Chapter

APPENDIX II Financial Operations and Transactions

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
September 2001
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The tables in this appendix supplement the information given in Chapter 6 on the IMF’s financial operations and policies.

Table II.1Arrangements Approved During Financial Years Ended April 30, 1953–2001
Financial YearNumber of Arrangements1Amounts Committed Under Arrangements2

(In millions of SDRs)
Stand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
1953225555
1954226363
1955224040
1956224848
1957991,1621,162
195811111,0441,044
195915151,0571,057
19601414364364
19611515460460
196224241,6331,633
196319191,5311,531
196419192,1602,160
196524242,1592,159
19662424575575
19672525591591
196832322,3522,352
19692626541541
197023232,3812,381
19711818502502
19721313314314
19731313322322
197415151,3941,394
19751414390390
1976182201,1882841,472
1977191204,6805185,198
197818181,2851,285
1979144185081,0931,600
1980244282,4797973,277
19812111325,1985,22110,419
1982195243,1067,90811,014
1983274315,4508,67114,121
1984252274,287954,382
198524243,2183,218
1986181192,1238252,948
19872210324,1183584,476
198814115301,7022456702,617
198912147242,9562074279554,545
199016334263,2497,6273741511,328
199113223202,7862,338154545,593
199221215295,5872,49327438,826
199311318231,9711,242495273,789
199418217281,381779271,1703,357
1995173113113,0552,3351,19716,587
199619418329,6458,3811821,47619,684
199711512283,1831,1939115,287
19989482127,3363,0781,73832,152
199954101914,32514,09099829,413
2000114102515,7066,58264122,929
2001111142613,093-91,24914,333

Does not include extensions to existing arrangements.

Includes augmentations or reductions of amounts under existing arrangements. Does not include financing provided outside arrangements (SDR 138 million of emergency assistance in FY2001).

Does not include extensions to existing arrangements.

Includes augmentations or reductions of amounts under existing arrangements. Does not include financing provided outside arrangements (SDR 138 million of emergency assistance in FY2001).

Table II.2Arrangements in Effect at End of Financial Years Ended April 30, 1991–2001
FinancialNumber of Arrangements as of April 30Amounts Committed Under Arrangements

as of April 30

(In millions of SDRs)
YearStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotalStand-ByEFFSAFPRGFTotal
19911451214452,7039,5975391,81314,652
1992227816534,83312,1591012,11119,203
1993156420454,4908,569832,13715,279
1994166322471,1314,504802,7138,428
19951991275613,1906,840493,30623,385
19962171285714,9639,3901823,38327,918
1997141135603,76410,1844,04817,996
19981413336028,32312,3364,41045,069
1999912355632,74711,4014,18648,334
20001611315845,6069,7983,51658,921
20012512438061,3059,7894,57675,670
Table II.3Stand-By Arrangements in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Prior to

FY2001
In

FY2001
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2001
Argentina3/10/003/9/035,3995,1876,751
Bosnia and Herzegovina5/29/985/29/019414
Brazil12/2/9812/1/0113,0252,551
Croatia3/19/015/18/02200200
Ecuador4/19/006/30/01227113
Estonia3/1/008/31/012929
Gabon10/23/004/22/029379
Korea12/4/9712/3/0015,5001,088
Latvia12/10/994/9/013333
Latvia4/20/0112/19/023333
Lithuania3/8/006/7/016262
Mexico7/7/9911/30/003,1031,164
Nigeria8/4/008/3/01789789
Pakistan11/29/009/30/01465210
Panama6/30/003/29/026464
Papua New Guinea3/29/009/28/018619
Philippines4/1/9812/31/001,021238
Peru3/12/013/11/02128128
Romania8/5/992/28/01400260
Russia7/28/9912/27/003,3002,829
Thailand8/20/976/19/002,900400
Sri Lanka4/20/016/19/0220097
Turkey12/22/9912/21/022,8925,7844,743
Uruguay5/31/003/31/02150150
Zimbabwe8/2/9910/1/00141117
Total48,21213,0936,12916,032
Table II.4Extended Arrangements in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Prior to

FY2001
In

FY2001
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2001
Bulgaria9/25/989/24/0162852
Colombia12/20/9912/19/021,9571,957
Indonesia2/4/0012/31/023,6382,787
Jordan4/15/994/14/0212891
Kazakhstan12/13/9912/12/02329329
Macedonia, FYR11/29/0011/28/032423
Moldova5/20/965/19/0013548
Pakistan10/20/9710/19/00455341
Panama12/10/976/20/0012080
Peru6/24/992/8/01383383
Ukraine9/4/988/15/021,9201,018
Yemen, Republic of10/29/9710/28/01106–3326
Total9,798–98526,284
Table II.5Arrangements Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in Effect During Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In millions of SDRs)
Arrangement DatesAmounts ApprovedUndrawn Balance
MemberEffective

