PART V Round Table: Key Issues in Policy Today
- Richard Bart, and Chorng-Huey Wong
- Published Date:
- June 1994
C. Fred Bergsten
My remarks, which will reflect the perspective of the global monetary system, will focus primarily on the industrial countries and the exchange rate relationships among them. As Anthony Lanyi said, those relationships are absolutely crucial for developing countries—in fact, they may be more important for developing than for industrial countries. Industrial and developing countries are obviously linked through monetary stability itself, but to me, the most critical link is through trade.
All of you, I am sure, would take the view that open world markets—particularly open markets in the industrial countries—are extremely important to the development of poorer countries—and indeed, to the development and growth of virtually all countries. To my mind, maintaining equilibrium exchange rates, or exchange rates that sustain more or less balanced current account positions among the major industrial countries, is absolutely essential to maintaining open trade markets. What, for example, has been the single most important determinant of American trade policy, particularly in the postwar period? The answer is not the unemployment rate or the growth rate—in fact, it is none of the domestic economic variables.
It is the exchange rate. When the dollar exchange rate has been substantially overvalued, as it was toward the end of the Bretton Woods period in the late 1960s and during the first half of the 1980s under fully flexible exchange rates, American trade policy has been at its most protectionist. The first Reagan Administration—to take the latest case in point—talked a free-trade, open-market game. Yet the Reagan Administration, according to its own Secretary of the Treasury, Jim Baker, applied more import controls than any American administration in the twentieth century. The reason was that the Administration’s policy mix, which produced the hugely overvalued dollar, combined with the absence of any domestic or international monetary arrangements to constrain the overvalued dollar, pushed the United States, despite the best of intentions to the contrary, to put import quotas on autos, steel, textiles, machine tools—a whole list of products.
When the exchange rate gets too far out of line, political pressures become overwhelming. Even the most competitive industries are unable to compete; they lose market share and join others seeking protection. In such a situation, no administration can resist protectionist trends, not even Ronald Reagan’s. And that, I think, is why it is so important for all countries—including developing countries, and certainly including the newly emerging market economies—that we have a global monetary regime that maintains some semblance of equilibrium.
How has the world addressed this problem? During the postwar period, there have been two broad systemic attempts to address the issue of exchange rate equilibrium. One was the effort to maintain rigidly fixed exchange rates—first, during the Bretton Woods period, on a global scale under the original IMF Articles of Agreement, and then, after 1987, through the European Monetary System (EMS). (Only during the last five years has the EMS tried to avoid currency realignments with a system of fixed exchange rates.) Both these systems failed because they were too rigid and did not provide an exchange rate tool that permitted flexibility in the adjustment process. I would never suggest that the exchange rate tool should be the centerpiece of the adjustment process, but without it, the record shows that adjustment fails and that trade protection, economic imbalances, distorted investment patterns, and the like all come into play.
Likewise, there was a long experiment with unmanaged flexibility of exchange rates between roughly 1973 and 1985—with purity from 1981 to 1985—and it, too, failed miserably. Exchange rates, which were determined solely by market forces, responded to “bandwagon” psychology in the markets (including interest rate differentials that may or may not have had much to do with underlying economic relationships). In such circumstances, exchange rates can be driven far out of line. In the first half of the 1980s, for instance, the dollar became so overvalued that U.S. trade policy was driven into protectionism, placing serious strains on the entire monetary and trade system until the trend was arrested in the mid-1980s. Likewise, the earlier period of floating rates—which were not quite so purely maintained, as some sporadic attempts at management were made in 1975-76 and again in 1978-79—resulted in significant disequilibria: yen and deutsche mark undervaluation, dollar and sterling overvaluation, and a consistent pattern of repeated currency misalignments that led to economic problems.
