IMF Working Papers

Journal

Publisher:: International Monetary Fund
ISSN:: 1018-5941

The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. With nearly 300 released each year, working papers cover a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.

Get eTOC Alert

Download

To "B" or Not to "B" : A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

Get Code

Buy

Journal Issue

Volume/Issue:: 2000/189
Series:: IMF Working Papers
Author(s):: Danyang Xie
Publisher:: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Published Date:: November 2000
DOI:: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451859607.001
ISBN:: 9781451859607
ISSN:: 1018-5941
Page:: 18

This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is 'no' in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be 'yes' in a model advocated by Jones (1995).

Show Summary Details

To “B” or not to “B” - A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

To “B” or not to “B”: A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

IMF Working Papers

Table of contents Table of contents

To "B" or Not to "B" : A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model

Table of contents