date
Expiration

date
Through

April 30, 2000
In

FY2001
At date of

termination
As of

April 30, 2001
Albania5/13/987/31/01455
Benin7/18/007/17/032716
Bolivia9/18/989/17/0110156
Burkina Faso9/10/999/9/023922
Cambodia10/22/9910/21/025933
Cameroon12/21/0012/20/0311196
Central African Republic7/20/981/19/024925
Chad1/7/001/6/033626
Côte d’Ivoire3/17/983/16/01286162
Djibouti10/18/9910/17/021914
Ethiopia3/22/013/21/048770
Gambia, The6/29/9812/31/01217
Georgia1/12/011/11/0410890
Ghana5/3/995/2/0215537121
Guinea11/13/971/12/01718
Guinea-Bissau12/15/0012/14/03149
Guyana7/15/987/14/015429
Honduras3/26/993/25/0215765
Kenya8/4/008/3/03190156
Kyrgyz Republic6/26/986/25/017329
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.4/25/014/24/043227
Lesotho3/9/013/8/042521
Macedonia, FYR12/18/0012/17/0310
Madagascar211/27/9611/30/00812427
Madagascar3/1/012/28/047968
Malawi12/21/0012/20/034539
Mali8/6/998/5/024733
Mauritania7/21/997/20/024224
Mongolia7/30/977/29/003316
Moldova12/21/0012/20/0311192
Mozambique6/28/996/27/028734
Nicaragua3/18/983/17/0214934
Niger12/22/0012/21/0359
Pakistan10/20/9710/19/00682417
Rwanda6/24/981/31/027119
Sao Tome and Principe4/28/004/27/0375
Senegal4/20/984/19/0210729
Tajikistan6/24/9812/24/0110028
Tanzania4/4/004/3/0313575
Uganda311/10/973/31/01100
Vietnam4/6/014/12/04290249
Yemen, Republic of10/29/9710/28/0126595
Zambia3/25/993/28/03254200
Total3,3271,2496302,001

Extended from 1/12/00.

Extended from 7/27/00.

Extended from 11/9/00.

Extended from 1/12/00.

Extended from 7/27/00.

Extended from 11/9/00.

Table II.6Summary of Disbursements, Repurchases, and Repayments, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1948–2001(In millions of SDRs)
DisbursementsRepurchases and RepaymentsTotal IMF

Credit

Outstanding2
Financial

Year
Purchases1Trust Fund

loans
SAF

loans
PRGF

loans
TotalRepurchasesTrust Fund

repayments
SAF/PRGF

repayments
Total
1948606606133
1949119119193
195052522424204
195128281919176
195246463737214
19536666185185178
1954231231145145132
1955494927627655
1956393927227672
19571,1141,1147575611
195866666687871,027
1959264264537537898
1960166166522522330
1961577577659659552
19622,2432,2431,2601,2601,023
19635805808078071,059
1964626626380380952
19651,8971,8975175171,480
19662,8172,8174064063,039
19671,0611,0613403402,945
19681,3481,3481,1161,1162,463
19692,8392,8391,5421,5423,299
19702,9962,9961,6711,6714,020
19711,1671,1671,6571,6572,556
19722,0282,0283,1223,122840
19731,1751,175540540998
19741,0581,0586726721,085
19755,1025,1025185184,869
19766,5916,5919609609,760
19774,910324,94286886813,687
19782,5032682,7714,4854,48512,366
19793,7206704,3904,8594,8599,843
19802,4339623,3953,7763,7769,967
19814,8601,0605,9202,8532,85312,536
19828,0418,0412,0102,01017,793
198311,39211,3921,555181,57426,563
198411,51811,5182,0181112,12934,603
19856,2896,2892,7302122,94337,622
19864,1014,1014,2894134,70236,877
19873,6851393,8246,1695796,74933,443
19884,1534454,5977,9355288,46329,543
19892,5412902643,0956,2584476,70525,520
19904,5034194085,3296,0423566,39824,388
19916,955844917,5305,4401685,60825,603
19925,3081254835,9164,76814,77026,736
19938,465205739,0584,083364,11928,496
19945,325506125,9874,348521124,51329,889
199510,6151457311,1753,98442444,23136,837
199610,8701821,29512,3476,69873957,10042,040
19974,9397055,6446,66855247,19640,488
199820,00097320,9733,78915954,38556,026
199924,07182624,89710,46562711,09267,175
20006,3775136,89022,99363423,62750,370
20019,59963010,22911,24358811,83148,662

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases.

Includes reserve tranche purchases.

Excludes reserve tranche purchases.

Table II.7Purchases and Loans from the IMF, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In millions of SDRs)
MemberReserve

Tranche1
Stand-By/

Credit Tranche
Extended

Fund Facility
SRFTotal

Purchases
PRGF

Loans
Total Purchases

and Loans
Albania1010
Algeria
Argentina2,3521,4823,8343,834
Bolivia1111
Bosnia and Herzegovina161616
Bulgaria209209209
Burkina Faso1111
Cambodia1717
Cameroon5252
Central African Republic88
Chad55
Congo, Rep. of111111
Djibouti33
Ecuador282828
Ethiopia1818
Gabon131313
Gambia, The88
Georgia1818
Ghana41412768
Guinea88
Guinea-Bissau55
Guyana77
Honduras1616
Indonesia591591591
Jordan151515
Kenya3434
Kyrgyz Republic1010
Lao, People’s Dem. Rep.333
Lesotho44
Macedonia, FYR1123
Madagascar4949
Malawi77
Mali77
Mauritania1313
Moldova1919
Mongolia88
Nicaragua2020
Niger88
Pakistan255255255
Papua New Guinea575757
Philippines238238238
Romania878787
Rwanda1919
Sao Tome and Principe22
Senegal2929
Sierra Leone101010
Sri Lanka103103103
Tajikistan1212
Tanzania4040
Turkey1,1092,6033,7113,711
Ukraine19019018208
Vietnam4141
Yemen, Republic of772027
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. of621172178178
Zambia4646
Total1064,3951,0134,0859,59963010,229

Includes reserve tranche purchases made in connection with the use of the same-day SDR borrowing arrangements by members paying the reserve asset portion of their quota increases.