Note that I use the word “misalignments” rather than “volatility.” I have very little concern about volatility causing real economic problems. The issue is misalignments, which occur when rates are persistently out of kilter with the underlying economic relationships among nations. Zero current account balances may not be the only acceptable positions, however. It is possible to make a clear case for some countries to run modest structural surpluses and for others to run modest structural deficits, at least for some time. Current account balances must meet certain tests. For purposes of my analysis, purchasing power parity (PPP) is totally irrelevant. A PPP exchange rate between the yen and the dollar, for example, would probably be somewhere between Y 180-200 to the dollar, compared with the November 1992 rate of about Y 120 per dollar. With such a rate, the Japanese current account surplus would probably hit $300-400 billion a year, and the world economic system would collapse because other countries simply would not accept such a rate. So PPP rates, while valuable for many analytical purposes, such as comparing real incomes across countries, in my view have nothing to do with exchange rates in the real world. In that world—our world—as I have said, market rates should maintain some rough equilibrium among the competitive positions of countries, using as approximate measures current account balances, but also taking into account internal balances or the absence of them.
If the fixed rate system breaks down because it is too rigid, and the freely flexible rate system results in massive misalignments, what is left? The conclusion I reach is that we need to find some synthesis of the two extremes, extracting the best features of both fixed and flexible rate systems and avoiding the worst. When the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was extensive discussion about the possibility of this kind of intermediate system. In those days, it was talked about in terms of wider bands around parities, crawling pegs—which of course would mean modest variations in central parities—or some combination of the two, such as widening the band around parities and letting the parities slide, glide, or crawl. Those systems were actively considered but rejected in the face of subsequent events: first, the oil shocks, then the failure of the Committee of Twenty to work out systemic reform in an explicit way. And so the world went to unmanaged flexibility.
Another variant that has been tried is a truly adjustable peg system, which keeps exchange rates fixed but allows them to be adjusted from time to time. This type of peg was used to some extent in the earlier stages of the Bretton Woods system and in fact kept the system afloat for at least the first decade or so. But then, as large imbalances began to develop toward the end of the 1960s, the rigidity that I mentioned before set in, and the system did not contribute to the adjustment process.
Likewise, the EMS had an adjustable peg system during its first seven or eight years. There were frequent parity realignments within the EMS—on average, at least one a year—between 1979 and 1987, and they clearly worked. The EMS countries were extremely good at anticipating the onset of disequilibria, adjusting their parities frequently and by small amounts. These changes did not reward speculators, because most of the alterations remained within the margins of the existing bands, and the step gains of the recent EMS crisis (which are still going on) were not a factor. This adjustable peg variant of a fixed rate system continued to work until the EMS countries got ahead of themselves. In 1987 they rejected the notion of adjusting the pegs and tried to fix the rates permanently. In my judgment, they made the move toward economic and monetary union too quickly, before underlying policies and conformity of economic performance would permit. In the end, the system fell apart, resulting in the enormous number of floats, unregulated parity changes, and the like that have taken place since September 1992. The lesson is that some limited, intermediate variable—an adjustable peg—does in fact work.
A third method of approaching the issue of intermediate exchange rate options involves limited flexibility. Earlier, I mentioned wider bands, crawling pegs, or some combination of the two. This sort of system is what my colleague John Williamson and I came up with at the Institute for International Economics about ten years ago: a system of target zones, with rates maintained within fairly wide real exchange rate ranges (not nominal ranges). The ranges would change with inflation differentials, but in addition, they would need to be changed from time to time in response to real shocks and differences in underlying competitive positions.
Interestingly, the world seemed to be moving toward such a system in the mid-1980s. When the Group of Five finance ministers launched the famous Plaza Agreement to bring down the dollar in September 1985, they changed the system. They prefaced their intervention policy with the observation that the effort to maintain equilibrium exchange rates without government intervention had failed. They had thought everything would converge, but when convergence did not take place, they elected to involve themselves in the active management of the exchange rate system.
