CHAPTER 9 Subsidies to Gold Producers

International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
February 1996
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J. Keith Horsefield

The fund’s policy of discouraging sales of gold at premium prices, described in the last chapter, has had a parallel in connection with the payment of subsidies to gold producers. This practice too has been held by the Board to run the risk of infringing Article IV, Section 2, which reads as follows:

  • Gold purchases based on par values.—The Fund shall prescribe a margin above and below par value for transactions in gold by members, and no member shall buy gold at a price above par value plus the prescribed margin, or sell gold at a price below par value minus the prescribed margin.

The margin referred to was fixed by the Board in June 1947 at ¼ of 1 per cent plus certain handling and transportation charges. In October 1954 this was altered to either ¼ of 1 per cent plus handling and transportation charges, or 1 per cent, at the option of the member.


The problem of subsidies to gold producers first came to the notice of the Board in August 1947, when Peru, having been discouraged from assisting its gold miners to profit from the premium on gold available in free markets, asked the Fund to suggest what alternative methods of aiding its producers were open to it. This problem was remitted to the Committee on External Sales of Gold, which had been set up in May 1947 to consider a request from Colombia for the Board’s views on a plan similar to that originally proposed by Peru.1 (It may be noted that at Bretton Woods Colombia had offered an amendment—which was not accepted—authorizing member countries to pay bonuses in order to promote gold production within their territories.)2

Before the committee was able to consider the matter, the need for a decision was precipitated by an announcement by the Canadian Minister of Finance that his Government proposed to offer to each Canadian gold mine a subsidy of Can$7 for each ounce of gold produced in excess of the output for the year ended June 30, 1947. When communicating this to the Board in November 1947, Mr. Rasminsky (Canada) explained that he was in effect informing the Fund what his Government intended to do, leaving it up to the Fund to take what action it thought necessary.

Meanwhile the committee, having made a preliminary examination of the question posed by Peru, had some doubts whether it was competent to give an answer; the view was expressed that it could not give useful advice to members without having consulted, for example, gold mining experts. It therefore came back to the Board and asked for clarification of its terms of reference. This was given in the form of an instruction to examine whether the Canadian scheme or a variant of it was consonant with the provisions of the Fund Agreement, and what general methods of encouraging gold production in Peru would meet the same test. In its considerations, the committee was enjoined to pay due attention to the implications of these questions for general monetary policy, and to their effect upon the policies and actions of other members.

The discussion of the Canadian plan in the committee showed that there was a difference of opinion between Mr. Overby (United States) and Mr. Martínez-Ostos (Mexico) on the one hand, and Mr. Bolton (United Kingdom) and Mr. Bruins (Netherlands) on the other. Messrs. Overby and Martínez-Ostos believed that the proposed subsidy amounted to an increase in the price of gold, and therefore contravened Article IV, Section 2. Mr. Overby also contended that the economic effects could be serious, and in particular that the subsidy would cause irresistible pressure on the governments of other gold producing countries to assist their gold miners in similar ways. Mr. Bolton and Mr. Bruins, on the other hand, regarded the Canadian proposal as a domestic matter, and not tantamount to an increase in the official price of gold. Mr. Bruins, however, deplored the probable effect, mentioned by Mr. Overby, on other gold producing countries.

Shortly afterwards the Canadian Government, responding to the criticisms in the committee, put forward a new proposal. This provided for a subsidy comprising some percentage (e.g., 30 per cent, 40 per cent, 50 per cent) of the amount by which a mine’s actual production costs per fine ounce of gold exceeded a stated basic cost (e.g., $18, $20, $25) per fine ounce. This would be paid on the amount by which the production in any year exceeded a certain percentage (e.g., 66⅔ per cent, 75 per cent) of gold production in the base year. For new mines the subsidy would be paid on the entire production for the first year, and on the amount by which output exceeded a certain percentage (e.g., 66⅔ per cent, 75 per cent) of the first year’s production in subsequent years.

