Chapter

CHAPTER 26 Some Characteristics of Operation

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
February 1996
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Author(s)
Joseph Gold

THE AVOIDANCE OF SANCTIONS

A student of the development of the Fund must note how little use the Fund has made of sanctions. This characteristic of the way in which the Fund has operated has had a formative influence on Fund law and practice. The Articles authorize the Fund to take certain actions of which some are clearly sanctions and others have been regarded as comparable to sanctions if only because there is a tacit view that they involve an adverse judgment on the member against which the action is taken. One of the most obvious sanctions is a declaration of ineligibility to use the Fund’s resources either because a member “is using the resources of the Fund in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund” 1 or because a member “fails to fulfill any of its obligations” under the Articles.2 If a member makes an unauthorized change of par value despite the objection of the Fund in circumstances in which the Fund is entitled to object, this is technically not a failure by the member to fulfill any of its obligations, but it becomes automatically unable to make purchases unless the Fund decides to forestall ineligibility.3

The most radical of all obvious sanctions is the compulsory withdrawal of a member from the Fund. This can be required if after a reasonable period a member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its obligations under the Articles or if a difference between the Fund and a member persists on its unauthorized change of par value.4

A member must consult with the Fund on means to reduce the Fund’s holdings of the member’s currency once the rate of charge on any part of them reaches 4 per cent per annum. If the member fails to reach an agreement on repurchase within three to five years after a purchase, or fails to observe the terms of an agreement, the Fund may levy penalty rates of charge after the charge has reached 5 per cent per annum.5

Under Article XII, Section 8, the Fund may communicate its views informally to any member on any matter arising under the Articles, and may publish a report regarding a member’s monetary or economic conditions and developments which directly tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of members. In exceptional circumstances, the Fund may make representations to a member that is availing itself of the transitional arrangements of Article XIV that conditions are favorable for the withdrawal of any particular restriction, or for the general abandonment of restrictions, that are inconsistent with any other provision of the Articles.6 There are other actions that the Fund may take that might be regarded by some observers as sanctions, but it is not necessary to complete the list, although one of them will be singled out later because of its special relationship to the international monetary system.

In the elaborate congressional hearings on the proposed U.S. Bretton Woods legislation in 1945, there was much discussion of the sanctions and safeguards in the Articles in order to rally public opinion in the United States to support of the Fund by showing that abuse of the proposed institution by its members could be prevented or deterred. The Fund has found it necessary to make a negligible use of this armory of sanctions and quasi-sanctions. The most dramatic employment of a sanction in the history of the Fund was the declaration of Czechoslovakia’s ineligibility in November 1953 and the decision in September 1954 to compel it to withdraw because of its failure to provide information under Article VIII and consult under Article XIV. There have been no other declarations of ineligibility or decisions to compel withdrawal, although ineligibility proceedings were initiated against Cuba in February 1964 for failure to repurchase after it had requested and been refused a postponement beyond five years from its purchase, and in these circumstances Cuba withdrew voluntarily. France became ineligible in January 1948 when it adopted an unauthorized par value, but ineligibility was automatic under Article IV, Section 6 and called for no declaration by the Fund.7 Under Article XV, Section 2, if a difference between a member and the Fund on an unauthorized change of par value continues, the member may be required to withdraw. The Fund took no further action in the case of France, and eligibility was restored by the Fund in October 1954, even though a new par value was not established until December 1958. Only two members have had to pay rates of charge in excess of 5 per cent per annum, and then for no more than brief periods. The Fund has made no formal representations under Article XIV, Section 4, and has not published any report under Article XII, Section 8.

The sparing use of sanctions can be evaluated only if it is known to what extent sanctions could have been applied, but it is not easy to arrive at a judgment on that question. One reason for the difficulty is that the practices and procedures that have been developed to avoid sanctions, particularly in connection with the use of the Fund’s resources, make it unnecessary to determine whether members are making an improper use. There have been numerous failures by members to observe their obligations to seek the prior approval of the Fund for the introduction of multiple currency practices or restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, but in most cases these failures were the subject of consultation with the Fund after the adoption of the measures and the Fund then took decisions to approve them. Many of the failures to observe obligations in the code of conduct were the result of oversight, but there have been a few cases in which the violation has been a conscious choice under what was thought to be the pressure of events. There have been no more than a handful of cases in which members have failed to honor their financial obligations meticulously. Only in rare instances have charges been paid or repurchases made after the due date, and there has never been a protracted or permanent default. Although there is no legal or logical distinction between financial and other obligations, financial institutions and their members have a special sensitivity about the prompt and full performance of financial obligations.

