Article

IMF Policy Paper: Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Countries

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department;International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.;International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
Published Date:
June 2019
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Context

1. The outlook for LICs is adversely affected by the global slowdown, internal fragility, natural disasters, and rising debt vulnerabilities. Key global risks include an escalation of trade tensions and a sudden, sharp tightening of financial conditions. Domestic conflicts, humanitarian crises, and cross-border tensions have elevated economic and political pressures faced by many LICs in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, public debt and debt service have continued to rise for a large share of PRGT-eligible countries, with growing recourse to bilateral and commercial financing on market-based terms.1 Given tighter financial conditions and larger exposure to commercial debt, many LICs are faced with debt roll-over risks, increased debt servicing costs, and mounting risks to debt sustainability, jeopardizing the gains made after HIPC debt relief.

2. The Fund has continued to provide financial support to a sizeable share of PRGT-eligible countries, with positive results in many cases. About 57.1 percent of PRGT-eligible countries have received concessional financial support from the Fund since the new PRGT facilities architecture became effective in 2010, with the bulk of PRGT financing coming from multiyear ECF arrangements. Based on the findings of the 2019 Review of Conditionality, three-quarters of PRGT programs are estimated to have been at least partially successful from 2011–2017. In contrast to the broader trend, most LICs with an IMF financing arrangement have been able to contain or even reduce debt vulnerabilities.2

3. To support LICs amidst growing vulnerabilities and financing needs, the 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries (the LIC FR) proposes a package of reform measures.3 The package would increase access limits and norms under the IMF concessional financing facilities and enhance the flexibility of the ECF and SCF to better address LICs’ needs, while safeguarding scarce PRGT resources. In particular, it aims to: (i) address access erosion, while preserving the self-sustainability of the PRGT finances; (ii) better target scarce PRGT resources to the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable PRGT-eligible members; (iii) respond to the needs for more tailored engagement with fragile states (FS) and countries prone to natural disasters; and (iv) improve the flexibility of PRGT instruments through reforms to the SCF, length of the ECF, and EDD requirements.

4. This paper reviews the PRGT financing framework, and analyzes the resource impact of the reforms proposed in the LIC FR. The next section describes the framework and resources that underpin the Fund’s concessional lending operations. The following two sections provide an in-depth assessment of the adequacy of resources under the self-sustained PRGT financing framework by projecting medium-term demand for concessional loans against the PRGT’s lending capacity under different scenarios, with sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results. The subsequent section estimates the financial implications of the reform package proposed in the LIC FR. The final section reports on the Trust for Special Poverty Reduction and Growth Operations for the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries and Interim ECF Subsidy Operations (PRG-HIPC Trust), on the remaining protracted arrears cases (Sudan and Somalia), as well as the funding situation of the CCRT. The paper concludes with proposed decisions.

PRGT Financing Framework

The PRGT is financed through an endowment-based model designed to provide concessional financial support to LICs on a self-sustained basis. Existing loan and subsidy resources are sufficient to support the Fund’s concessional lending over the medium term, subject to extensions of contributors’ loan agreements and an update of the PRGT Instrument for PRGT operations beyond 2020.

A. Self-Sustained PRGT

5. PRGT lending is supported by an endowment-based financing model. The PRGT is separate from the Fund’s General Resources Account (GRA) and is funded from member contributions in the form of grants and loans, as well as the Fund’s own resources.4 The PRGT differs in three important respects from the GRA. First, whereas lending from the GRA is primarily financed from the Fund’s quota resources, the PRGT does not have a comparable dedicated source for resources used for lending. Rather, PRGT loan resources are borrowed from bilateral contributors (Appendix Table 1). A second key difference relates to the concessional nature of PRGT lending with interest rate subsidies across its facilities.5 The subsidy costs are covered by an endowment-based financing model (described below). Lastly, the PRGT is only available to eligible countries whereas the GRA is available to all Fund member countries.

6. In 2012, the Board adopted a three-pillar strategy to make the PRGT’s concessional lending self-sustaining. Under the self-sustained PRGT, existing balances generate the necessary subsidy resources for a sustained level of lending in perpetuity without the need for regular subsidy contributions from the Fund’s membership.6 The three pillars are: (i) a base envelope of SDR 1¼ billion in annual PRGT lending capacity, which is expected to cover concessional lending needs during normal periods; (ii) contingent measures that can be invoked when average financing needs exceed the base envelope by a substantial margin for an extended period; and (iii) the expectation that future modifications to PRGT facilities would be consistent with maintaining self-sustainability.7 The self-sustained PRGT framework therefore allows course correction if demand is unusually high over an extended period or subsidy resources do not accumulate as envisaged but is based on the expectation that policy modifications would not require fundraising initiatives ex ante.

7. The PRGT financing framework consists of Loan Accounts, Subsidy Accounts, and the Reserve Account (Figure 1). Loan resources are borrowed from individual member countries and institutions (PRGT loan contributors) at market rates8, which are then on-lent to PRGT-eligible members at subsidized rates under one of the PRGT facilities. Resources from PRGT loan contributors are non-revolving and need to be replenished at regular intervals through borrowing agreements. The subsidy costs are financed from balances in the PRGT Subsidy Accounts provided by bilateral contributors and the IMF.9 The Reserve Account contains Fund contributions in the form of Special Disbursement Account (SDA) resources derived from gold sales, which provides security to lenders to the PRGT while also generating investment income that can be used to fund the self-sustained PRGT.10 The resources in the Reserve Account can be called upon to meet the PRGT’s obligations to its creditors in the case of delayed payments by PRGT borrowers.

Figure 1.PRGT Structure and Flow of Funds1

1/ The PRGT comprises of four Loan Accounts (ECF/SCF/RCF/General), the Reserve Account and four Subsidy Accounts (ECF/SCF/RCF/General).

Source: Finance Department, International Monetary Fund.

Note: PRGT = Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust; SDA = Special Disbursement Account.

B. Resource Update

8. Existing loan resources are sufficient to cover PRGT operations over the medium term, provided that the PRGT loan commitment period is extended. The 2015 fundraising round mobilized SDR 11.4 billion in new loan resources from 15 PRGT lenders.11 Loan providers committed these new resources through traditional loan agreements, Note Purchase Agreements (NPAs) and augmentations of existing agreements (Table 1). Nine lenders participate in the encashment regime of the PRGT.12 In January 2018, the cumulative borrowing limit under the PRGT was raised by SDR 1 billion to SDR 38.5 billion to accommodate the higher-than-expected level of new loan resources mobilized.13 Uncommitted loan resources from existing and new loan agreements totaled SDR 14 billion at end-December 2018.14 Uncommitted PRGT loan resources, net of a liquidity buffer of SDR 3.3 billion for possible encashment calls, are deemed sufficient to meet expected demand well into the next decade.15

Table 1.New PRGT Loan Agreements(in millions of SDRS; as of end-March 2019)
CountryAmountEffective DateMediaTypeAccountEncashment
Belgium3508/30/2017EURLoanECFNo
Brazil5006/1/2017USDNPAGLAYes
Canada5001/10/2017USDLoanGLANo
China8004/21/2017RMBNPAGLAYes
Denmark30011/17/2016EURLoanGLANo
France2,0002/1/2018SDRLoanECFYes
Italy4007/17/2017SDRLoanECFYes
Japan1,8004/20/2017SDRNPAGLAYes
Korea50012/20/2016SDRLoanGLAYes
Netherlands50012/20/2016EURLoanGLANo
Norway30011/17/2016USDLoanRCF/SCFNo
Spain4502/22/2017EURLoanGLAYes
Sweden50011/17/2016USDLoanGLAYes
Switzerland5008/30/2017EURLoanGLANo
United Kingdom2,0001/23/2017SDRNPAECFYes
Total11,400

9. The PRGT Instrument and bilateral borrowing agreements will need to be amended to extend the period for PRGT operations beyond 2020. The Instrument currently authorizes the commitment of loan resources until end-2020. Staff proposes to extend the commitment period for PRGT lending by four years to end-2024, and to establish end-2029 as the normal drawdown period for new borrowing, corresponding to the longest initial arrangement period of five years for PRGT financing arrangements, as proposed for ECF arrangements under the LIC FR. Current borrowing agreements with loan contributors would also need to be extended to provide for drawdown periods until end-2029. Staff will reach out to members on this proposal and provide an update to the Executive Board by April 2020. Decision 2 would provide the legal basis in the PRGT Instrument for these extensions.

10. Balances in the PRGT Subsidy Accounts amounted to about SDR 3.6 billion at end-February 2019 (Table 2). This is broadly unchanged from the previous year’s level. In addition to IMF resources and bilateral contributions from members in the subsidy accounts, SDR 245 million is presumed to be available from the PRG-HIPC Trust.16 Overall, these resources are sufficient to subsidize PRGT lending over the medium to longer term, although a more in-depth analysis is required to assess PRGT self-sustainability (see below).

Table 2.Balances of PRGT Accounts(in billions of SDRs; as of end-February 2019)
AccountAmount
Subsidy Accounts3.59
General Subsidy Account2.55
ECF Subsidy Account1.00
RCF Subsidy Account0.02
SCF Subsidy Account0.02
Reserve Account3.81
Memorandum item:
PRG-HIPC Trust0.24

11. Subsidy contributions remain pending from 28 countries and are below pledged amounts.

  • PRGT Subsidy Account balances do not include amounts pledged but not yet received (Appendix Tables 25). At end-February 2019, total pending subsidy contributions amounted to about SDR 185 million from 28 countries (Appendix Table 8). About 89 percent of the total distributions of the general reserve attributable to windfall profits of the gold sales has been received, compared with the 95 percent pledged by 165 countries.
  • Income from bilateral deposit and investment agreements remains short of pledged amounts. Seven countries have pledged contributions to the PRGT to be fulfilled from investment returns on bilateral deposit and investment agreements. At end-February 2019, contributions generated from these investments reached only SDR 12.9 million in NPV terms compared to SDR 61.4 million pledged due to the low return environment.17 Consequently, several contributors agreed to extend the initial maturity of their agreements to generate earlier pledged amounts (Appendix Table 4).

12. The PRGT Reserve Account, at SDR 3.8 billion as of end-February 2019, continues to provide security to PRGT loan providers. As of end-December 2018, the Reserve Account balance was about SDR 39 million lower than at end-2017 as administrative fees reimbursed to the GRA exceeded net investment returns. The Reserve Account balance covers about 59 percent of total PRGT obligations and remains substantially higher than total PRGT repayments falling due in 2019 (Figure 2 and Appendix Table 9). In addition, the reserve ratio remains well above the 40 percent historical average prior to the delivery of debt relief through the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which is considered to be a sufficient level to back PRGT payments. Absent large shocks to PRGT demand or the credit portfolio, this ratio is expected to gradually increase over the medium to long term.18

Figure 2.PRGT Reserve Coverage

(in SDR millions; as of end-December 2018)

13. The adequacy of resources under the self-sustaining PRGT is assessed annually from two perspectives:

  • i. A demand model derives a range of plausible projections of the average annual concessional lending over the medium to longer run.
  • ii. A capacity (“supply”) model estimates the PRGT’s self-sustained lending capacity based on available subsidy resources.

The analysis from these models, discussed in the following sections, informs staff’s assessment of the adequacy of the overall framework, the affordability of any policy refinements, and the potential need for corrective contingency measures.

14. The 2018 annual review of the Fund’s concessional financing assessed the PRGT’s self-sustaining financing framework to be intact. 19 Taking into account the available PRGT resources, the PRGT’s permanent lending capacity was estimated at SDR 1.31 billion annually, slightly above the target of SDR 1¼ billion. Demand was projected to range between SDR 1.0 and 1.7 billion annually over the coming 10-year period. On balance, the PRGT’s lending capacity was assessed to be adequate under a range of plausible scenarios. The next two sections (on demand and capacity) update and refine last year’s assessment, followed by an analysis of how the proposed LIC facilities reforms would affect the self-sustained PRGT.

Demand for PRGT Loans

Annual demand for PRGT loans is estimated to be in the range of SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on average over the next decade, or SDR 0.9–1.5 billion on a subsidy-use basis (excluding precautionary arrangements). Demand projections are subject to significant uncertainties and are most sensitive to access and blending assumptions.

A. Recent Trends

15. Demand for PRGT resources has receded since the global financial crisis, averaging about SDR 1.1 billion over the past five years. Demand for the Fund’s concessional resources is historically volatile and tends to move with economic cycles and shocks. Total PRGT commitments in 2018 fell to SDR 0.3 billion, compared to SDR 1.7 billion in 2017, and a ten-year average of SDR 1.2 billion (Figure 3 and Appendix Table 14). Disbursements tend to exhibit less volatility. In 2018, disbursements under a total of 20 arrangements (including one-off RCF disbursements) amounted to SDR 0.9 billion, broadly unchanged from 2017, and in line with its ten-year average (Figure 3). Based on a survey of country teams, new commitments in 2019 are projected to rebound to [SDR 1.6 billion or SDR 1.1 billion when probability-adjusted], partly reflecting tighter domestic and external financing conditions, as well as emergency assistance needed to respond to natural disasters such as Cyclone Idai.

Figure 3.New Commitments and Ongoing Disbursements to PRGT Countries, 2010–181/

(In millions of SDRs, as of December 31, 2018)

Source: Finance Department

1/ In April 2010, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka graduated from the PRGT; Armenia graduated in July 2013; Georgia graduated in April 2014; Bolivia, Mongolia, Nigeria, and Vietnam graduated in October 2015.

2/ Total number of new commitments in calendar year, including augmentations.

3/ Total number of lending facilities in calendar year, from January 1 to December 31.

16. The stock of PRGT lending commitments has been relatively stable, reaching SDR 7.4 billion at end-March 2019. Similarly, total credit outstanding was broadly unchanged over the past twelve months at SDR 6.4 billion, and undrawn commitments under existing arrangements stood at SDR 1.0 billion. ECF credit amounted to about 86 percent of total loans outstanding. Credit concentration was moderate, with about 44 percent of credit outstanding by the top five borrowers (compared to about 84 percent in the GRA). Debt vulnerabilities of PRGT borrowers remain significant, with about half of the countries (accounting for about 39.6 percent of credit outstanding) classified as high risk or in debt distress in the most recent LIC DSA.

17. The share of eligible countries receiving PRGT support has declined, and access levels have been dispersed around applicable norms, depending on individual financing needs. The experience of countries’ use of PRGT facilities since 2010 has informed staff’s updates and revisions to its demand projections (see next section).

  • Usage across countries. The share of PRGT-eligible countries using the PRGT in any one year has receded from peak levels of around 50 percent in the wake of the global financial crisis to around 25 percent in recent years (Figure 4).20 Since the inception of the new facilities framework, usage has averaged 35 percent, with 26 percent of PRGT-eligible countries using ECF arrangements, 4 percent SCF arrangements, and 5 percent receiving RCF disbursements.
  • Access levels. Access under the PRGT at the time of approval has varied depending on individual financing needs, though it has on average remained broadly in line with applicable norms.21 Total disbursements have been below total commitments on average (see above), which can be largely explained by (i) timing differences and (ii) the non-disbursement of precautionary SCF arrangements. Across non-precautionary arrangements, ex post annual disbursements have been broadly of the same magnitude as ex ante (at approval) annualized commitments, because access augmentations during arrangements have been broadly offset by undrawn commitments under programs that failed to complete all reviews (Box 1).

