Chapter

Appendix II: Financial Operations and Transactions

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
October 2004
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The tables in this appendix supplement the information given in Section 7 on the IMF’s financial operations and policies. Components may not sum to total because of rounding.

Table II.1Arrangements Approved During Financial Years Ended April 30, 1953–2004
Financial

Year
Number of ArrangementsAmounts Committed Under Arrangements

(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
1953225555
1954226363
1955224040
1956224848
1957991,1621,162
195811111,0441,044
195915151,0571,057
19601414364364
19611515460460
196224241,6331,633
196319191,5311,531
196419192,1602,160
196524242,1592,159
19662424575575
19672525591591
196832322,3522,352
19692626541541
197023232,3812,381
19711818502502
19721313314314
19731313322322
197415151,3941,394
19751414390390
1976182201,1882841,472
1977191204,6805185,198
197818181,2851,285
1979144185081,0931,600
1980244282,4797973,277
19812111325,1985,22110,419
1982195243,1067,90811,014
1983274315,4508,67114,121
1984252274,287954,382
198524243,2183,218
1986181192,1238252,948
19872210324,1183584,476
198814115301,7022456702,617
198912147242,9562074279554,545
199016334263,2497,6273741511,328
199113223202,7862,338154545,593
199221215295,5872,49327438,826
199311318231,9711,242495273,789
199418217281,381779271,1703,357
1995173113113,0552,3351,19716,587
199619418329,6458,3811821,47619,684
199711512283,1831,1939115,287
19989482127,3363,0781,73832,152
199954101914,32514,09099829,413
2000114102515,7066,58264122,929
2001111142613,093−91,24914,333
2002991839,4391,84841,287
2003102102228,5977941,18030,571
20045101514,51996715,486
Table II.2Arrangements in Effect as of April 30, 1995–2004
Financial

Year
Number of Arrangements as of April 30Amounts Committed Under Arrangements as of April 30

(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
19951991275613,1906,840493,30623,385
19962171285714,9639,3901823,38327,918
1997141135603,76410,1844,04817,996
19981413336028,32312,3364,41045,069
1999912355632,74711,4014,18648,334
20001611315845,6069,7983,51658,920
2001178376234,9068,6973,29846,901
2002134355244,0957,6434,20155,939
2003153365442,8074,4324,45051,689
2004112364953,9447944,35659,094
Table II.3Stand-By and Extended Arrangements in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2004(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Prior to

FY2004
In

FY2004
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2004
Argentina1/24/20038/31/20032,175
Argentina9/20/20039/19/20068,9814,810
Bolivia4/2/20036/15/20048621
Bosnia and Herzegovina8/2/20022/29/200468
Brazil9/6/20023/31/200522,8214,55410,175
Bulgaria2/27/20023/15/2004240
Colombia1/15/20031/14/20051,5481,548
Croatia2/3/20034/2/2004106106
Dominica8/28/20021/2/20043
Dominican Republic8/29/20038/28/2005438306
Ecuador3/21/20034/20/2004151_91
Guatemala6/18/20033/15/20048484
Jordan7/3/20027/2/200485_75
Macedonia, FYR4/30/20036/15/2004208
Paraguay12/15/20033/31/20055050
Peru2/1/20022/29/2004255255
Romania10/31/200110/15/2003300
Turkey2/4/20022/3/200512,8211,361
Ukraine3/29/20043/28/2005412412
Uruguay4/1/20023/31/20052,128559
Total Stand-By Arrangements42,80714,51953619,325
Indonesia2/4/200012/31/20033,638
Serbia and Montenegro5/14/20025/13/2005650350
Sri Lanka4/18/20034/17/2006144124
Total Extended Arrangements4,432474
Total47,23914,51953619,799
Table II.4Arrangements Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2004(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Prior to

FY2004
In

FY2004
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2004
Albania6/21/20026/20/20052812
Armenia5/23/20015/22/20046919
Azerbaijan17/6/20013/31/20058039
Bangladesh6/20/20036/19/2006347248
Benin27/17/20003/31/200427
Burkina Faso6/11/20036/10/20062417
Burundi1/23/20041/22/20076943
Cameroon312/21/200012/20/200411132
Cape Verde4/10/20024/9/200594
Chad41/7/20001/6/2004485
Congo, Dem. Rep. of6/12/20026/11/200558080
Cöte d’Ivoire3/29/20023/28/2005293234
Dominica12/29/200312/28/200685
Ethiopia53/22/20017/31/200410010
Gambia, The7/18/20027/17/20052017
Georgia1/12/20011/11/200410859
Ghana5/9/20035/8/2006185132
Guinea5/2/20015/1/20046439
Guinea-Bissau12/15/200012/14/2003149
Guyana69/20/20023/19/20065543
Honduras2/27/20042/26/20077161
Kenya’8/4/20008/3/2003190156
Kenya11/21/200311/20/2006175150
Kyrgyz Republic12/6/200112/5/20047319
Lao P.D.R.84/25/20014/24/20053214
Lesotho93/9/20016/30/2004254
Madagascar103/1/20013/1/2005791223
Malawi1112/21/200012/20/20044532
Mali128/6/19998/5/200351
Mauritania7/18/20037/17/200666
Moldova12/21/200012/20/200311183
Mongolia139/28/20017/31/20052816
Mozambique146/28/19996/27/2003878
Nepal11/19/200311/18/20065043
Nicaragua12/13/200212/12/20059856
Niger1512/22/20006/30/2004598
Pakistan12/6/200112/5/20041,034345
Rwanda8/12/20028/11/200543
Senegal4/28/20034/27/20062417
Sierra Leone169/26/20013/25/200513128
Sri Lanka4/18/20034/17/2006269231
Tajikistan12/11/200212/10/20056539
Tanzania174/4/20008/15/2003135
Tanzania8/16/20038/15/20062014
Uganda9/13/20029/12/2005148
Vietnam4/13/20014/12/2004290166
Total4,4509674872,089