Although their first action was the effort to bring down the dollar, the change was systemic. A second and more important systemic change occurred with the Louvre Accord in early 1987, when the Group of Seven industrial countries (there were actually six at the time) adopted so-called reference ranges around the currencies in a weaker version of the target zones that Mr. Williamson and I had developed earlier. Unfortunately, from a systemic standpoint, those reference ranges were adopted prematurely—before the currency adjustments had gone far enough in repairing the huge disequilibria that had existed prior to 1985, and so the ranges could not hold. The yen-dollar range had to be re-based within a few months, and there were crises in the fall of 1987 that led up to Black Monday. But the Louvre Accord was evidence of the desire of the industrial countries’ monetary authorities to find an intermediate alternative to total flexibility without going back to completely fixed rates.
One other important development emerged from the 1986 summit of the Group of Seven countries: the adoption of the so-called Tokyo indicators. This series of indicators was intended to guide the coordination of the adjustment process, and it laid the foundation for what occurred a few months later—the decision to limit exchange rate flexibility. In practice, however, the Tokyo indicators may never have meant much, and they were not widely used. There was very little linkage between the indicators on the real side and the reference ranges on the monetary side; finally, the whole experiment collapsed before it had really been tried.
Yet some remnants of that “reference range” thinking of five years ago remain, and in fact the current exchange rate levels are not too far from the levels of five years ago, when the Louvre Accord was modified (roughly the end of 1987). Many people, including outgoing U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury David Mulford, assert that the reference ranges not only worked but are still in place. This claim is probably too ambitious, because there have been enormous oscillations since then, as well as continued disequilibria of exchange rates. Nevertheless, an effort was made to find a synthesis between the excessive rigidity of fixed rates and the excessive movements and misalignments of freely flexible rates. This “third way,” to use the currently popular political jargon, would draw on the best of both.
Where do we go from here? With the breakdown of the EMS, I think the officials of the Group of Five and Group of Seven countries will be very cautious about trying to move to any new regime soon. On the other hand, it is clear that significant problems remain—for example, the imbalance of the yen. According to my analysis, which of course is based on the need for some kind of current account equilibrium, the yen in 1992 was undervalued in real terms by at least 20-25 percent. In nominal terms, it was weaker against the dollar in 1992 than it was at the end of 1987, at which time, even with the appropriate lags, there were a huge Japanese surplus and an enormous American deficit. But during the five years after 1987, cumulative Japanese inflation remained around 12 percent lower than American inflation, and Japanese productivity grew 10-12 percent faster than American productivity, further improving Japan’s competitiveness. In real terms, just to keep the real yen-dollar rate at the 1987 level would have required an appreciation of approximately 20 percent of the nominal yen rate against the dollar—i.e., from 120-25 to the dollar to about 100 against the dollar.
There are also yen imbalances vis-à-vis European currencies. I am suggesting that there has been currently a generalized yen undervaluation, the result of which, of course, is the largest Japanese trade surplus ever. The bulk—if not all—of Japan’s present economic growth is the result of its expanding trade surplus, not of growth in domestic demand. This scenario puts huge negative pressure on other countries and once again stimulates the kind of protectionist responses that have emerged in earlier, similar periods. For example, the U.S. auto industry and auto workers have demanded tight, comprehensive new quotas on auto imports—also covering the Japanese transplants here in the United States—based on the argument that three quarters of the U.S.-Japanese trade imbalance, which is again soaring, is in the automobile industry. This argument is obviously fallacious; I oppose it and hope President Clinton will oppose it. But it is also a reminder of the trade problems caused in part by currency relationships that are allowed to get out of hand.
In sum, I would say that we are in a period during which the major industrial countries—the Groups of Five and Seven—are trying to find a more effective international monetary system somewhere between pure fixity and unfettered flexibility. Some more or less successful experiments have already been launched: the Plaza Agreement, which certainly succeeded in realigning rates for a time, and the Louvre Accord, which had limited success but was premature and did not really get a fair trial. It remains to be seen whether we can find a more balanced and effective global monetary system in the 1990s. Finding such a system is very important for all countries, including developing countries and emerging market economies, because of the effect the system will have on world trade policy and growth, and especially on the future of an open global economy.
