Chapter

Overview

Author(s):
Laura Wallace
Published Date:
May 1997
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Author(s)
Laura Wallace

As africa looks for ways to deepen and accelerate the economic reform process, the lessons of the East Asian miracle, of course, come to mind. That is why on May 13–14, 1996, African and Asian officials and academics—along with representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilateral institutions—met in Paris to exchange experiences. The hope, as co-chairman Hideichiro Hamanaka of the Ministry of Finance of Japan put it in his welcoming remarks, was to find hints of innovative approaches to meet the challenges Africa now faces. He cautioned that no single formula would work for every country; rather, the emphasis would have to be on developing policies tailored for specific countries and regions. Nonetheless, an exchange of experiences was an excellent starting point, as each region had valuable lessons to offer.

Session I. Obstacles to Continued Reform

The first session opened with African and Asian perspectives on what could be done to remove the obstacles to continued reform in Africa. For Kwesi Botchwey of Ghana, the answer laid in strengthening the design, negotiation, and implementation of adjustment programs, as these programs provided the overall policy framework for domestic policy reform and external resource transfers. How should this be done? He cited general agreement on three points.

  • Programs should aim at sustainable long-term and broad-based growth, not just short-term external viability;

  • Countries should focus more on structural issues (e.g., financial sector reform, public sector reform, and privatization); and

  • Countries would benefit from a stable democratic environment that made for transparency and accountability in economic management, and also facilitated popular participation in decision making. As part of this process, governance issues needed to be better articulated, both to determine what fell within the sovereign jurisdiction of the adjusting country and what were the legitimate areas of mutual interest (i.e., between the Bretton Woods institutions and the adjusting country).

On a personal note, he also urged formulating structural targets and conditionality in language and terms that were clear and lent themselves to the least subjective interpretation; improving the adequacy, predictability, and timeliness of external resource flows; and setting up a “Special Program for Clearing the Pipeline of Committed Resources for Africa”—an attempt to at least rationalize those resources already committed to the region.

For Dahlan Sutalaksana of Indonesia, the emphasis was on removing obstacles to economic efficiency and persuading policymakers to hold firm. He noted that since the early 1970s, Indonesia had focused on three key components—getting the prices right, making the market mechanism work, and reducing “bureaucratic costs.” Granted, eliminating subsidies sometimes raised questions of political stability, but not acting meant placing a lasting and growing burden on the budget, in turn, draining resources needed for other programs. Similarly, trying to let the market take care of itself would arouse much opposition, but Indonesia’s experience suggested that as long as the government held firm, market participants would adjust to the new conditions, although not immediately. Finally, policymakers should not shy from reforming bureaucracies, despite the fact that it took years to succeed. The key here was establishing an environment of discipline and ensuring that the affected bureaucratic elements understood the necessity of reform.

In the general discussion that ensued, it was clear that Botchwey’s comments on democracy and governance had hit a nerve, triggering a spirited debate that kept resurfacing throughout the rest of the seminar.1 Basant Kapur of Singapore set the tone by suggesting that the key question was not whether a democratic or authoritarian regime was needed but rather whether the country was achieving economic growth, a position supported by some of the African participants. What was needed was market-oriented and outward-oriented strategies that enabled systemic corruption to be reduced and business to be promoted. One might well ask if it was possible to assume that economic growth should come first and democracy second.

Joseph Tsika of Congo noted that his nation, like many others, really had no choice: because of poor economic decisions in the past, they now had to turn to the international community for help, and donors insisted on democracy, even though autocracies had demonstrated the ability to mobilize everyone behind an ideal.

Botchwey responded by defending the need for democracy in Africa: good autocrats were fine so long as they remained good, but when they ceased to be good, there was no way to get rid of them. But should democracy be a condition for financial support? He felt that if the macroeconomic policy framework was sound and the process of resource mobilization and use was transparent and accountable, “the minimum conditions for financial support existed to enable the donors and the adjusting country, through informal dialogue and consultation, to gradually encourage the evolution of a full-fledged democratic environment.” He also suggested that the moral strength of the call for democracy by the West was being sapped by a perception in the developing world that when the market was large and the spoils sufficiently attractive, donors found a way of turning their eyes away from obvious abuses, such as in human rights. Finally, Botchwey—supported by other African participants—underscored the importance of dialogue and consultation not just between donors and recipients but also among the various parties in a country.