Figure 4.PRGT Usage

(number of countries in percent of total eligible)

B. Demand Model

18. Given the considerable uncertainty around longer-term economic developments and use of the PRGT’s facilities, demand is projected within the range of two benchmark scenarios (a “low case” and a “high case”). The two scenarios are distinguished by the assumed share of countries using PRGT facilities, reflecting the experience that demand for Fund support can fluctuate significantly with economic cycles and shocks. The demand estimates under these scenarios entail assumptions about countries’ rising income levels that affect the use of blending resources from the PRGT and GRA, and eventual graduation from PRGT eligibility based on current policies. The model also assumes that access levels across facilities will rise over time to match projected longer-term GDP developments and potential financing needs of PRGT-eligible countries.

Box 1.PRGT Resources: Indicators of Demand

Experience has shown that, across non-precautionary arrangements, annual disbursements have on average been broadly of the same magnitude as annualized commitments at the time of program approval.

PRGT disbursements have on average been lower than commitments. Demand for concessional resources has been historically volatile, especially when measured in commitments. Demand on a disbursement basis has been less volatile and has tended to be lower on average than commitments. These differences reflect a range of factors in the way the Fund provides financial support. For instance, during periods of rising demand for Fund support, new commitments will tend to spike (e.g., approval of multiyear arrangements), rising well above disbursements, as was the case in the aftermath of the 2009 global financial crisis and the 2014 commodity price shock (Box 1, Figure 1). The pattern reverses after the peak of a crisis, when existing arrangements are already in place and continue to disburse. Commitments will also tend to differ from disbursements when: (i) SCF arrangements remain precautionary; (ii) programs go off track; and (iii) access under existing arrangements is augmented.

Figure 1.PRGT Resources Committed and Disbursed

(in millions SDRs)

When adjusting for timing and precautionary support, disbursements have been broadly in line with ex-ante commitments. To reconcile demand on a commitment and disbursement basis, PRGT commitments can be adjusted to (i) phase the original amounts approved under multi-year arrangements into annual commitments; (ii) exclude commitments related to precautionary SCFs; and (iii) control for new commitments from post approval augmentations. The observed discrepancy between commitments and disbursements is sharply reduced by accounting for precautionary arrangements (Box 1, Figure 2), and shrinks even further, to 2 percent on average (2008–18), if augmentations are dropped from the adjusted commitments measure (Box 1, Figure 3). The rationale is that, historically, augmentations in some arrangements have broadly offset undrawn commitments under other arrangements that have gone off track. These stylized facts have been used to refine the longer-term demand forecast model and complement it with a projected “subsidy use” (disbursement) measure.

Figure 2.PRGT Resources Committed and Disbursed (in millions SDRs)

Figure 3.PRGT Resources Committed and Disbursed (in millions SDRs)

19. The demand model has been updated and refined to better reflect the historical experience with the facility architecture adopted in 2009. In addition to updates based on the latest WEO data and projections, the demand model was refined to: (i) improve projections of longer-term GDP and access growth; (ii) better calibrate the assumed levels of access per facility and the probability of use of different facilities to the historical experience since the 2009 reforms, (iii) fully reflect the impact of the current exemption from blending for countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities; and (iv) better match the assumed timing of countries moving to blending and graduation with the historical experience, including with respect to market access and short-term vulnerabilities. Finally, an explicit subsidy-use (disbursement-based) demand measure is estimated to complement the traditional commitments-based measure.

C. Updated Demand Projections

20. Using the revised model, annual demand for PRGT resources over the next 10 years is projected to average between SDR 1.0–1.7 billion (Table 3). This is similar to the projection in the 2018 Update paper, reflecting offsetting effects from the above refinements and updates. Based on plausible assumptions about the precautionary use of the SCF, this projection translates into a range of SDR 0.9–1.5 billon in average annual demand involving the use of subsidy resources. On average, disbursements in nominal SDR terms would be around 40 percent above the 2018 level, broadly in line with the projected increase in nominal GDP over the coming decade.22

Table 3.Projected Demand for PRGT Resources(in SDR billions)
Average Demand (2018–27)
Low Case 1/High Case 1/
Baseline 2018 Update Paper1.001.68
Average Demand (2019–28)
New Baseline 2/Low CaseHigh Case
Demand for PRGT resources (total)1.021.70
Demand involving subsidy resources 3/0.931.54
Sensitivity AnalysisChange relative to New Demand Baseline (with use of subsidy resources)
1. No change in access until next review in 2024 4/-0.15-0.25
2. 50 percent increase in access in 20190.240.40
3. Faster GDP and demand growth by 1pp per year starting in 20230.020.03
4. Removal of blending exemption for countries at high-risk of debt distress-0.14-0.23
5. Faster graduation from the PRGT (by 2-years on average)-0.01-0.02
6. Full disbursement of precautionary SCFs0.090.16

Given the uncertainty around longer-term economic developments and use of PRGT resources, demand is projected using two benchmark scenarios, differentiated by the share of PRGT eligible countries using Fund resources. The demand estimates reflect assumptions about the use of blending and graduation from PRGT eligibility, and assume rising access levels across facilities that broadly match longer-term GDP developments of PRGT-eligible countries.

In addition to standard updates based on the latest WEO data and projections, the demand model was refined to (i) improve projections of longer-term GDP and access growth; (ii) better calibrate the assumed levels of access and probability of use of different facilities to the historical experience, (iii) fully reflect the exemption from blending of countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities; and (iv) better match the assumed timing of countries moving to blending and graduation with the historical experience, including with respect to market access and short-term vulnerabilities.

An explicit subsidy-use (disbursement-based) demand measure is estimated to complement the traditional commitments-based measure. This measure treats a certain share of SCF arrangements as fully precautionary.

The baseline outlook assumes rising access levels across facilities that broadly match projected longer-term GDP developments, preserving the real value of access in relation to GDP. The scenario keeps access unchanged until the forthcoming LIC review in 2024 implying some erosion in real terms.

Given the uncertainty around longer-term economic developments and use of PRGT resources, demand is projected using two benchmark scenarios, differentiated by the share of PRGT eligible countries using Fund resources. The demand estimates reflect assumptions about the use of blending and graduation from PRGT eligibility, and assume rising access levels across facilities that broadly match longer-term GDP developments of PRGT-eligible countries.

In addition to standard updates based on the latest WEO data and projections, the demand model was refined to (i) improve projections of longer-term GDP and access growth; (ii) better calibrate the assumed levels of access and probability of use of different facilities to the historical experience, (iii) fully reflect the exemption from blending of countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities; and (iv) better match the assumed timing of countries moving to blending and graduation with the historical experience, including with respect to market access and short-term vulnerabilities.

An explicit subsidy-use (disbursement-based) demand measure is estimated to complement the traditional commitments-based measure. This measure treats a certain share of SCF arrangements as fully precautionary.

The baseline outlook assumes rising access levels across facilities that broadly match projected longer-term GDP developments, preserving the real value of access in relation to GDP. The scenario keeps access unchanged until the forthcoming LIC review in 2024 implying some erosion in real terms.

21. The demand projections are subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly in the longer run. Sensitivity analysis indicates that demand is most sensitive to access and blending assumptions (Box 2). Demand is projected to increase further in the longer run, ranging between SDR 1.1–1.8 billon per year over the next 20 years on a subsidy-use basis. The gradual upward trend reflects that, on current trends and policies, blending and graduation (which free up PRGT resources) are not projected to fully offset growing GDP and financing needs. However, considerable uncertainty exists on future PRGT use, which depends on countries’ longer-term developments as well as global factors.23

Box 2.Sensitivity Analysis Against the Demand Model Baseline

  • Access. Keeping access unchanged until the next LIC Facilities Review in 2024 would reduce annual average demand by SDR 0.15–0.25 billion over the next decade relative to the baseline, as access would not grow in line with nominal GDP. Conversely, raising access by 50 percent in 2019 would increase annual average demand by SDR 0.24–0.40 billion over the next ten years.
  • GDP. Higher GDP growth across PRGT-eligible countries would modestly increase demand, as larger financing needs would not be fully offset by faster graduation and blending.
  • Blending. Eliminating the exclusion from blending for qualified countries at high risk of debt distress (while retaining it for countries in debt distress) would reduce average annual demand for PRGT credit by SDR 0.14–0.23 billion over the next decade, while increasing demand for GRA resources by a similar magnitude.
  • Graduation. Demand projections are not very sensitive to graduation assumptions. For instance, there are only limited savings from more rapid graduation (e.g., due to market access) as graduations mostly involve countries that use blended arrangements, with two-thirds of financing already coming from the GRA.
  • Precautionary vs. disbursing SCFs. Demand projections include an assumption that a certain share of SCF arrangements will remain precautionary ex post. If all SCF arrangements were to fully disburse, this would raise demand by SDR 0.09–0.16 billion.

Assessing PRGT Self-Sustaining Capacity

The PRGT’s estimated long-term annual lending capacity is modestly above the target of SDR 1¼ billion. Taking into account the revised demand baseline, capacity is projected to reach between SDR 1.2–1.5 billion in ten years.

A. Capacity Model

22. A capacity (“supply”) model is used to estimate the PRGT’s self-sustained lending capacity. The self-sustained annual lending capacity represents the average annual level of new concessional lending (in nominal SDR terms) that the Trust can finance in perpetuity, based on available resources in the subsidy accounts and the Reserve Account. Using a cashflow model, the permanent lending capacity is derived as the level of lending where available subsidy resources cover all future subsidy needs without depleting the endowment resources in nominal terms. Available subsidy resources are affected, inter alia, by the initial balances of the PRGT Subsidy Accounts and Reserve Account, investment returns on those balances, the reimbursement to the GRA for the PRGT’s administrative expenses, and the extent to which pledges from previous PRGT fund-raising efforts are realized. Subsidy needs depend on the PRGT credit outstanding over time and the average subsidy element of PRGT loans, determined by the spread between interest rates charged by PRGT loan providers and the concessional rates of charge set for loans under the different PRGT facilities.

23. The capacity model has been updated and refined to reflect historical trends and changes in policies. In addition to the standard data updates and minor technical adjustments, interest rate and investment return projections have been modified to reflect longer-term historical trends and new investment policies. In addition, there were two analytical enhancements to the capacity model: (i) a range of self-sustained capacity projections is derived by integrating the new disbursement-based demand projections into the capacity model for the low and high scenarios and (ii) a demand benchmark consistent with self-sustainability is derived, representing the annual average demand over the coming 10 years that would bring the PRGT lending capacity to the self-sustained target of SDR 1¼ billion by the end of the period.

B. Projections of PRGT Lending Capacity

24. Based on the updated capacity model, the estimated PRGT lending capacity remains consistent with the self-sustaining PRGT framework (Table 4). The PRGT’s self-sustained long-term average annual lending capacity is estimated at SDR 1.31 billion, unchanged from the April 2018 Update Paper. This indicates that there is room for higher levels of lending under the self-sustained financing framework—average annual demand of SDR 1.4 billion over the next decade would bring the PRGT lending capacity to the target of SDR 1¼ billion by the end of the period. Using the new baseline demand estimates involving use of subsidy resources under the high and low cases, the PRGT lending capacity is projected to reach between SDR 1.20–1.46 billion in ten years. This implies that on current trends, capacity will more likely than not exceed the SDR 1¼ billion target by 2028, pointing to some modest room to accommodate higher PRGT access levels and policy refinements.

Table 4.PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity
Estimated Capacities
April 2018 Update Paper1.31
Updated Estimate 1/1.31
PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity Target1.25
Sensitivity AnalysisChange relative to Updated Capacity Estimate
1. Investment premium (lower by 40 basis points)-0.17
2. SDR Rate (Decrease by 50 basis points)0.02
3. GRA Reimbursement (Increase by 15mn)-0.08
4. Pledged Contributions (Decrease by SDR 300mn) 2/-0.06
5. Short-term demand Shock 3/-0.07

As of January 2019.

At end-February 2018, total pending subsidy contributions amounted to SDR 128 million from 27 countries. In addition, SDR 240 million is presumed to be available from the PRG-HIPC Trust for self-sustained PRGT operations.

Two years of elevated demand at historical 15-year average plus two standard deviations.

As of January 2019.

At end-February 2018, total pending subsidy contributions amounted to SDR 128 million from 27 countries. In addition, SDR 240 million is presumed to be available from the PRG-HIPC Trust for self-sustained PRGT operations.

Two years of elevated demand at historical 15-year average plus two standard deviations.

25. The self-sustained lending capacity is sensitive to factors that directly impact the PRGT’s endowment. In general, lower investment premiums on PRGT assets, shortfalls in pledged contributions, and a sustained period of elevated demand for concessional resources constitute key risks (Box 3).

Box 3.Sensitivity Analysis Against the PRGT’s Estimated Self-Sustained Lending Capacity

  • Short-term demand shock. If demand for PRGT lending over the next two years is two standard deviations above the 15-year average, the self-sustained capacity would be permanently lowered by SDR 0.06 billion.
  • Investment premium. In line with the investment strategy for PRGT assets, projections assume a 90 bp investment premium over rates paid to PRGT lenders. Lowering this premium by 40 bp would reduce the annual lending capacity by SDR 0.17 billion.
  • SDR rate. Assumed SDR rate impacts both projected income of the Trust (as it is a basis for projected rate of return on assets) and cost of lending. Lowering the SDR rate by 100 bp points marginally increases annual lending capacity by about SDR 0.02 billion.
  • GRA reimbursement. The General Account (GRA) is normally reimbursed for expenses of administering the PRGT.1 Projections assume that SDR 65 million is paid from the Reserve Account every year. Increasing the GRA reimbursement by SDR 15 million would decrease estimated annual lending capacity by about SDR 0.08 billion.
  • Pledged contributions. Estimates of the lending capacity assume that all subsidy resources pledged by members will be realized and that SDR 240 million currently held in the PRG-HIPC Trust will be transferred to the PRGT. If SDR 300 million of these expected resources is not received, the PRGT’s lending capacity would be lower by SDR 0.06 billion.
1/ See Decision No. 8760-(87/176), paragraph 3.

Financing the Reform Package Under the Self-Sustained PRGT

The policy package proposed in the LIC FR, providing for higher access and more flexibility of PRGT facilities, can be accommodated within the self-sustained PRGT framework.

26. Staff has simulated a policy package with the following elements: (a) a generalized increase in access norms and limits by one-third in 2019; (b) flexibility enhancements to the SCF and ECF, including longer durations; (c) a doubling of the annual access limit under the RCF regular window, matching the limit under the shocks window; 24 (d) an alignment of the SCF interest rate to the ECF rate schedule; and (e) a removal of the exemption from presumed blending for higher income countries at high risk of debt distress that have substantial access to international financial markets.