The staff advised the committee that this revised plan need not be objected to, particularly in the light of the comment by the reporting delegate of Committee 1 of Commission I at Bretton Woods, to the effect that members were free to encourage their local gold mining industries by means other than paying a higher price for gold.3 At the instance of Mr. Overby, however, the committee decided that it would be preferable first to draft a general statement on the Fund’s attitude toward subsidies, and after three meetings of the committee and three of the Board, at which drafts were discussed, a detailed statement was adopted on December 11, 1947.4 The following are the operative paragraphs:

  • The International Monetary Fund has a responsibility to see that the gold policies of its members do not undermine or threaten to undermine exchange stability. Consequently every member which proposes to introduce new measures to subsidize the production of gold is under obligation to consult with the Fund on the specific measures to be introduced.
  • Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund members are prohibited from buying gold at a price above parity plus the prescribed margin. In the view of the Fund, a subsidy in the form of a uniform payment per ounce for all or part of the gold produced would constitute an increase in price which would not be permissible if the total price paid by the member for gold were thereby to become in excess of parity plus the prescribed margin. Subsidies involving payments in another form may also, depending upon their nature, constitute an increase in price.

Some reservations to this statement were expressed by Executive Directors. Mr. Tansley (United Kingdom), who had objected to a provision in an earlier draft requiring members to consult the Fund about proposed changes in regulations and practices relating to external transactions in gold, expressed similar concern at the terms of the statement as issued, because there was in it no definition of subsidies. Mr. de Largentaye (France) would have preferred the Board to state that the Fund disapproved of subsidies on gold production, but contended that the Fund Agreement did not empower it to object, since Article IV, Section 2, referred only to price. Mr. Martínez-Ostos sought, and obtained, an assurance that the issuance of the statement would not prevent members from asking the Fund to reconsider any of the related questions involved, or from requesting a formal interpretation by the Executive Directors.

In the light of the general policy just expressed, the Board considered the Canadian plan as acceptable, and took the following decision:

  • The Canadian Government has consulted with the Fund regarding its proposed gold production subsidy and has today made an announcement on this subject. The Fund has examined the present Canadian proposal in the light of its own general statement of policy published today. The Fund has determined that in the present circumstances the proposed Canadian action is not inconsistent with the policy stated by the Fund.

The crucial element in the policy formulated in the statement quoted above was that it brought within the prohibition in Article IV, Section 2, all subsidy schemes providing for uniform payments per ounce. It is arguable that the consequential recourse by gold producing countries to subsidies adapted to the circumstances of individual producing units stimulated gold production more than uniform subsidies would have done.


The next opportunity to apply the newly framed policy came in March 1948, when Mr. McFarlane (Australia) sought the approval of the Board for a plan prepared by the Australian Government. This was designed to enable certain marginal gold mines in Western Australia to remain in production despite rising costs—a socially necessary measure since the local population was economically dependent on their continuance. The Government proposed to determine the amount of assistance to be given to each mine individually, on the basis of its costs, ore reserves, value, and dependent population. Mr. McFarlane said that the measures would not affect the price of gold, nor increase output; the Government was opposed to any subsidies for the latter purpose.

Mr. Overby called attention to a statement issued by the U.S. National Advisory Council on the day after the enunciation of the Board’s general policy. This expressed the view, inter alia, that there were no grounds which would justify instituting a subsidy to encourage the production of gold in the United States. Mr. Overby said that, in the light of this, he would have to object to any proposal by another member country to subsidize gold production in order to increase it. However, as this feature was absent from the Australian proposal, he would not oppose its approval. The Board then decided that the plan as put forward was consistent with the principles enunciated in its statement of December 11, 1947; therefore the Fund would not object to it.

Six months later the Board considered a staff report on subsidy arrangements in Southern Rhodesia. These had come to light as a result of an article in the London Economist in May 1948.5 Mr. Tansley, having made inquiries, explained to the Board in June that the Government of Southern Rhodesia, which was a self-governing territory, had included the proposal in good faith in its budget for the year. The plan provided for a minimum payment of £1 7s. 6d. an ounce for all gold produced, with additional benefits up to £1 0s. 0d. an ounce for mines of economic benefit to Southern Rhodesia which otherwise would have to close. It was regarded as a cost of living payment to the industry to compensate for sharply increased costs. The Government had considered that a system of subsidies to individual mines, such as the Canadian Government had instituted, would be impracticable because of the large number of small mines whose costs would be difficult to determine. Mr. Tansley concluded by saying that the British Government felt that it had gone as far as it could in drawing the attention of Southern Rhodesia to the difficulties inherent in the proposal.