Emergency postconflict assistance.

Includes reserve tranche purchases made in connection with the use of the same-day SDR borrowing arrangements by members paying the reserve asset portion of their quota increases.

Emergency postconflict assistance.

Table II.8Repurchases and Repayments to the IMF, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In millions of SDRs)
MemberStand-By/

Credit Tranche
Extended

Fund Facility
CCFF

and STF
Total

Repurchases
SAF/PRGF and

Trust Fund

Repayments
Total Repurchases

and Repayments
Albania1157
Algeria7575150
Argentina2667401,0062,012
Armenia36918
Azerbaijan28103876
Bangladesh6262
Belarus13233672
Benin99
Bolivia2020
Bosnia and Herzegovina111122
Brazil
Bulgaria11351164328
Burkina Faso77
Burundi33
Cambodia1179
Cameroon121224
Central African Republic
Chad22
Congo, Dem. Rep. of11
Congo, Republic of
Côte d’Ivoire3030
Croatia222244
Djibouti22
Ecuador4
Equatorial Guinea22
Estonia448
Ethiopia1010
Gabon5510
Gambia, The11
Georgia591428
Ghana3131
Guinea66
Guinea Bissau
Guyana1515
Honduras55
India191938
Indonesia275275550
Jamaica141429
Jordan292958
Kazakhstan6415577296592
Kenya3232
Korea2,5382,5385,076
Kyrgyz Republic55516
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.88
Latvia8816
Lesotho44
Lithuania1392244
Macedonia, FYR841224
Madagascar44
Malawi66
Mali1414
Mauritania99
Mexico2,791972,8885,776
Moldova5271428
Mongolia55
Mozambique2222
Nepal33
Nicaragua44
Niger11
Pakistan1312015155357
Panama414182
Papua New Guinea8816
Peru107107214
Philippines6612
Romania593190180
Russia1,0781753601,6133,226
Rwanda549220
Senegal1515
Sierra Leone1919
Slovak Republic8686172
Sri Lanka6060
Sudan152664794
Tajikistan8816
Tanzania1717
Thailand375375750
Togo77
Tunisia303060
Turkey282856
Uganda3333
Ukraine476835591,118
Uzbekistan32174998
Venezuela175195370740
Vietnam441826
Yemen, Republic of6464128
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. of5656112
Zambia
Zimbabwe21211860
Total8,7051,71182711,24357723,063
Table II.9Outstanding IMF Credit by Facility and Policy, Financial Years Ended April 30, 1993–2001(In millions of SDRs and percent of total)
199319941995199619971998199920002001
Millions of SDRs
Stand-By Arrangements110,5789,48515,11720,70018,06425,52625,21321,41017,101
Extended Arrangements9,8499,56610,1559,98211,15512,52116,57416,80816,108
Supplemental Reserve Facility7,10012,6554,085
Compensatory and Contingency
Financing Facility4,2083,7563,0211,6021,3366852,8453,0322,992
Systemic Transformation Facility2,7253,8483,9843,9843,8693,3642,7181,933
Subtotal (GRA)24,63525,53232,14036,26834,53949,70160,65143,96842,219
SAF Arrangements1,4841,4401,2771,208954730565456432
PRGF Arrangements22,2192,8123,3184,4694,9045,5055,8705,8575951
Trust Fund158105102959090898989
Total28,49629,88936,83742,04040,48856,02667,17550,37048,691
Percent of total
Stand-By Arrangements1373241494546384335
Extended Arrangements343228242822253333
Supplemental Reserve Facility13199
Compensatory and Contingency
Financing Facility15128431466
Systemic Transformation Facility9109107554
Subtotal (GRA)868587868589908787
SAF Arrangements553321111
PRGF Arrangements289911121091212
Trust Fund133333331
Total100100100100100100100100100

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than ½ of one percent of total.

Includes outstanding credit tranche and emergency purchases.

Includes outstanding associated loans from the Saudi Fund for Development.

Less than ½ of one percent of total.

Table II.10Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Estimated Value of Contributions (Commitments as of April 30, 2001)(In millions of SDRs)
Subsidies (Grant or Grant Equivalent)1Loans2
ContributorPrior to

Enlargement3
For

Enlargement3
TotalPrior to

Enlargement3
For

Enlargement3
Argentina3535
Australia1414
Austria422063
Bangladesh11
Belgium8835123200
Botswana22
Canada12974203300400
Chile44
China1515100
Czech Republic1313
Denmark501667100
Egypt1313100
Finland4242
France23S2504858001,100
Germany1971977001,050
Greece251439
Iceland325
India1313
Indonesia66
Iran2
Ireland88
Italy11648164370460
Japan4682507182,2002,150
Korea518606528
Luxembourg51015
Malaysia331447
Malta112
Morocco1010
Netherlands8356140250
Norwav3015459060
Pakistan44
Portugal55
Singapore201434
Spain2929216192
Sweden13253185
Switzerland5653109200152
Thailand12517
Tunisia22
Turkey1111
United Kingdom27980359
United States15224176
Uruguay22
Subtotal (Bilateral)2,23341,2333,4664,9416,341
OPEC Fund540
Special Disbursement Account606606
Subtotal2,2331,8394,0724,9416,381
Saudi Arabia6161650
Total2,2501,8394,0884,9916,381

The amounts reported for grant contributions are the “as needed” equivalent of the resources committed, or implicit in loans or deposits at concessional interest rates. The calculations are based on actual interest rates and an assumed rate of 5.0 percent for the remaining life of the PRGF Trust.

