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Ibrahim Nana
,
Rasmané Ouedraogo
, and
Sampawende J Tapsoba
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between uncertainty and trade. We use a gravity model for 143 countries over the 1980-2021 period to assess the impact of uncertainty on bilateral trade. We confirm that, in general, uncertainty has a negative impact on trade. The findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in global uncertainty is associated with a decline in bilateral trade by 4.5 percent, with fuel and industrial products trade being the most impacted. This negative impact is observed for uncertainty on both sides of the border, with a higher impact of uncertainty from the importing country. The article goes deeper into the analysis and shows that deeper trade integration (horizontal integration) mitigates the negative impact of uncertainty on trade. In contrast, higher participation in global value chains (vertical integration) amplifies the negative effect of uncertainty on trade. We find that geopolitical tensions amplify the deterrent effect of uncertainty on trade. Finally, the result is heterogeneous across income levels, regions, and resource endowment: (a) uncertainty has a negative impact on bilateral trade between Emerging Markets and Developing Economies and Advanced Economies; however, (b) at the regional level, Africa and Europe’s intraregional trade decrease as uncertainty surges. (c) Evidence shows that non-resources-rich countries are more at risk.
Kevin Fletcher
,
Veronika Grimm
,
Thilo Kroeger
,
Aiko Mineshima
,
Christian Ochsner
,
Andrea F. Presbitero
,
Paul Schmidt-Engelbertz
, and
Jing Zhou
Global geopolitical tensions have risen in recent years, and European energy prices have been volatile following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some analysts have suggested that these shifting conditions may significantly affect FDI both to and from Germany. To shed light on this issue and other factors affecting German FDI, we leverage two detailed and complementary FDI datasets to explore recent trends in German FDI and how it is affected by geopolitical tensions and energy prices. In doing so, we also develop a new measure of geopolitical alignment. Our main findings include the following: (i) the post-pandemic recovery in Germany’s inward and outward FDI has been weaker than in the US or the rest of the European Union (EU27) as a whole; (ii) Germany’s outward FDI linkages with geopolitically distant countries have been weakening since the Global Financial Crisis; (iii) the relationship between Germany’s outward FDI and geopolitical distance has become more pronounced over the last six years; (iv) Germany’s outward FDI to China-Russia bloc countries is more sensitive to recent geopolitical developments compared with that to US-bloc countries; and (v) Germany’s outward FDI in energy-intensive sectors decreases as destination countries’ energy costs increase, but energy costs do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on outward FDI in non-energy intensive sectors.
Gita Gopinath
,
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
,
Andrea F Presbitero
, and
Petia Topalova
Global linkages are changing amidst elevated geopolitical tensions and a surge in policies directed at increasing supply chain resilience and national security. Using granular bilateral data, this paper provides new evidence of trade and investment fragmentation along geopolitical lines since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and compares it to the historical experience of the early years of the Cold War. Gravity model estimates point to significant declines in trade and FDI flows between countries in geopolitically distant blocs since the onset of the war in Ukraine, relative to flows between countries in the same bloc (roughly 12% and 20%, respectively). While the extent of fragmentation is still relatively small and we do not know how longlasting it will be, the decoupling between the rival geopolitical blocs during the Cold War suggests it could worsen considerably should geopolitical tensions persist and trade restrictive policies intensify. Different from the early years of the Cold War, a set of nonaligned ‘connector’ countries are rapidly gaining importance and serving as a bridge between blocs. The emergence of connectors has likely brought resilience to global trade and activity, but does not necessarily increase diversification, strengthen supply chains, or lessen strategic dependence.
Mr. Jorge A Alvarez
,
Mehdi Benatiya Andaloussi
,
Chiara Maggi
,
Alexandre Sollaci
,
Martin Stuermer
, and
Petia Topalova
This paper studies the economic impact of fragmentation of commodity trade. We assemble a novel dataset of production and bilateral trade flows of the 48 most important energy, mineral and agricultural commodities. We develop a partial equilibrium framework to assess which commodity markets are most vulnerable in the event of trade disruptions and the economic risks that they pose. We find that commodity trade fragmentation – which has accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – could cause large price changes and price volatility for many commodities. Mineral markets critical for the clean energy transition and selected agricultural commodity markets appear among the most vulnerable in the hypothetical segmentation of the world into two geopolitical blocs examined in the paper. Trade disruptions result in heterogeneous impacts on economic surplus across countries. However, due to offsetting effects across commodity producing and consuming countries, surplus losses appear modest at the global level.
International Monetary Fund. African Dept.
This paper focuses on United Republic of Tanzania’s 2023 Article IV Consultation and First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement. Reforms focus on strengthening the economic recovery, preserving macroeconomic stability, and supporting structural reforms toward sustainable and inclusive growth. Tanzania’s economic reform program is progressing. All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets for December 2022 were met. The structural benchmarks to prepare and begin implementing a plan to clear all expenditure arrears and to submit the amendments to the Banking and Financial Institutions Act to Parliament were completed ahead of time. Spillovers from the war in Ukraine and domestic factors have weighed on Tanzania’s economic recovery from the pandemic. While inflation remains below target, the Bank of Tanzania should stand ready to tighten monetary policy as needed while allowing more exchange rate flexibility against external shocks. Structural reforms are essential to promote inclusive, resilient, and sustainable growth. Business reforms should focus on streamlining bureaucratic procedures, simplifying the business regulatory regime, and enhancing regulatory transparency.
International Monetary Fund. African Dept.