Mr. Overby suggested that Mr. Tansley’s last statement raised serious questions about responsibilities to the Fund, since the United Kingdom had included Southern Rhodesia in the nonmetropolitan territories for which it had accepted the Articles of Agreement. He asked that the question should be further studied, and discussions between the staff, the U.K. delegation, and representatives of Southern Rhodesia were held during the Annual Meeting in Washington. As a result, Mr. Tansley reported to the Board on October 5 that the British Government accepted responsibility vis-à-vis the Fund.

Mr. Tansley went on to say that the British Government realized that Southern Rhodesia had unwittingly adopted measures which were not consistent with Article IV, Section 2, and with the Fund’s statement of December 11, 1947. Southern Rhodesia was unable to modify the arrangements during the current budget year, but had undertaken to introduce legislation to remove the inconsistency at the next session of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. Mr. Overby pointed out that the measures criticized had been introduced in Southern Rhodesia without consultation with the Fund, and suggested that the Fund’s disapproval be made clear. This was done in the ensuing Annual Report.6

In April 1949 the promised legislation was introduced. It replaced the flat rate subsidy by assistance on a graduated scale related to the gold content of the ore processed. The new scale rose from 1s. 0d. a ton for ore yielding 0.75 dwt. per ton to 5s. 0d. a ton for ore yielding 4.0 dwts., and then fell off to zero for ore yielding 10 dwts. This was considered by the Board on May 4. The discussion raised for the first time the significance of the phrase in the statement of December 11, 1947, “a uniform payment per ounce for … part of the gold produced….” The Legal Department advised the Board that the broad intention of the statement had been to prohibit a flat rate subsidy for all gold produced or for such a substantial part of it as to violate the spirit. The Southern Rhodesian plan could not, the Department thought, be said to set up a uniform payment for all or for a substantial part of the gold produced.

Mr. Southard (United States) again referred to the U.S. Government’s disapproval of gold subsidies instituted for the purpose of expanding gold production to enhance a country’s balance of payments position. Commenting on this, Mr. Parkinson (Canada) said that Canada’s subsidy continued to be for the purpose of maintaining production in an industry whose output was substantially below normal. In 1948 the value of gold produced was some $10–15 million higher than in 1947, but this was only a negligible part of the improvement in the Canadian balance of payments during the year. Mr. McFarlane said that the purpose of the Australian subsidy plan was similar, and that output in 1948 had not increased at all. Mr. Tansley said that in Southern Rhodesia the previous subsidy scheme, which the Fund did not approve, had done no more than slow down the rate of decline of gold production, and as the new system would cost little, if anything, more than the previous one, it was clear that the Government’s objective remained a modest one. The Board then decided that the proposed subsidy did not contravene the requirements of Article IV, Sections 2 and 4, or of the Board’s statement of December 11, 1947.

Following the devaluations in September 1949, Australia and Southern Rhodesia canceled their subsidies and Canada reduced the amount of its subsidy, while still avoiding payment of a uniform amount per ounce.7 When in September 1950 Canada adopted a fluctuating exchange rate, its subsidy was increased by 10 per cent, but in the rush of events the Government overlooked obtaining the Fund’s consent, for which Mr. Parkinson subsequently expressed the Government’s regret.

Shortly thereafter Canada sought the Fund’s approval for a change in the cost limits used for the calculation of the subsidy for individual mines, raising the minimum limit and lowering the maximum one. It also proposed to change the base year to 1949. The cost to the Government was expected to fall from $9.4 million in 1950 to $7 million in 1951. Asked under what conditions Canada could visualize that the subsidy could be eliminated, Mr. Parkinson said that this would probably have to depend primarily upon increased efficiency and declining costs in the industry. He agreed that the latter development did not seem likely, at least for some time to come. The Board accepted the proposed change in the subsidy arrangements as being within the terms of its statement of December 11, 1947. A minor change in the plan, introduced early in 1951, was similarly accepted, the Board referring in its decision to the continuing rise in operating costs. A further minor change was approved in June 1951.

Up to this time the Canadian subsidy had been renewed from year to year; but in December 1951 the Government sought the Board’s concurrence in its extension for two years. Mr. Wolfson (Canada) explained that Canadian producers had been given the option of continuing to receive the subsidy or of selling their output in the free market; this had followed from the Board’s statement of September 28, 1951.8 (When that statement was prepared, Mr. Rasminsky had said that his Government would not “feel obligated … to resort to any form of pretence with regard to gold transactions at premium prices.”) Some Executive Directors questioned whether, in view of the option available to gold producers, there was any justification in continuing the subsidy; insofar as this kept gold off the free market, it would lessen the desirable tendency for the free market price to fall. Pressing this argument, Mr. Martínez-Ostos said that he still believed that any subsidy contravened the requirements of Article IV, Section 2. However, as the Board had so frequently approved the Canadian plan, he would not vote against it.

