached when the Fund determines that members having not less than 75 per cent of the total of quotas on November 1, 1978 have consented to increases in their quotas. In determining whether this degree of participation has been reached, the Fund will take into account all consents to increases, whether they are increases to the maximum amount provided for or to a smaller amount.

8. The proposed Resolution does not provide for increases in quotas by fixed installments. A member will be able, however, to consent to an increase smaller than the maximum provided for. The member will be able to consent to further increases, up to the maximum provided for, at a later date, provided it is within the period for consent under paragraph 3 of the proposed Resolution.

9. The proposed Resolution provides that a member must pay the increase in its subscription within 30 days after (a) the date on which the member notifies the Fund of its consent, or (b) the date on which the participation requirement is met, whichever is the later.

10. Reflecting the understandings reached at the September 1978 meeting of the Interim Committee, 25 per cent of the increase in quotas proposed as a result of the current review should be paid in SDRs for those members that are participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department, and 25 per cent of the increase in the quotas of nonparticipants should be paid in the currencies of other members specified by the Fund, subject to their concurrence. The balance of the increase shall be in a member’s own currency. These payments are in accordance with the prescription of Article III, Section 3 (a), [Second Amendment], and therefore it is not necessary to include any provision for the payment of increases in the Resolution.

11. In accordance with paragraph 3 of the Interim Committee’s communiqué of September 24, 1978, the Executive Board has taken decisions on aspects of the special drawing right that are referred to in paragraph 5 of that communiqué. These decisions will become effective on the dates referred to in them if the proposed Resolution and the Resolution on allocations of SDRs become effective. The proposed Resolution provides that it will become effective if it and the proposed Resolution on the Allocation of Special Drawing Rights are adopted by the necessary majority of the total voting power for each.

12. The Executive Board recommends adoption of the attached Resolution. The attached Resolution is designed to enable the Board of Governors to vote at one time on all matters connected with the increases in quotas under the Resolution.

Resolution Submitted to the Board of Governors

Whereas the Executive Board has submitted to the Board of Governors a report entitled “Increases in Quotas of Fund Members—Seventh General Review” containing recommendations on increases in the quotas of individual members of the Fund; and

Whereas the Executive Board has recommended the adoption of the following Resolution of the Board of Governors, which Resolution proposes increases in the quotas of members of the Fund as a result of the Seventh General Review of Quotas and deals with certain related matters, by vote without meeting pursuant to Section 13 of the By-Laws of the Fund;

Now, therefore, the Board of Governors hereby resolves that:

1. The International Monetary Fund proposes that, subject to the provisions of this Resolution, the quotas of members of the Fund shall be increased to the amounts shown against their names in the Annex to this Resolution, provided that any member may consent to an increased quota that is smaller than the one shown in the Annex, and may consent thereafter to further increases that raise its quota to the amount shown against its name in the Annex not later than the date prescribed by or under paragraph 3 below.

2. A member’s increase in quota as proposed by this Resolution shall not become effective unless the member has notified the Fund of its consent to the increase not later than the date prescribed by or under paragraph 3 below and has paid the increase in quota in full, provided that (a) no increase in quota shall become effective before the date of the Fund’s determination that members having not less than three fourths of the total of quotas on November 1, 1978 have consented to increases in their quotas, and (b) if the determination has not been made before July 1,1980, no increase in quota shall become effective until after October 5, 1980.

3. Notices in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall be executed by a duly authorized official of the member and must be received in the Fund not later than November 1, 1980, provided that the Executive Board may extend this period as it may determine.

4. Each member shall pay to the Fund the increase in its quota within 30 days after the later of (a) the date on which it notifies the Fund of its consent or (b) the date of the Fund’s determination under paragraph 2 above. If this determination is made in the period between July 1 and October 5, 1980, for the purpose of this paragraph it shall be deemed to have been made on October 5, 1980.

5. This Resolution shall become effective if it and the Proposed Resolution on Allocation of Special Drawing Rights for the Third Basic Period are adopted by the necessary majority of the total voting power for each.