27. The proposed reform package is projected to result in average annual demand of SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on a subsidy-use basis over the next decade. The impact of higher access, a lower SCF rate, and enhanced facilities flexibility would be partly offset by reduced demand from the proposed modification of the blending policy. Specifically:

  • i. The proposed one-third access increase would raise annual demand by an average of SDR 0.11–0.18 billion over the next decade, reducing self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.05–0.08 billion by the end of the period (Table 5, P1).
  • ii. The enhancements to the SCF and RCF would raise annual demand by an estimated SDR 0.02–0.11 billion over the next decade, reducing self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.01–0.05 billion (Table 5, P2).
  • iii. Eliminating the exemption from presumed blending for higher income countries that are classified as high risk of debt distress and have substantial access to international financial markets, would reduce annual demand by about SDR 0.08–0.14 billion over the next decade, increasing self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.04–0.06 billion (Table 5, P3).
  • iv. The alignment of the SCF rate schedule to that of the ECF rate would reduce self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.03 billion (Table 5, P5).
  • v. Graduations in the forthcoming review of PRGT eligibility are not expected to alter the picture.
Table 5.Impact on Policy Reforms on PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity
in SDR billions
Avg. Annual Demand (2019–28)Estimated Capacity (Medium-term) 1/
Low CaseHigh CaseLow CaseHigh Case
New Baseline Demand for PRGT Resources1.021.70n.a.n.a.
New Baseline Demand Involving Subsidy Resources0.931.541.461.20
10-year Demand Benchmark 2/1.431.25
Benchmark Policy Package 3/Change relative to New Baseline (with use of Subsidy Resources), unless noted (in SDR billions)
Demand-Model Impact
P1 – Access Increase (33% in 2019)0.110.18-0.05-0.08
P2 – SCF/ECF Enhancements and Supplemental RCF Access Increase0.020.11-0.01-0.05
P3 – Blending Exemption (Countries with Market Access and meet the income threshold can blend)-0.08-0.140.040.06
P4 – Combined (Scenarios 1–3)0.040.15-0.02-0.07
Supply-Model Impact
P5 – Align SCF/ECF Rates 4/---0.03-0.03
Avg. Annual Demand (2019–28)Estimated Capacity (Medium-term) 5/
Low CaseHigh CaseLow CaseHigh Case
Consolidated Impact (P6) 6/0.040.15-0.05-0.10
in levels (use of subsidy resources)0.981.691.4 11.10

Capacity estimates as of end-2028. Medium-term estimates of lending capacity are derived by integrating 10-years of projected demand for different scenarios into the baseline capacity model. Preliminary estimates subject to data revisions.

The level of demand that can be maintained for 10 consecutive years consistent with the self-sustained capacity target of SDR 1.25 billion.

The proposed policy reforms affect the financing framework primarily indirectly via the demand channel. The exception is the alignment of ECF/SCF rates of charge, which has a direct impact on capacity by increasing the subsidy element of PRGT loans.

Change relative to P4.

Includes the alignment of the ECF/SCF rate of charge.

Before incorporating the potential impact related to the 2019 PRGT Eligibility Review.

Capacity estimates as of end-2028. Medium-term estimates of lending capacity are derived by integrating 10-years of projected demand for different scenarios into the baseline capacity model. Preliminary estimates subject to data revisions.

The level of demand that can be maintained for 10 consecutive years consistent with the self-sustained capacity target of SDR 1.25 billion.

The proposed policy reforms affect the financing framework primarily indirectly via the demand channel. The exception is the alignment of ECF/SCF rates of charge, which has a direct impact on capacity by increasing the subsidy element of PRGT loans.

Change relative to P4.

Includes the alignment of the ECF/SCF rate of charge.

Before incorporating the potential impact related to the 2019 PRGT Eligibility Review.

28. The proposed reform package would be generally consistent with the self-sustained PRGT financing framework, with risks evenly balanced over the coming decade. Based on the demand range projected above, self-sustained capacity would reach SDR 1.1–1.4 billion by 2028 (Table 5 (P6) and Figures 5 and 6). The longer-term outlook is subject to greater uncertainty, with downside risks from both supply and demand factors, such as low investment returns on PRGT assets or prolonged periods of high and rising aggregate financing needs.

Figure 5.PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity: Policy Package

(In SDR Millions)

1/ Shows the projected capacity range following 10-years under the low and high demand consolidated policy package scenarios, including the alignment of ECF/SCF rates of charge.

Figure 6.Self-Sustained PRGT Capacity: 10-year Outlook 2/

Source: Staff calculations and estimates.

1/ The shaded area shows the upper (lower) range of estimated lending capacity associated with the low (high) demand-model projections for the various policy scenarios examined.

2/ Reports capacity at time t based on demand projections from 2019 to t-1. For example, capacity in 2029 is based on ten years of demand projections (2019–2028).

29. The evolution of capacity will need to be monitored carefully, and policies reviewed periodically. This will be important to ensure that the outlook for capacity remains in line with the base envelope of SDR 1¼ billion. A range of policy options and contingency measures can be triggered under the three-pillar PRGT framework in the event of a sustained disequilibrium between supply and demand.25

Financing Debt Relief

The Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) is currently underfunded. Remaining protracted arrears cases (Somalia and Sudan) would require the mobilization of new resources once these countries are ready to participate in the HIPC Initiative.

A. Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust

30. Additional resources are needed to fund the existing mandate of the CCRT. The CCRT was created in 2015 to provide grants for debt relief to the poorest and most vulnerable countries26 under two windows: (i) the Post-Catastrophe Relief window for catastrophic natural disasters; and (ii) the Catastrophe Containment window for fast-spreading major public health disasters with international spillover potential.27 Of the 58 members approached under the 2015 CCRT fund-raising campaign, only six pledged a total amount of US$93.3 million (of which US$84.7 million received), well short of the US$150 million target. Staff informally approached countries with pending responses to the campaign, but no additional pledges have been forthcoming so far. As of end-February 2019, total CCRT contributions amounted to SDR 99.5 million, for a total balance of the Trust of SDR 149 million.28 In December 2018, five countries repurposed their maturing HIPC deposits, for a total of SDR 12.7 million, to be invested in BIS obligations and generate income for the benefit of the CCRT (see paragraph 30). In 2018, Mexico disbursed SDR 1.74 million of the SDR 7.97 million pledged under the 2015 fundraising round.

31. The estimated CCRT underfunding is substantial, limiting the Fund’s ability to assist countries hit by catastrophic disasters. The estimated underfunding stands between SDR 200 and 275 million, as the original US$150 million fund-raising target was based on members’ quota levels before the 14th General Review of Quotas. Doubling of quotas under the 14th General Review of Quotas is estimated to have proportionally increased the initial shortfall, as the debt flow relief in percent of quota remained unchanged. This reflects a gap of about SDR 100–175 million under the Post Catastrophe Relief window and of SDR 100 million under the Catastrophe Containment window. The first stage of the LIC FR assessed that reforms to widen access to the CCRT would increase demand for debt relief under the CCRT and would therefore require additional fundraising.29

32. Staff will consider options to address the CCRT underfunding. These could include: (i) launching a new fund-raising campaign and/or (ii) adjusting the CCRT access policy with the objective of realigning it with access prior to the 14th General Review of Quotas and with available financing. These options will be further explored in the context of the 2020 Update paper, informed by indications of countries’ willingness to contribute in filling the financing gap, including through their informal responses from the 2015 campaign.

B. Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

33. The HIPC Initiative is nearly completed. The Fund provided SDR 2.6 billion in debt relief to 36 of the 39 eligible countries (Appendix Table 11).30 Three pre-decision point countries (Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan) have yet to start the HIPC qualification process.31 In 2008, the IMF and the World Bank jointly committed to provide HIPC and “beyond-HIPC” debt relief to Liberia. A large share of the membership contributed to Liberia’s financing package, but pledges for a total of SDR 17.7 million (March 2008 NPV terms) are yet to be received from eight countries (Appendix Table 13). The PRG-HIPC Trust covered the shortfall in the interim; eventual disbursements of the outstanding pledges would replenish its resources. As of end-February 2019, the balance in the PRG-HIPC Trust stood at SDR 0.24 billion (Table 2).

34. Expiring PRG-HIPC deposit agreements were renewed or repurposed for the benefit of the PRGT or the CCRT. Part of the PRG-HIPC Trust resources were provided by countries through income generated by deposit agreements with the understanding that the principal would be repaid at maturity. In December 2018, 21 deposit agreements32 (SDR 120.3 million) reached maturity. Staff proposed either a renewal of these deposits for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC Trust or repurposing for the benefit of the PRGT or CCRT. At end-March 2019, 17 deposit agreements (SDR 65.1 million) were renewed or repurposed.33 Four countries, with total deposits of SDR 55.2 million, requested to be repaid (see Table 6 and Appendix Table 7).

Table 6.PRG-HIPC Deposit Extensions and Repayments(in millions of SDRs; as of end-April 2019)
In million SDRsNumber of contributors
Total120.321
Subtotal extended or repurposed65.117
Renewed for PRG-HIPC Trust 1/28.310
Repurposed for PRG Trust24.12
Repurposed for the CCR Trust12.75
Repayments55.24

One renewed deposit was augmented by SDR 5.4 million. Total amount of renewed deposit agreements for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC is SDR 33.7 million, of which SDR 28.3 million was already in the Trust.

One renewed deposit was augmented by SDR 5.4 million. Total amount of renewed deposit agreements for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC is SDR 33.7 million, of which SDR 28.3 million was already in the Trust.

C. Overdue Financial Obligations

35. Sudan and Somalia remain in protracted arrears to the Fund. As of end-February 2019, overdue financial obligations to the Fund from these countries totaled SDR 1.2 billion. Sudan and Somalia have been in arrears to the Fund since 1984 and 1987, respectively. Providing debt relief for Sudan and Somalia would require additional resources, as the costing of HIPC debt relief excluded the three protracted arrears cases to avoid undermining the Fund’s financial capacity as a result of debt forgiveness.34 Consequently, a new fundraising campaign would be needed once these countries are ready to clear their arrears and participate in the HIPC Initiative and potentially “beyond-HIPC” debt relief.3536At that time, the approach for providing Liberia’s debt relief, including the financing modalities, could serve as a useful framework.37

  • Sudan. Sudan accounts for 80 percent of the total amount of members’ outstanding arrears to the Fund. Sudan remains on the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism, which prevents meaningful progress towards debt relief. The Article IV mission scheduled in late 2018 was postponed due to government reshuffling and security issues. On the political front, President Bashir stepped down in April amidst protests, leading to the formation of a military-backed transition government. The country continues to be faced with severe economic imbalances, scarce reserves and social unrest.
  • Somalia. Under successive Staff-Monitored Programs since 2016, Somalia is pursuing reforms to establish a track record of sound policy performance to normalize its relationship with the international community and make progress toward possible HIPC debt relief. Discussions on a fourth SMP have been initiated, and Board endorsement that this SMP meets the upper credit disbursements were frontloaded to repay the bridge loan. To finance Liberia’s debt relief, bilateral contributions from 102 countries were facilitated by a partial distribution from the balances of the SCA-1 and proceeds of deferred charges adjustments used to offset the impact on IMF income from Liberia’s arrears, and new resources from the G7.

Issues for Discussion

  • Do Directors agree that the proposed package of PRGT reform measures is consistent with the self-sustained PRGT financing framework?
  • Do Directors agree that options for addressing the underfunding of the CCRT should be discussed in the 2020 Update paper?
  • Do Directors support the proposal to amend the PRGT Instrument to extend the commitment and drawdown periods for concessional lending to end-2024 and end-2029 respectively?

Proposed Decisions

The following decisions, each of which may be adopted by a majority of the votes cast, are proposed for adoption by the Executive Board:

Decision 1:

The Executive Board notes the report entitled “Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Countries,” and decides that the annual review of the financing of the Trust for Special Poverty Reduction and Growth Operations for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Interim ECF Subsidy Operations, contemplated in paragraph 2 of Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted on February 4, 1997, as amended, is completed.

Decision 2:

Amendments to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Instrument

  • 1) The Instrument to establish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT Instrument) annexed to Decision No. 8759-(87/176) ESAF, as amended, is revised as follows:
    • i) In Section II, paragraph 1 (e)(2), “December 31, 2024” shall be substituted for “December 31, 2020.”
    • ii) In Section III, paragraph 3, third sentence, “December 31, 2029” shall be substituted for “December 31, 2024.”
Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1.PRGT Borrowing Agreements(in millions of SDRs; as of end-December 2018)
Effective date of agreementExpiration date for drawingsLoan commitmentsAmount DisbursedEarly repayment elated to the MDRIAmount outstanding
AmountIn percent of commitment
Belgium
National Bank of Belgium 1/02-JUM99931-Dec-2014350.0350.0100.0163.010.4
National Bank of Belgium 3/12-NOV-201231-Dec-2024350.0350.0100.0-349.7
National Bank of Belgium 3/30-Aug-201731-Dec-2024350.0----
Brazil
Banco Central do Brazil 2/01-Jun-201731-Dec-2024500.0----
Canada
Government of Canada22-Feb-198931-Dec-1997300.0300.0100.016.1-
Government of Canada09-May-199531-Dec-2005400.0400.0100.0143.3-
Government of Canada 2/05-Mar-201031-Dec-2024500.0164.632.9-144.6
Government of Canada 2/10-Jan-201731-Dec-2024500.0----
China
Government of China 1/05-JUI-199431-Dec-2014200.0200.0100.071.3-
People’s Bank of China 3/03-Sep-201031-Dec-2024800.0800.0100.0-690.4
People’s Bank of China 2/21-Apr-201731-Dec-2024800.0----
Denmark
National Bank of Denmark03-May-200031-Dec-2003100.0100.0100.0100.0-
National Bank of Denmark 2/28-Jan-201031-Dec-2024200.039.519.7-35.8
National Bank of Denmark 2/4/17-NOV-201631-Dec-2024300.0----
Egypt
Central Bank of Egypt 1/13-Jun-199431-Dec-2014155.6155.6100.021.97.7
France
Agence Française de Développement 5/05-Apr-198831-Dec-1997800.0800.0100.0--
Agence Française de Développement 5/03-Jan-199531-Dec-2005750.0750.0100.0--
Agence Française de Développement 1/5/17-Dec-199931-Dec-20141,350.01,350.0100.0485.2115.1
Agence Française de Développement 5/6/20-Aug-200931-Dec-2014670.0670.0100.0-375.0
Bank of France 3/03-Sep-201031-Dec-20181,328.01,328.0100.0-1,146.4
Bank of France 3/01-Feb-201831-Dec-20242,000.0----
Germany
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau31-Mar-198931-Dec-1997700.0700.0100.019.7-
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau17-May-199531-Dec-2005700.0700.0100.0313.0-
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 1/19-Jun-200031-Dec-20141,350.01,350.0100.0591.0212.3
Italy
Bank of Italy 7/04-OCM99031-Dec-1997370.0370.0100.011.7-
Bank of Italy 7/29-May-199831-Dec-2005210.0210.0100.0170.9-
Bank of Italy 1/01-Mar-200031-Dec-2014800.0800.0100.0164.850.8
Bank of Italy 3/18-Apr-201131-Dec-2024800.0800.0100.0-691.6
Bank of Italy 3/17-JUI-201731-Dec-2024400.0----
Japan
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 8/12-Apr-198831-Dec-19972,200.02,200.0100.0--
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 1/8/05-OCM99431-Dec-20142,934.82,934.8100.0-28.8
Government of Japan 2/03-Sep-201031-Dec-20241,800.0366.620.4-359.5
Government of Japan 2/4/20-Apr-201731-Dec-20241,800.0----
Korea
Bank of Korea20-Apr-198931-Dec-199765.065.0100.00.3-
Bank of Korea20-Jun-199431-Dec-200527.727.7100.020.0-
Bank of Korea 2/07-Jan-201131-Dec-2024500.086.717.3-85.7
Bank of Korea 2/4/20-Dec-201631-Dec-2024500.0----
Netherlands
Bank of the Netherlands 1/29-Sep-199931-Dec-2014450.0450.0100.055.226.7
Bank of the Netherlands 2/27-JUI-201031-Dec-2024500.0135.327.1-135.3
Bank of the Netherlands 2/4/20-Dec-201631-Dec-2024500.0----
Norway
Bank of Norway14-Apr-198831-Dec-199790.090.0100.02.7-
Bank of Norway16-Jun-199431-Dec-200560.060.0100.032.5-
Government of Norway 9/25-Jun-201031-Dec-2024300.0300.0100.0-197.8
Government of Norway 9/17-NOV-201631-Dec-2024300.0----
OPEC Fund for International Development 10/20-Dec-199431-Dec-200537.037.0100.025.7-
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 2/13-May-201131-Dec-2024500.0104.921.0-104.9
Spain
Bank of Spain 11/20-Jun-198830-Jun-1993220.0216.498.4--
Government of Spain08-Feb-199531-Dec-200567.067.0100.0--
Bank of Spain 1/14-Feb-200031-Dec-2014425.0425.0100.061.732.3
Bank of Spain 2/17-Dec-200931-Dec-2024405.0116.328.7-116.3
Bank of Spain 2/22-Feb-201731-Dec-2024450.0----
Sweden
Sweden17-Nov-201631-Dec-2024500.0----
Switzerland
Swiss Confederation 12/23-Dec-198831-Dec-1997200.0200.0100.0--
Swiss National Bank 1/22-Jun-199531-Dec-2014401.7401.7100.073.214.3
Swiss National Bank 2/21-Apr-201131-Dec-2024500.0102.520.5-102.5
Swiss National Bank 2/30-Aug-201731-Dec-2024500.0----
United Kingdom
Government of the United Kingdom 2/03-Sep-201031-Dec-202415.615.6100.0-14.4
Government of the United Kingdom 3/30-Nov-201531-Dec-20241,312.51,312.5100.0-1,312.5
Government of the United Kingdom 3/23-Jan-201731-Dec-20242,000.0----
Subtotal37,594.822,402.559.62,543.06,360.5
Associated Agreement -
Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)28-Feb-1989-- 13/49.549.5100.0--
Total Loan and Associated Loan Agreements 14/37,644.322,452.059.62,543.06,360.5