Session II. How to Accelerate Reform

In the second session, the seminar turned to how reform could be accelerated in the more difficult areas—revenue mobilization, financial sector reform, and public enterprise restructuring and privatization—as opposed to the “early-stage” structural reforms (i.e., liberalizing exchange systems, opening up trade and payments systems, removing price controls and quantitative restrictions, and liberalizing production and marketing systems).

Fiscal and Financial Sector Reforms

Peter Heller of the IMF started out by noting that an adequate non-inflationary revenue mobilization effort was critical for financing a government’s necessary social and economic expenditure obligations. Yet, in sub-Saharan Africa, the tax effort in two-thirds of the countries had been disappointingly low, with tax revenue at or below 15 percent of GDP; indeed, almost one-third had ratios below 10 percent of GDP. How could African governments boost these ratios? He suggested that they focus on strengthening both tax policy and tax and customs administration, as was being successfully done in Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Uganda. Key measures should include reducing and controlling exemptions, simplifying tax structures, reducing reliance on trade taxes, introducing a simplified form of the value-added tax, simplifying the approach to taxing small enterprises, and relying on an integrated rather than a piecemeal approach to tax policy.

Shahid Yusuf of the World Bank, in commenting on the paper, agreed with Heller’s assessment of the challenges facing African countries in mobilizing tax revenues. But on the question of tax/GDP ratios, he noted that the picture was less grim if the sample was enlarged from 29 to include the remaining 13 sub-Saharan countries—as seven of these had ratios greater than 15 percent and only three were 10 percent or below. Moreover, on average, tax/GDP ratios in Africa were comparable to those of East Asian countries in the 1970s, and East Asia only began introducing significant reforms in the early to mid-1980s. What was most striking about East Asia’s fiscal experience was that expenditure management, rather than an extraordinary tax effort, was the principal achievement, and it contributed to the increase in national savings that substantially explained East Asia’s growth performance.

The question of sequencing and pacing of reforms—another theme throughout the seminar—first surfaced in a presentation on financial reform by David Cole (and Betty Slade), formerly of the Harvard Institute for International Development. Given the many serious disruptions and financial crises associated with recent attempts to modernize, privatize, and increase the market orientation of financial systems in African countries, he said, policymakers might want to consider a more gradual, market-building approach, one that operated on a time frame of one or two decades rather than a few years. Countries should not try to push their system ahead too rapidly, because a misstep could slow down the entire liberalization process.

Tetsuji Tanaka of Japan suggested that a key influence in both the possibility of a shift toward a market economy and the pace of reform would be historical and cultural conditions. He noted that some say “ethics and a philosophy that includes asceticism are required to operate a capitalist market economy.” As evidence, they point to the roles of the Protestant ethic of nineteenth century Europe and Confucianism in East Asia (i.e., helping to nurture the necessary stoicism and desire to abide by contracts). He felt that market participants must be “ascetic” (laying aside their own interests) and “fair” from a social point of view, and technocrats should be trained to perform with a high degree of integrity. As for what lessons East Asia could offer not only Africa but also Central Asian economies, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, that were attempting a takeoff with scarce accumulated capital, Tanaka underscored the importance of channeling public funds to the market and letting the government set priorities for distributing the funds. The degree of market intervention should be dictated by the development stage of each economy; the number of market participants; the degree of market maturity; the market practices; and history, culture, and religion.

In the comments that followed, both Kapur of Singapore and Patrick Downes of the IMF raised questions about the workability of a number of the suggestions in the Cole and Slade paper on a more gradual approach to financial sector reform, particularly in the areas of monetary policy management and prudential management of banks.

As for the pace of reform, Downes agreed with Cole that sometimes financial reforms failed, at least temporarily, because the authorities attempted to go too fast or because some of the concomitant reforms were not present, such as fiscal consolidation and effective banking supervision capability. But he cautioned that in an era of economic globalization and integrated financial markets—and particularly the availability of vastly enlarged amounts of private international capital—one must ask whether the relative costs and benefits for Africa of opening up its financial markets only slowly were the same as those faced in Asia when these countries had made their decisions regarding liberalization. He argued that “there is a danger that countries in Africa, the poorer countries, may be marginalized and left behind—all the more so as official aid flows start to dry up and the large private capital flows increasingly gravitate to emerging market countries.” Moreover, delaying financial reforms often worsened existing problems in the monetary and banking system.