Abstract

A funding squeeze has hit the region hard. Persistent global inflation and tighter monetary policies have led to higher borrowing costs for sub-Saharan African countries and have placed greater pressure on exchange rates. Indeed, no country has been able to issue a Eurobond since spring 2022.The interest burden on public debt is rising, owing to a greater reliance on expensive market-based funding combined with a long-term decline in aid budgets. The lack of financing affects a region that is already struggling with elevated macroeconomic imbalances. Public debt and inflation are at levels not seen in decades, with double-digit inflation present in about half of the countries—eroding household purchasing power and striking at the most vulnerable. In this context, the economic recovery has been interrupted. Growth in sub-Saharan Africa will decline to 3.6 percent this year. Amid a global slowdown, activity is expected to decelerate for a second year in a row. Still, this headline figure masks significant variation across the region. The funding squeeze will also impact the region’s longer-term outlook. A shortage of funding may force countries to reduce resources for critical development sectors like health, education, and infrastructure, weakening the region’s growth potential.

International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This paper outlines key changes in the global trade landscape in recent years, reviews the role of the Fund in this area, and outlines a trade strategy for the Fund going forward. The analysis points to three key messages. First, while trade has been resilient vis-à-vis recent global shocks, the deteriorating trade policy environment poses risks to the current levels of prosperity. Second, the Fund has responded quickly to key trade developments in its multilateral surveillance, but attention to trade policy has declined pointing to the need of improved expertise. Third, a reinvigorated trade strategy for the Fund would help country authorities to address key challenges, including adjusting to structural changes associated with climate change and new technologies; promoting policy coherence between trade and non-trade objectives such as climate, inequality, and security; and managing rising geopolitical tensions and risks of geo-economic fragmentation.
International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept
Thailand’s economy is recovering from an unprecedented crisis emanating from multiple waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ample policy space has allowed a swift and bold policy response and vaccine rollout has accelerated. However, the recovery is weak and uneven across sectors, with inflation rapidly rising driven by energy prices. Downside risks dominate the outlook, sharpening policy tradeoffs. The pandemic has also brought to the fore the urgency for Thailand to identify new growth drivers to reverse the pre-pandemic trend of declining productivity growth and meet the challenges of the post-pandemic world.
Mr. Serhan Cevik
Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.
Mr. Alexei P Kireyev
and
Andrei Leonidov
This paper proposes a method for assessing international spillovers from nominal demand shocks. It quantifies the impact of a shock in one country on all other countries. The paper concludes that the network effects in shock spillovers can be substantial, comparable, and often exceed the initial shock. Individual countries may amplify, absorb, or block spillovers. Most developed countries pass-through shocks, whereas low-income countries and oil exporters tend to block shock spillovers. The method is used to study demand shocks originating from a large and medium country, China and Ukraine respectively.