Extended from 7/5/04.

Extended from 7/16/03.

Extended from 12/20/03.

Augmented by SDR 5.6 million on 5/16/01, and by SDR 5.6 million on 1/16/02. Extended from 1/6/03, and from 12/6/03.

Augmented by SDR 13.4 million on 3/18/02. Extended from 3/21/04.

Extended from 9/19/05.

Augmented by SDR 40 million on 10/18/00.

Extended from 4/24/04.

Extended from 3/8/04.

“Augmented by SDR 12.2 million on 3/17/04. Extended from 2/29/04. and from 11/30/04.

Extended from 12/20/03.

Extended from 8/5/02.

Extended from 9/27/04.

Augmented by SDR 28.4 million on 3/27/00. Extended from 6/27/02.

Extended from 12/21/03.

Extended from 9/25/04.

Extended from 4/3/03, and from 6/30/03.

Extended from 7/5/04.

Extended from 7/16/03.

Extended from 12/20/03.

Augmented by SDR 5.6 million on 5/16/01, and by SDR 5.6 million on 1/16/02. Extended from 1/6/03, and from 12/6/03.

Augmented by SDR 13.4 million on 3/18/02. Extended from 3/21/04.

Extended from 9/19/05.

Augmented by SDR 40 million on 10/18/00.

Extended from 4/24/04.

Extended from 3/8/04.

“Augmented by SDR 12.2 million on 3/17/04. Extended from 2/29/04. and from 11/30/04.

Extended from 12/20/03.

Extended from 8/5/02.

Extended from 9/27/04.

Augmented by SDR 28.4 million on 3/27/00. Extended from 6/27/02.

Extended from 12/21/03.

Extended from 9/25/04.

Extended from 4/3/03, and from 6/30/03.

Table II.5Summary of Disbursements, Repurchases, and Repayments, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1948–2004(In millions of SDRs)
DisbursementsRepurchases and RepaymentsTotal Fund

Credit

Outstanding 2
Financial

Year
Purchases 1Trust Fund

loans
SAF

loans
PRGF

loans
TotalRepurchasesTrust Fund

repayments
SAF/PRGF

repayments
Total
1948606606133
1949119119193
195052522424204
195128281919176
195246463737214
19536666185185178
1954231231145145132
1955494927627655
1956393927227672
19571,1141,1147575611
195866666687871,027
1959264264537537898
1960166166522522330
1961577577659659552
19622,2432,2431,2601,2601,023
19635805808078071,059
1964626626380380952
19651,8971,8975175171,480
19662,8172,8174064063,039
19671,0611,0613403402,945
19681,3481,3481,1161,1162,463
19692,8392,8391,5421,5423,299
19702,9962,9961,6711,6714,020
19711,1671,1671,6571,6572,556
19722,0282,0283,1223,122840
19731,1751,175540540998
19741,0581,0586726721,085
19755,1025,1025185184,869
19766,5916,5919609609,760
19774,910324,94286886813,687
19782,5032682,7714,4854,48512,366
19793,7206704,3904,8594,8599,843
19802,4339623,3953,7763,7769,967
19814,8601,0605,9202,8532,85312,536
19828,0418,0412,0102,01017,793
198311,39211,3921,555181,57426,563
198411,51811,5182,0181112,12934,603
19856,2896,2892,7302122,94337,622
19864,1014,1014,2894134,70236,877
19873,6851393,8246,1695796,74933,443
19884,1534454,5977,9355288,46329,543
19892,5412902643,0956,2584476,70525,520
19904,5034194085,3296,0423566,39824,388
19916,955844917,5305,4401685,60825,603
19925,3081254835,9164,76814,77026,736
19938,465205739,0584,083364,11928,496
19945,325506125,9874,348521124,51329,889
199510,6151457311,2023,98442444,23136,837
199610,8701821,29512,3476,69873957,10042,040
19974,9397055,6446,66855247,19640,488
199820,00097320,9733,78915954,38556,026
199924,07182624,89710,46562711,09267,175
20006,3775136,89022,99363423,62750,370
20019,59963010,22911,24358811,83148,691
200229,19495230,14619,20776919,97658,699
200321,7841,21823,0027,7849288,71272,879
200417,83086518,69521,63889022,52869,031