Turning to Tanaka’s paper, Downes agreed with the importance of an appropriate work and business ethic, but questioned Tanaka’s call for more state intervention. Rather, a more activist stance was required in championing the cause of free markets in countries like the Kyrgyz Republic, even more so perhaps than in Africa where the historical experience had been quite different. He noted that financial reform was a continuous process, and thus it would be a waste of resources to develop market institutions and implement financial reforms without adhering to them.

Tanaka’s suggestions on government intervention (and the Cole and Slade call for a more gradual approach to financial sector reform), however, found support from Tadahiko Nakagawa of the Export-Import Bank of Japan. He drew on Japan’s recent experiences in countries such as Tunisia and Hungary to argue that “although a market approach serves as a sound basis for financial reform, some types of creative interventions and controls—in this case, our two-step loans—can help support or complement the market system,” paving the way for future financial reform in countries at a transitional stage of development. Although Japan had yet to try such two-step loans in Africa—whereby Japan lends money to a bank (or banks) in a particular country, and the bank then onlends the money to individual enterprises—it was contemplating doing so.

In the discussion that ensued, most participants focused on the pacing and sequencing of reforms. In the fiscal area, the African representatives suggested that the problem was one of timing, not one of whether the IMF’s suggested reforms should be adopted. If countries reduced export taxes too rapidly, trying to replace them with domestic consumption taxes, difficulties arose because most African economies were rural and agricultural in nature, and the informal sector was still large. In addition, it was often hard to reduce and eliminate tax exemptions, as most were linked to investment codes and most developing countries offered such exemptions. Further, they noted that donors could help by ensuring that funds arrived on time.

In the financial area, although some participants favored a more gradual approach, the general consensus among the Africans present was that they could not afford to proceed at the pace that some Asian economies had adopted, given the changed economic environment. As Soumaïla Cissé of Mali put it, Africa had to accelerate or risk being swept out of the way. Moreover, several speakers pointed to cases where quick moves to market-oriented systems had helped to depersonalize and depoliticize decision making.

Parastatal Reform and Privatization

On the privatization front, John Nellis of the World Bank noted that there had been a decline worldwide in the number, as well as in the economic and financial weight, of state-owned enterprises over the past decade. But in Africa, parastatals still accounted for a large amount of economic activity (as measured by GDP), nonagricultural employment, and investment—despite the recent spurt of privatizations. This situation is a problem because these entities consume about 20 percent of available human and physical capital in the region, while contributing only about 10 percent of value added. What are the key obstacles? Nellis pointed to lingering government fears that unemployment would rise, that the only buyers would be seen as undesirable (e.g., foreigners, a particular ethnic group, or well-connected domestic elites), that sources of patronage and perquisites would be lost, or that deindustrialization would result. He urged African governments to move quickly on privatizing those parastatals producing tradable products and operating in competitive, or potentially competitive markets, and to involve the private sector in running the infrastructure parastatals.

But Yasuo Yokoyama of Mitsui and Co. saw the time frame rather differently. “Rapid privatization will not produce the desired good results,” he maintained, “but instead only pose further difficulties for the business sector.” Countries should take a leaf out of Japan’s book and spend the next 50–100 years establishing sound economic fundamentals before embarking on privatizations.

Two African speakers—Jean-Claude Brou of Côte d’Ivoire and Cissé of Mali—however, saw no reason to defer privatization, underscoring all the progress that had been made in their countries in recent years. Brou said that ideally five conditions should be in place: a balanced macroeconomic environment; a competitive market; full political support as well as the support of a majority of the people; the prior definition of a clear, transparent, and rigorous process; and a flexible, pragmatic approach to implementation. But if there were sectors where a competitive market was not yet a reality, certain interim measures could be taken. For example, in the electricity sector in his country, the government and the private operator of the electricity network had signed an agreement defining their respective responsibilities, especially on establishing rates.

In the discussion that followed, most African participants cited their own instances of progress on the privatization front, stressing that the remaining obstacles were largely political and social, not just technical. Several speakers pointed to the challenge of convincing unions, parliaments, and political parties to embrace privatization when the costs were immediate, while the benefits were long term and diffuse. Mary Muduuli of Uganda noted that her country was only now waking up to the need to put advertisements in the media to explain the advantages of privatization.