Loan contributions are provided either at concessional interest rates or on the basis of weighted averages of market interest rates in the currencies comprising the SDR basket.

The ESAF Trust, predecessor to the PRGF Trust, was enlarged And extended effective February 23, 1994.

The sum of individual contributions has been adjusted downward to take into account additional loan costs.

The SDR equivalent of US$50 million valued at the exchange rate of end-April 2001.

Corresponds to loans under the associated loan agreement with the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) at an interest rate of 0.5 percent a year.

The amounts reported for grant contributions are the “as needed” equivalent of the resources committed, or implicit in loans or deposits at concessional interest rates. The calculations are based on actual interest rates and an assumed rate of 5.0 percent for the remaining life of the PRGF Trust.

Loan contributions are provided either at concessional interest rates or on the basis of weighted averages of market interest rates in the currencies comprising the SDR basket.

The ESAF Trust, predecessor to the PRGF Trust, was enlarged And extended effective February 23, 1994.

The sum of individual contributions has been adjusted downward to take into account additional loan costs.

The SDR equivalent of US$50 million valued at the exchange rate of end-April 2001.

Corresponds to loans under the associated loan agreement with the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) at an interest rate of 0.5 percent a year.

Table II.11PRGF-HIPC Trust, Estimated Value of Pledged Bilateral Contributions (Commitments as of April 30, 2001)

(In millions of SDRs “as needed”)1

Major industrial countries880.5Chile4.4
Canada48.8China19.7
France82.2Colombia0.9
Germany127.2Cyprus0.8
Italy63.6Dominican Republic0.5
Japan144.0Egypt1.3
United Kingdom82.2Fiji0.1
United States332.6Ghana0.5
Other advanced countries299.7Grenada0.1
Australia24.8India22.9
Austria14.3Indonesia8.2
Belgium35.3Jamaica2.7
Denmark18.5Jordan0.7
Finland8.0Lebanon0.4
Greece6.3Libya7.3
Iceland0.9Malaysia12.7
Ireland5.9Maldives0.01
Israel1.8Malta1.1
Korea15.9Mauritius0.1
Luxembourg0.7Micronesia, Federated States of0.00001
Netherlands45.4Morocco1.6
New Zealand1.7Pakistan3.4
Norway18.5Paraguay0.1
Portugal6.6Peru2.5
San Marino0.05Philippines6.7
Singapore16.5St. Lucia0.1
Spain23.3St. Vincent and the Grenadines0.1
Sweden18.3Samoa0.005
Switzerland37.0South Africa28.6
Fuel-exporting countries88.3Sri Lanka0.6
Algeria5.5Swaziland0.03
Bahrain0.9Thailand4.5
Brunei Darussalam0.1Tonga0.02
Gabon2.5Tunisia1.5
Iran, Islamic Republic of2.2Urugua2.2
Kuwait3.1Vanuatu0.1
Nigeria13.9Vietnam0.4
Oman0.8Countries in transition42.9
Qatar0.5Croatia0.4
Saudi Arabia53.5Czech Republic4.1
Trinidad and Tobago1.6Estonia0.5
United Arab Emirates3.8Hungary6.0
Other developing countries173.4Latvia1.0
Argentina16.2Poland12.0
Bangladesh1.7Russia14.6
Barbados0.4Slovak Republic4.0
Belize0.3Slovenia0.4
Botswana3.1Others74.9
Brazil15.0
Cambodia0.04Total (94 contributors)1,559.8

The term “as needed” refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the assumed time profile of resources required by the PRGF-HIPC Trust for the delivery of HIPC assistance and subsidies related to interim PRGF lending. The value of a contribution in “as needed” terms is estimated taking into account the timing of its availability in relation to the timing of resource requirements of the PRGF-HIPC Trust. All calculations are based on an SDR interest rate assumption of 5 percent a year.

The term “as needed” refers to the nominal undiscounted sum of the assumed time profile of resources required by the PRGF-HIPC Trust for the delivery of HIPC assistance and subsidies related to interim PRGF lending. The value of a contribution in “as needed” terms is estimated taking into account the timing of its availability in relation to the timing of resource requirements of the PRGF-HIPC Trust. All calculations are based on an SDR interest rate assumption of 5 percent a year.