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases; includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases; includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Table II.6Purchases and Loans from the IMF, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2004(In millions of SDRs)
MemberReserve

Tranche
Emergency

Assistance
Stand-By/

Credit

Tranche
Extended

Fund

Facility
SRFTotal

Purchases
PRGF

Loans
Total

Purchases

and Loans
Afghanistan111111
Albania88
Argentina5,3725,3725,372
Armenia1010
Azerbaijan2626
Bangladesh9999
Benin44
Bolivia212121
Bosnia and Herzegovina363636
Brazil5,7873,8079,5949,594
Bulgaria104104104
Burkina Faso77
Burundi10102636
Cameroon1616
Cape Verde22
Chad55
Congo. Dem. Rep. of5353
Dominica1134
Dominican Republic131131131
Ecuador303030
Ethiopia2121
Ghana5353
Guyana66
Haiti555
Honduras1010
Indonesia1,0321,0321,032
Kenya2525
Kyrgyz Republic1919
Lao P.D.R.55
Lesotho77
Macedonia, FYR121212
Madagascar3535
Malawi66
Mali66
Mauritania11
Mongolia88
Mozambique88
Nepal77
Nicaragua3535
Niger1717
Pakistan258258
Romania110110110
Rwanda11
Senegal77
Serbia and Montenegro100100100
Sierra Leone2828
Tajikistan1818
Tanzania2121
Turkey1,0211,0211,021
Uganda44
Uruguay239239239
Total161012,8651,1323,80717,83086518,695
Table II.7Repurchases and Repayments to the IMF, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2004(In millions of SDRs)
MemberStand-By/

Credit

Tranche
Extended

Fund

Facility
Others1Total

Repurchases
SAF/PRGF and

Trust Fund

Repayments2
Total

Repurchases

and Repayments
Albania66
Algeria195112307307
Argentina5,4282565,6845,684
Armenia661420
Azerbaijan831391352
Bangladesh252525
Belarus181818
Benin1010
Bolivia2525
Bosnia and Herzegovina363636
Brazil9,6469,6469,646
Bulgaria1635197070
Burkina Faso1212
Burundi191919
Cambodia1189
Cameroon1414
Central African Rep.11
Chad1313
Comoros
Congo, Rep. of2235
Cöte d’Ivoire8383
Djibouti111
Dominican Republic151515
Ecuador595959
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia99
Gabon3101313
Gambia, The22
Georgia992534
Ghana1919
Guinea1313
Guinea-Bissau2224
Guyana1313
Haiti6639
Honduras1818523
Indonesia183577760760
Jamaica111111
Jordan56177373
Kenya1414
Kyrgyz Republic1919
Lao R.D.R.66
Latvia888
Lesotho11
Lithuania1171818
Macedonia, FYR1111516
Madagascar55
Malawi77
Mali2222
Mauritania1313
Moldova1261818
Mongolia66
Mozambique1616
Nepal22
Nicaragua77
Niger99
Pakistan1933713236286448
Panama777
Papua New Guinea101010
Peru272727
Philippines325132457457
Romania66319797
Russian Federation2368512691,3561,356
Rwanda11
Senegal3030
Serbia and Montenegro333333
Sierra Leone2525
Sri Lanka1717
St. Kitts and Nevis111
Sudan41051919
Tajikistan22
Tanzania2121
Thailand138138138
Togo1111
Turkey2,0182,0182,018
Uganda3636
Ukraine8983172172
Uruguay434343
Uzbekistan171717
Vietnam334851
Yemen, Rep. of771320
Zambia169169
Zimbabwe77
Total18,5232,33078521,63889022,528

Includes Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and Systemic Transformation Facility.

Includes repayment for Saudi Fund for Development.

Includes Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and Systemic Transformation Facility.

Includes repayment for Saudi Fund for Development.

Table II.8Outstanding IMF Credit by Facility and Policy, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1995–2004(In millions of SDRs and percent of total)
1995199619971998199920002001200220032004
(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-By Arrangements 115,11720,70018,06425,52625,21321,41017,10128,61234,24142,070
Extended Arrangements10,1559,98211,15512,52116,57416,80816,10815,53814,98113,783
Supplemental Reserve Facility7,10012,6554,0855,87515,7006,027
Compensatory Financing Facility3,0211,6021,3366852,8453,0322,992745413119
Systemic Transformation Facility3,8483,9843,9843,8693,3642,7181,9331,311644154
Subtotal (General Resources Account)32,14036,26834,53949,70160,65143,96842,21952,08165,97862,153
SAF Arrangements1,2771,20895473056545643234113786
PRGF Arrangements 23,3184,4694,9045,5055,8705,8575,9516,1886,6766,703
Trust Fund102959090898989898989
Total36,83742,04040,48856,02667,17550,37048,69158,69972,87969,031
(Percent of total)
Stand-By Arrangements 141494546384335494761
Extended Arrangements28242822253333262120
Supplemental Reserve Facility1319910219
Compensatory Financing Facility8431466113
Systemic Transformation Facility109107554213
Subtotal (General Resources Account)87868589908787889190
SAF Arrangements3321111133
PRGF Arrangements 291112109121211910
Trust Fund3333333333
Total100100100100100100100100100100

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than one-half of 1 percent of total.