Including additional loan commitments for interim PRGF operations.

Committed to the General Loan Account of the PRGT.

Committed to the ECF Loan Account of the PRGT.

Augmentation of existing agreement.

Before April 17, 1998, known as Caisse Française de Développement.

The loan commitment, which became effective on August 20, 2009, was made in the context of establishment of the ESF.

In late 1999, the Bank of Italy replaced the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi as lender to the PRGF Trust.

On October 1, 1999, the Export-Import Bank of Japan merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund and became the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Committed to the SCF Loan Account and RCF Loan Account of the PRGT in equal proportion; the SCF component of the loan has been extended till end-2024.

The loan commitment is for the SDR equivalent of US$50 million.

The original loan commitment of the Bank of Spain was SDR 220 million; however, only SDR 216.4 million was drawn and disbursed by the expiration date for drawings.

The full loan commitment of SDR 200 million was drawn in January 1989; this amount was fully disbursed to borrowers by March 1994.

On August 26, 1998, the SFD indicated that it did not intend to make further loans in association with the PRGF.

Any mismatch of outstanding resources between the amount owed by PRGF borrowers and the amount owed to PRGF lenders arises because of mismatches in timing between drawdowns from lenders to the Trust and disbursements of PRGF loans to borrowers.

Including additional loan commitments for interim PRGF operations.

Committed to the General Loan Account of the PRGT.

Committed to the ECF Loan Account of the PRGT.

Augmentation of existing agreement.

Before April 17, 1998, known as Caisse Française de Développement.

The loan commitment, which became effective on August 20, 2009, was made in the context of establishment of the ESF.

In late 1999, the Bank of Italy replaced the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi as lender to the PRGF Trust.

On October 1, 1999, the Export-Import Bank of Japan merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund and became the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Committed to the SCF Loan Account and RCF Loan Account of the PRGT in equal proportion; the SCF component of the loan has been extended till end-2024.

The loan commitment is for the SDR equivalent of US$50 million.

The original loan commitment of the Bank of Spain was SDR 220 million; however, only SDR 216.4 million was drawn and disbursed by the expiration date for drawings.

The full loan commitment of SDR 200 million was drawn in January 1989; this amount was fully disbursed to borrowers by March 1994.

On August 26, 1998, the SFD indicated that it did not intend to make further loans in association with the PRGF.

Any mismatch of outstanding resources between the amount owed by PRGF borrowers and the amount owed to PRGF lenders arises because of mismatches in timing between drawdowns from lenders to the Trust and disbursements of PRGF loans to borrowers.

Appendix Table 2.Bilateral Commitments to the PRGF-ESF and PRG-HIPC Trusts 1/*(in millions of SDRs; as of end-February 2019)
PRGF-ESF Trust 2/PRG-HIPC Trust
Subsidy contributionsSubsidies and HIPC grant contributions 5/Of which: Pending
For subsidization 3/For MDRI debt relief 4/Total
TOTAL2,195.91,120.03,315.91,562.325.9
Major industrial countries1,422.6818.82,241.3880.5--
Canada144.884.8229.648.8--
France232.9116.4349.382.2--
Germany113.766.1179.8127.2--
Italy128.384.4212.763.6--
Japan435.6253.4689.0144.0--
United Kingdom267.2155.4422.682.2--
United States100.258.3158.4332.6--
Other advanced countries646.8250.4897.2299.7--
Australia12.63.716.324.8--
Austria61.7--61.714.3--
Belgium66.139.5105.635.3--
Denmark40.623.664.118.5--
Finland26.015.141.18.0--
Greece22.913.336.26.3--
Iceland2.61.54.20.9--
Ireland5.42.47.85.9--
Israel------1.8--
Korea39.621.060.615.9--
Luxembourg12.9--12.90.7--
Netherlands128.5--128.545.4--
New Zealand------1.7--
Norway26.815.742.518.5--
Portugal2.61.44.06.6--
San Marino------0.0*--
Singapore11.16.517.616.5--
Spain13.03.116.223.3--
Sweden109.065.0174.018.3--
Switzerland65.338.5103.837.0--
Fuel exporting countries10.26.116.3114.323.2
Algeria------5.5--
Bahrain------0.90.9
Brunei Darussalam------0.1--
Gabon------2.51.9
Iran, Islamic Republic of1.00.61.52.2--
Kuwait------3.1--
Libya------7.3--
Nigeria------13.9--
Oman------0.8--
Qatar------0.5--
Saudi Arabia9.25.514.753.5--
United Arab Emirates------3.8--
Venezuela------20.420.4
Other developing countries104.644.8149.4224.72.7
Argentina19.911.531.416.2--
Bangladesh0.50.20.81.7--
Barbados------0.4--
Belize------0.3--
Botswana1.00.61.66.4--
Brazil------15.0--
Cambodia------0.0*--
Chile2.31.33.64.4--
China9.84.214.019.7--
Colombia------0.9--
Cyprus------0.8--
Dominican Republic------0.50.5
Egypt7.54.311.81.3--
Eswatini------0.0*--
Fiji------0.1--
Ghana------0.5--
Grenada------0.10.1
India11.7--11.722.9--
Indonesia3.72.15.88.2--
Jamaica------2.7--
Lebanon------0.40.4
Malaysia19.211.230.412.7--
Maldives------0.010.0
Malta0.90.51.31.1--
Mauritius------0.1--
Mexico------54.5--
Micronesia, F. S.------0.0*--
Morocco5.43.28.61.6--
Pakistan2.10.32.53.4--
Paraguay------0.1--
Peru------2.5--
Philippines------6.7--
Samoa------0.0*--
South Africa------28.6--
Sri Lanka------0.6--
St. Lucia------0.1--
St. Vincent and the Grenadines------0.1--
Thailand7.44.411.94.5--
Tonga------0.0*--
Trinidad and Tobago------1.61.6
Tunisia0.60.30.91.5--
Turkey11.8--11.8----
Uruguay0.80.51.32.2--
Vanuatu------0.10.1
Vietnam------0.4--
Countries in transition11.8--11.842.9--
Croatia------0.4--
Czech Republic11.8--11.84.1--
Estonia------0.5--
Hungary------6.0--
Latvia------1.0--
Poland------12.0--
Russian Federation------14.6--
Slovak Republic------4.0--
Slovenia------0.4--

Less than SDR 5,000.

Pre-2006 fund-raising initiatives. Subsidy contributions pledged before 2006 to the benefit of the PRGF Trust, the remainder of which is now available for the PRGT, and for PRG-HIPC Trust.

Excludes SDR 100 million in end-2005 NPV terms committed by the G-8 to compensate for transfer from the PRGF Trust to the MDRI and subsidy resources pledged and/or received under fundraising rounds since 2006.

Estimated values of total contributions pledged before 2006. Amounts correspond to the nominal sum of contributions and earnings on outstanding balances.

Amounts transferred in early 2006 from the PRGF Subsidy Accounts to the MDRI Trust.

Amounts reported on “as needed” basis, corresponding to the nominal sum of concessional assistance taking into account the profile of subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending and the provision of HIPC assistance, respectively. Estimates were made at end-1999 in the context of HIPC fundraising based on members’ pledges.

Less than SDR 5,000.

Pre-2006 fund-raising initiatives. Subsidy contributions pledged before 2006 to the benefit of the PRGF Trust, the remainder of which is now available for the PRGT, and for PRG-HIPC Trust.

Excludes SDR 100 million in end-2005 NPV terms committed by the G-8 to compensate for transfer from the PRGF Trust to the MDRI and subsidy resources pledged and/or received under fundraising rounds since 2006.

Estimated values of total contributions pledged before 2006. Amounts correspond to the nominal sum of contributions and earnings on outstanding balances.

Amounts transferred in early 2006 from the PRGF Subsidy Accounts to the MDRI Trust.

Amounts reported on “as needed” basis, corresponding to the nominal sum of concessional assistance taking into account the profile of subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending and the provision of HIPC assistance, respectively. Estimates were made at end-1999 in the context of HIPC fundraising based on members’ pledges.

Appendix Table 3.ESF Subsidy Contributions 1/(in millions of currency units; as of end-February 2019)
Form of contributionContribution pledgedContribution received
(Amount)(SDR equivalent)(SDR equivalent)
CanadaGrantCAN$25.014.315.0
FranceConcessional loanSDR20.0 2/20.04.8 3/
IcelandGrantISK10.20.10.1
JapanGrantSDR20.020.020.0
NorwayGrantSDR24.724.724.7 4/
OmanGrantSDR3.03.02.2
Russian FederationGrantSDR30.030.030.0
Saudi ArabiaDeposit agreement 5/SDR40.0 6/40.07.1 3/
SpainGrantSDR5.35.35.3
Trinidad and TobagoDeposit agreementSDR0.8 6/0.80.2 3/7/
United KingdomGrant£50.053.153.1
Total Grant150.5150.4
Total Implicit Subsidy20.04.8
Total Investment and Deposit40.87.3
Total211.3162.4
Source: Finance Department.

2005 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) fundraising campaign.

To be generated as an implicit subsidy from the concessional loan at 0.5 percent or 6-month rate, whichever is lower.

Contributions received/generated in end-2005 NPV terms.

Received in five tranches during 2006–2012.

The investment guided by provisions of 2006 Memorandum of Understanding was converted to a BIS deposit based on June 2018 agreement.

Reflecting net investment income (in end-2005 NPV terms) to be generated from deposit/investment agreements.

Trinidad and Tobago’s deposit matured on September 18, 2017 and was repaid before generating the pledged amount of contribution.

Source: Finance Department.

2005 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) fundraising campaign.

To be generated as an implicit subsidy from the concessional loan at 0.5 percent or 6-month rate, whichever is lower.

Contributions received/generated in end-2005 NPV terms.

Received in five tranches during 2006–2012.

The investment guided by provisions of 2006 Memorandum of Understanding was converted to a BIS deposit based on June 2018 agreement.

Reflecting net investment income (in end-2005 NPV terms) to be generated from deposit/investment agreements.

Trinidad and Tobago’s deposit matured on September 18, 2017 and was repaid before generating the pledged amount of contribution.

Appendix Table 4.Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the PRGT(in millions of SDR units unless otherwise indicated; as of end-February 2019)
Under the 2009 LIC Financing Package 1/Contributions upon termination of the EPCA/ENDA subsidy account 2/Total Contributions Received
Form of contributionContributions pledgedContributions received
in millions of currency unitsSDR equivalentSDR millionSDR millionSDR million
AlgeriaGrantSDR 2.32.302.30-2.30
ArgentinaGrantSDR 3.93.903.90-3.90
AustraliaGrantA$30.017.6317.630.0617.69
AustriaGrantSDR 3.93.903.900.043.94
BelgiumGrant---0.230.23
BotswanaDepositSDR 0.20.20 3/0.04 4/-0.04
CanadaGrantCAN$40 and SDR 2.827.9627.960.7728.73
ChinaInvestmentSDR 17.517.50 3/4.70 4/0.084.78
DenmarkGrantDKK 30.03.573.57-3.57
IndonesiaDeposit--0.49--
ItalyGrantSDR 22.122.1022.10-22.10
IrelandGrant---0.030.03
JapanGrantSDR 28.828.8028.80-28.80
KoreaGrantSDR 8.88.808.800.209.00
KuwaitGrantUS$3.92.612.61-2.61
LuxembourgGrant---0.280.28
MalaysiaDeposit--0.01--
MaltaGrantSDR 0.20.200.20-0.20
MoroccoInvestmentSDR 1.11.10 3/0.35 4/-0.35
NetherlandsGrantSDR 9.59.50 5/10.331.2511.58
PeruDepositSDR 1.21.20 3/0.40 4/-0.40
PhilippinesGrantSDR 1.91.901.90-1.90
QatarGrantSDR 0.60.600.60-0.60
Saudi ArabiaGrantSDR 11.011.00 6/-0.150.15
South AfricaTBDSDR 3.43.40---
SpainGrantSDR 9.09.008.82-8.82
SwedenGrantSEK 50.04.814.773.157.92
SwitzerlandGrantCHF 16.011.1111.110.3611.47
Trinidad and TobagoTBDSDR 0.60.60---
United KingdomGrantSDR 19.819.8021.341.6022.94
UruguayInvestmentSDR 0.60.60 3/0.15 4/-0.15
Total Investment20.66.1
Total Grants and other193.5180.6
Total214.1186.88 .2194.5

2009 LIC fundraising campaign.

Transfer of members’ share in the balance of EPCA/ENDA Administered Subsidy Account upon the Account’s Termination on February 1, 2014 (see Update on the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Proposed Amendments to the PRGT Instrument, April 8, 2014).