One must conclude that there has been a high degree of law observance by members, but not complete impeccability, and sanctions could have been applied more frequently than they have been. It should be added that the Rules and Regulations require the Managing Director to report to the Executive Directors any case in which it appears to him that a member is not fulfilling its obligations.8 There has been no formal decision to minimize the use of sanctions, and it is not easy, therefore, to explain fully why they have been avoided. Sanctions involve an adverse judgment by the international community, and it is painful not only to the member against which the judgment is delivered but also to its fellow members that adopt the judgment. Another reason is the conviction that persuasion based on consultation and collaboration are more likely to encourage the widespread observance of obligations than punitive methods. This conviction rests not only on the prescription of the Articles but also on the experience of the Fund. In any event, it seems to have been concluded that usually there is no advantage in reacting to the violation of one obligation by imposing sanctions that may lead to withdrawal from the Fund and the release from all obligations.

The Fund’s attitude to sanctions has affected its practice most profoundly in connection with the use of its resources. The power to challenge a member’s representation when it requests a purchase is not a complete safeguard for the Fund because a challenge is not a proper substitute for a declaration of ineligibility if there are grounds for ineligibility. In the early years of the Fund, informal procedures were employed, such as warning some members that Article XX, Section 4 (i) might be invoked to postpone exchange transactions with them if they submitted requests. Under this provision the Fund has the power to postpone transactions with a member if, in the opinion of the Fund, they would lead to use of its resources in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Articles or prejudicial to the Fund or its members. However, this provision also could provide only a partial defense against improper use because the Fund decided on March 10, 1948 that the power could be exercised only in the case of a member that had not already had an exchange transaction with the Fund.9

The major contribution to the protection of the Fund’s resources without the need to rely on the sanction of ineligibility has been made, of course, by the technique of the stand-by arrangement. Here again, however, the desire to avoid ineligibility has affected the development of that instrument. In early stand-by arrangements a paragraph was employed, as a result of the decision of October 1, 1952,10 which provided that the Fund would not permit a member to make purchases under a stand-by arrangement that were requested after the member became ineligible or after the Executive Directors adopted a decision to consider a proposal made by the Managing Director or an executive director to suppress or limit the member’s eligibility. The reluctance to employ procedures related to ineligibility in order to interrupt the right to make purchases under a stand-by arrangement was responsible for the introduction of two features of stand-by arrangements that were meant to be substitutes for these procedures. The first was the evolution of performance clauses containing performance criteria as described in Chapter 23.11

The second of the two features of the Fund’s practice that were designed to avoid ineligibility procedures under stand-by arrangements was the use of the “prior notice” clause. This was a clause in stand-by arrangements by which the Fund reserved to itself the privilege of giving notice and thereby interrupting a member’s right to request purchases after the date of the notice. Nothing was said about the criteria for giving notice. The clause became standard practice because a member’s program might be jeopardized by the non-observance of certain policies in its letter of intent even though, by their nature, they could not be given the objective formulation that is required for performance criteria. Notwithstanding the widespread use of the prior notice clause before it was repudiated, it was invoked on only one occasion, on September 17, 1958.12 All of the inhibitions that attended the ineligibility procedures for which the prior notice clause was to be a substitute obstructed action under the clause as well. The embarrassment that was felt by the Executive Directors on the one occasion on which they decided to give notice helped to bring about the demise of the clause. That event occurred not because of the profligate use of the clause, but because of the conviction that it did not produce the most desirable balance between assurance to a member that it could use the Fund’s resources and assurance to the Fund that use would be consistent with the Articles. The Fund decided in February 1961 to proscribe prior notice clauses and even deleted them from stand-by arrangements then in operation.13

When the decision to abandon prior notice clauses was taken, the staff and some executive directors urged that ineligibility procedures should not be regarded as an impeachment, and that, with this change in attitude, more use could be made of them. These recommendations have not been followed. Instead, the consequences of the decision have been, first, a greater vigilance than ever in ensuring that performance criteria are truly objective, because, if they are not, they will suffer from the same vice of subjectivity as the prior notice clause. Second, the decision led to a greater sophistication in the formulation of performance criteria as determinants of the effectiveness of a member’s program. Third, performance criteria tended to proliferate until this tendency was curbed by a decision of September 20, 1968 which declares that they must be confined to those that are truly necessary for evaluating the progress of a program.