Table II.12Holdings of SDRs by All Participants and by Groups of Countries as Percent of Their Cumulative Allocations of SDRs, at End of Financial Years Ended April 30, 1992–2001
Nonindustrial Countries2
Net debtor countries
All

Participants1
Industrial

Countries2
All

nonindustrial

countries
Net

creditor

countries
All net

debtor

countries
Heavily

indebted

poor countries
199296.8121.244.6200.136.58.2
199363.073.141.6166.635.14.6
199471.077.956.3222.547.712.5
199590.9105.160.4263.949.814.1
199691.4102.467.9285.556.617.4
199787.299.860.5303.647.817.3
199895.0107.069.4323.756.124.1
199981.194.652.5170.746.326.3
200084.695.062.5174.156.620.6
200186.6101.654.6204.246.512.4

Consists of member countries that are participants in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2001, of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion), SDR 3 billion was not held by participants but instead by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Based on IFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Consists of member countries that are participants in the SDR Department. At the end of FY2001, of the total SDRs allocated to participants in the SDR Department (SDR 21.4 billion), SDR 3 billion was not held by participants but instead by the IMF and prescribed holders.

Based on IFS classification (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various years).

Table II.13Key IMF Rates, Financial Year Ended April 30, 2001(In percent)
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest

Rate and

Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration1
Basic Rate

of Charge1
Period

Beginning
SDR Interest

Rate and

Unadjusted Rate

of Remuneration1
Basic Rate

of Charge1
2000
May 14.294.88November 64.845.50
May 24.294.88November 134.855.51
May 84.415.01November 204.845.50
May 154.495.11November 274.855.51
May 224.394.99
May 294.354.95December 44.785.43
December 114.705.34
June 54.405.00December 184.685.32
June 124.435.04December 254.344.93
June 194.364.96
June 264.394.992001
January 14.605.23
July 34.394.99January 84.425.03
July 104.495.11January 154.545.16
July 174.555.17January 224.475.08
July 244.575.20January 294.435.04
July 314.605.23
February 54.374.97
August 74.625.25February 124.364.96
August 144.675.31February 194.334.92
August 214.715.36February 264.294.88
August 284.745.39
March 54.274.85
September 44.705.34March 124.204.78
September 114.645.28March 194.104.66
September 184.655.29March 263.914.45
September 254.675.31
April 23.944.48
October 24.745.39April 93.764.28
October 94.765.41April 163.844.37
October 164.735.38April 233.724.23
October 234.805.46April 303.784.30
October 304.835.49

Under the FY2001 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward and the rate of charge was adjusted upward to share the burden of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2001 are refundable when overdue charges are paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge presented is the effective rate following the retroactive reduction that was implemented after the end of the financial year. The basic rate of charge, which was set at 115.9 percent of the SDR interest rate, was reduced to 113.7 percent of the SDR interest rate as a result of the retroactive reduction.

Under the FY2001 decision on burden sharing, the rate of remuneration was adjusted downward and the rate of charge was adjusted upward to share the burden of protecting the IMF’s income from overdue charges and of contributing to the IMF’s precautionary balances. The amounts generated from burden sharing in FY2001 are refundable when overdue charges are paid and when overdue obligations cease to be a problem. The basic rate of charge presented is the effective rate following the retroactive reduction that was implemented after the end of the financial year. The basic rate of charge, which was set at 115.9 percent of the SDR interest rate, was reduced to 113.7 percent of the SDR interest rate as a result of the retroactive reduction.

Table II.14Members That Have Accepted the Obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Articles of Agreement
MemberEffective Date