In terms of the general issue of exchange rate policy, the most important principle to understand is that it is not a separate dimension of economic policy. Rather, it is part of the constellation of economic policies—monetary policy in particular, but also to some extent fiscal and trade policy. It is impossible to maintain an exchange rate policy independent of the other key elements of economic policy. Fred Bergsten, I think, adopts the same point of view. He believes that policy commitments on exchange rates constrain the way a government conducts other economic policies. But there is also in Mr. Bergsten’s view the idea that it is possible to have a meeting in the Hotel Okura and magically to appreciate the Japanese yen by 20-25 percent, without really doing anything else to any other element of U.S. or Japanese economic policy. There may in fact be times when a clear, forceful statement backed by a modest amount of intervention can move an exchange rate back toward the underlying economic fundamentals, as happened in the correction of the overvaluation of the dollar in the mid-1980s. There are also circumstances in which a tightening of monetary policy can take a big bubble out of asset prices, as the Japanese authorities have recently shown. But in general, to believe that there will be many opportunities to influence important economic variables without changing something fundamental and important about the main controls of economic policy is, in my view, a mistake.
In terms of exchange rate policies for different countries, the second important principle is “one size does not fit all.” A constellation of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies appropriate for one country or one group of countries is not necessarily appropriate for others. In this regard, several important differences between the economic circumstances of different countries influence the nature of exchange rate policies. The major industrial countries have open capital markets capable of mobilizing huge flows of resources when persuaded that what the authorities think may be the right exchange rate is not sustainable. The markets in these countries are thus able to place a very important constraint on the conduct of economic policies directed at influencing exchange rates. On the other hand, the degree of capital mobility relevant to many—though not all—developing countries is not nearly as great as it is for major industrial countries. The capacity to conduct an exchange rate policy that will not be disrupted by capital flows is somewhat different in countries whose capital markets are relatively insulated.
Another important distinction is that many developing countries do not have the same capacity as industrial countries to separate fiscal and monetary policy. For example, in the 1991 fiscal year, the United States was easily able to finance a $300 billion fiscal deficit, despite the fact that the M-2 grew at a very sluggish pace. In contrast, in many developing countries, the capacity to finance deficits domestically is closely connected to the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, a developing country that has a problem controlling its fiscal deficit will have a problem controlling credit and monetary aggregates, and that limitation can be an important constraint on domestic exchange rate policy. In this context, it is also worth noting the linkages that generally exist between structural policies and fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies in formerly centrally planned economies. The inability to harden the budget constraints of state enterprises that still dominate most of the formerly centrally planned economies has severely affected these countries’ ability to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline, a weakness that is inevitably reflected in exchange rate policy. Again, I emphasize the second fundamental rule of exchange rate policy, “one size does not fit all.” Exchange rate policy depends on both the nature of a country’s economy and the constraints on domestic economic policy.
With that in mind, let me turn to some of Mr. Bergsten’s remarks, which relate primarily to exchange rate policies for industrial countries. These remarks also apply to several developing countries whose internal financial markets are beginning to resemble those of the industrial countries.
First, Mr. Bergsten has emphasized the key link between exchange rate policy and trade policy—the desire to have an exchange rate system that will help maintain an open trading system. This objective, of course, is a fundamental principle embodied in the IMF Articles of Agreement. The idea behind this principle derives from the unfortunate experience of the interwar period. Competitive depreciations and other actions to stimulate employment, together with restrictive policies aimed at defending unrealistic exchange rates, contributed to a monumental collapse of world trade and economic activity. The objective of the Bretton Woods system was to move away from an exchange rate system that impeded the free movement of goods and resources toward an exchange rate system that supported the growth of world trade and, in turn, the prosperity of the world economy.