Earlier in this discussion of sanctions it was said that one further sanction would be singled out. That was a reference to Article VII, which is entitled “Scarce Currencies.” Under Section 1, if the Fund finds that a general scarcity of a particular currency is developing, the Fund may inform members and issue a report setting forth the causes of the scarcity and containing recommendations for bringing it to an end. Section 2 empowers the Fund to borrow a member’s currency or to acquire it for gold if the Fund deems it appropriate to replenish its holdings of that currency. Section 3 provides that if it becomes evident to the Fund that the demand for a member’s currency seriously threatens the Fund’s ability to supply the currency, the Fund, whether or not it has issued a report under Section 1, must make a formal declaration of the scarcity of the currency, apportion its existing and future supply of the currency, and issue a report. The formal declaration operates as an authorization to any member, after consulting the Fund, to impose temporary limitations on the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency. There are certain qualifications on the exercise of the authority, but, subject to them, members “have complete jurisdiction in determining the nature of [the] limitations”14 on exchange operations, and therefore members would be able to discriminate against transactions in the scarce currency.

Action by the Fund under Section 1 or Section 3 was considered by the drafters to be the way in which the Fund could put pressure on a member that enjoys a substantial and persistent surplus in its balance of payments while a considerable number of other members suffer from deficits in their balance of payments. It is possible to detect a difference in tone in the explanations of these provisions before the Articles took effect, with Keynes describing the forerunner of Section 3 as “a sanction” and U.S. representatives generally avoiding quite so harsh a description.15

The provisions of Sections 1 and 3 and their relevance to conditions at the time were discussed by the Executive Directors in August 1947. The staff prepared a memorandum in which it was explained that the provisions were intended to prevent a general contraction of world trade as a result of inadequate imports and foreign investments by a great trading country. The insufficient monetary reserves of members at that time were not the result of any decline in demand in the United States or inadequate loans and grants by it; the abnormal demand for dollars was caused by an imbalance between the needs and the productive resources of many members. The implication of the staff’s approach was that an adverse judgment would be implied by action under Section 1 and more particularly Section 3. In fact, the judgment would have been more disturbing than its legal consequences because many members were able to discriminate against transactions involving the U.S. dollar even in the absence of a declaration of the scarcity of the dollar. These were the members availing themselves of the transitional arrangements of Article XIV which permitted discrimination for balance of payments reasons. The Executive Directors decided on August 14, 1947 that there was no justification for action under Article VII, Sections 1 or 3. The possibility of invoking these provisions has not been discussed by the Executive Directors since August 1947, although the effectiveness of the provisions was the subject of debate in the Contracting Parties to the GATT in 1955.

It seems to have become a received idea that a report under Section 1 or a declaration under Section 3 is an adverse judgment; certainly the consequences of the declaration, and perhaps also the report, could be grave. It was not to be expected that the Fund’s customary caution in applying sanctions would be relaxed in the case of sanctions as serious as those that are available under Article VII. This has led some observers to conclude that the only provision under which effective pressure could be applied against a member that has a substantial and persistent surplus in its balance of payments is sterile, and that the international adjustment process is all the weaker for that loss.

This discussion of the scarce currency provisions can be completed by a brief mention of the practice that has developed under Article VII, Section 2. Under that provision, the Fund can replenish its holdings of a currency by borrowing or by the sale of gold, and the Fund has now done this on a number of occasions. The provision would have had a more appropriate place in Article V among those dealing with the operations of the Fund, and it did appear in the forerunner of that article at one stage in its legislative history. Not only was the provision moved but the somewhat maladroit word “scarce” was introduced in its title. It has been necessary for the Fund to emphasize that the replenishment of a member’s currency under Section 2 does not require action under either Section 1 or Section 3 and is not an animadversion on the member. On the contrary, the replenishment makes action under Section 3 less justifiable, because, if the replenishment takes the form of lending to the Fund, the member is making a contribution to the operation of the international monetary system by increasing the Fund’s capacity to assist members in deficit. A member is required to provide its own currency to the Fund for gold but no member is obligated to lend to the Fund.