of Acceptance
MemberEffective Date

of Acceptance
AlgeriaSeptember 15, 1997HondurasJuly 1, 1950
Antigua and BarbudaNovember 22, 1983HungaryJanuary 1, 1996
ArgentinaMay 14, 1968IcelandSeptember 19, 1983
ArmeniaMay 29, 1997IndiaAugust 20, 1994
AustraliaJuly 1, 1965IndonesiaMay 7, 1988
AustriaAugust 1, 1962IrelandFebruary 15, 1961
Bahamas, TheDecembers, 1973IsraelSeptember 21, 1993
BahrainMarch 20, 1973ItalyFebruary 15, 1961
BangladeshApril 11, 1994JamaicaFebruary 22, 1963
BarbadosNovember 3, 1993JapanApril 1, 1964
BelgiumFebruary 15, 1961JordanFebruary 20, 1995
BelizeJune 14, 1983KazakhstanJuly 16, 1996
BeninJune 1, 1996KenyaJune 30, 1994
BoliviaJune 5, 1967KiribatiAugust 22, 1986
BotswanaNovember 17, 1995KoreaNovember 1, 1988
BrazilNovember 30, 1999KuwaitApril 5, 1963
Brunei DarussalamOctober 10, 1995Kyrgyz RepublicMarch 29, 1995
BulgariaSeptember 24, 1998LatviaJune 10, 1994
Burkina FasoJune 1, 1996LebanonJuly 1, 1993
CameroonJune 1, 1996LesothoMarch 5, 1997
CanadaMarch 25, 1952LithuaniaMay 3, 1994
Central African RepublicJune 1, 1996LuxembourgFebruary 15, 1961
ChadJune 1, 1996Macedonia, FYRJune 19, 1998
ChileJuly 27, 1977MadagascarSeptember 18, 1996
ChinaDecember 1, 1996MalawiDecember 7, 1995
ComorosJune 1, 1996MalaysiaNovember 11, 1968
Congo, Republic ofJune 1, 1996MaliJune 1, 1996
Costa RicaFebruary 1, 1965MaltaNovember 30, 1994
Côte d’IvoireJune 1, 1996Marshall IslandsMay 21, 1992
CroatiaMay 29, 1995MauritaniaJuly 19, 1999
CyprusJanuary 9, 1991MauritiusSeptember 29, 1993
Czech RepublicOctober 1, 1995MexicoNovember 12, 1946
DenmarkMay 1, 1967Micronesia, Federated States ofJune 24, 1993
DjiboutiSeptember 19, 1980MoldovaJune 30, 1995
DominicaDecember 13, 1979MongoliaFebruary 1, 1996
Dominican RepublicAugust 1, 1953MoroccoJanuary 21, 1993
EcuadorAugust 31, 1970NamibiaSeptember 20, 1996
El SalvadorNovember 6, 1946NepalMay 30, 1994
Equatorial GuineaJune 1, 1996NetherlandsFebruary 15, 1961
EstoniaAugust 15, 1994New ZealandAugust 5, 1982
FijiAugust 4, 1972NicaraguaJuly 20, 1964
FinlandSeptember 25, 1979NigerJune 1, 1996
FranceFebruary 15, 1961NorwayMay 11, 1967
GabonJune 1, 1996OmanJune 19, 1974
Gambia, TheJanuary 21, 1993PakistanJuly 1, 1994
GeorgiaDecember 20, 1996PalauDecember 16, 1997
GermanyFebruary 15, 1961PanamaNovember 26, 1946
GhanaFebruary 21, 1994Papua New GuineaDecember 4, 1975
GreeceJuly 7, 1992Paraguay’August 22, 1994
GrenadaJanuary 24, 1994PeruFebruary 15, 1961
GuatemalaJanuary 27, 1947PhilippinesSeptember 8, 1995
GuineaNovember 17, 1995PolandJune L 1995
Guinea-BissauJanuary 1, 1997PortugalSeptember 12, 1988
GuyanaDecember 27, 1966QatarJune 4, 1973
HaitiDecember 22, 1953RomaniaMarch 25, 1998
RussiaJune 1, 1996SwedenFebruary 15, 1961
RwandaDecember 10, 1998SwitzerlandMay 29, 1992
St. Kitts and NevisDecember 3, 1984TanzaniaJuly 15, 1996
St. LuciaMay 30, 1980ThailandMay 4, 1990
St. Vincent and the GrenadinesAugust 24, 1981TogoJune 1, 1996
SamoaOctober 6, 1994TongaMarch 22, 1991
San MarinoSeptember 23, 1992Trinidad and TobagoDecember 13, 1993
Saudi ArabiaMarch 22, 1961’TunisiaJanuary 6, 1993
SenegalJune 1, 1996TurkeyMarch 22, 1990
SeychellesJanuary 3, 1978UgandaApril 5, 1994
Sierra LeoneDecember 14, 1995UkraineSeptember 24, 1996
SingaporeNovember 9, 1968United Arab EmiratesFebruary 13, 1974
Slovak RepublicOctober 1, 1995United KingdomFebruary 15, 1961
SloveniaSeptember 1, 1995United StatesDecember 10, 1946
Solomon IslandsJuly 24, 1979UruguayMay 2, 1980
South AfricaSeptember 15, 1973VanuatuDecember 1, 1982
SpainJuly 15, 1986VenezuelaJuly 1, 1976
Sri LankaMarch 15, 1994Yemen, Republic ofDecember 10, 1996
SurinameJune 29, 1978ZimbabweFebruary 3, 1995
SwazilandDecember 11, 1989
Table II.15Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy as of March 31, 2001
Exchange Rate Classification System
The classification system, in effect since January 1999, is based on the members’ actual, de facto, regimes that may differ from their officially announced arrangements. The scheme ranks exchange rate regimes broadly on the basis of the degree of flexibility of the arrangement. It distinguishes between the more rigid forms of pegged regimes (such as currency board arrangements); other conventional fixed peg regimes against a single currency or a basket of currencies; exchange rate bands around a fixed peg; crawling peg arrangements; and exchange rate bands around crawling pegs, in order to help assess the implications of the choice of exchange rate regime for the degree of independence of monetary policy. This includes a category to distinguish the exchange arrangements of those countries that have no separate legal tender. The system presents members” exchange rate regimes against alternative monetary policy frameworks with the intention of using both criteria as a way of providing greater transparency in the classification scheme and to illustrate that different forms of exchange rate regimes could be consistent with similar monetary frameworks. The following explains the categories.
Exchange Rate Regime
Exchange Arrangements with No Separate Legal Tender
The currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender, or the member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which the same legal tender is shared by the members of the union. Adopting such regimes is a form of surrendering the monetary authorities’ independent control over domestic monetary policy.
Currency Board Arrangements
A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This implies that domestic currency be issued only against foreign exchange and that it remain fully backed by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions such as monetary control and the lender of the last resort and leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy; some flexibility may still be afforded depending on how strict the rules of the boards are established.
Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements
The country pegs (formally or de facto) its currency at a fixed rate to a major currency or a basket of currencies, where a weighted composite is formed from the currencies of major trading or financial partners and currency weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, services, or capital flows. In a conventional fixed peg arrangement, the exchange rate fluctuates within a narrow margin of less than ±1 percent around a formal or de facto central rate. The currency composites can also be standardized, such as those of the SDR. The monetary authority stands ready to maintain the fixed parity through intervention, limiting the degree of monetary policy discretion; the degree of flexibility of monetary policy, however, is greater relative to currency board arrangements or currency unions, in that traditional central banking functions are, though limited, still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the exchange rate, though infrequently.
Pegged Exchange Rates Within Horizontal Bands
The value of the currency is maintained within certain margins of fluctuation of at least ±1 percent around a formal or de facto fixed central rate. It also includes the arrangements of the countries in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) (replaced with ERM-II on January 1, 1999). There is some limited degree of monetary policy discretion, with the degree of discretion depending on the band width.
Crawling Pegs