Mr. Southard denied that the intention of the Board’s statement of September 1951 was to channel more gold into free markets; on the contrary, it was the Fund’s wish that as much as possible should find its way into monetary reserves. He therefore saw no contradiction between that statement and the Canadian subsidy. While he himself thought that subsidies for gold production were unwise, the Canadian plan had previously been approved, and the Board’s decision of September 28 made no difference. He therefore supported the Canadian request. The Board then agreed to it.

In November 1952 the Canadian Government decided that it would be necessary to increase the scale of its subsidy. Rising costs and declining yields had led to the closing of ten mines during the previous eighteen months, and more were threatened with closure. Executive Directors commented in terms similar to those used on previous occasions, but the Board decided again that the plan was compatible with the Fund’s policy.

Later developments in connection with the Canadian subsidy may be briefly noted. It was prolonged without alteration in December 1953, the Government at that time still regarding it as a temporary measure. In January 1955 the rate of subsidy was reduced to two thirds of the excess of costs of production over Can$26.50 an ounce, up to a maximum of Can$12.33 an ounce.9 It was payable on two thirds of the amount produced. This new plan was initially to be limited to two years, but in 1956 it was extended for a further two years.10 In 1958 the rate of subsidy was increased by 25 per cent (to offset the decline in the gold price corresponding to the appreciation of the Canadian dollar), and the arrangement was extended for a further two years.11 In June 1960 it was further extended through 1963.12 Finally, in April 1964 it was extended to the end of 1967, with a modification excluding new lode mines commencing production after June 1965 unless they provided direct support to an existing gold mining community.13 These successive adjustments were all considered by the Board, and the schemes as revised were deemed consistent with Fund policy.


In 1954 three other countries joined Canada in offering subsidies for gold production—Australia, Colombia, and the Philippines. The first of these to submit a proposal was the Philippines, which consulted the Fund in June 1954 about a proposal to provide subsidies at three levels, to corresponding categories of mines, classified on the basis of profits and production costs.

Commenting on this proposal, the staff suggested that it was scarcely consistent with the policy enunciated on December 11, 1947, since uniform payments per ounce would be made to the mines in each group. Nevertheless the staff recommended that the proposal should be approved, being influenced by the belief that in the past the application of the 1947 policy had led to the drawing of fine distinctions which were difficult to defend. Since the number of mines in the Philippines to be assisted was in any case quite small, there would be no large groups receiving identical assistance. While it could not be denied that the contemplated subsidy would amount to “a uniform payment per ounce for … part of the gold produced,” the structure of the subsidy was so similar to others which had been approved that the staff believed the Board could consent.

Discussing the proposal, Executive Directors recognized that gold mines in the Philippines were gravely disadvantaged by high production costs. Mr. Saad (Egypt), who had been elected by the Philippines, supported the recommendation of the staff, while recognizing that the phrase quoted from the 1947 decision created a problem. He agreed with a suggestion by the staff that the policy should be re-examined. Mr. Eriksen (Norway) agreed with the proposal but suggested that meanwhile the Philippine plan should be approved for one year only. Other Directors, however, observed that the Philippines had proposed to apply the subsidy for two years, and it seemed inappropriate to refuse this request merely in order that the policy might be re-examined. One Director indeed suggested that experience with the Canadian subsidy suggested that there was no good purpose to be served by approving such a plan for a fixed term; he thought it would be better to approve the Philippine proposal without a time limit, on the understanding that any changes would be brought before the Board.

Mr. Southard believed that the plan met the test of a subsidy and not an increase in the monetary price of gold. Mr. de Lattre (France) recalled that Mr. de Largentaye had frequently indicated his dislike of subsidies, but considering the small number of mines involved in the Philippines he would not object to the proposal. Mr. Bury (Australia) saw no advantage in re-examining the Fund’s policy; he thought it was clear that it would be unreasonable to deny the Philippine request to meet their serious problems. He and Mr. Warren (Canada) both welcomed the implicit change in the application of the Fund’s policy. On this footing the Board decided that the Philippine proposal was deemed to be consistent with the objectives of the Fund’s statement of December 11, 1947. The plan was subsequently modified on two occasions and approved by the Board for continuance until July 1957, when it was allowed to expire.14 For some years thereafter producers were assisted through the Philippines’ exchange system. The resulting multiple currency practice was considered by the Board in January 1958 and not objected to.