STRICT OBLIGATIONS AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS

The Fund’s reluctance to employ sanctions is not associated with a relaxed understanding of the obligations of members. The Fund has tended to the view that obligations are not to be construed more narrowly than the terms in which they are written, and therefore it has not been responsive to alleged legal justifications for failures to observe obligations. An example of this strict construction has been cited in connection with par values: if a member wishes to change the par value of its currency it may do this only by the immediate adoption of a new par value in accordance with the Articles and without any intervening period of fluctuation in the exchange rate for its currency or an intervening unauthorized par value. Another example is the Fund’s position on the scope of the obligation of members to refrain from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions without the approval of the Fund. The question arose whether the obligation applies to restrictions that are imposed for such political reasons as the preservation of national or international security and not for economic reasons. The Fund has made strenuous efforts at all times to exclude political considerations from its discussions and decisions. The desire to operate as a technical organization is reflected in the Fund’s agreement with the United Nations which was entered into pursuant to Article X of the Fund’s Articles and Article 63 of the Charter of the United Nations and came into force on November 15, 1947. The agreement recognizes that

by reason of the nature of its international responsibilities and the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Fund is, and is required to function as, an independent international organization.16

It is an accepted convention of the Fund that political issues are not allowed to intrude into operating decisions, and thus there have been occasions on which the executive director appointed or elected by one disputant in a political controversy outside the Fund has not opposed an exchange transaction involving another disputant. It will be realized that the dilemma involving restrictions for security reasons was acute. In their decision of August 14, 1952, the Executive Directors expressed their conviction that the Fund does not provide a suitable forum for the discussion of the political and military considerations that are responsible for the adoption of these restrictions. The Executive Directors were aware, however, that it is not possible to distinguish sharply between cases involving only these considerations and other cases involving economic motivations and effects as well, that the Fund must protect the legitimate interests of its members, and that the language of the Articles makes no exception for any category of restrictions. They concluded, therefore, that the Fund’s jurisdiction over restrictions applies whatever the motivation with which, or the circumstances in which, they are imposed.17

The Fund’s skeptical attitude to alleged legal justifications for the nonperformance of obligations that are written in absolute form can be illustrated by two cases. The first of these arose in June 1948 and related to the responsibility of the United Kingdom for a subsidy paid by Southern Rhodesia to its domestic gold producers which appeared to be inconsistent with the Articles and the Fund’s policy. A member accepts the Articles not only on its own behalf but also in respect of all colonies, overseas territories, territories under its protection, suzerainty, or authority and all territories in respect of which it exercises a mandate.18 The United Kingdom felt that it could not require Southern Rhodesia to modify the subsidy because the colony was wholly self-governing in domestic matters. The Fund relied, however, on the traditional principle that a state cannot invoke its constitutional or domestic law as a legal excuse for noncompliance with a treaty obligation, and the United Kingdom withdrew its objection.

The second case relates to the compulsory withdrawal of Czechoslovakia. It was contended by Czechoslovakia that the complaint that it had failed to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 and Article XIV, Section 2 was unfounded because the failure referred to in Article XV, Section 2 meant noncompliance for which there was no legal justification. Reasons of national security were a legal justification and Czechoslovakia had reasons of this kind for noncompliance. The reply was that the conditions on which the Fund may compel a member to withdraw are set forth in the Articles; failure to perform an obligation was one of these conditions; and no exception was made for reasons of national security in connection with the obligations on which the complaint was based. In the Board of Governors, the Governor for Czechoslovakia proposed an interpretative resolution which would have held that:

1. “Failure to fulfill the members’ obligations under the Agreement” in Article XV, Section 2, means legally not justified nonfulfillment of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement.

2. Reasons of national security are under the general concept of international law legal justification for “failure to fulfill the members’ obligations under the Agreement.”

3. Members of the Fund are entitled not to comply with the provisions of the Articles of Agreement if to comply would endanger their national security, and, in particular, are entitled to withhold information under Article VIII, Section 5, the disclosure of which would endanger their national security.

The Board of Governors refused to adopt this proposed resolution and confirmed the interpretation of the Executive Directors.19

It must not be inferred from what has been said that the attitude of the Fund has been “let justice be done though the Fund perish” (fiat justitia pereat Argentaria). Faced by the problems that a strict view of obligations may provoke, the Fund has been prepared to find practical solutions within its constitutional framework. The decision on restrictions imposed for security reasons on payments and transfers for current international transactions can be reverted to as an example. In order to give effect to all interests, including the Fund’s interest in avoiding political controversy, the decision established a special procedure by which a member can perform its obligation to obtain the approval of restrictions imposed for security reasons. Any member contemplating the adoption of restrictions that in its view are related solely to the preservation of national or international security may give notice under the decision and apply for prior approval, and the Fund will act promptly on the request. If the member finds that circumstances preclude advance notice to the Fund, it should give notice as promptly as possible but ordinarily not later than thirty days after imposition of the restrictions. Each notice is circulated immediately to the Executive Directors, and unless the Fund informs the member within thirty days after receiving the notice that the Fund is not satisfied that the restrictions are imposed solely to preserve security, the member may assume that the Fund has no objection to the imposition of the restrictions. Notices have been given under the decision in connection with a number of international incidents of a political character. In no instance has there been any request to place a. notice on the agenda of the Executive Directors, and the Fund has not objected to the imposition of any of the restrictions to which notices have related.