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than one-half of 1 percent of total.

Table II.9Summary of Bilateral Contributions to the PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts(In millions of SDRs: as of April 30, 2004)
PRGF TrustPRGF-HIPC Trust
Subsidy contributions

“as needed”1
Loan

commitments2
Subsidies and HIPC grant

contributions “as needed”3
Total3, 490.715, 722.71, 561.6
Major industrial countries2,299.912,864.8880.5
Canada204.5700.048.8
France470.62,900.082.2
Germany198.12,750.0127.2
Italy154.31,380.063.6
Japan724.15,134.8144.0
United Kingdom370.182.2
United States178.1332.6
Other advanced countries977.82,452.8299.7
Australia16.524.8
Austria62.214.3
Belgium118.2350.035.3
Denmark67.0100.018.5
Finland42.18.0
Greece39.46.3
Iceland4.60.9
Ireland8.45.9
Israel1.8
Korea60.092.715.9
Luxembourg14.10.7
Netherlands142.8450.045.4
New Zealand1.7
Norway45.5150.018.5
Portugal5.16.6
San Marino0.04
Singapore30.716.5
Spain24.5708.423.3
Sweden186.618.3
Switzerland109.9601.737.0
Fuel-exporting countries16.749.593.1
Algeria5.5
Brunei Darussalam0.1
Gabon52.5
Iran, Islamic Republic of1.92.2
Kuwait3.1
Libya7.3
Nigeria13.9
Oman0.8
Qatar0.5
Saudi Arabia14.849.553.5
United Arab Emirates3.8
Other developing countries182.9355.6221.3
Argentina635.316.2
Bangladesh0.91.7
Barbados0.4
Belize0.3
Botswana1.95.7
Brazil15.0
Cambodia0.04
Chile4.04.4
China15.1200.019.7
Colombia0.9
Cyprus0.8
Egypt13.4155.61.3
Fiji0.1
Ghana0.5
India13.122.9
Indonesia6.58.2
Jamaica2.7
Malaysia43.912.7
Malta2.11.1
Mauritius0.1
Mexico54.5
Micronesia, Federated States of0.04
Morocco9.71.6
Pakistan3.83.4
Paraguay0.1
Peru2.5
Philippines6.7
Samoa0.04
South Africa28.6
Sri Lanka0.6
St. Lucia0.1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines0.1
Swaziland0.04
Thailand17.34.5
Tonga0.04
Tunisia1.71.5
Turkey11.8
Uruguay2.52.2
Vietnam0.4
Countries In transition13.442.9
Croatia0.4
Czech Republic13.44.1
Estonia0.5
Hungary6.0
Latvia1.0
Poland12.0
Russian Federation14.6
Slovak Republic4.0
Slovenia0.4
Pending contributions to the PRGF-HIPC Trust (“as needed”)324.0
Bahrain0.9
Dominican Republic0.5
Grenada0.1
Lebanon0.4
Maldives0.0 4
Trinidad and Tobago1.6
Vanuatu0.1
Venezuela20.4

The calculations are based on actual interest rates through the end of January 2004 and an assumed SDR interest rate of 5 percent a year thereafter.

Excludes a loan commitment from the OPEC Fund for International Development of $50 million (equivalent to SDR 37 million).

The term “as needed’ refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the projected delivery of HIPC assistance plus the profile of projected subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending during 2002-05.

Less than SDR 100,000.

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 1.9 million “as needed.”

Contnbution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 6.4 million “as needed.”

The calculations are based on actual interest rates through the end of January 2004 and an assumed SDR interest rate of 5 percent a year thereafter.

Excludes a loan commitment from the OPEC Fund for International Development of $50 million (equivalent to SDR 37 million).

The term “as needed’ refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the projected delivery of HIPC assistance plus the profile of projected subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending during 2002-05.

Less than SDR 100,000.

Contribution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 1.9 million “as needed.”

Contnbution to the PRGF-HIPC Trust includes a pending balance of SDR 6.4 million “as needed.”