The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed, preannounced rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators (past inflation differentials vis-à-vis major trading partners, differentials between the target inflation and expected inflation in major trading partners, etc.). The rate of crawl can be set to generate inflation-adjusted changes in the currency (“backward looking”), or at a preannounced fixed rate below the projected inflation differentials (“forward looking”). Maintaining a credible crawling peg imposes constraints on monetary policy in a similar manner as a fixed peg system.
Exchange Rates Within Crawling Bands
The currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins of at least +1 percent around a central rate, which is adjusted periodically at a fixed preannounced rate, or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. The degree of flexibility of the exchange rate is a function of the width of the band, with bands chosen to be either symmetric around a craw ling central parity or to widen gradually with an asymmetric choice of the crawl of upper and lower bands (in the latter case, there is no preannouncement of a central rate). The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band continues to impose constraints on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence being a function of the band width.
Managed Floating with No Predetermined Path for the Exchange Rate
The monetary authority influences the movements of the exchange rate through active intervention in the foreign exchange market without specifying, or precommitting to, a predetermined path for the exchange rate. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental—including, for example, the balance of payments position, international reserves, and parallel market developments—and the adjustments may not be automatic.
Independent Floating
The exchange rate is market determined, with any foreign exchange intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than at establishing a level for it. In these regimes, monetary policy is in principle independent of exchange rate policy.
Monetary Policy Framework
Members’ exchange rate regimes are presented against alternative monetary policy frameworks in order to present the role of the exchange rate in broad economic policy and help identify potential sources of inconsistency in the monetary-exchange rate policy mix.
Exchange Rate Anchor
The monetary authority stands ready to buy and sell foreign exchange at given quoted rates to maintain the exchange rate at its predetermined level or range (the exchange rate serves as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy). These regimes cover exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements, fixed pegs with and without bands, and crawling pegs with and without bands, where the rate of crawl is set in a forward-looking manner.
Monetary Aggregate Anchor
The monetary authority uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate (reserve money, Ml, M2, etc. and the targeted aggregate becomes the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy.
Inflation Targeting Framework
A framework that targets inflation involves the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Additional key features include increased communication with the public and the markets about the plans and objectives of monetary policymakers and increased accountability of the central bank for obtaining its inflation objectives. Monetary policy decisions are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from the announced inflation target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the intermediate target of monetary policy.
IMF-Supported or Other Monetary Program
An IMF-supported or other monetary program involves implementation of monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of a framework that establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for net domestic assets of the central bank. As the ceiling on net domestic assets limits increases in reserve money through central bank operations, indicative targets for reserve money may be appended to this system.
Other
The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant information available for the country.
Monetary Policy Framework1
Exchange Rate Regime (number of countries)Exchange rate anchorMonetary aggregate targetInflation-targeting frameworkIMF supported or other monetary programOther
Exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender (39)Another currency as legal tenderECCU2Benin*Euro Area34
CFA franc zoneBurkina Faso*Austria
WAEMUCAEMCCameroon*Belgium
Ecuador*Antigua and BarbudaBenin*Cameroon*Central African Rep *Finland
KiribatiBurkina Faso*Central African Rep*France
Marshall IslandsDominicaCôte d’Ivoire*Chad*Germany
GrenadaGuinea Bissau*Chad*Congo, Rep. of*Greece
MicronesiaSt. Kitts and NevisMali*Congo, Rep. of*Côte d’Ivoire*Ireland
PalauNiger*Equatorial GuineaEcuador*Italy
PanamaSt. LuciaSenegal*Gabon*Luxembourg
San MarinoSt. Vincent and the GrenadinesTogoGabon*Guinea-Bissau*Netherlands
Mali*Portugal
Niger*Spain
Senegal*
Currency board arrangements (8)Argentina*Argentina*
Bosnia and Herzegovina*Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria*Bulgaria*
China: Hong Kong, SARDjibouti*
Djibouti*Estonia*
Estonia*Lithuania*
Lithuania*
Other conventional fixed peg arrangements (including de facto peg arrangements under managed floating) (44)Against a single currency (31)Against a composite (13)China, People’s Rep. of*6Jordan*6Latvia*
ArubaBangladesh People’sLesotho*
Bahamas, The5Botswana5 Rep. of*6Jiesotlm*
Bahrain6, 7FijiMacedonia, FYR*
BarbadosKuwaitTrinidad and Tobago
BelizeLatvia*
BhutanMalta
Cape VerdeMorocco
China, People’s Rep. of*6Myanmar5
Comoros8Samoa
Congo, Dem. Rep. ofSeychelles
El Salvador13Solomon Islands
EritreaTonga
Iran, Islamic Rep. of5,6Vanuatu
Iraq
Jordan*6
Lebanon6
Lesotho*
Macedonia, FYR*6
Malaysia
Maldives6
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands Antilles
Oman
Qatar6,7
Saudi Arabia6,7
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic5
Trinidad and Tobago*
Turkmenistan6
United Arab Emirates6,7
Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands (6) 9Within a cooperative arrangement ERM II (1)Other band arrangements (5)
CyprusLibyan A.I.
DenmarkEgypt5Suriname5
Vietnam6
Crawling pegs (4) 6Bolivia*Bolivia
Costa RicaNicaragua*
Nicaragua*Zimbabwe*
Zimbabwe*
Exchange rates within crawling bands (5)6,10Israel*Honduras*HungaryIsrael*Honduras*
Uruguay*VenezuelaUruguay*
Managed foating with no preannounced path for exchange rate (33)Jamaica*6Czech Rep.Cambodia5Algeria3
SloveniaNorwayCroatiaAzerbaijan
TunisiaEthiopiaBelarus3,5
Jamaica*6Burundi3
KazakhstanDominican Rep.3,5
KenyaGuatemala3
Kyrgyz Rep.India3
MauritaniaLao P.D.R.3,5
NigeriaParaguay3
PakistanSingapore
RomaniaSlovak Rep.3
RussiaUzbekistan3,5
Rwanda
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Ukraine
Yugoslavia
Independently floating (47)Gambia, The*AustraliaAlbaniaAfghanistan5,11
Ghana*Brazil12AngolaJapan3
Guinea*CanadaArmeniaLiberia3
Guyana*Chile5Colombia*Somali
Mauritius6Colombia*Gambia, The*Switzerland3
Malawi*IcelandGeorgiaUnited States3
MexicoKoreaGhana*
Mongolia*New ZealandGuinea*
Peru*PolandGuyana*
Philippines*South AfricaHaiti
Sao Tome andSwedenIndonesia
Principe*Thailand*Madagascar
Sierra Leone*UnitedMalawi*
Turkey*KingdomMoldova
Yemen*Mongolia*
Gambia, The*Mozambique
Papua New
Guinea
Peru*
Philippines*
Sao Tome and
Principe*
Sierra Leone*
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand*
Turkey*
Uganda
Yemen, Rep. of*
Zambia
Sources: IMF Staff Reports.Note: The term “country,” as used in this publication, does not in all eases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice; the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained and provided internationally on a sepa rate and independent basis.