But the African participants also felt that the multilateral institutions and donors could help by not setting structural targets and conditions that were unrealistic and even perverse—a case in point being the “fire sales” that can result when a set number of firms in a targeted sector must be privatized by a certain date. And they took strong issue with Yokoyama’s suggestion, which they viewed as provocative, that Africa would need to wait decades before it could successfully tackle privatizations.

Session III. Enhancing the Effectiveness of External Assistance

In the third session, the debate turned to experiences with structural adjustment programs that had been supported by the IMF and World Bank, both from the point of view of recipients and donors.

Zéphirin Diabré of Burkino Faso led off his paper by suggesting that since these programs were the target of fairly harsh criticism, it was important to determine how they could be improved.2 His recommendations include ensuring that the strategic view of development is internalized (i.e., national leaders prepare the draft programs); poverty reduction is the primary objective; the social dimension is recognized and conditionality reduced; the general public understands the programs; and adjustment has a regional dimension. He called for another approach to conditionality, involving greater recognition of individual country capabilities and constraints and greater promptness in disbursements. He also observed that “the general impression is that the emphasis is on restoring macroeconomic equilibria at the expense of bona fide development.”

As for Zambia, Jacob Mwanza said that his country’s experiences with adjustment programs since the early 1970s showed that stabilization measures were easier to implement than structural adjustment measures, as the latter required striking and maintaining a careful balance between tight and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. He emphasized the importance of appropriate economic policies, but noted that, in the end, they could do little more than permit, or at most, encourage a better economic performance—also critical was establishing an institutional framework to support the “correct” policies. Zambia’s prospects for economic recovery and sustainable development now depended critically on sound economic management and external support. But at the same time, debilitating external debt loads had to be resolved.

On the donor side, Michael Foster of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) in the United Kingdom explored the recent switch from the traditional project approach to a sector-wide approach, now a central element of the World Bank’s lending strategy in Africa. He said the context for the switch was twofold: weaknesses in African budgets and budget management (e.g., large deficits that strangle private access to credit, poor levels of accountability, and poorly targeted subsidies and spending priorities); and the fact that donors themselves had contributed significantly to the budget problems (e.g., by giving too much project aid relative to resources for operation and maintenance, undermining local management capacity, and often escaping budget disciplines).

Foster said the sector-wide approach, which was part of the evolving consensus on new conditionality, hinged on a medium-term expenditure framework that determined the size of the resource envelope for the sector, and the government drawing up a comprehensive program for the sector that was agreed with the donors. Key factors for success included: strong leadership from the government side, macroeconomic stability and predictable budgets, adequate commitment and motivation of those required to change their behavior, confidence in the accounting arrangements, donors’ willingness to merge their efforts and accept lower visibility of their own funds, and donors not forcing the pace on governments or other donors.

In commenting on the papers, Peter Warutere of Kenya remarked that the recent growth pickup in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole seemed to stem in part from strong structural reforms. Until recently, he noted, many African leaders viewed such reforms with suspicion, given that many donors were also demanding political democratization, and the programs were being prescribed by outsiders unfamiliar with the intricate domestic conditions. But in recent years, donors had recognized the need to mobilize popular support for reforms. Indeed, Kenya’s decision to publicly debate its 1996–98 Policy Framework Paper—which was designed by the government, with assistance from the IMF and World Bank staffs—was part of this process.

From the Asian side, Masako Ii of Japan struck an upbeat note by suggesting that recent studies on the impact of adjustment programs on social sectors did not show a major cut in the expenditure share of health and education, although they did show some expenditure misallocation within a given social sector (for example, expenditures should be targeted at priority programs that benefited the poor most, such as primary education or basic health, rather than at salary supplements). Moreover, she felt that simple measurement errors might be responsible for the pessimism about saving, investment, employment, and growth in Africa, as official statistics (both of the international financial institutions and African governments) underestimated economic activity by excluding data from the informal sector.

In the following discussion, the main concern was how to get the desired supply response in African nations, particularly in the productive, as opposed to the social, sectors. Cole asked if the kind of infrastructure and other elements that would support such a rapid supply response were much less readily available in Africa than they had been in South Korea in the mid-1960s and Indonesia in the late 1960s.