Table II.10Holdings of SDRs by All Participants and by Groups of Countries as Percentage of Their Cumulative Allocations of SDRs, at End of Financial Years Ended April 30, 1995–2004
Nonindustrial Countries2
All

Participants1
Industrial

Countries 2
All nonindustrial

countries
Net creditor

countries 3
All net debtor

countries 3
Heavily Indebted

poor countries
199590.9105.160.4263.949.814.1
199691.4102.467.9285.556.617.4
199787.299.860.5303.647.817.3
199895.0107.069.4323.756.124.1
199981.194.652.5170.746.326.3
200084.695.062.5174.156.620.6
200186.6101.654.6204.246.512.4
200291.5107.756.9227.944.714.6
200393.0102.472.0173.757.717.1
200496.3105.676.3230.523.520.9

Member countries participating in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2004. of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion). SDR 0.8 billion was not held by participants but by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Based on IFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Net creditor countries’ holdings of SDRs are greater than their cumulative allocations of SDRs. Net debtor countries’ holdings of SDRs are smaller than their cumulative allocations of SDRs.

Member countries participating in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2004. of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion). SDR 0.8 billion was not held by participants but by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Based on IFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Net creditor countries’ holdings of SDRs are greater than their cumulative allocations of SDRs. Net debtor countries’ holdings of SDRs are smaller than their cumulative allocations of SDRs.

Table II.11Key IMF Rates, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2004(In percent)
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest Rate

and Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration 1
Basic Rate

of Charge 1
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest Rate

and Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration 1
Basic Rate

of Charge 1
2003
May 11.752.31November 31.592.10
May 51.722.27November 101.592.10
May 121.722.27November 171.582.09
May 191.682.22November 241.582.09
May 261.672.20
December 11.592.10
June 21.662.19December 81.592.10
June 91.602.11December 151.592.10
June 161.511.99December 221.582.09
June 231.501.98December 291.572.07
June 301.522.01
2004
July 71.511.99January 51.592.10
July 141.491.97January 121.582.09
July 211.491.97January 191.572.07
July 281.511.99January 261.572.07
August 41.522.01February 21.592.10
August 111.532.02February 91.602.11
August 181.522.01February 161.602.11
August 251.532.02February 231.612.13
September 11.552.05March 11.622.14
September 81.542.03March 81.612.13
September 151.552.05March 151.612.13
September 221.552.05March 221.602.11
September 291.542.03March 291.582.09
October 61.542.03April 51.612.13
October 131.542.03April 121.612.13
October 201.552.05April 191.602.11
October 271.582.09April 261.622.14

Under the Executive Board’s FY2004 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward, and the rate of charge was adjusted upward, to share the impacts of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2004 are refundable when overdue charges are paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge remained set at 132.0 percent of the SDR interest rate throughout FY2004.

Under the Executive Board’s FY2004 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward, and the rate of charge was adjusted upward, to share the impacts of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2004 are refundable when overdue charges are paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge remained set at 132.0 percent of the SDR interest rate throughout FY2004.

Table II.12Members That Have Accepted the Obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, of the Articles of Agreement
MemberEffective Date