Reflecting net investment income (in end-2008 NPV terms) to be generated from investment agreements.

Reflecting end-February 2019 net income earned on the investment (in end-2008 NPV terms).

Initial pledge of SDR 9.5 million has been changed to SDR 10.33 million, last payment received in February 2018.

A pledge of SDR 16,709,643 is to be received following expiry of existing deposit agreement with the PRGT on 12/31/2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in end 2008 NPV terms at the time when the pledge was made.

2009 LIC fundraising campaign.

Transfer of members’ share in the balance of EPCA/ENDA Administered Subsidy Account upon the Account’s Termination on February 1, 2014 (see Update on the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Proposed Amendments to the PRGT Instrument, April 8, 2014).

Reflecting net investment income (in end-2008 NPV terms) to be generated from investment agreements.

Reflecting end-February 2019 net income earned on the investment (in end-2008 NPV terms).

Initial pledge of SDR 9.5 million has been changed to SDR 10.33 million, last payment received in February 2018.

A pledge of SDR 16,709,643 is to be received following expiry of existing deposit agreement with the PRGT on 12/31/2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in end 2008 NPV terms at the time when the pledge was made.

Appendix Table 5.Distribution of the General Reserve Associated with Gold Windfall Profits 1/2/(in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019)
MemberDistribution of SDR 700 Million 3/Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million 4/
PledgesPayment/Transfer AmountDate of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral ContributionPledgesPayment/Transfer AmountDate of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution
(In millions of SDRs)(In millions of SDRs)
Afghanistan---1.191.1910/22/2013
Albania---0.440.4410/22/2013
Algeria3.693.6910/23/20129.229.2210/22/2013
Angola---2.102.1010/22/2013
Antigua and Barbuda---0.100.1010/22/2013
Argentina6.226.2210/23/201215.5615.5610/22/2013
Armenia0.270.2710/23/20120.680.6810/22/2013
Australia 5/9.519.554/26/201323.7923.287/23/2014
Austria6.216.2110/25/201315.5415.5410/25/2013
Azerbaijan---1.18-pending
Bahamas, The---0.960.9610/22/2013
Bahrain---0.99-pending
Bangladesh1.571.5710/23/20123.923.9210/22/2013
Barbados---0.500.5010/22/2013
Belarus1.141.1410/23/20122.842.8410/22/2013
Belgium 5/10.1510.118/28/201425.3825.4812/28/2015
Belize0.060.0610/26/20120.140.1410/22/2013
Benin0.180.1810/23/20120.450.4510/22/2013
Bhutan0.020.0210/23/20120.050.0510/22/2013
Bolivia------
Bosnia0.500.5010/23/20121.241.2410/22/2013
Botswana0.230.2310/23/20120.580.5810/22/2013
Brazil12.50-pending31.24-pending
Brunei0.630.6310/23/20121.581.5810/22/2013
Bulgaria1.691.6910/23/20124.234.2310/22/2013
Burkina Faso0.180.1810/23/20120.440.4410/22/2013
Burundi0.200.2010/23/20120.570.5710/22/2013
Cambodia0.260.2610/23/20120.640.6410/22/2013
Cameroon0.550.5510/23/20121.361.3610/22/2013
Canada18.7218.7210/23/201246.8146.8110/22/2013
Cape Verde0.030.0310/23/2012---
Central African Republic0.160.1610/23/2012---
Chad0.200.2010/23/20120.490.4910/22/2013
Chile------
China28.0028.0010/23/201270.0170.0110/22/2013
Colombia---5.57-pending
Comoros0.030.0310/23/20120.070.0710/22/2013
Congo, Democratic Republic of the1.571.5710/23/20123.923.9210/22/2013
Congo, Republic of---0.620.6210/22/2013
Costa Rica0.48-pending1.21-pending
Cote d’Ivoire0.960.9610/23/20122.392.3910/22/2013
Croatia0.540.5411/5/20131.341.3411/5/2013
Cyprus0.470.473/28/20161.161.163/28/2016
Czech Republic 6/2.952.9511/26/20127.377.3710/22/2013
Denmark5.565.5612/18/201313.9013.8512/4/2014
Djibouti0.050.0510/23/20120.120.1210/22/2013
Dominica0.020.0210/23/20120.060.0610/22/2013
Dominican Republic------
Ecuador------
Egypt2.772.7710/23/20126.946.9410/22/2013
El Salvador------
Equatorial Guinea---0.38-pending
Eritrea------
Estonia0.280.2810/23/20120.690.6910/22/2013
Estwatini------
Ethiopia0.390.3910/23/20120.980.9810/22/2013
Fiji0.210.2110/23/20120.520.5210/22/2013
Finland3.723.7210/23/20129.299.2910/22/2013
France31.5731.5710/23/201278.9278.9210/22/2013
Gabon0.450.4510/23/20121.131.1310/22/2013
Gambia, The0.090.0910/23/20120.230.2310/22/2013
Georgia0.440.4410/23/20121.101.1010/22/2013
Germany42.8242.8212/6/2012107.05107.0510/24/2013
Ghana 6/1.081.0811/8/20122.71-pending
Greece3.243.2410/23/20128.108.1010/22/2013
Grenada0.03-pending---
Guatemala------
Guinea0.310.3110/23/20120.790.7910/22/2013
Guinea-Bissau0.040.0410/23/20120.100.1010/22/2013
Guyana------
Haiti0.240.2410/23/20120.600.6010/22/2013
Honduras0.380.3810/23/20120.950.9510/22/2013
Hungary3.05-pending7.63-pending
Iceland 6/0.350.353/24/20140.860.862/24/2014
India17.1117.1110/23/201242.7842.7810/22/2013
Indonesia 7/6.11-pending15.28-pending
Iran, Islamic Republic of 5/4.404.409/8/201511.0011.009/8/2015
Iraq3.493.4910/23/2012---
Ireland3.703.7211/8/20179.249.3011/8/2017
Israel------
Italy23.1723.1710/23/201257.9357.9310/22/2013
Jamaica0.800.8010/23/20122.012.0110/22/2013
Japan 5/45.9438.093/11/2013114.86110.553/4/2014
Jordan 5/0.500.5010/23/20121.251.257/16/2015
Kazakhstan------
Kenya0.800.8010/23/20121.991.994/7/2014
Kiribati------
Korea 6/9.909.901/24/201324.7424.769/18/2014
Kosovo---0.430.4310/22/2013
Kuwait4.064.0610/23/201210.1510.1510/22/2013
Kyrgyz Republic0.260.2610/23/20120.650.6510/22/2013
Lao P.D.R. 6/0.160.1611/20/20120.390.3910/22/2013
Latvia0.420.4212/20/20121.041.0412/20/2013
Lebanon0.78-pending1.96-pending
Lesotho0.050.0510/23/20120.260.2610/22/2013
Liberia0.380.3810/23/2012---
Libya3.30-pending8.26-pending
Lithuania0.540.5410/23/20121.351.3510/22/2013
Luxembourg1.231.2310/24/20123.083.0810/22/2013
Macedonia, FYR0.200.2010/23/20120.510.5110/22/2013
Madagascar 2/------
Malawi0.180.1810/23/20120.510.5110/22/2013
Malaysia5.215.2110/23/201213.0413.0410/22/2013
Maldives0.030.0310/23/20120.070.0710/22/2013
Mali0.270.2710/23/20120.690.6910/22/2013
Malta0.300.3010/23/20120.750.7510/22/2013
Marshall Islands------
Mauritania0.190.1910/23/20120.470.4710/22/2013
Mauritius0.300.3010/23/20120.750.7511/7/2013
Mexico 5/10.6610.667/23/201526.6526.657/23/2015
Micronesia---0.040.0410/22/2013
Moldova0.360.3610/23/20120.910.9110/22/2013
Mongolia0.150.1510/23/20120.380.3810/22/2013
Montenegro0.040.0411/26/20120.100.1010/31/2013
Morocco1.731.7310/23/20124.324.3210/22/2013
Mozambique0.330.3310/23/20120.830.8310/22/2013
Myanmar0.760.7610/23/20121.901.9010/22/2013
Namibia0.400.4010/23/20121.001.0010/22/2013
Nepal 6/0.210.212/13/20130.520.5210/22/2013
Netherlands15.1815.1810/23/201237.9437.9410/22/2013
New Zealand2.632.6310/23/20126.576.5710/22/2013
Nicaragua0.380.3810/23/20120.960.9610/22/2013
Niger0.190.1910/23/20120.480.4810/22/2013
Nigeria5.155.1510/23/201212.8812.8810/22/2013
Norway5.545.5412/6/201313.8413.8412/6/2013
Oman0.700.7011/13/20131.741.7410/22/2013
Pakistan3.043.0410/23/20127.607.6010/22/2013
Palau------
Panama0.610.6110/23/20121.521.5210/22/2013
Papua New Guinea0.390.3910/23/20120.97-pending
Paraguay0.290.2910/7/20140.730.7310/7/2014
Peru1.88-pending4.69-pending
Philippines3.003.0010/23/2012---
Poland4.96-pending12.41-pending
Portugal3.033.0310/23/20127.577.5710/22/2013
Qatar0.890.8910/23/20122.22-pending
Romania 6/---7.577.5812/18/2015
Russia 6/17.4817.4910/10/201343.6943.6910/22/2013
Rwanda0.240.2410/23/20120.590.5910/22/2013
Samoa---0.090.0910/22/2013
San Marino0.070.0710/23/20120.080.0810/22/2013
Sao Tome0.020.0210/23/20120.050.0510/22/2013
Saudi Arabia20.5420.5410/23/201251.3451.3410/22/2013
Senegal0.480.4810/23/20121.191.1910/22/2013
Serbia, Republic of1.371.3710/23/20123.443.4410/22/2013
Seychelles0.030.0310/23/20120.080.0810/22/2013
Sierra Leone0.300.3010/23/20120.760.7610/22/2013
Singapore4.144.142/15/201710.3510.372/1/2017
Slovak Republic 5/1.131.1312/14/20122.832.8312/4/2013
Slovenia0.400.4012/4/20121.011.0110/25/2013
Solomon Islands0.030.0310/23/20120.080.0810/22/2013
Somalia 2/------
South Africa5.495.538/31/201713.7313.795/22/2017
South Sudan------
Spain11.8311.8310/23/201229.5729.5710/22/2013
Sri Lanka 6/1.221.222/1/20133.043.0410/22/2013
St. Kitts------
St. Lucia---0.110.1110/22/2013
St. Vincent and Grenadines------
Sudan 2/------
Suriname------
Sweden 6/7.047.0411/19/201217.6117.6110/22/2013
Switzerland 5/8/10.1710.171/23/201525.4227.041/24/2018
Syria------
Tajikistan0.260.2610/23/20120.640.6410/22/2013
Tanzania0.580.5810/23/20121.461.4610/22/2013
Thailand4.234.2310/23/201210.5910.5910/22/2013
Timor-Leste---0.060.0610/22/2013
Togo0.220.2210/23/20120.540.5410/22/2013
Tonga0.020.0210/23/20120.050.0510/22/2013
Trinidad and Tobago0.990.9910/23/2012---
Tunisia0.840.8410/23/20122.112.1110/22/2013
Turkey 5/4.284.274/5/201310.7010.7012/9/2015
Turkmenistan0.220.2210/23/20120.550.5510/22/2013
Tuvalu---0.010.0110/22/2013
Uganda0.530.5311/26/20141.331.3311/26/2014
Ukraine4.034.0310/23/201210.0810.0810/22/2013
United Arab Emirates2.212.2110/23/20125.535.5310/22/2013
United Kingdom 5/31.5732.213/21/201378.9278.834/7/2014
United States123.83123.8310/23/2012309.57309.5710/22/2013
Uruguay0.900.9010/23/20122.252.2510/22/2013
Uzbekistan0.81-pending---
Vanuatu---0.120.1210/22/2013
Venezuela------
Vietnam 6/1.351.354/5/20133.393.3910/22/2013
Yemen, Republic of---1.791.7910/22/2013
Zambia1.441.4410/23/20123.593.5910/22/2013
Zimbabwe1.041.0410/23/20122.602.6010/22/2013
Total664.6623.51,663.71,563.9
Total in percent of distribution94.989.195.189.4

Self-sustained PRGT fundraising campaign.

Madagascar was not approached with the request for contributing under either distribution; Sudan’s and Somalia’s shares were applied against their arrears.

The distribution became effective on October 12, 2012 and was implemented on October 23, 2012. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.

The distribution became effective on October 10, 2013 and was implemented on October 22, 2013. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.

Member’s actual contribution differs from initial pledge on account of foreign exchange rates on value date of payment.

The actual contribution includes interest earned in the Interim Administered Account.

In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.

Switzerland pledged to contribute its shares under both distributions in five equal annual installments. The last installment received on January 24, 2018.

Self-sustained PRGT fundraising campaign.

Madagascar was not approached with the request for contributing under either distribution; Sudan’s and Somalia’s shares were applied against their arrears.

The distribution became effective on October 12, 2012 and was implemented on October 23, 2012. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.

The distribution became effective on October 10, 2013 and was implemented on October 22, 2013. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.

Member’s actual contribution differs from initial pledge on account of foreign exchange rates on value date of payment.

The actual contribution includes interest earned in the Interim Administered Account.

In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.

Switzerland pledged to contribute its shares under both distributions in five equal annual installments. The last installment received on January 24, 2018.