Mr. Bergsten maintains that efforts to fix exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system—and, more recently, under the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System—have proved injurious to trade and that in the end, both systems failed. But in fact, the Bretton Woods system functioned fairly successfully for at least 15 years, during a period when world trade and economic activity expanded very rapidly. The primary reason the Bretton Woods system collapsed was that beginning in the late 1960s, the anchor country (the United States) pursued monetary and fiscal policies inconsistent with the desires of some of the system’s key participants. A similar problem has recently afflicted the ERM. Although the recent difficulties in the ERM have a variety of causes, and although many countries share responsibility within the system, the central problem (which has produced most of the tension within the system) has been the divergence between the policy mix pursued by the anchor country, Germany, and the domestic policy needs of some other members. For example, the United Kingdom experienced a two-year recession prior to the summer of 1992, and when an economy that has been in recession for two years is forced to raise its interest rates substantially to defend the exchange rate peg, the policy is not credible.
However, it should not be concluded from this experience that fixed exchange rates and adjustable peg systems always give rise to major policy tensions. For most of the period since its inception in 1979, the ERM has functioned reasonably well, reducing exchange rate turbulence among participants and facilitating convergence toward low inflation rates. The lesson from recent experience is that when major divergences do arise among the domestic policy needs of different participants in a pegged exchange rate system, it is important to recognize this fact and to make appropriate and timely adjustments.
On the other side of the coin, Mr. Bergsten suggests that the system of floating exchange rates among the world’s major currencies has also failed to some extent. We certainly saw an extraordinary appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s, particularly in 1984-85, as the dollar’s value became detached from any credible notion of underlying economic fundamentals. However, I think it is a misreading of the economic history of the early 1980s not to recognize that an important part of this substantial appreciation was in fact desirable from the standpoint of the world economy. In the first two years of the U.S. economy’s expansion after the 1980-82 recession, real domestic demand grew in the United States by 15 percent. Some 3.5 percentage points of that growth was pushed out through the deterioration of the U.S. trade balance and helped to propel a recovery from the recession in the rest of the world. This spur to global growth was not a bad thing in the early 1980s, although the dollar did appreciate excessively in 1983–84.
We need to ask, though, what else the United States could have done in the way of a policy response to the dollar appreciation in 1984, aside from having a meeting, making pronouncements, and doing a bit of intervention. It is useful to recall that during 1984, the Federal Reserve retightened U.S. monetary policy because of fears of a resurgence of inflationary pressures. That action clearly contributed to the dollar’s further appreciation. In my judgment, however, it would have been a mistake for the Federal Reserve to continue with an expansionary policy that could only have increased worries about inflation and perhaps even fueled the resurgence the monetary authorities feared.
Further, Mr. Bergsten suggests that he and John Williamson invented target zones ten years ago. In fact, among the IMF documents from the initial period of floating in 1974 is an extensive memorandum from J. Marcus Fleming, then Deputy Director of the Research Department, describing a proposal to establish target zones for exchange rates among the major industrial countries. The idea was that the industrial countries, by adopting target zones for exchange rates, would simultaneously commit themselves to adjusting their underlying economic policies in order to keep exchange rates within those zones. At that time, the major industrial countries were not prepared to undertake such a commitment, and hence the target zone proposal died. However, I think the essential idea of Mr. Fleming’s notion of target zones remains relevant. If these zones are to be meaningful, effective, and credible in the market, they need to be backed by a willingness to adjust underlying economic policies. The real issue is whether it is appropriate to divert economic policies from other objectives in order to use them to keep exchange rates within prescribed target zones.
Finally, Mr. Bergsten has observed that the yen is currently 20–25 percent undervalued. I think, however, that at its present level vis-à-vis the dollar, the yen is probably appropriately valued, given the savings and investment situations in the United States and Japan and the relative cyclical positions of the two economies. The United States is now beginning to rebound from the recession, but it is not yet apparent that the Japanese economy is beginning to recover convincingly from its slowdown in growth. It is natural in such circumstances for both the U.S. current account deficit and the Japanese current account surplus to enlarge somewhat. This enlargement of payments imbalances may well generate trade policy pressures and tensions in 1993 and beyond, particularly if Japan’s current account surplus grows much beyond 3 percent of GNP. But such trade policy tensions are not necessarily—and especially not in this instance—a signal that the exchange rate is diverging far from its appropriate underlying equilibrium value, given both the relative cyclical positions of the two economies and the factors influencing their savings and investment positions over the long term.