The decision dealing with restrictions established a procedure to enable members to stay within the law. A further illustration will be cited but of a different kind because it deals with the consequences of a situation that is contrary to the law. After Canada decided that it would not observe the obligations of Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 (b) and would allow the exchange rate for its currency to be determined by market forces, the Fund was faced with the problem of conducting transactions or making calculations in such a currency. It must be emphasized that a par value agreed with the Fund continues to be the par value for the purposes of the Articles until a new par value is established even though the member fails to perform its obligations to make the par value effective in exchange transactions taking place in its territories. If the Fund continued to stand ready to sell the currency at the par value, the practical effect would be to deprive other members of the opportunity to purchase the currency if it depreciated in the market, while there might be too great a readiness to purchase it from the Fund if the currency appreciated. The solution was an elaborate decision under which the Fund deals at market rates in a fluctuating currency to which the decision is applied, and makes all of its computations on the same basis.20 The Fund employs the maintenance of gold value provisions in the Articles 21 to adjust all of its holdings in accordance with market rates prevailing on or about the dates as of which computations are made or transactions are carried out because it would produce a chaotic situation if the Fund were to value its currency holdings at one rate and at the same time use another rate in any of its operations or calculations.22

RECIPROCITY AND LEGAL ORDER

It has been suggested by some commentators that the Articles establish a legal system of reciprocity. For example, when the issue before a court in one member has been whether it must declare an exchange contract unenforceable under Article VIII, Section 2 (b) because it is contrary to the exchange control regulations of another member, the court has felt on occasion that it was relevant to inquire whether the other member was applying Article VIII, Section 2(b) or other provisions in the Articles.23 It is true that the Articles envisage benefits for all members because all have assumed obligations by subscribing to the Articles. It does not follow from this, however, that there is a legal principle of reciprocity by which the failure of one member to observe an obligation releases another member or members from their obligations to the delinquent member. The purpose of the Articles is to preserve legal order notwithstanding failures by a member from time to time to fulfill any of its obligations under the Articles. It is the function of the Fund to decide whether there has been a failure and what the legal consequences shall be. Even if the Fund is satisfied that there has been a failure, it does not follow that the legal consequence will be the release of other members from any of their obligations in relation to the defaulter or other members.

There is an eloquent statement of this principle by a Netherlands court that was asked to refrain from applying Article VIII, Section 2 (b) to an exchange contract that was said to be contrary to the exchange control regulations of Indonesia because of alleged violations of treaty obligations owed by Indonesia to the Netherlands:

The Dutch forum must refrain from evaluating the Indonesian foreign exchange provisions and must also refrain from judging the question whether in view of its behavior Indonesia can be considered as a treaty partner. Apart from the fact that a partner to a treaty which has had to protest against violations of international agreements must itself fulfill its obligations, the paramount interest is that the international order to which the Netherlands and Indonesia have both adhered be respected.24

The principle on which the Articles are based and which guides the operation of the Fund is the one expressed by the Netherlands court. If, therefore, a member introduces restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, this gives no license to other members to retaliate at will. They must observe this restraint even if the restrictions are discriminatory. Indeed, although one of the objectives of the Fund is the elimination of discrimination, and although the Fund has pursued this objective with vigor,25 it must be recalled that the Fund does have the legal authority to approve discriminatory currency arrangements.26 But even if a member introduces discriminatory or other restrictions without the approval of the Fund, other members are not entitled to adopt countermeasures without the Fund’s approval if they are measures that require the Fund’s approval. The Fund’s Rules and Regulations establish procedures under which members can lodge complaints against a member that is alleged to be neglecting its obligations,27 but, in accordance with the tendency to avoid formal procedures, most discussions of a member’s practices take place informally and usually during regular consultations. By common consent, these consultations are a convenient and effective procedure for expressing an international opinion on a member’s practices. In fact, the opportunities offered by consultations are considered so useful that occasionally members air informal complaints about an economic or financial policy of a member even though the complainants are aware that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Fund to approve or disapprove the policy. Some of these complaints are made in the forum of the Executive Directors because the present state of international economic organization does not provide another international forum with direct jurisdiction.