Appendix Table 6.PRGT Subsidy Agreements(in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019)
AgreedEffective date of agreementVehicle 2/Deposit/Investment AmountInterest Rate (percent)Maturity (years)
AgreedOutstanding
Austria
Austrian National BankJun. 8, 1988Admin. Account60.0--0.55½–10
Austrian National BankApr. 19, 1994Admin. Account50.0--0.55½–10
Belgium
National Bank of BelgiumJun. 30, 1989Admin. Account100.0--0.510
National Bank of BelgiumApr. 21, 1994Admin. Account80.0--0.510
Botswana
Bank of Botswana 4/5/Jun. 30, 1994Admin. Account6.9--2.010
Bank of Botswana 6/7/Aug. 22, 2012Deposit in BIS Obligations1.51.50.15+5 3/
Chile
Banco Central de ChileAug. 24, 1994Admin. Account15.0--0.55
China
People’s Bank of China 6/8/Aug. 23, 2011Pooled with other Trust Assets100.0100.00.16¼ plus 3/
Greece
Bank of GreeceNov. 30, 1988Admin. Account35.0--0.55½–10 3/
Bank of GreeceApr. 22, 1994Admin. Account35.0--0.55½–10
Indonesia
Bank Indonesia 9/Jun. 23, 1994Admin. Account25.0----10 3/
Bank Indonesia 10/Jun. 30, 2014Deposit in BIS Obligations25.0--Variable 7/1/3 3/
Bank Indonesia 11/Oct. 27, 2014Deposit in BIS Obligations25.0--Variable 8/4/9/2019 3/
Bank Indonesia 11/Apr. 9, 2019Deposit in BIS Obligations35.935.9Variable 8/12/31/2023
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Central Bank of IranMay 24, 1994Admin. Account5.0--0.510
Malaysia
Bank Negara MalaysiaMay 17, 1988Subsidy Account Investments40.0--0.510 3/
Bank Negara Malaysia 5/Jun. 30, 1994Subsidy Account Investments40.0--2.010
Bank Negara MalaysiaJan. 1, 2019Deposit in BIS Obligations7.47.4-10
Malta
Central Bank of MaltaDec. 13, 1989Subsidy Account Investments1.4--0.513
Central Bank of MaltaMay 27, 1994Subsidy Account Investments1.4--0.513
Morocco
Bank Al.-Maghrib 12/Mar. 22, 2012Pooled with other Trust Assets7.87.8--5+0.5 +5 3/
Pakistan
State Bank of Pakistan 13/Apr. 21, 1994Subsidy Account Investments10.0--0.516
Peru
Banco Central de Reserva del Peru 6/14/Jan. 29, 2010Deposit in BIS Obligations6.16.10.17+7
Portugal
Banco do PortugalMay 5, 1994Admin. Account13.1--0.56–10
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Fund for Development 15/Apr. 11, 2006Deposit in BIS Obligations115.9115.90.5 or less15½
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 16/Jan 1. 2019Deposit in BIS Obligations16.716.7-3
Singapore
Monetary Authority of SingaporeNov. 4, 1988Subsidy Account Investments40.0--2.010 3/
Monetary Authority of Singapore 5/May 20, 1994Subsidy Account Investments40.0--2.010
Spain
Government of Spain 17/Feb. 8, 1995Subsidy Account Investments60.3--0.510
Thailand
Bank of ThailandJun. 14, 1988Subsidy Account Investments20.0--2.010 18/
Bank of ThailandApr. 22, 1994Subsidy Account Investments40.0--2.010 18/
Trinidad and Tobago
Government of Trinidad and TobagoDec. 7, 2006Subsidy Account Investments3.0--1.010
Tunisia
Banque Centrale de Tunisie 19/May 4, 1994Subsidy Account Investments3.6--0.510
Uruguay
Banco Central del Uruguay 20/Jul. 7, 1994Subsidy Account Investments7.2----10
Banco Central del Uruguay 6/Mar. 11, 2010Subsidy Account Investments2.02.0--10
Total1,075.1293.3

Agreements to provide subsidy contributions to the PRGT in the form of income earned on the deposit/investment in the Trust, net of below market rate of interest paid to the contributor on the principal of the deposit/investment. These do not include subsidies provided to the Trust as direct grants.

Starting from July 2017 contributors have an option to invest in Trust assets (“pooled investment”) or separately in BIS obligations. Prior to this change all investments were part of other invested assets unless they were held separately in a dedicated Administered Account.

Extended or repurposed upon maturity.

Equivalent of US$10 million (at the exchange rate of June 29, 1994).

The Fund made early repayments to Botswana, Malaysia, and Singapore on March 1, 2004.

No interest is paid if net investment earnings are lower than 0.1 percent per annum.

In August 2017, the agreement was temporary extended to August 30, 2022, and then in April 2018 renewed until August 30, 2023. The deposit is invested with the BIS obligations, separately from the Trust’s assets.

In November 2017, the agreement was extended until pledged contribution of SDR 17.5 million in 2008 NPV terms is generated from the investment.

Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2 percent per annum. If net return was less than 2 percent per annum, the deposit bore zero interest. The investment was extended in 2004 for another 10 years to benefit the HIPC Trust.

This was a temporary deposit agreement, which matured on October 27, 2014, when a new deposit agreement was finalized. The PRGT General Subsidy Account had benefited from the investment income of up to 2 percent while any excess of the 2 percent investment income had to be for the benefit of Bank Indonesia.

The deposit became effective on October 27, 2014 (replacing June 2014 temporary agreement) with maturity of December 31, 2018 which was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. On April 9, 2019 the extended agreement was replaced by a new one, with augmented principal, to benefit the PRGT in lieu of Indonesia’s pledge to contribute its shares in both gold profits distributions to the PRGT. The investment income of up to 2 percent shall be transferred for the benefit of the PRGT General Subsidy Account and any excess above the 2 percent shall benefit Bank Indonesia. The principal of the deposit is invested separately from other Trust’s assets in BIS obligations.

In March 2017, Morocco extended its investment agreement by additional six months and then by additional five years to September 22, 2022.

Several deposits totaling SDR 10 million, which were all repaid in March 2010, sixteen years after the effective date of the first deposit.

In January 2017, Peru extended its investment agreement by additional seven years, until January 29, 2024.

The principal includes (i) a new investment of SDR 38.2 million and (ii) a rollover of two investments of SDR 49.8 million and SDR 27.9 million from the PRG-HIPC Trust upon their maturities in 2011–14. Based on a revised agreement, starting from July 2018 the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns 0.5 percent or BIS rate, whichever is lower.

Based on a revised agreement (see above), the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns zero rate. Upon maturity on 12/31/2021 the principal will be transferred as grant to the PRGT.

The investment was made from repayments of each of the first nine (out of ten) semiannual drawings of SDR 67 million loan from the Government of Spain (the Instituto de Crédito Oficial) to the PRGT. The agreement expired in November 2012.

Deposit encashed/repaid before maturity in January 1998 due to BOP problems.

Equivalent of US$5 million (at the exchange rate of May 11, 1994).

Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2.6 percent per annum. No interest paid if net return was 2.6 percent per annum or less.

Agreements to provide subsidy contributions to the PRGT in the form of income earned on the deposit/investment in the Trust, net of below market rate of interest paid to the contributor on the principal of the deposit/investment. These do not include subsidies provided to the Trust as direct grants.

Starting from July 2017 contributors have an option to invest in Trust assets (“pooled investment”) or separately in BIS obligations. Prior to this change all investments were part of other invested assets unless they were held separately in a dedicated Administered Account.

Extended or repurposed upon maturity.

Equivalent of US$10 million (at the exchange rate of June 29, 1994).

The Fund made early repayments to Botswana, Malaysia, and Singapore on March 1, 2004.

No interest is paid if net investment earnings are lower than 0.1 percent per annum.

In August 2017, the agreement was temporary extended to August 30, 2022, and then in April 2018 renewed until August 30, 2023. The deposit is invested with the BIS obligations, separately from the Trust’s assets.

In November 2017, the agreement was extended until pledged contribution of SDR 17.5 million in 2008 NPV terms is generated from the investment.

Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2 percent per annum. If net return was less than 2 percent per annum, the deposit bore zero interest. The investment was extended in 2004 for another 10 years to benefit the HIPC Trust.

This was a temporary deposit agreement, which matured on October 27, 2014, when a new deposit agreement was finalized. The PRGT General Subsidy Account had benefited from the investment income of up to 2 percent while any excess of the 2 percent investment income had to be for the benefit of Bank Indonesia.

The deposit became effective on October 27, 2014 (replacing June 2014 temporary agreement) with maturity of December 31, 2018 which was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. On April 9, 2019 the extended agreement was replaced by a new one, with augmented principal, to benefit the PRGT in lieu of Indonesia’s pledge to contribute its shares in both gold profits distributions to the PRGT. The investment income of up to 2 percent shall be transferred for the benefit of the PRGT General Subsidy Account and any excess above the 2 percent shall benefit Bank Indonesia. The principal of the deposit is invested separately from other Trust’s assets in BIS obligations.

In March 2017, Morocco extended its investment agreement by additional six months and then by additional five years to September 22, 2022.

Several deposits totaling SDR 10 million, which were all repaid in March 2010, sixteen years after the effective date of the first deposit.

In January 2017, Peru extended its investment agreement by additional seven years, until January 29, 2024.

The principal includes (i) a new investment of SDR 38.2 million and (ii) a rollover of two investments of SDR 49.8 million and SDR 27.9 million from the PRG-HIPC Trust upon their maturities in 2011–14. Based on a revised agreement, starting from July 2018 the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns 0.5 percent or BIS rate, whichever is lower.

Based on a revised agreement (see above), the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns zero rate. Upon maturity on 12/31/2021 the principal will be transferred as grant to the PRGT.

The investment was made from repayments of each of the first nine (out of ten) semiannual drawings of SDR 67 million loan from the Government of Spain (the Instituto de Crédito Oficial) to the PRGT. The agreement expired in November 2012.

Deposit encashed/repaid before maturity in January 1998 due to BOP problems.

Equivalent of US$5 million (at the exchange rate of May 11, 1994).

Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2.6 percent per annum. No interest paid if net return was 2.6 percent per annum or less.

Appendix Table 7.PRG-HIPC Trust—Bilateral Deposit/Investment Agreements(in SDRs; as of end-April 2019)
ContributorType of agreementEffective date of agreementAmountAmount outstandingInterest rate (per annum)Term/date of maturity 1/
AlgeriaDeposit Agreement3/27/20017,600,0007,600,0000%3/27/2021
ArgentinaDeposit Agreement5/4/200115,628,05915,628,0590%5/4/2020
BotswanaInvestment Agreement4/25/199714,607,060-2%4/30/2002 2/
BotswanaInvestment Agreement8/9/200215,065,760-1%, variable 3/5 years
BotswanaInvestment Agreement5/9/20086,142,590-1%, variable 3/5 years
Brunei DarussalamPooled Investment10/24/200152,35152,3510%1/12/2028 4/
ChileDeposit Agreement10/1/199915,000,000-0.5%5 years
ColombiaDeposit Agreement9/21/20011,181,774-0%12/31/2018
CroatiaDeposit Agreement4/9/2001519,161-0%12/31/2018
CroatiaDeposit in BIS1/1/2019519,161519,1610%12/31/2023
Czech RepublicDeposit Agreement2/22/20005,664,0385,664,0380%2/24/2020
EgyptDeposit Agreement6/16/20001,723,6801,723,6800%6/30/2019 5/
FijiDeposit Agreement8/28/2003194,021-0%12/31/2018 2/
FinlandDeposit Agreement2/22/20015,811,869-0%12/31/2018 2/
GermanyDeposit Agreement1/31/2000220,656,300 6/-0%10 years
GhanaDeposit Agreement5/10/2000982,328-0.5%10 years
GreeceDeposit Agreement2/22/20015,440,000-0%10 years
HungaryDeposit Agreement12/8/20009,237,1059,237,1050%12/9/2019 7/
IndiaDeposit Agreement3/31/200031,370,304-0%12/31/2018
IndonesiaDeposit Agreement7/18/20004,850,030-0%4/9/2019 8/
IndonesiaDeposit Agreement4/9/201910,296,31710,296,3170%12/31/2023 8/
IndonesiaThe Instrument for the Administered Account Indonesia6/30/200425,000,000-Variable 9/June, 2014 2/
Iran, Islamic Republic ofInvestment Agreement5/30/19975,000,000 10/-0.5%10 years
KuwaitPooled Investment7/25/20004,196,5954,196,5950%1/12/2024 4/
LibyaDeposit Agreement10/8/20029,950,3709,950,3700%12/31/2019
MalaysiaInvestment Agreement6/26/199820,000,000-0.5%, variable 11/10 years
MalaysiaDeposit Agreement5/29/20017,368,106-0%12/31/2018 2/
MoroccoDeposit Agreement6/22/20002,186,9682,186,9680%6/22/2020
OmanPooled Investment7/5/20011,057,0411,057,0410%1/12/2024 4/
PakistanDeposit Agreement6/22/20004,659,3074,659,3070%6/22/2020
ParaguayDeposit Agreement12/18/2001310,097-1%5 years
PeruDeposit Agreement1/28/20006,143,881-1.5%10 years 2/
PolandDeposit Agreement6/12/20007,073,7807,073,7800%6/12/2020
QatarDeposit Agreement5/25/2000749,713749,7130%6/30/2019 5/
Saudi ArabiaMemorandum of Understanding3/16/200127,850,000 12/-0.5%10 years 2/
Saudi ArabiaMemorandum of Understanding3/16/200149,820,000-0.5%10 years 2/
Saudi ArabiaMemorandum of Understanding3/16/200116,709,643-0%12/31/2018 2/
SingaporeInvestment Agreement11/20/199840,000,000-0.5%, variable 13/10 years
SingaporeDeposit Agreements4/24/20014,045,647-0%12/31/2018
Sri LankaDeposit Agreement4/24/2000788,783788,7830%12/31/2023 14/
St. LuciaDeposit Agreement8/23/2000100,000-0.5%10 years
SwedenDeposit Agreement11/1/200118,600,000-0%12/31/2018
ThailandInvestment Agreement3/14/20016,128,354-0%12/31/2018 2/
TongaDeposit Agreement8/28/200325,898-0%12/31/2018 2/
TunisiaDeposit Agreement3/20/20012,361,6052,361,6050.5%3/20/2021
United Arab EmiratesPooled Investment7/24/20015,141,4625,141,4620%1/12/2024 4/
UruguayDeposit Agreement3/13/20027,940,000-Variable 15/10 years
VietnamDeposit Agreement5/24/2000522,962-0%12/31/2018 2/

Some agreements specified the maturity date and others a term (e.g., a “10 years” term indicates that the deposit is due in 10 years from the effective date of the agreement).

Repurposed upon maturity for the benefit of another concessional initiative (PRGT or CCRT).

Original interest rate was 2% per annum; in August 2004, the rate was amended to 1% per annum, but could have been reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 3% per annum.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended as a pooled investment.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019 pending further decisions.

The agreed amount was Euro 300 million and the deposit was denominated in Euro over its lifetime.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 9, 2018 was temporarily extended to December 9, 2019 pending further decisions.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. It was replaced by a new agreement on April 9, 2019 extending the deposit to end-2023 and augmenting its principal by one quarter of Indonesia’s shares in both gold profits distributions.

2% per annum of the net investment earnings (or any lesser amount if the returns on investments was below 2%) was to be transferred to the PRGF-HIPC Trust and the remainder to the depositor. Upon maturity of the deposit in June 2014, the Indonesian authorities agreed to put the SDR 25 million principal in a temporary deposit, pending an agreement to reinvest it in October 2014 for the benefit the PRGT.

Five annual installments of 10 year maturity, each equivalent to SDR 1 million.

Two installments (received in June 1998 and August 1999) with maturity date of 10 years each. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in June 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to be reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.

The investment consisted of 14 installments, each of 10 year maturity, with the first one received on March 27, 2001 and the last one on September 27, 2004. The installments originated from repayments of the outstanding amounts of associated loans made by the SFD to PRGF borrowers and the date of each installment corresponded to the date of repayment of the loans. Upon maturity, each subsequent installment has been reinvested to benefit the PRGT.

Four annual instalments of SDR 10 millions each (received in November 1998, August 1999, August 2000, and August 2001, respectively) and 10 year maturity. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in August 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to revert to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended to December 31, 2023 pending decision on a form of investment.

Interest rate obtained by the Trust minus 2.6% per annum; if the interest rate was 2.6% per annum or less, no interest was paid to the depositor.

Some agreements specified the maturity date and others a term (e.g., a “10 years” term indicates that the deposit is due in 10 years from the effective date of the agreement).

Repurposed upon maturity for the benefit of another concessional initiative (PRGT or CCRT).