of Acceptance
MemberEffective Date

of Acceptance
AlgeriaSeptember 15, 1997IcelandSeptember 19, 1983
Antigua and BarbudaNovember 22, 1983IndiaAugust 20, 1994
ArgentinaMay 14, 1968IndonesiaMay 7, 1988
ArmeniaMay 29, 1997IrelandFebruary 15, 1961
AustraliaJuly 1, 1965IsraelSeptember 21, 1993
AustriaAugust 1, 1962ItalyFebruary 15, 1961
Bahamas, TheDecember 5, 1973JamaicaFebruary 22, 1963
BahrainMarch 20, 1973JapanApril 1, 1964
BangladeshApril 11, 1994JordanFebruary 20, 1995
BarbadosNovember 3, 1993KazakhstanJuly 16, 1996
BelarusNovember 5, 2001KenyaJune 30, 1994
BelgiumFebruary 15, 1961KiribatiAugust 22, 1986
BelizeJune 14, 1983KoreaNovember 1, 1988
BeninJune 1, 1996KuwaitApril 5, 1963
BoliviaJune 5, 1967Kyrgyz RepublicMarch 29, 1995
BotswanaNovember 17, 1995LatviaJune 10, 1994
BrazilNovember 30, 1999LebanonJuly 1, 1993
Brunei DarussalamOctober 10, 1995LesothoMarch 5, 1997
BulgariaSeptember 24, 1998LibyaJune 21, 2003
Burkina FasoJune 1, 1996LithuaniaMay 3, 1994
CambodiaJanuary 1, 2002LuxembourgFebruary 15, 1961
CameroonJune 1, 1996Macedonia, FYRJune 19, 1998
CanadaMarch 25, 1952MadagascarSeptember 18, 1996
Central African RepublicJune 1, 1996MalawiDecember 7, 1995
ChadJune 1, 1996MalaysiaNovember 11, 1968
ChileJuly 27, 1977MaliJune 1, 1996
ChinaDecember 1, 1996MaltaNovember 30, 1994
ComorosJune 1, 1996Marshall IslandsMay 21, 1992
Congo, Democratic Republic ofFebruary 10, 2003MauritaniaJuly 19, 1999
Congo, Republic ofJune 1, 1996MauritiusSeptember 29, 1993
Costa RicaFebruary 1, 1965MexicoNovember 12, 1946
Côte d’IvoireJune 1, 1996Micronesia, Federated States ofJune 24, 1993
CroatiaMay 29, 1995MoldovaJune 30, 1995
CyprusJanuary 9, 1991MongoliaFebruary 1, 1996
Czech RepublicOctober 1, 1995MoroccoJanuary 21, 1993
DenmarkMay 1, 1967NamibiaSeptember 20, 1996
DjiboutiSeptember 19, 1980NepalMay 30, 1994
DominicaDecember 13, 1979NetherlandsFebruary 15, 1961
Dominican RepublicAugust 1, 1953New ZealandAugust 5, 1982
EcuadorAugust 31, 1970NicaraguaJuly 20, 1964
El SalvadorNovember 6, 1946NigerJune 1, 1996
Equatorial GuineaJune 1, 1996NorwayMay 11, 1967
EstoniaAugust 15, 1994OmanJune 19, 1974
FijiAugust 4, 1972PakistanJuly 1, 1994
FinlandSeptember 25, 1979PalauDecember 16, 1997
FranceFebruary 15, 1961PanamaNovember 26, 1946
GabonJune 1, 1996Papua New GuineaDecember 4, 1975
Gambia, TheJanuary 21, 1993ParaguayAugust 22, 1994
GeorgiaDecember 20, 1996PeruFebruary 15, 1961
GermanyFebruary 15, 1961PhilippinesSeptember 8, 1995
GhanaFebruary 21, 1994PolandJune 1, 1995
GreeceJuly 7, 1992PortugalSeptember 12, 1988
GrenadaJanuary 24, 1994QatarJune 4, 1973
GuatemalaJanuary 27, 1947RomaniaMarch 25, 1998
GuineaNovember 17, 1995Russian FederationJune 1, 1996
Guinea-BissauJanuary 1, 1997RwandaDecember 10, 1998
GuyanaDecember 27, 1966St. Kitts and NevisDecember 3, 1984
HaitiDecember 22, 1953St. LuciaMay 30, 1980
HondurasJuly 1, 1950St. Vincent and the GrenadinesAugust 24, 1981
HungaryJanuary 1, 1996SamoaOctober 6, 1994
San MarinoSeptember 23, 1992ThailandMay 4, 1990
Saudi ArabiaMarch 22, 1961Timor-LesteJuly 23, 2002
SenegalJune 1, 1996TogoJune 1, 1996
Serbia and MontenegoMay 15, 2002TongaMarch 22, 1991
SeychellesJanuary 3, 1978Trinidad and TobagoDecember 13, 1993
Sierra LeoneDecember 14, 1995TunisiaJanuary 6, 1993
SingaporeNovember 9, 1968TurkeyMarch 22, 1990
Slovak RepublicOctober 1, 1995UgandaApril 5, 1994
SloveniaSeptember 1, 1995UkraineSeptember 24, 1996
Solomon IslandsJuly 24, 1979United Arab EmiratesFebruary 13, 1974
South AfricaSeptember 15, 1973United KingdomFebruary 15, 1961
SpainJuly 15, 1986United StatesDecember 10, 1946
Sri LankaMarch 15, 1994UruguayMay 2, 1980
SudanOctober 29, 2003UzbekistanOctober 15, 2003
SunnameJune 29, 1978VanuatuDecember 1, 1982
SwazilandDecember 11, 1989VenezuelaJuly 1, 1976
SwedenFebruary 15, 1961Yemen, Republic ofDecember 10, 1996
SwitzerlandMay 29, 1992ZambiaApril 19, 2002
TanzaniaJuly 15, 1996ZimbabweFebruary 3, 1995
Note: The IMF’s Articles of Agreement can be found at www.imf.org/external/about.htm.
Note: The IMF’s Articles of Agreement can be found at www.imf.org/external/about.htm.
Table II.13De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy at April 30, 2004 1
This classification system is based on members’ actual, de facto arrangements as identified by IMF staff, which may differ from their officially announced arrangements. The scheme ranks exchange rate arrangements on the basis of their degree of flexibility and the existence of formal or informal commitments to exchange rate paths. It distinguishes among different forms of exchange rate regimes, in addition to arrangements with no separate legal tender, to help assess the implications of the choice of exchange rate arrangement for the degree of monetary policy independence. The system presents members’ exchange rate regimes against alternative monetary policy frameworks with the intention of using both criteria as a way of providing greater transparency in the classification scheme and to illustrate that different exchange rate regimes can be consistent with similar monetary policy frameworks. The following explains the categories.
Exchange Rate Regimes
Exchange Arrangements with No Separate Legal Tender
The currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender (formal dollarization), or the member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which the same legal tender is shared by the members of the union. Adopting such regimes implies the complete surrender of the monetary authorities’ independent control over domestic monetary policy.
Currency Board Arrangements
A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This implies that domestic currency will be issued only against foreign exchange and that it will remain fully backed by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions, such as monetary control and lender of last resort, and leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy. Some flexibility may still be afforded, depending on how strict the banking rules of the currency board arrangement are.
Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements
The country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or a basket of currencies, where the basket is formed from the currencies of major trading or financial partners and weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, services, or capital flows. The currency composites can also be standardized, as in the case of the SDR. There is no commitment to keep the parity irrevocably. The exchange rate may fluctuate within narrow margins of less than ±1 percent around a central rate-or the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate may remain within a narrow margin of 2 percent-for at least three months. The monetary authority stands ready to maintain the fixed parity through direct intervention (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in the market) or indirect intervention (e.g., via aggressive use of interest rate policy, imposition of foreign exchange regulations, exercise of moral suasion that constrains foreign exchange activity, or through intervention by other public institutions). Flexibility of monetary policy, though limited, is greater than in the case of exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency boards because traditional central banking functions are still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the exchange rate, although relatively infrequently.
Pegged Exchange Rates Within Horizontal Bands
The value of the currency is maintained within certain margins of fluctuation of at least ±1 percent around a fixed central rate or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate exceeds 2 percent. It also includes arrangements of countries in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) that was replaced with the ERM II on January 1, 1999. There is a limited degree of monetary policy discretion, depending on the band width.
Crawling Pegs
The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators, such as past inflation differentials vis-à-vis major trading partners, differentials between the inflation target and expected inflation in major trading partners, and so forth. The rate of crawl can be set to generate inflation-adjusted changes in the exchange rate (backward looking) or set at a preannounced fixed rate and/or below the projected inflation differentials (forward looking). Maintaining a crawling peg imposes constraints on monetary policy in a manner similar to a fixed-peg system.
Exchange Rates Within Crawling Bands
The currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins of at least ±1 percent around a central rate-or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate exceeds 2 percent-and the central rate or margins are adjusted periodically at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. The degree of exchange rate flexibility is a function of the band width. Bands either are symmetric around a crawling central parity or widen gradually with an asymmetric choice of the crawl of upper and lower bands. (In the latter case, there may be no preannounced central rate.) The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band imposes constraints on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence being a function of the band width.
Managed Floating with No Predetermined Path for the Exchange Rate
The monetary authority attempts to influence the exchange rate without having a specific exchange rate path or target. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental (e.g., balance of payments position, international reserves, parallel market developments), and adjustments may not be automatic. Intervention may be direct or indirect.
Independently Floating
The exchange rate is market determined, with any official foreign exchange market intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than establishing a level for it.
Monetary Policy Frameworks
The exchange rate regimes are presented alongside monetary policy frameworks in order to present the role of the exchange rate in broad economic policy and help identify potential sources of inconsistency in the monetary-exchange rate policy mix.
Exchange Rate Anchor
The monetary authority stands ready to buy/sell foreign exchange at given quoted rates to maintain the exchange rate at its preannounced level or range; the exchange rate serves as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy. This type of regime covers exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender; currency board arrangements; fixed pegs with and without bands; and crawling pegs with and without bands.
Monetary Aggregate Anchor
The monetary authority uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate, such as reserve money, M1, or M2, and the targeted aggregate becomes the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy.
Inflation-Targeting Framework
This involves the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Additional key features include increased communication with the public and the markets about the plans and objectives of monetary policymakers and increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. Monetary policy decisions are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from the announced target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the intermediate target of monetary policy.
Fund-Supported or Other Monetary Program
This involves implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies within the confines of a framework that establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for net domestic assets of the central bank. Indicative targets for reserve money may be appended to this system.
Other
The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant information available for the country.
Table II.13(continued)
Exchange Rate Regime (number of countries)Exchange rate anchorMonetary aggregate targetInflation-targeting frameworkIMF-supported or other monetary programOther
Exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender(41)Another currency as legal tender Ecuador El Salvador4 Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia, Fed. States of Palau Panama San Marino Timor-LesteECCU2