A leading example of the fact that the Articles establish a legal order which does not entitle members to take the law into their own hands in matters within the Fund’s jurisdiction is the episode in which France adopted an unauthorized change of par value and discriminatory multiple rates of exchange on January 26, 1948.28 The principle of the exchange rate obligations of the Articles is that each member is responsible for maintaining the value of its own currency. If it fails in this obligation, the obligation is not shifted to other members. Accordingly, the Fund held that other members were not bound to regard the former par value for the franc or the new rates of exchange for the franc as binding on them and as rates that they would have to enforce by appropriate measures in exchange transactions in their territories. However, both they and France remained bound by their obligations under Article IV, Section 4 (a), and the Fund called on them to maintain close contact with the Fund on the negotiation of new exchange arrangements. As a practical solution, the Fund agreed that any bilateral arrangements establishing rates of exchange based on the unauthorized change of par value, or the evolution of such rates in exchange transactions in the absence of bilateral arrangements, were not inconsistent with the objectives of the Articles. The Fund declared that specific approval had to be sought for bilateral arrangements for the adoption, or for the adoption without bilateral agreement, of rates not compatible with the unauthorized change of par value even if they were based on other rates introduced by France as part of its exchange reform. The Fund received a number of requests from France and other members for the approval of rates of exchange between the franc and other currencies that were justified because of special economic or other stated reasons. Some of these rates were not acceptable to the Fund and were modified. The general approach of the Fund was to resist the proliferation of rates beyond those already in existence.

The adoption by France of its new exchange system did not release other members from their obligations although the new system involved a par value to which the Fund objected and multiple rates which it did not approve. The Fund insisted that other members were not entitled to retaliate by establishing rates of exchange between their currencies and the franc as they saw fit or even to establish rates by agreement with France in view of the interests of members that were not parties to the agreements. The relationships between the currencies of members are not simply bilateral but fit into an orderly design involving all currencies which is supervised by the Fund. If the design is disturbed at one place, the disturbance must be contained and order restored. One of the economic features of the French exchange system that the Fund found most undesirable was the introduction of broken cross rates. Rates of exchange ceased to be uniform among members in terms of gold as a common measure. This is a condition that can produce the most damaging distortions in trade and payments, and the Fund has opposed it relentlessly.

Article V, Section 5; below, Vol. III, p. 192.

Article XV, Section 2 (a).

Article IV, Section 6.

Article XV, Section 2 (b).

Article V, Section 8 (d); Rules and Regulations, Rule I-4 (g); below, Vol. III, pp. 193, 296.

Article XIV, Section 4.

See above, pp. 549, 574.

Rules and Regulations, Rule K-1; below. Vol. III, p. 299.

E.B. Decision No. 284-2; below, Vol. III, p. 272.

E.B. Decision No. 155-(52/57); below, Vol. III, pp. 230–31.

See above, pp. 533–35.

See above, Vol. I, p. 433.

E.B. Decision No. 1151-(61/6), February 20, 1961; below, Vol. III, p. 234.

Article VII, Section 3 (b); below, Vol. III, p. 195.

See, for example, Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the U.S. Senate on H.R. 3314 (79th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 168–72. See also Questions and Answers on the International Monetary Fund, Questions 30-32; below, Vol. III, pp. 171–75.

Below, Vol. III, p. 215.

E.B. Decision No. 144-(52/51); below, Vol. III, p. 257.

Article XX, Section 2 (g); below, Vol. III, p. 207.

Summary Proceedings, 1954, pp. 97–102, 112–14, 121–22, 135–80.

E.B. Decisions Nos. 321-(54/32), June 15, 1954, 1245-(61/45), August 4, 1961, 1283-(61/56), December 20, 1961; below, Vol. III, pp. 222–24.

Article IV, Section 8.

Joseph Gold, Maintenance of the Gold Value of the Fund’s Assets, IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 6.

Pan American Insurance Co. v. Blanco, 311 F. 2d 424, 427 fn. 8 (1962).

Frantzmann v. Ponijen, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1960), No. 290. Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts (1962), pp. 113–18.

E.B. Decisions Nos. 433-(55/42), June 22, 1955, 201-(53/29), May 4, 1953, 955-(59/45), October 23, 1959; below, Vol. III, pp. 258–60.

Article VIII, Section 3.

Rules and Regulations, Rules H-2, H-3, K-4, M-4, M-5; below, Vol. III, pp. 293–94, 299, 301.

See above, pp. 549, 574, 583.

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