In June 1961, however, the Philippines reintroduced subsidies. This time, producers were divided into two categories only—marginal and over-marginal—depending on whether or not their profits fell short of “base profits” calculated separately for each mine.15 The Board agreed that these arrangements were consistent with the Fund’s policy. This plan was modified in the following year as a result of the inauguration of a floating exchange rate on January 22, 1962. While the rates of subsidy remained unchanged, it was proposed that the total of the official price plus the subsidy should not exceed P 200 an ounce nor fall below

160 an ounce for both classes of producers. (At the free rate, these figures were approximately equivalent to $55 and $44.) As there appeared to be a danger that these arrangements might lead to the payment of a uniform premium price for gold should the exchange rate appreciate or depreciate sufficiently far, the Board asked for assurances that, if this seemed likely to happen, corrective measures would be taken in consultation with the Fund. These assurances were forthcoming, and the Board then accepted the plan, which has since been maintained in operation.16 A new par value for the Philippine peso was agreed with the Fund on November 8, 1965.

In June 1954 Colombia also introduced a subsidy for gold producers. The Government then set aside the sum of Col$80,000 a month to assist certain small mines and gold-pan miners whose production had not exceeded 180 ounces of gold during the first six months of 1953.17 Provided that these mines and miners agreed to sell their gold to the central bank, they would be eligible to receive not more than Col$20 per fine ounce (equivalent at the official rate to US$8) on not more than 30 ounces a month. This plan was brought to the notice of the Board in January 1955, during the 1954 consultation with Colombia, and was deemed to be consistent with Fund policy. The subsidy was discontinued in 1962, but since then Colombian gold producers have been assisted through the exchange market and fiscal incentives.

Australia reintroduced subsidy arrangements in October 1954.18 Its gold producers were divided into two groups. Those with an output exceeding 500 ounces a year and satisfying certain conditions were to be eligible during the two financial years 1954/55 and 1955/56 for a subsidy equal to three fourths of the excess cost of production over £A 13 10s. 0d. (US$30) an ounce, subject to a maximum subsidy of £A 2 0s. 0d. an ounce. Producers whose output was less than 500 ounces a year were to be eligible for a flat rate subsidy of £A 1 10s. 0d. an ounce. This flat rate was adopted for administrative convenience because of the great number of small mines affected and the possible imperfection of their records. The output of the small mines represented only 4 per cent of Australia’s total production. Mr. Southard commented that a good case had been made out for the flat rate subsidy to small producers, and he believed that it would not result in any measurable breaking down of the Fund’s policy; he therefore supported the Australian request for approval of the plan. The Board accepted it as being consistent with the objectives of Fund policy.

In September 1957 and May 1959 the rates of subsidy paid to both classes of producer were increased.19 With these alterations the scheme remained in operation until October 1961, when it was modified to remove the sharp distinction between large and small producers. Under the revised plan producers with an annual output of between 500 and 1,075 ounces could opt to be paid a flat rate subsidy at a rate diminishing from £A 2 8s. 0d. an ounce at 500 ounces to zero at 1,076 ounces a year.20

In August 1962 Australia granted a subsidy for developmental purposes to mines not previously eligible; the allowance was not to exceed the amount by which their expenditure on development in any year exceeded their annual rate of expenditure on development in a selected base period.21 The latter provision was removed in 1965, when the rates of subsidy were again increased.22 All these changes were submitted to the Board and were accepted as consistent with the Fund’s policy.

It may be added that the possibility of revising the statement of policy enunciated in December 1947, suggested during the discussion of the original Philippine proposal mentioned above, was reviewed by the staff in December 1954 and January 1955. In view of the legislative history of Article IV, Section 2, however, the Legal Department formed the view that any payments made in addition to the official price of gold must be construed as additions to its price. No reformulation of the 1947 decision which would be consistent with the Articles could therefore be found, and the matter was not again submitted to the Executive Board.


