- International Monetary Fund
- Published Date:
- August 2002
The IMF operates on the basis of weighted voting power of its members. Ordinarily, decisions require a simple majority of the votes cast but special majorities are needed for certain decisions as specified in the Articles of Agreement. The original Articles required special majorities for 9 categories of decisions. In the first amendment, that number rose to 21 and in the second amendment it more than doubled again to over 50. At the same time, the number of special majorities was simplified and reduced to two: 70 percent and 85 percent. The third amendment added one category of special voting majority.
The increased prescription of special voting majorities was supported on the argument that the expanded responsibilities of the IMF required that important policy decisions should command very wide support. However, it also heightened the concern that it would become very difficult to garner the necessary consensus to take major decisions, such as the 85 percent majorities required to approve quota increases, to allocate SDRs, to establish the Council, and other matters. At the same time, it reflected the insistence not only of the United States and of Europe but also, for example, of a group of developing countries to be able to protect their interests through the veto power.
The need for flexibility in the management of the international monetary system following the breakdown of the par value rule led to increased use of “enabling powers” that required special majorities. The novelty of certain provisions was also seen as justifying special voting majorities, such as for several decisions relating to the SDR regime or for sales of gold by the IMF.
Several decisions subject to special majorities can be expected to be taken only in exceptional circumstances—for example, the enforcement of pressures on a member, the suspension of voting rights, and the compulsory withdrawal.
While the Board of Governors has made the maximum delegation of authority to the Executive Board, there remain 13 categories of decisions—most of them relating to adjustment of quotas, to allocation or cancellation of SDRs, to the Council, and to the size of the Executive Board—that cannot be delegated to the Executive Board and nearly all of which require 85 percent of the total voting power. Of the more than 40 categories of decisions requiring special voting majorities that can be taken by the Executive Board, 16 require 85 percent of the total voting power. Most of the remaining categories of decisions relate to financial and operational issues for which the 70 percent majority of the voting power was justified in order to safeguard interests of both debtors and creditors.
|Director||Casting||Votes by||Total||Percent of|
|Alternate||Votes of||Country||Votes1||IMF Total2|
|Ruediger von Kleist|
|Tom Scholar||United Kingdom||107,635||107,635||4.97|
|J. de Beaufort Wijnholds||Armenia||1,170|
|Yuriy G. Yakusha||Herzegovina||1,941|
|Fernando Varela||Costa Rica||1,891|
|Pier Carlo Padoan||Albania||737|
|Ian E. Bennett||Antigua and Barbuda||385|
|Nioclás A. O’Murchú||Barbados||925|
|St. Kitts and Nevis||339|
|St. Vincent and|
|Michael J. Callaghan||Australia||32.614|
Federated States of
|Papua New Guinea||1,566||9,049|
|Sulaiman M. Al-Turki||Saudi Arabia||70,105||70,105||3.24|
|Ahmed Saleh Alosaimi|
|Cyrus D.R. Rustomjee||Angola||3,113|
|Dono Iskandar||Brunei Darussalam||1,750|
|Kwok Man Low||Indonesia||21,043|
|A. Shakour Shaalan||Bahrain,|
|Syrian Arab Republic||3,186|
|United Arab Emirates||6,367|
|Yemen. Republic of||2,685||64,008||2.95|
|WEI Benhua (China)||China||63,942||63,942||2.95|
|WANG Xiaoyi (China)|
|Aleksei V. Mozhin (Russia)||Russia||59,704||59,704||2.76|
|Andrei Lushin (Russia)|
|Roberto F. Cippa||Azerbaijan||1,859|
|Roberto Junguito||Dominican Republic||2,439|
|Trinidad and Tobago||3,606||53,422||2.47|
|Vijay L. Kelkar||Bangladesh||5,583|
|(Sri Lanka)||Sri Lanka Algeria||4,384||52,112||2.41|
|Islamic Republic of Iran)||Ghana||3,940|
|Mohammed Daïri||Iran, Islamic|
|A. Guillermo Zoccali||Argentina||21,421|
|Guillermo Le Fort||Chile||8,811|
|Damian Ondo Mañe||Cape Verde||346|
|Equatorial Guinea)||Central African Republic||807|
|Congo, Republic of||1,096|
|Sāo Tomé and Príncipe||324|
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Access policies on the use of IMF resources are reviewed annually. During most of the 1990s, the net cumulative access limit in terms of a member’s quota has been 300 percent. The provision for higher “exceptional” access, which was used on several occasions during the financial crises of the past decade, was abolished in the context of the latest review of the IMF’s financing facilities (see Section VII).