Original interest rate was 2% per annum; in August 2004, the rate was amended to 1% per annum, but could have been reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 3% per annum.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended as a pooled investment.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019 pending further decisions.

The agreed amount was Euro 300 million and the deposit was denominated in Euro over its lifetime.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 9, 2018 was temporarily extended to December 9, 2019 pending further decisions.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. It was replaced by a new agreement on April 9, 2019 extending the deposit to end-2023 and augmenting its principal by one quarter of Indonesia’s shares in both gold profits distributions.

2% per annum of the net investment earnings (or any lesser amount if the returns on investments was below 2%) was to be transferred to the PRGF-HIPC Trust and the remainder to the depositor. Upon maturity of the deposit in June 2014, the Indonesian authorities agreed to put the SDR 25 million principal in a temporary deposit, pending an agreement to reinvest it in October 2014 for the benefit the PRGT.

Five annual installments of 10 year maturity, each equivalent to SDR 1 million.

Two installments (received in June 1998 and August 1999) with maturity date of 10 years each. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in June 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to be reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.

The investment consisted of 14 installments, each of 10 year maturity, with the first one received on March 27, 2001 and the last one on September 27, 2004. The installments originated from repayments of the outstanding amounts of associated loans made by the SFD to PRGF borrowers and the date of each installment corresponded to the date of repayment of the loans. Upon maturity, each subsequent installment has been reinvested to benefit the PRGT.

Four annual instalments of SDR 10 millions each (received in November 1998, August 1999, August 2000, and August 2001, respectively) and 10 year maturity. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in August 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to revert to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.

Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended to December 31, 2023 pending decision on a form of investment.

Interest rate obtained by the Trust minus 2.6% per annum; if the interest rate was 2.6% per annum or less, no interest was paid to the depositor.

Appendix Table 8.Pending Bilateral Contributions of Subsidy Resources to PRGT, PRG-HIPC and CCRT(in millions of SDR unless otherwise noted; as of end-April 2019)
CountryContribution pledgedOf which
Amount receivedAmount pending
Under the HIPC Initiative fundraising round 1/
Bahrain0.90-0.90
Dominican Republic0.50-0.50
Gabon2.500.601.90
Grenada0.10-0.10
Lebanon0.40-0.40
Maldives0.01-0.01
Trinidad & Tobago1.62-1.62
Vanuatu0.10-0.10
Venezuela20.35-20.35
Subtotal26.480.6025.88
Under the ESF fundraising round
Oman3.002.200.80
Trinidad and Tobago0.800.170.63 2/
Subtotal3.802.371.43
Under the 2009 fundraising round
Saudi Arabia16.70-16.70 3/
South Africa3.40-3.40
Trinidad and Tobago0.60-0.60
Subtotal20.70-20.70
Under the first distribution of the general reserve associated with gold windfall profits (of SDR 700 million)
Brazil12.50-12.50
Costa Rica0.48-0.48
Grenada0.03-0.03
Hungary3.05-3.05
Indonesia 4/6.11-6.11
Lebanon0.78-0.78
Libya3.30-3.30
Peru1.88-1.88
Poland4.96-4.96
Uzbekistan0.81-0.81
Subtotal33.91-33.91
Under the second distribution of the general reserve associated with gold windfall profits (of SDR 1,750 million)
Azerbaijan1.18-1.18
Bahrain0.99-0.99
Brazil31.24-31.24
Colombia5.57-5.57
Costa Rica1.21-1.21
Equatorial Guinea0.38-0.38
Ghana2.71-2.71
Hungary7.63-7.63
Indonesia 4/15.28-15.28
Lebanon1.96-1.96
Libya8.26-8.26
Papua New Guinea0.97-0.97
Peru4.69-4.69
Poland12.41-12.41
Qatar2.22-2.22
Subtotal96.71-96.71
Under the CCRT fundraising round (in USD million)
Mexico7.971.74 5/6.23
Subtotal7.971.746.23
Total189.584.71184.86

Estimated on “as needed” basis.

Contribution generated from a ten year deposit, repaid upon maturity in September 2017, estimated as SDR 0.17 million in 2005 NPV terms.

Agreed to be paid at end‐2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in 2008 NPV terms.

In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.

Partial contribution received on July 31, 2018.

Estimated on “as needed” basis.

Contribution generated from a ten year deposit, repaid upon maturity in September 2017, estimated as SDR 0.17 million in 2005 NPV terms.

Agreed to be paid at end‐2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in 2008 NPV terms.

In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.

Partial contribution received on July 31, 2018.

Appendix Table 9.PRGT Reserve Account Coverage(in millions of SDR; as of end of period)
YearReserve Account balance (A)Outstanding PRGT credit 3/ (B)Reserve coverage ratio (In percent) (A)/(B)
1988169103164.1
198927251053.3
199039579549.7
19915131,32038.9
19926301,78635.3
19937932,00539.6
19941,0092,78636.2
19951,3363,91934.1
19961,7164,44638.6
19972,0934,89242.8
19982,3455,42143.3
19992,5485,82043.8
20002,7145,77347.0
20012,9175,97148.9
20023,0796,63646.4
20033,1156,70346.5
20043,1746,63247.9
20053,2856,18553.1
20063,3923,656 1/92.8
20073,5573,67396.8
20083,8183,89598.0
20093,9264,96579.1
20103,9675,06878.3
20113,9815,09278.2
20123,962 2/5,58171.0
20133,919 2/5,97265.6
20143,861 2/6,06363.7
20153,826 2/6,39859.8
20163,8806,38060.8
20173,816 2/6,43459.3
20183,778 2/6,36159.4
Memorandum item:
PRGT repayments: January-December 2018940

The decline in total PRGT credit outstanding by about 40 percent from 2005 reflects early repayments arising from the delivery of HIPC and MDRI debt relief.

The decline in Reserve Account balances during 2012–15 and in 2017–18 is on account of the administrative fees reimbursed to the GRA that have exceeded net investment returns.

Credit outstanding to PRGT lenders.

The decline in total PRGT credit outstanding by about 40 percent from 2005 reflects early repayments arising from the delivery of HIPC and MDRI debt relief.

The decline in Reserve Account balances during 2012–15 and in 2017–18 is on account of the administrative fees reimbursed to the GRA that have exceeded net investment returns.

Credit outstanding to PRGT lenders.

Appendix Table 10.Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the CCRT(in millions of SDR unless otherwise indicated; as of end-April 2019)
MDRI-II TransferNew resourcesTotal contributions receivedPrincipal of Deposit Invested 1/
PledgedGrants Received
In SDR millionIn US$ millionSDR equivalentSDR equivalentIn SDR million
Argentina0.40--0.40-
Australia0.13--0.13-
Austria 2/-----
Bangladesh0.01--0.01-
Belgium1.37--1.37-
Botswana0.02--0.02-
Canada2.94--2.94-
Chile0.05--0.05-
China0.15--0.15-
Denmark0.82--0.82-
Egypt0.15--0.15-
Fiji----0.19
Finland0.53--0.535.81
France4.04--4.04-
Germany2.2930.0021.4923.79-
Greece0.46--0.46-
Iceland0.05--0.05-
Indonesia 3/0.07--0.075.45
Ireland0.08--0.08-
Italy2.93--2.93-
Japan8.807.305.3414.14-
Korea0.73--0.73-
Malaysia0.39--0.39-
Malta0.02--0.02-
Mexico-11.001.741.74-
Morocco0.11--0.11-
Norway0.54--0.54-
Pakistan0.01--0.01-
Portugal0.052.001.451.50-
Saudi Arabia0.19--0.19-
Singapore0.22--0.22-
Spain0.11--0.11-
Sweden2.26--2.26-
Switzerland1.34--1.34-
Thailand0.15--0.156.13
Tonga----0.03
Tunisia0.01--0.01-
Turkey-1.000.740.74-
United Kingdom5.4042.0029.9235.32-
United States2.02--2.02-
Uruguay0.02--0.02-
Vietnam----0.52
Total38.8693.3060.6899.5418.13

Former HIPC deposits repurposed upon maturity in December 2018 and invested in BIS obligations for 5 to 15 years to generate income for the benefit of the CCRT.

CCR pledge was rescinded pending a budget allocation of grant resources.

Indonesia decided to invest in BIS deposits one quarter of its shares in both distributions of gold sales profits for the benefit of the CCRT. The related agreement became effective on April 9, 2019.

Former HIPC deposits repurposed upon maturity in December 2018 and invested in BIS obligations for 5 to 15 years to generate income for the benefit of the CCRT.

CCR pledge was rescinded pending a budget allocation of grant resources.

Indonesia decided to invest in BIS deposits one quarter of its shares in both distributions of gold sales profits for the benefit of the CCRT. The related agreement became effective on April 9, 2019.

Appendix Table 11.Implementation of the HIPC Initiative(in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019)
Decision pointCompletion pointAmount committedAmount disbursed 1/
Completion point countries (36)2,4212,595
1Afghanistan 2/Jul-07Jan-10--
2BeninJul-00Mar-031820
3BoliviaFeb-00Jun-0162 3/65 4/
4Burkina FasoJul-00Apr-0244 3/46 4/
5BurundiAug-05Jan-091922
6CameroonOct-00Apr-062934
7Central African RepublicSep-07Jun-091718
8ChadMay-01Apr-151417
9ComorosJul-10Dec-1233
10Congo, Dem. Rep. ofJul-03Jul-10280331
11Congo, Rep. ofMar-06Jan-1056
12Côte d’IvoireApr-09Jun-1243 3/26 5/
13EthiopiaNov-01Apr-044547
14Gambia, TheDec-00Dec-0722
15GhanaFeb-02Jul-049094
16GuineaDec-00Sep-122835
17Guinea-BissauDec-00Dec-1099
18GuyanaNov-00Dec-0357 3/60 4/
19HaitiNov-06Jun-0922
20HondurasJun-00Apr-052326
21LiberiaMar-08Jun-10441452 6/
22MadagascarDec-00Oct-041516
23MalawiDec-00Aug-063337
24MaliSep-00Mar-0346 3/49 4/
25MauritaniaFeb-00Jun-023538
26MozambiqueApr-00Sep-01107 3/108 4/
27NicaraguaDec-00Jan-046471
28NigerDec-00Apr-043134
29RwandaDec-00Apr-054751
30São Tomé and PríncipeDec-00Mar-0711
31SenegalJun-00Apr-043438
32Sierra LeoneMar-02Dec-06100107
33TanzaniaApr-00Nov-018996
34TogoNov-08Dec-1000
35UgandaFeb-00May-00120 3/122 4/
36ZambiaDec-00Apr-05469508
Pre-decision point countries (1)
37Eritrea
Protracted arrears cases (2)
38Somalia
39Sudan
Total2,4212,595

Includes the commitment made in NPV terms plus interest earned on that commitment.

Afghanistan, at the time of its decision point, did not have any outstanding eligible debt to the IMF and, therefore, did not receive debt relief under the HIPC Initiative from the Fund.

Includes commitment under the Original HIPC Initiative.

Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda benefited from both the Original and Enhanced HIPC Initiatives.

Côte d’Ivoire reached its decision point under the original HIPC Initiative in 1998, but did not reach its completion point under the original HIPC Initiative. Debt relief of SDR 17 million, committed to Côte d’Ivoire under the original HIPC Initiative, was therefore not delivered.

The cost for providing debt relief to Liberia was not included in the original financing framework of the HIPC Initiative, therefore, additional financing would need to be secured.

Includes the commitment made in NPV terms plus interest earned on that commitment.

Afghanistan, at the time of its decision point, did not have any outstanding eligible debt to the IMF and, therefore, did not receive debt relief under the HIPC Initiative from the Fund.

Includes commitment under the Original HIPC Initiative.

Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda benefited from both the Original and Enhanced HIPC Initiatives.

Côte d’Ivoire reached its decision point under the original HIPC Initiative in 1998, but did not reach its completion point under the original HIPC Initiative. Debt relief of SDR 17 million, committed to Côte d’Ivoire under the original HIPC Initiative, was therefore not delivered.

The cost for providing debt relief to Liberia was not included in the original financing framework of the HIPC Initiative, therefore, additional financing would need to be secured.

Appendix Table 12.Debt Relief Following Implementation of the MDRI(in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019)
Delivery dateFund credit from disbursements prior to end-2004 1/ (A)Financed by HIPC umbrella sub-accounts 2/ (B)Remaining MDRI-eligible credit (C=A-B=D+E)Financed by
MDRI-I Trust (D)MDRI-II Trust (E)
HIPC countries (28)3/2,8636702,1921,1041,088
1BeninJan-0636.1234-34
2BoliviaJan-06160.96155-155
3Burkina FasoJan-0662.155757-
4BurundiFeb-0926.41799-
5CameroonApr-06173.324149-149
6Central African RepublicJul-094.0222-
7Congo, Dem. Rep. ofJul-10248.1248---
8Congo, Rep. ofJan-107.935-5
9EthiopiaJan-06112.1328080-
10Gambia, TheDec-079.4277-
11GhanaJan-06265.445220220-
12Guinea-BissauDec-100.510--
13GuyanaJan-0645.11332-32
14HondurasJan-06107.5998-98
15MadagascarJan-06137.39128128-
16MalawiSep-0637.9231515-
17MaliJan-0675.1136262-
18MauritaniaJun-0632.9330-30
19MozambiqueJan-06106.6248383-
20NicaraguaJan-06140.54992-92
21NigerJan-0677.6186060-
22RwandaJan-0652.7332020-
23São Tomé and PríncipeMar-071.4011-
24SenegalJan-06100.3695-95
25Sierra LeoneDec-06117.3417777-
26TanzaniaJan-06234.027207207-
27UgandaJan-0687.7127676-
28ZambiaJan-06402.64398-398
Non-HIPC countries (2)4/126-126126-
29CambodiaJan-0657-5757-
30Tajikistan, Rep. ofJan-0669-6969-
Memorandum item (1)TotalFinanced by LAARemaining debtFinanced by LAA
31Liberia 5/Jun-10543427116116-
Total6/3,5321,0972,4341,3471,088

Amount outstanding at the completion point (net of repayments between January 1, 2005 to the completion point date).

Balances available at the time of MDRI debt relief.

Afghanistan, Comoros, Haiti, and Togo did not have MDRI-eligible credit and did not receive MDRI debt relief. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea had fully repaid MDRI-eligible debt by completion point date.

Non-HIPCs but qualified for MDRI debt relief with a per capita income below the US$380 threshold.

Liberia received “MDRI-like” (beyond-HIPC) debt relief at end-June 2010, which was financed from the Liberia Administered Account (LAA). Its eligible credit outstanding corresponds to the amount of arrears clearance to the IMF in March 2008.

Including Liberia’s beyond HIPC debt-relief.

Amount outstanding at the completion point (net of repayments between January 1, 2005 to the completion point date).

Balances available at the time of MDRI debt relief.

Afghanistan, Comoros, Haiti, and Togo did not have MDRI-eligible credit and did not receive MDRI debt relief. Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea had fully repaid MDRI-eligible debt by completion point date.

Non-HIPCs but qualified for MDRI debt relief with a per capita income below the US$380 threshold.

Liberia received “MDRI-like” (beyond-HIPC) debt relief at end-June 2010, which was financed from the Liberia Administered Account (LAA). Its eligible credit outstanding corresponds to the amount of arrears clearance to the IMF in March 2008.