On the topic of ownership and conditionality, several Africans expressed frustration with donor conditionality and lack of transparency, and what they perceived to be shifting goalposts whenever they were about to score a goal. Warutere raised questions about donor consistency on such sensitive issues as human rights and pointed to instances of inflexible conditionality in privatization. What should be done if buyers could not be found for enterprises, even after they had been advertised several times? How could the government avoid charges of corruption if the enterprises in the end were sold to the highest bidders, but the bids were less than half the valuation price?

Session IV. Future Role of Governments and Donors

Mark Baird of the World Bank opened the panel discussion by noting that what was striking at the seminar was the broad acceptance of the need to undergo adjustment. There were clear concerns, however, about the need to secure both short-term results to sustain the reform process politically and long-term results that delivered on promised reductions in poverty—prompting him to urge countries to persevere with adjustment. “All the evidence clearly shows that when you implement sound macroeconomic policies, you do get a supply response.” But in Africa progress in policy reform had been uneven, with slippages, raising questions about the credibility of the programs.

World Bank colleague Ravi Kanbur observed that over the past few years, the dialogue between Asia and Africa had been maturing and deepening, with the realization that there was not the East Asian miracle, but rather many East Asian miracles, each with its own peculiarities; and, of course, there was not a single Africa, but many Africas. Thus, country specificity should be the basis of the future dialogue.

Kanbur highlighted three issues that merited more discussion: culture, timing, and conditionality. On culture, everyone accepted that it was important for economic growth, but the connection needed to be explored. For example, Tetsuji Tanaka had mentioned that many observers point to the vital role of Confucianism in East Asia in terms of instilling the proper ethics and philosophy required to operate a capitalist market economy—yet only 40–50 years ago, many observers had cited Confucianism for the slow economic progress in East Asia.

On timing, it was doubtful that Africa really had 50 years to get its economic fundamentals right before proceeding with privatization. So how could Africa get its desired “quick growth,” in light of points raised by Cole and others that moving too quickly could sometimes backfire? And on conditionality, as countries moved more deeply into structural reform, the number of paradoxes that arose underscored the need for rethinking the links between conditionality, ownership, and policy reform. For example, Western commentators often cited land reform in East Asia as a key policy reform, yet land reform was imposed by an occupying military power. And some countries proposed reform programs, presumably demonstrating ownership, that donors refused to accept. Perhaps part of the answer lay in the technical solutions suggested by Baird, such as disconnecting the resource flow from the satisfaction of specific conditionalities in tricky areas (e.g., civil service reform and privatization).

Speaking for the OECD, Richard Carey stressed the new emphasis on “development partnerships”—a term that derived from four major changes. First, donors and recipients had moved from viewing conditionality as a cost of access to external resources to thinking in terms of policy reform as the path to sustainable development. The question was no longer whether to engage in policy reform, but how to do it, and Africans themselves were fully engaged in the process. Second, there had been a shift from short-term to long-term adjustment perspectives, with a concern for sustainability (economic, social, environmental, cultural, and political). As part of this, there was also a recognition of the key role of institutional and capacity development. Third, the “results culture” put the spotlight on what everyone’s efforts added up to, underscoring the need for coordination and integrated sector approaches. Fourth, a shift in accountability philosophies meant focusing more on what was being done with balance of payments and budget support in terms of resource allocation, particularly through the public budget. As a result of these changes, Carey said the OECD was undertaking a number of new initiatives, including in the area of governance.

On governance, Hiroyuki Hino of the IMF noted that there was a growing consensus that economic governance issues—such as lack of transparency in budgetary procedures and corruption—played an important role in investment and savings decisions and ultimately economic growth. Rebutting suggestions that perhaps economic governance was not that critical, given that some countries had grown rapidly despite widespread corruption, he said such arguments overlooked the concern that the efficiency of resource allocation was undermined by corruption. Possible remedies might include closing avenues for rent seeking; setting up a system that would assure full transparency in public finance; strictly enforcing a civil service code of conduct; and establishing a civil service that was lean, efficient, and properly remunerated.