ANNEX TO RESOLUTION
Proposed

Maximum

Quota

(In millions

of SDRs)
1. Afghanistan67.5
2. Algeria427.5
3. Argentina802.5
4. Australia1,185.0
5. Austria495.0
6. Bahamas49.5
7. Bahrain30.0
8. Bangladesh228.0
9. Barbados25.5
10. Belgium1,335.0
11. Benin24.0
12. Bolivia67.5
13. Botswana13.5
14. Brazil997.5
15. Burma109.5
16. Burundi34.5
17. Cameroon67.5
18. Canada2,035.5
19. Central African Empire24.0
20. Chad24.0
21. Chile325.5
22. China550.0
23. Colombia289.5
24. Comoros3.5
25. Congo, People’s Republic of the25.5
26. Costa Rica61.5
27. Cyprus51.0
28. Denmark465.0
29. Dominican Republic82.5
30. Ecuador105.0
31. Egypt342.0
32. El Salvador64.5
33. Equatorial Guinea15.0
34. Ethiopia54.0
35. Fiji27.0
36. Finland393.0
37. France2,878.5
38. Gabon45.0
39. Gambia, The13.5
40. Germany, Federal
Republic of3,234.0
41. Ghana159.0
42. Greece277.5
43. Grenada4.5
44. Guatemala76.5
45. Guinea45.0
46. Guinea-Bissau5.9
47. Guyana37.5
48. Haiti34.5
49. Honduras51.0
50. Iceland43.5
51. India1,717.5
52. Indonesia720.0
53. Iran1,075.0
54. Iraq234.1
55. Ireland232.5
56. Israel307.5
57. Italy1,860.0
58. Ivory Coast114.0
59. Jamaica111.0
60. Japan2,488.5
61. Jordan45.0
62. Kampuchea, Democratic25.0
63. Kenya103.5
63. Korea255.9
65. Kuwait393.3
66. Lao People’s Democratic Republic24.0
67. Lebanon27.9
68. Lesotho10.5
69. Liberia55.5
70. Libya298.4
71. Luxembourg46.5
72. Madagascar51.0
73. Malawi28.5
74. Malaysia379.5
75. Maldives1.4
76. Mali40.5
77. Malta30.0
78. Mauritania25.5
79. Mauritius40.5
80. Mexico802.5
81. Morocco225.0
82. Nepal28.5
83. Netherlands1,422.0
84. New Zealand348.0
85. Nicaragua51.0
86. Niger24.0
87. Nigeria540.0
88. Norway442.5
89. Oman35.1
90. Pakistan427.5
91. Panama67.5
92. Papua New Guinea45.0
93. Paraguay34.5
94. Peru246.0
95. Philippines315.0
96. Portugal258.0
97. Qatar66.2
98. Romania367.5
99. Rwanda34.5
100. São Tomé and Principe3.0
101. Saudi Arabia1,040.1
102. Senegal63.0
103. Seychelles2.0
104. Sierra Leone46.5
105. Singapore92.4
106. Solomon Islands3.2
107. Somalia34.5
108. South Africa636.0
109. Spain835.5
110. Sri Lanka178.5
111. Sudan132.0
112. Suriname37.5
113. Swaziland18.0
114. Sweden675.0
115. Syrian Arab Republic94.5
116. Tanzania82.5
117. Thailand271.5
118. Togo28.5
119. Trinidad and Tobago123.0
120. Tunisia94.5
121. Turkey300.0
122. Uganda75.0
123. United Arab Emirates202.6
124. United Kingdom4,387.5
125. United States12,607.5
126. Upper Volta24.0
127. Uruguay126.0
128. Venezuela990.0
129. Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of135.0
130. Western Samoa4.5
131. Yemen Arab Republic19.5
132. Yemen, People’s Democratic Republic of61.5
133. Yugoslavia415.5
134. Zaïre228.0
135. Zambia211.5

Resolution No. 34-2, adopted by the Board of Governors effective December 11, 1978.

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