For nearly ten years after 1954 the only new plan to subsidize gold production brought to the notice of the Board was one introduced by Fiji for the three fiscal years 1958/59, 1959/60, and 1960/61. In these years the Fiji Government undertook to pay an annual subsidy not exceeding £150,000 a year to the one mining company in the colony, on condition that the company would expend an equal or greater amount on development. The maximum subsidy was to be reduced by £2 for each ounce that output fell below 75,000 ounces in any one of the three years. This plan was accepted by the Board at the instance of the United Kingdom, of which Fiji was a nonmetropolitan territory, in February 1959.23

In August 1963 South Africa obtained the Board’s approval for a plan to assist twelve marginal gold mines to meet the cost of pumping out underground water in order that they might remain in production. The total cost for the year 1963–64 was not to exceed R 1 million. In April 1964 this assistance to the marginal mines was supplemented by the grant of unsecured loans by the state to cover working losses up to 10 per cent of revenue, plus certain capital expenditures approved by the Government Mining Engineer.24 These arrangements have since been continued from year to year.25

The only other subsidy plan introduced during the period covered by this history was a new arrangement by Southern Rhodesia in December 1963. This was designed to subsidize potentially economic mines that otherwise would for the time being operate at a loss and possibly have to close down. The amount of assistance to be given was left to the discretion of the Minister of the Treasury.26 The plan was accepted by the Fund as being consistent with its objectives, and has since remained in force.27


The size of the output of gold is determined by a number of factors, including the availability and yield of ores, the ability of the mines to compete for necessary resources of labor and capital, and the attractiveness of the price of gold in relation to its cost of production. Compared with these three factors, the effects of a subsidy can only be marginal, so that one can hardly expect to detect it from the figures of output.

In general, however, it appears that subsidy arrangements have at best succeeded in maintaining output at the level at which it stood when they were introduced. The exceptions have been Canada, from 1948 to about 1955, and South Africa. Canadian output rose from $124 million in 1948 to $159 million in 1955, fluctuated around the latter figure until 1961, but then fell off, to $126 million in 1965. South Africa’s production rose from 58 per cent of world output (excluding communist countries) in 1945 to 75 per cent in 1965, but its subsidies affected only about 4 per cent of its output. Colombia’s output was a little larger than usual in 1956 and 1960, but if the former year is averaged with 1957 the improvement disappears, and the higher figure achieved in 1960 has not been repeated. Figures for the most recent years show a decline also in Australia, despite the continuance of the subsidy. It seems clear, therefore, that subsidies have not led to any material increase in the output of gold.

On the other hand, the spread of subsidy payments has certainly slowed the pace of mine closures and thereby averted a significant fall in output from a growing number of marginal and submarginal mines. The proportion of gold produced from mines with reported production costs above the equivalent of $35 an ounce was perhaps 30 per cent in Canada in 1965 and some 45 per cent in Australia in the year ended June 30, 1966. On less complete information it may be inferred that the proportion of gold produced from such mines in Ghana was about one fourth, in the Philippines a large proportion, and in Rhodesia a substantial part. In all, among gold producers other than South Africa, somewhere between 22 per cent and 27 per cent of output may have been made economic by subsidy payments. This would represent between 5½ and 7 per cent of world production outside the communist countries; without subsidy payments, most if not all of this output might have been expected to cease.


See above, p. 175.


Alternative C, Proceedings, p. 432.


Proceedings, p. 575.


E.B. Decision No. 233-2, December 11, 1947; below, Vol. III, p. 225.


“Rhodesia’s Gold Subsidy,” The Economist, Vol. CLIV (January-June 1948), p. 855.


Annual Report, 1949, p. 36.


Annual Report, 1950, p. 74.


See above, p. 200.


Annual Report, 1955, p. 95.


Annual Report, 1957, p. 105.


Annual Report, 1959, pp. 149–50.


Annual Report, 1961, p. 125.


Annual Report, 1964, p. 109.


Annual Report, 1958, p. 144.


Annual Report, 1962, p. 164.


Annual Report, 1963, p. 181, 1964, p. 109, 1965, pp. 102–103, and 1966, p. 119.


Annual Report, 1955, pp. 94–95.


Ibid., p. 94.


Annual Report, 1958, p. 145, and 1960, p. 144.


Annual Report, 1962, pp. 163–64.


Annual Report, 1963, p. 181.


Annual Report, 1965, p. 103.


Annual Report, 1959, pp. 150–51.


Annual Report, 1964, p. 109.


Annual Report, 1965, pp. 102–103, and 1966, p. 119.


Annual Report, 1964, p. 109.


Annual Report, 1965, p. 103, and 1966, p. 119.

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