The Executive Board rejected the recommendations of the Quota Formula Review Group because, counterproductively, they would have meant a further increase in the quota share of the industrial countries.
The proposed enlargement of the European Union by an additional 10 countries to a total of 25, through the accession of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia would further raise the EU’s aggregate voting power by 2.8 percent to 32.8 percent.
The General Arrangements to Borrow were set up in 1962 by the Group of 10 industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and, later, Switzerland).
The role of the World Bank’s Executive Board has been more limited because its charter did not confer on that institution powers that impinge on the sovereignty of its member states. In the chapter on governance in the World Bank history (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, 1997, Volume I), Devesh Kapur barely mentions the Bank’s Executive Board.
Following the promulgation of a Code of Conduct for the staff in 1998, the Executive Board adopted a similar code for itself in 2000, including the same financial disclosure requirements as for senior staff, and set up an Ethics Committee to examine issues as necessary and report to the Board for disposition.
The Western European presence in the Board grows to nine Executive Directors when Spain holds that position in the Latin American constituency that it shares with Mexico, Venezuela, and the Central American countries.
A new country, East Timor, applied for membership in March 2002.
In addition to repayments of the 1976 Trust Fund loans, which had been financed by a share of Fund gold sales for the benefit of developing countries (see also Section VI).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo cleared its overdue obligations to the IMF in June 2002.
Board consideration of operational matters, financial issues, requests for use of IMF resources, and other matters is concluded, as needed, with formal decisions for which drafts are provided by the Fund’s legal department. The relevant decisions are published with commentary in the IMF’s Annual Report and are periodically reprinted in the Compendium on Legal Decisions.
The activities of the Group of 10 industrial countries have taken a lower profile since the mid-1970s. The Deputies of the Group of 10 continue to make a valuable contribution with the preparation of special studies on systemic issues. IMF management and staff participate in the activities of the Group of 10.
The Development Committee (the Joint Bank-Fund Committee on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries) was set up at the same time as the Interim Committee in 1974. Closer examination of Development Committee issues falls outside the scope of this pamphlet.
The African, Asian, and Latin American regions each appointed eight members of the Group of 24, at the ministerial and deputy levels, with a rotating chairmanship of the group. The Managing Director and staff participate in the group’s meetings.
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in the 1975 summit; Canada was included in 1976 and the President of the European Commission in 1977. The G-5 Finance Ministers continued to meet separately until after the 1987 Louvre Summit.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.
The IMF’s task in protecting the integrity of the international monetary system requires it also to assess the standards of supervision of offshore financial centers and to involve itself in the financial aspects of money laundering.
The guidelines can be found on the IMF’s external website: www.imf.org.
The IMF has developed the Data Dissemination Standard (DDS), the Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency, and the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision leads on the Capital Accord and on the Core Principles of Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on Securities Markets, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on the insurance sector. The World Bank leads on the implementation of standards on corporate governance (which were developed by the OECD) and on Accounting/Auditing (for which standards were developed by the respective international associations). The Bank and the IMF collaborate on Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).
An amendment of the Articles of Agreement becomes binding on all member countries as soon as the required majority of 85 percent of the total voting power in the IMF has been achieved.
The NAB were concluded in 1998 with the GAB countries (see footnote 5 on page 12) and other countries that were deemed financially strong to lend resources to the IMF. The additional countries included Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Together, the 25 participants in the NAB were ready to lend up to SDR 34 billion under the old and new arrangements together.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PAMPHLET SERIES
(All pamphlets have been published in English, French, and Spanish, unless otherwise stated)
45. Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF, by the Treasurer’s Department. Sixth edition, 2001. Third edition also in Russian.
46. The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund, by Manuel Guitián. 1992.
47. Social Dimensions of the IMF’s Policy Dialogue, by the staff of the IMF. 1995.
48. Unproductive Public Expenditures: A Pragmatic Approach to Policy Analysis, by the Fiscal Affairs Department. 1995.
49. Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment, by the Fiscal Affairs Department. 1995.
50. The Role of the IMF: Financing and Its Interactions with Adjustment and Surveillance, by Paul R. Masson and Michael Mussa. 1995.
51. Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: The Enhanced HIPC Initiative, by David Andrews, Anthony R. Boote, Syed S. Rizavi, and Sukhwinder Singh. Revised 1999.
52. The IMF and the Poor, by the Fiscal Affairs Department. 1998.
53. Governance of the IMF: Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency, and Accountability, by Leo Van Houtven. 2002.
54. Fiscal Dimensions of Sustainable Development, by the Fiscal Affairs Department. 2002.
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