Antigua and Barbuda

Dominica*

Grenada

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines
CFA franc zoneEuro area3

Austria

Belgium

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

Spain
WAEMU

Benin

Burkina Faso*

Côte d’Ivoire*

Guinea-Bissau

Mali

Niger*

Senegal

Togo
CAEMC

Cameroon*

Central African Rep.

Chad

Congo. Rep. of

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon
Currency board arrangements (7)Bosnia and Herzegovina

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

China-Hong Kong SAR

Djibouti

Estonia

Lithuania
Other conventional fixed-peg arrangements (41)Against a single currency (32)

Aruba

Bahamas, The5

Bahrain

Barbados

Belize

Bhutan

Cape Verde*

China†6

Comoros7

Eritrea

Guinea*6

Jordan*6

Kuwait

Lebanon6

Lesotho*

Macedonia, FYR*6

Malaysia

Maldives6

Namibia

Nepal*

Netherlands Antilles

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Suriname5,6

Swaziland

Syrian Arab Rep.5

Turkmenistan6

Ukraine6

United Arab Emirates

Venezuela

Zimbabwe6
Against a composite (9)

Botswana5

Fiji

Latvia

Libya

Malta

Morocco

Samoa

Seychelles

Vanuatu
China †6
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands (4) 8Within a cooperative arrangement (1) Denmark9Other band arrangements (3) Cyprus

Hungary†

Tonga
Hungary†
Crawling pegs (5)Bolivia

Costa Rica

Nicaragua*

Solomon Islands6

Tunisia
Tunisia
Exchange rates within crawling bands (5)10Belarus

Honduras*

Israel†

Romania6

Slovenia†6
Israel†
Managed floating with no preannounced path for the exchange rate (49)Bangladesh*

Cambodia5

Egypt5

Ghana*6

Guyana*

Indonesia

Iran, I.R. of

Jamaica6

Mauritius

Sudan

Zambia
Czech Rep.

Peru6

Thailand
Argentina*

Azerbaijan*

Croatia

Ethiopia*

Georgia

Haiti3,6

Kenya*

Kyrgyz Rep.*

Lao P.D.R.*5

Moldova6

Mongolia *

Mozambique6

Pakistan*

Rwanda*

Serbia and

Montenegro*11

Tajikistan*

Vietnam
Afghanistan, I.S. of

Algeria3

Angola3

Burundi*3

Gambia, The3,6

India3

Iraq

Kazakhstan3

Mauritania*

Myanmar3,5,6

Nigeria6

Paraguay*3

Russian Federation3

São Tomé and

Príncipe

Singapore3

Slovak Rep.3

Trinidad and Tobago

Uzbekistan3,5
Independently floating (35)Malawi*

Sierra Leone*6

Sri Lanka*

Uruguay*

Yemen, Rep.of
Australia

Brazil*

Canada

Chile5

Colombia*

Guatemala†

Iceland

Korea

Mexico

New Zealand

Norway

Philippines

Poland

South Africa

Sweden

Turkey*

United Kingdom
Albania*

Armenia*

Congo, Dem.

Rep. of*

Madagascar*

Tanzania*

Uganda*
Dominican Rep.*3

Japan3

Liberia3,6

Papua New Guinea3

Somalia5,12

Switzerland3

United States3
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Country Reports and International Financial Statistics.

An asterisk (*) indicates that the country has an IMF-supported or other monetary program. A dagger (†) indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary policy. (It should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to infer from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal role in conducting monetary policy.)

These member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union have a currency board arrangement

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but, rather, monitors various indicatorsin conducting monetary policy.

For El Salvador, the printing of new colones, the domestic currency, is prohibited, but the existing stock of colones will continue to circulate along with the U.S. dollar as legal tender until all colón notes wear out physically.

The member maintains an exchange arrangement involving more than one market. The arrangement shown is the one maintained in the major market.

The regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French Treasury as the CFA franc zone countries.

The band widths for these countries are as follows: Cyprus (±15%), Denmark (±2.25%), Hungary (±15%). and Tonga (±5%).

Participants in the ERM (exchange rate mechanism) II of the European Monetary System.

The band widths for these countries are Belarus (adjusted frequently), Honduras (±7%), Israel (±26%), and Romania and Slovenia (unannounced).

The description of the exchange rate regime applies to the Republic of Serbia only, which accounts for about 93% of the economy of Serbia and Montenegro: in the Republic of Montenegro, the euro is legal tender. In the United Nations-administered province of Kosovo, the euro is the most widely used currency.

Insufficient information on the country is available for classification.

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Country Reports and International Financial Statistics.

An asterisk (*) indicates that the country has an IMF-supported or other monetary program. A dagger (†) indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary policy. (It should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to infer from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal role in conducting monetary policy.)

These member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union have a currency board arrangement

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but, rather, monitors various indicatorsin conducting monetary policy.

For El Salvador, the printing of new colones, the domestic currency, is prohibited, but the existing stock of colones will continue to circulate along with the U.S. dollar as legal tender until all colón notes wear out physically.

The member maintains an exchange arrangement involving more than one market. The arrangement shown is the one maintained in the major market.

The regime operating de facto in the country is different from its de jure regime.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French Treasury as the CFA franc zone countries.

The band widths for these countries are as follows: Cyprus (±15%), Denmark (±2.25%), Hungary (±15%). and Tonga (±5%).

Participants in the ERM (exchange rate mechanism) II of the European Monetary System.

The band widths for these countries are Belarus (adjusted frequently), Honduras (±7%), Israel (±26%), and Romania and Slovenia (unannounced).

The description of the exchange rate regime applies to the Republic of Serbia only, which accounts for about 93% of the economy of Serbia and Montenegro: in the Republic of Montenegro, the euro is legal tender. In the United Nations-administered province of Kosovo, the euro is the most widely used currency.

Insufficient information on the country is available for classification.

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