But when it came to noneconomic governance issues, such as democratization, Hino said the link with economic performance was more complex. He pointed to the range of opinions expressed at the seminar, with some speakers confident that good political governance was essential for good economic performance, and others wondering whether democracy of the Westminster type was necessary for economic development in all African countries. Nonetheless, it was important to recognize that most bilateral donors saw a vital link between open, democratic, and accountable systems of governance and respect for human rights on the one hand, and the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development on the other. Indeed, a number of these donors, facing ever tighter budgetary constraints, were linking their assistance to the political aspects of good governance. With Africa still heavily dependent on donor help, that reality meant that Africa would have to develop a constructive approach to deal with donors on a broad range of governance issues.

Tour de Table

In the final tour de table, several key themes emerged.

Culture. Mwanza observed that the seminar had opened a window of opportunity for his country and the African continent to explore economic models of development that stood as alternatives to traditional Western ones. The key ingredient for success, across cultures, looked to be the consistent pursuit and implementation of sound macroeconomic policies. However, Toshio Fujinuma of Japan cautioned that taking culture into account did not mean just picking the best model for rapid economic growth but, rather, instigating changes in social values or behavior patterns.

Lessons from East Asia. Kapur emphasized the importance of an outward-oriented trade and investment strategy to boost economic efficiency and competitiveness. Such a strategy involved getting prices right, pursuing wide-ranging economic and social infrastructure improvements, attracting direct foreign investment, and insisting on good governance. Tanaka added that the exact recipe would vary from country to country, reflecting diverse starting points and differences among countries, such as in culture.

Governance. Several speakers picked up on Hino’s distinction between economic and noneconomic governance, with general agreement that good governance, however defined, was vital for economic growth. Joseph Kinyua of Kenya stressed that a lack of good economic governance gave rise to wasted resources and investment distortions, making it harder to raise living standards. Moreover, it was difficult to achieve good economic governance without also securing good noneconomic governance, which formed the basis for political stability. But Luc Oyoubi of Gabon wondered whether everyone in the seminar meant the same thing when talking about democracy, as some seemed to feel that there were only good elements. Certainly, freedom of enterprise was favorable, but output lost to strikes was not.

Conditionality. On the need to rethink conditionality, Foster of ODA noted that the key problem he observed with conditionality was that it prevented credibility. It was private investors, not donors, who needed to be convinced. Thus, recipient governments should take ownership of their programs and convince investors that they would remain committed. Cole urged donors and recipients to operate as allies, not adversaries. As evidence, he cited the cases of Korea in the mid-1960s and Indonesia in the late 1960s, both of which enjoyed turning points when there was a close alliance between donors and recipients.

Timing. African participants once again expressed their eagerness to move forward as quickly as possible, with Brou stressing that Africa could not afford the luxury to wait decades to replicate the East Asian miracle. But Cole maintained his voice of caution on financial sector reform, and several Asian speakers reiterated their preference for a more gradual approach. Nakagawa noted that “even if an issue is burning, we must think first.” Nonetheless, he underscored the international community’s responsibility to help Africa in its time of need, looking for optimism in the fact that many Africans at the seminar had cited growing signs of private sector development.

Concluding Remarks

In the concluding remarks, co-chairman Jack Boorman of the IMF observed that one unmistakable message of the seminar was that the politics of structural reform were tough. Participants agreed that more effort should go into communicating costs and benefits of policy options so that policymakers could enlist the support of their own civil societies—especially the private sector—for reform.

But as the dialogue accelerated, pressures for democratization and good governance would only grow. Boorman cited the widespread acceptance of the view that good governance—defined to include greater transparency and accountability in the conduct of governments—was socially desirable, that it could have a positive effect on growth, and that it was increasingly and inevitably a concern of donors. At the same time, new ways had to be found to craft programs and sector projects in a way that assured donors that their monies were being well spent while permitting governments to retain “ownership” of their reforms. He noted that many participants felt that good governance and democracy were the same thing and “there needs to be more exploration county by country, and perhaps with more subtlety, in the search for democratic processes appropriate to the conditions of Africa.”

Can Africa simply copy what worked best in East Asia and hope for a similar takeoff in the years to come? Boorman said that participants felt that the economic environment had changed dramatically since the East Asian countries established the basis for their spectacular growth. “The message that came through this discussion seemed to be that the cost of acting slowly—and forgoing the benefits that faster access to outside capital and technology can provide—is too dear.”

The discussion summaries in the Overview, as well as throughout the volume, highlight key interventions and are not meant to be a summary of all points made.

Zéphirin Diabré was unable to attend the seminar but submitted a paper.

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