Africa > Uganda
This paper revisits monetary policy transmission in Uganda, focusing on the credit and exchange rate channels. Despite inflation being below the target, the Bank of Uganda has maintained a tight monetary policy stance. The findings support the importance of exchange rate developments in shaping monetary policy actions in Uganda, offering several policy recommendations to further strengthen monetary policy transmission and enhance the inflation targeting framework.
This paper explores why increased aid flows require economic policymakers to confront some specific issues. Ensuring that increased aid promotes growth and reduces poverty is certainly the most important task. Empirical studies offer only mild support for aid-boosting growth. However, one study suggests that once one excludes the aid flows aimed at political and humanitarian goals, a positive net effect is observed for the remaining aid focused on economic objectives. This paper also outlines the roles to be played by development partners for making the aid being properly utilized for boosting growth.
This paper discusses the structural adjustment in low-income countries. In the first 20 months of its operations, the IMF’s structural adjustment facility (SAF) has provided concessional financial assistance to support the balance-of-payments adjustment efforts of 21 low-income member countries. Most SAF arrangements have supported policy reform programs that have also received support under other IMF facilities. The fundamental concept underlying the SAF is the notion that growth and adjustment are mutually reinforcing.
Abstract
Cette brochure est le sixième exposé consacré aux changements intervenus, sur le plan international et national, dans la législation et dans la pratique monétaire, concernant les droits de tirage spéciaux (DTS), les monnaies et l'or. Ce document souligne le fait que la monnaie d'un pays membre détenu par le FMI dans des comptes autres que le compte des ressources générales n'est pas assujettie, selon les statuts du FMI, au principe du maintien de sa valeur en termes de DTS applicable aux monnaies détenues au compte des ressources générales. Le FMI est habilité, explicitement ou implicitement, à investir des avoirs dans des comptes auxquels ne s'applique aucune obligation de maintien de la valeur.
Abstract
This paper presents the sixth survey of developments in international and national monetary law and practice involving special drawing rights (SDRs), currencies, and gold. The paper highlights that a member’s currency held by the IMF in accounts other than the General Resources Account is not subject under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to the principle of maintenance of value in terms of the SDR that applies to currency held in the IMF’s General Resources Account. The IMF has express or implied powers to invest holdings in accounts to which no obligation to maintain value is attached.
Abstract
Under the Articles, the Fund must oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation and must also oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations regarding exchange arrangements.45 In order to fulfill these functions, the Fund must exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members and must adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to these policies. Members, when requested by the Fund, must consult with it on their exchange rate policies.46 The Fund had adopted two decisions in 1977 and 1979 in which it set forth the principles for guidance and the procedures for surveillance.47 The Fund has reviewed these matters, and on April 9, 1982 adopted the decision set forth in Appendix B.
Abstract
The Gold Commission was appointed by the Secretary of the United States Treasury on June 22, 1981 in accordance with Section 10 of Public Law 96-389246 to “conduct a study to assess and make recommendations with regard to the policy of the U.S. Government concerning the role of gold in domestic and international monetary systems.” In March 1982, the Commission discharged its duty of reporting to Congress.247 The appointment of the Commission was followed by a cataract of suggestions in learned and other publications in the United States and elsewhere on the conclusions that the Commission should reach.
Abstract
1. The list of authorized holders of SDRs, apart from the Fund itself and members, has grown to 13 but is not closed. The terms and conditions prescribed by the Fund for all these “other holders” are the same. Other holders have begun to hold and deal in SDRs. The authorization of the Fund is not necessary for the use of the SDR as a unit of account or means of payment under contracts.
Abstract
In Pamphlet No. 36 (1981), there was a discussion of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the decisions of the Fund that deal with the Fund’s prescription of the entities that may hold and deal in special drawing rights (SDRs).1 These “other holders” (i.e., other than members of the Fund and the Fund itself) may hold and deal in SDRs proper, which means SDRs that came into existence when allocated by the Fund to participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department. All members of the Fund have decided to be participants. Any entity, official or private, may enter into contracts under which the SDR is the unit of account. The SDR in this sense is not the SDR proper but is, as a minimum, the means of expressing a value by reference to the value of the SDR in terms of currency. Prescription by the Fund is not necessary for the use of the SDR as a unit of account. A decision by the Fund is necessary if the Fund itself agrees to undertake the burden or accept the benefit of an obligation denominated in SDRs, but a decision of this kind has nothing to do with prescriptions of other holders of SDRs.