Including Liberia’s beyond HIPC debt-relief.

Appendix Table 13.Pending Disbursements to Finance Debt Relief to Liberia(in millions of SDRs, in March 14, 2008 NPV terms; as of end-April 2019)
Brazil16.90Mali0.19
Burkina Faso0.06Rwanda0.07
Chad0.05Samoa0.01
Guinea-Bissau0.01Sierra Leone0.38
Total17.7
Appendix Table 14.PRGT Historical Access from 2010 by Facilities(in percent of quota at approval or otherwise noted)
PRGT Credit Outstanding (in % of quota as of end-March 2019)Quota at Approval (in SDRs)Date of ApprovalExpiration DateOriginal PRGT CommitmentAugmentationGRA Commitment
ECF
Moldova57.05123,200,0001/29/20101/28/2013150.0-150.0
Malawi113.4469,400,0002/19/20102/18/201375.0--
Mauritania73.7164,400,0003/15/20103/14/2013120.0--
Grenada101.1511,700,0004/18/20104/17/201375.0--
Guinea-Bissau85.2514,200,0005/7/20105/6/2013157.5--
Lesotho48.7234,900,0006/2/20106/1/2013120.025.0-
Benin90.8261,900,0006/14/20106/13/2013120.0--
Burkina Faso126.9860,200,0006/14/20106/13/201376.760.0-
Armenia 1/63.3592,000,0006/28/20106/27/2013145.0-145.0
Sierra Leone124.73103,700,0007/1/20106/30/201330.0--
Haiti38.0481,900,0007/21/20107/20/201350.0--
Yemen20.90243,500,0007/30/20107/29/2013100.0--
Kenya66.55271,400,0001/31/20111/30/2014120.060.0-
Kyrgyz Republic66.2988,800,0006/20/20116/19/201475.0--
Cote d’Ivoire104.11325,200,00011/4/201111/3/2014120.040.0-
Afghanistan12.46161,900,00011/14/201111/13/201452.5--
Mali120.5393,300,00012/27/201112/26/201432.2--
Burundi25.8477,000,0001/27/20121/26/201539.013.0-
Guinea107.91107,100,0002/24/20122/23/2015120.042.1-
Niger121.1965,800,0003/16/20123/15/2015120.062.5-
Bangladesh54.86533,300,0004/11/20124/10/2015120.0--
Gambia46.9631,100,0005/25/20125/24/201560.0--
Central African Republic129.5455,700,0006/25/20126/24/201575.0--
Sao Tome-Principe32.717,400,0007/20/20127/19/201535.0--
Malawi113.4469,400,0007/23/20127/22/2015150.050.0-
Liberia59.77129,200,00011/19/201211/18/201540.046.4-
Solomon Islands9.7910,400,00012/7/201212/6/201510.0--
Sierra Leone124.73103,700,00010/21/201310/20/201660.0120.0-
Mali120.5393,300,00012/18/201312/17/201632.2167.8-
Burkina Faso126.9860,200,00012/27/201312/26/201645.047.4-
Grenada101.1511,700,0006/26/20146/25/2017120.00.0-
Chad164.0866,600,0008/1/20147/31/2017120.090.5-
Yemen20.90243,500,0009/2/20149/1/2017150.0--
Ghana114.41369,000,0004/3/20154/2/2018180.0--
Kyrgyz Republic66.2988,800,0004/8/20154/7/201875.0--
Haiti38.0481,900,0005/18/20155/17/201860.0--
Guinea-Bissau85.2514,200,0007/10/20157/9/2018120.040.0-
Sao Tome-Principe32.717,400,0007/13/20157/12/201860.0--
Afghanistan12.46323,800,0007/20/20167/19/201910.0--
Central African Republic129.54111,400,0007/20/20167/19/201975.045.0-
Madagascar101.80244,400,0007/27/201611/26/201990.012.5-
Moldova57.05172,500,00011/7/201611/6/201925.0-50.0
Cote d’Ivoire104.11650,400,00012/12/201612/11/201925.08.350.0
Niger121.19131,600,0001/23/20171/22/202075.0--
Benin90.82123,800,0004/7/20174/6/202090.0--
Togo80.82146,800,0005/5/20175/4/2020120.0--
Sierra Leone124.73207,400,0006/5/20176/4/202078.0--
Cameroon118.36276,000,0006/26/20176/25/2020175.0--
Chad164.08140,200,0006/30/20176/29/2020160.0--
Mauritania73.71128,800,00012/6/201712/5/202090.0--
Guinea107.91214,200,00012/11/201712/10/202056.3--
Burkina Faso126.98120,400,0003/14/20183/13/202190.0--
Malawi113.44138,800,0004/30/20184/29/202156.3--
Sierra Leone124.73207,400,00011/30/20186/29/202260.0--
RCF
Nepal28.1771,300,0006/7/20106/7/201040.0--
Kyrgyz Republic66.2988,800,0009/24/20109/24/201025.0--
St. Lucia10.3815,300,0001/20/20111/20/201125.07.2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines33.348,300,000⅜/2011⅜/201125.0--
Cote d’Ivoire104.11325,200,0007/19/20117/19/201125.0--
St. Vincent and the Grenadines33.348,300,0008/3/20118/3/201115.0--
Dominica67.038,200,0001/19/20121/19/201225.0--
Yemen20.90243,500,0004/17/20124/17/201225.0--
Mali120.5393,300,0002/5/20132/5/201312.9--
Samoa39.3811,600,0005/24/20135/24/201350.0--
Mali120.5393,300,0006/18/20136/18/201310.7--
Central African Republic129.5455,700,0005/22/20145/22/201415.0--
Madagascar101.80122,200,0006/26/20146/26/201425.0--
St. Vincent and the Grenadines33.348,300,0008/12/20148/12/201425.017.7
Guinea107.91107,100,00010/2/201410/2/201425.0--
Guinea-Bissau85.2514,200,00011/12/201411/12/201425.0--
Liberia59.77129,200,0002/27/20152/27/201525.0--
Central African Republic129.5455,700,0003/26/20153/26/201510.0--
Gambia46.9631,100,0004/13/20154/13/201525.0--
Vanuatu35.7117,000,0006/15/20156/15/201550.0-35.7
Nepal28.1771,300,0008/10/20158/10/201550.0--
Central African Republic129.5455,700,0009/24/20159/24/201515.0--
Dominica67.038,200,00011/5/201511/5/201575.0--
Madagascar101.80122,200,00011/25/201511/25/201525.0--
Haiti38.04163,800,00011/23/201611/23/201618.8--
Gambia46.9662,200,0007/5/20177/5/201718.8--
SCF
Solomon Islands9.7910,400,0006/2/201012/1/2011120.0--
Honduras-129,500,00010/1/20103/31/201250.0-50.0
Solomon Islands9.7910,400,00012/6/201112/5/201250.0--
Georgia 2/-150,300,0004/11/20124/10/201483.2-83.2
Tanzania15.83198,900,0007/6/20121/5/201475.0--
Honduras-129,500,00012/3/201412/2/201640.0-60.0
Kenya66.55271,400,0002/2/20152/1/201650.0-130.0
Mozambique44.38113,600,00012/18/20156/17/2017180.0--
Kenya66.55542,800,0003/14/20163/13/201865.3-130.7
Rwanda90.07160,200,0006/8/201612/7/201790.0--

Armenia graduated from PRGT in 2013.

Georgia graduated from PRGT in 2014; as of end-March 2019 all concessional credit has been repaid.

Armenia graduated from PRGT in 2013.

Georgia graduated from PRGT in 2014; as of end-March 2019 all concessional credit has been repaid.

3

See 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries—Reform Proposals.

4

The PRGT is established as a trust. The IMF acts as a trustee of the PRGT and trust assets are separate from resources in the GRA.

5

Fund concessional lending began in the 1970s and has since evolved. In July 2009, the Board approved a comprehensive reform of the IMF’s concessional facilities and financing framework. Assistance is provided through the facilities of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) to support eligible countries in achieving and maintaining a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.

7

This implies that any future modifications would be expected to ensure that the demand for IMF concessional lending can reasonably be met with the resources available under the first and second pillars under a plausible range of scenarios.

8

Loan contributors have the option to provide loan resources at below market rates.

9

Bilateral contributions are from distributions of the windfall gold sale profits, or typically provided through either grants or investments placed by contributors with the PRGT at zero or below market interest rates (the returns―or net differential returns―earned on the investment by the PRGT represents the subsidy contribution to the PRGT) (See Appendix Tables 67). Subsidy accounts also contain SDA resources contributed by the Fund.

10

Under the self-sustained model, the available resources in the PRGT subsidy accounts would be gradually drawn down to a zero balance, while balances in the Reserve Account would be allowed to grow so the returns on its assets could be used to subsidize concessional lending in perpetuity without depleting the Reserve Account. The SDA is a vehicle used to receive profits from the sale of gold held by the IMF at the time of the Second Amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (1978). Resources under the subsidy and reserve accounts are invested in line with the recently-approved investment strategy for Trust Assets.

11

The 2015 PRGT loan mobilization round was endorsed by the Executive Board in 2014 with the objective to raise additional borrowing capacity for the PRGT of up to SDR 11 billion (See Update on the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Proposed Amendments to the PRGT Instrument).

12

Under the encashment regime, the PRGT provides participating lenders with the right to request early repayment of outstanding claims in case of balance of payments need. The Fund repays the requesting lender by drawing down resources committed to the PRGT by other participating lenders, by means of a liquidity buffer of 20 percent of the loan amounts committed by lenders in the encashment regime.

13

PRGT borrowing limits have been in place since 1989 to ensure that new PRGT borrowing would not take place without prior consultation with loan account creditors regarding the justification for such borrowing and the adequacy of the Reserve Account. See Modifying the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Cumulative Borrowing Limit (See Modifying the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) Cumulative Borrowing Limit).

14

While the bulk of loan resources (SDR 8.9 billion) are in the General Loan Account (GLA), the rest is allocated among facility-specific accounts: ECF loan account (SDR 4.8 billion), the SCF loan account (SDR 150 million), and the RCF loan account (SDR 150 million).

15

Based on the amended PRGT instrument, loan resources from previous mobilization rounds will be drawn before new resources are activated. See Decision No. 16051-(16/86), adopted September 20, 2016, which amended the drawing mechanism under the PRGT Instrument to prioritize the use of resources from agreements effective earlier than May 31, 2014, before drawing on new resources. This amendment took effect on December 20, 2016, following consents from all affected PRGT lenders with undrawn loan balances.

16

The PRG-HIPC Trust was established in 1997 to provide assistance to LICs by making grants and/or loans to reduce external debt burdens to sustainable levels and to subsidize the interest payments. Upon liquidation, surplus funds shall be made available for self-sustained PRGT operations unless contributors request otherwise. See Section III and Section V, paragraph 2 of the PRG-HIPC Trust Instrument, as annexed to Decision No. 11436–97/10 and as amended.

17

The investment provided by Trinidad and Tobago was repaid at maturity before generating the pledged amount of contribution.

18

It is expected that income from investments would allow the RA balance to increase until subsidy account resources are fully drawn, upon which the RA resources could then be used to subsidize concessional lending in perpetuity. See also Footnote 10 above.

20

Usage is counted only when a financial arrangement has been in place for more than 6 months in a given calendar year, or if an RCF disbursement took place.

21

While there has been a significant variation across country cases and over time, access levels have on average been around the prevailing norms for ECF arrangements, which continue to account for the bulk of PRGT-supported programs. Average access under SCF arrangements has been somewhat above the applicable norms, although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions given the relatively small sample of SCF cases. RCFs do not currently have access norms.

22

The model assumes that the level of access is preserved in percent of nominal GDP for PRGT-eligible countries.

23

Apart from long-term growth and the incidence of crises, demand could be affected by structural changes in the access to alternative sources of financing, geopolitical developments, or pressures arising from natural disasters and climate change.

24

The proposed package also includes a higher cumulative access limit under the large natural disasters window of the RCF, but the expected impact on PRGT financing is low since the threshold for a large natural disaster is only expected to be met by small states with low quotas.

25

See Proposal to Distribute Remaining Windfall Gold Sales Profits and Strategy to Make the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Sustainable.

26

Only a subgroup of PRGT countries are eligible for assistance under the CCRT. Requirements include: (i) a per capita income below the International Development Association’s (IDA) operational cutoff (currently US$1,145) or (ii) limited to Small States (i.e. a population below 1.5 million) with a per capita income below twice the IDA cutoff. Moreover, to qualify under the CCRT’s catastrophic disaster window, the shock must have (i) directly affected at least one third of the population; and (ii) destroyed more than a quarter of the country’s productive capacity or caused damage deemed to exceed 100 percent of GDP. The second window is used to provide relief when an eligible member suffers a qualifying public health disaster.

27

The Trust was initially funded by repurposing the resources from its predecessor, the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief (PCDR) Trust and with residual balances from the MDRI-I and MDRI-II Trusts (see Appendix Table 10). These initial funds were adequate to grant support at the time of its establishment. However, to ensure the viability of the Trust and its capacity to meet future financing needs, a mobilization campaign of bilateral contributions to raise US$150 million (equivalent to SDR 106 million) was launched at the time of its establishment.

28

This includes contributions from the MDRI-II by 36 countries.

29

See 2018 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries.

30

Resources for debt relief came from gold sales and bilateral contributions in the form of grants or deposits generating income for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC Trust.

31

While Eritrea has no outstanding obligations to the Fund, Sudan and Somalia have protracted arrears (see paragraph 31).

32

Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam.

33

Of these, 3 have been temporarily extended to allow the authorities more time to finalize domestic procedures of renewal. One of the renewed deposit agreements was augmented by SDR 5.4 million; hence the total amount of renewed deposits agreements for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC stood at SDR 33.7 million.

35

In the context of the MDRI in 2005, the G-8 committed that donors would provide the extra resources necessary for full debt relief at HIPC Completion Point for the remaining protracted arrears cases (see G-8 Financing Ministers’ Conclusion on Development (2005)).

36

Both Somalia and Sudan are included in the list of HIPC-eligible countries. Following the separation of Sudan and South Sudan, the two countries reached the so-called “zero option” agreement in September 2012, with successive extensions since then, whereby Sudan would retain all external liabilities after the secession of South Sudan, provided that the international community gave firm commitments to the delivery of debt relief. Absent such a commitment, Sudan’s external debt would be apportioned with South Sudan based on a formula to be determined.

37

In 2008, with financing from a bridge loan provided by the US, Liberia cleared its long-standing overdue obligations to the IMF. Upon clearance of its arrears, the IMF Board approved an ECF/EFF arrangement; tranche (UCT)-policy standards could put Somalia on a path towards debt relief. Reaching the HIPC Decision Point will require sustained policy commitment and performance under that UCT SMP, alongside reconciliation of external debt data, and preparation of a poverty reduction strategy. In addition, given Somalia’s protracted arrears to the Fund, reaching the Decision Point will require cooperation with the Fund on policies and payments. Reaching the HIPC Decision Point would also require broad support from donors to provide the financial resources needed for arrears clearance and to cover the Fund’s cost of debt relief.

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