Moreover, there is a practical difficulty with the proposal to reduce payments imbalances by inducing an appreciation of the yen. As the old proverb says, “No matter how much you wave your hands, you won’t fly.” What is to be done if the pronouncements do not produce the desired appreciation? What policy adjustments would have to be made to effect such an appreciation? Some people think fiscal policy can be manipulated to influence the exchange rate, and it is useful that the Japanese have undertaken a substantial fiscal package to strengthen domestic demand growth over the coming year. Perhaps this action is helping to push up the yen. I am not, however, particularly hopeful that fiscal policy is an easy way to manipulate the exchange rate. Monetary policy is generally the tool most readily at hand for influencing the exchange rate of a currency. It may be possible to appreciate the yen vis-à-vis the dollar through a further significant easing of U.S. policy. But with short-term interest rates in the United States at their lowest level since the mid-1960s and the economy beginning to show some strength in its recovery, I think it is very difficult to argue that it would be economically desirable, from a broader policy perspective, to further ease U.S. monetary policy at this stage. It would also be inappropriate to tighten monetary policy in Japan, lifting the official Japanese discount rate 2-3 percentage points to appreciate the yen. The Japanese stock market is now 50 percent below its peak, and raising Japan’s short-term interest rates substantially at this point would probably push the economy into a deep recession that would be good for neither Japan nor the rest of the world.
For these reasons, I am much less assertive than Mr. Bergsten in saying that we ought to have a target zone system and commit underlying policies to the defense of those zones. We need to ask whether such policies might have a more important function than defending someone’s idea of what the sustainable equilibrium exchange rate should be.
Summary of Discussion
Participants expressed support for efforts to coordinate economic policy in order to maintain medium-term exchange rate alignment and advocated using monetary policy to reduce short-term exchange rate volatility. Most participants agreed that the exchange rate was an important indicator and felt that when it appeared too far out of line with economic fundamentals, it should influence the conduct of monetary, fiscal, and even intervention policy. Transparency was also seen as key to effective exchange rate policy; among other things, a single exchange rate should be established for all current account transactions. However, participants did not believe that any one system could be the best choice for all countries. A country with a fixed rate system that had some credibility should maintain that regime, as switching to a crawl could create unnecessary problems. On the other hand, countries with high inflation rates that could not be reduced to approximate those of industrial countries might create serious problems for themselves by attempting to establish pegs.
Participants did not see that having the central bank intervene in the forward exchange market served any particular purpose. But in countries where the private sector had not developed such a market, central bank involvement could be justified.
A discussion of exchange rate policy in developing countries with economic characteristics similar to those in industrial countries touched on specific examples. Participants noted that if Mexico adopted a fixed exchange rate and kept it in place for a period of time, the rate would acquire some credibility and be able to withstand a terms of trade shock. However, a better way for Mexico to move to a fixed rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar might be to slow the rate of crawl to zero temporarily, but not to commit to a peg until credibility was established. On the other hand, because Chile’s trade was much more diversified than Mexico’s, it was less obvious that pegging the Chilean currency to the U.S. dollar would be appropriate at all.
The discussion then turned to the question of whether a country’s exchange rate should be determined by a targeted current account balance. Participants were skeptical of this practice, since setting the exchange rate by this method would require information on variables—including price elasticities and the exchange rate link to the inflation rate—about which not enough was known. It was agreed that despite this shortage of information, target ranges could be set. Further, while participants agreed that identifying the correct exchange rate was impossible, they felt that a rate far from equilibrium could be identified, allowing authorities to recognize those times when corrective action might be needed.