A country with * indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary policy. It should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to inter from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal role in conducting monetary policy.

These countries have a currency board arrangement.

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.

Until they are withdrawn in the first half of 2002, national currencies will retain their status as legal tender within their home territories.

Member maintained exchange arrangements invoking more than one market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market.

The indicated country has a de facto arrangement under a formally announced policy of managed or independent floating. In the case of Jordan, it indicates that the country has a de jure peg to SDR but a de facto peg to the U.S. dollar. In the case of Mauritius, the authorities have a de facto policy of independent floating, with only infrequent intervention by the central bank.

Exchange rates are determined on the basis of a fixed relationship to the SDR, within margins of up to ±7.25%. However, because of the maintenance of a relatively stable relationship with the U.S. dollar, these margins are not always observed.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French treasury as do the CFA franc zone countries.

The band width for these countries is Cyprus (±2.25%), Denmark (±2.25%), Greece (±15%), Iceland (±9%), Libya (±77.5%), Suriname (±9.1%), and Vietnam (0.1% daily movement, one-sided).

The band for these countries is Honduras (±7%), Hungary (±2.25%), Israel (±20%), Uruguay (±3%), and Venezuela (±7.5%).

There is no relevant information available for the country.

Brazil maintains an IMF-supported program.

For El Salvador, the U.S. dollar is also legal tender; all financial system accounts are denominated in U.S. dollars.

Sources: IMF Staff Reports.Note: The term “country,” as used in this publication, does not in all eases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice; the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained and provided internationally on a sepa rate and independent basis.

A country with * indicates that the country adopts more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary policy. It should be noted, however, that it would not be possible, for practical reasons, to inter from this table which nominal anchor plays the principal role in conducting monetary policy.

These countries have a currency board arrangement.

The country has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.

Until they are withdrawn in the first half of 2002, national currencies will retain their status as legal tender within their home territories.

Member maintained exchange arrangements invoking more than one market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market.

The indicated country has a de facto arrangement under a formally announced policy of managed or independent floating. In the case of Jordan, it indicates that the country has a de jure peg to SDR but a de facto peg to the U.S. dollar. In the case of Mauritius, the authorities have a de facto policy of independent floating, with only infrequent intervention by the central bank.

Exchange rates are determined on the basis of a fixed relationship to the SDR, within margins of up to ±7.25%. However, because of the maintenance of a relatively stable relationship with the U.S. dollar, these margins are not always observed.

Comoros has the same arrangement with the French treasury as do the CFA franc zone countries.

The band width for these countries is Cyprus (±2.25%), Denmark (±2.25%), Greece (±15%), Iceland (±9%), Libya (±77.5%), Suriname (±9.1%), and Vietnam (0.1% daily movement, one-sided).

The band for these countries is Honduras (±7%), Hungary (±2.25%), Israel (±20%), Uruguay (±3%), and Venezuela (±7.5%).

There is no relevant information available for the country.

Brazil maintains an IMF-supported program.

For El Salvador, the U.S. dollar is also legal tender; all financial system accounts are denominated in U.S. dollars.

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