The final point concerned the problem industrial countries’ quota restrictions posed for developing countries. While quotas on products such as textiles and steel were viewed as a serious concern, participants were impressed by the success a number of East Asian countries had made despite these barriers. The view was expressed that while quotas (or similar trade barriers) were not an absolute impediment to successful development through a more open domestic trade strategy, they remained a problem. The consensus was that since many developing countries had unilaterally liberalized their trade regimes in the last several years, these countries in particular should be more vociferous in criticizing the industrial countries for their perceived backward movement on trade policy issues.
List of Participants*
Assistant Director, IMF Institute
Senior Advisor, IMF Policy Development and Review Department
Senior Advisor, IMF Research Department
W. Max Corden
Professor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Chief Economist, World Bank
Associate Director, IMF Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department
Steven B. Kamin
Staff Economist, Federal Reserve Board
Paul R. Masson
Assistant Director, IMF European I Department
Peter J. Quirk
Division Chief, IMF Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department
Carlos A. Végh
Economist, IMF Research Department
C. Fred Bergsten
Institute for International Economics
Liam Patrick Ebrill
Division Chief, IMF European I Department
Leslie J. Lipschitz
Assistant Director, IMF African Department
Director, IMF Research Department
Saleh M. Nsouli
Assistant Director, IMF Middle Eastern Department
Lorenzo L. Perez
Assistant Director, Western Hemisphere Department
Thomas M. Reichmann
Assistant Director, IMF European I Department
Reinold H. van Til
Division Chief, IMF African Department
National Bank of Poland
Senior Advisor, IMF European I Department
John R. Dodsworth
Division Chief, IMF Central Asia Department
Mohamed A. El-Erian
Division Chief, IMF Middle Eastern Department
Martin J. Fetherston
Division Chief, IMF European I Department
Hans M. Flickenschild
Advisor, IMF Policy Development and Review Department
Deputy Director, IMF Institute
Claudio M. Loser
Deputy Director, IMF Western Hemisphere Department
Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico
Director, IMF European II Department
Chief Executive Director, Czech National Bank
Division Chief, IMF Research Department
Thomas A. Wolf
Assistant Director, IMF European II Department
Director, State Bank of Pakistan
Director, Bank of Finland
Samuel Kye Apea
Deputy Secretary, Ministy by of Finance and Economic Planning
Assistant Governor, Bank of Lithuania
Charles Sydney Rodney Chuka
Director, Reserve Bank of Malawi
Advisor, National Bank of Belgium
Division Chief, Deutsche Bundesbank
Guzman Nicolas Eyzaguirre
Director of Research, Central Bank of Chile
Carlos Eduardo de Freitas
Head, Central Bank of Brazil
Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance
Deputy Director, Bank of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Maurice John Pette Kanga
Director, Central Bank of Kenya
P. B. Kulkarni
Executive Director, Reserve Bank of India
Keun Yung Lee
Deputy Director, Bank of Korea
Nikolay Vladimirovich Luzgin
Head, National Bank of Belarus
Nadia Mohamed Hussein
Deputy General Manager, Central Bank of Egypt
Ahmad Hasan Mustafa
Head, Central Bank of Jordan
Director, National Bank of Hungary
Deputy Chief, Bank of Canada
Central Director, Bank Al-Maghrib
First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury
Australian Capital Territory
Second Vice President, Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina
Victor V. Rakov
Deputy Managing Director, Central Bank of the Russian Federation
Alhaji M. R. Rasheed
Director, Central Bank of Nigeria
Managing Director, Bank Indonesia
Director of Money and Credit, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning
Alexander N. Sharov
Deputy Chairman of the Board, National Bank of Ukraine
Vice Governor, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Ralph W. Smith, Jr.,
Assistant Director, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
B. Sh. Tadzhiyakov
First Deputy Chairman, National Bank of Kazakhstan
Manager, Central Bank of Venezuela
Director, Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Planning
The titles and affiliations listed are those that were in effect at the time of the seminar (December 1992).