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Saioa Armendariz
,
Carlos de Resende
,
Alice Fan
,
Gianluigi Ferrucci
,
Bingjie Hu
,
Sadhna Naik
, and
Can Ugur
This paper examines competitiveness and productivity in the Baltics. Focusing on recent developments, it asks why Russia’s war in Ukraine led to a prolonged recession and strong decline in competitiveness in Estonia, while Latvia and Lithuania shielded their economies more effectively. The paper starts by documenting a deterioration in export performance across the region. Using a constant share decomposition, it finds that, unlike in Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia’s declining export share has been mainly linked to a reduction in the ‘intensive margin’—a sign of weakening external competitiveness and declining relative productivity. Multivariate filtering techniques and estimates of the real effective exchange rates based on historical productivity trends, consistent with Balassa-Samuelson, confirm that differences in long-term total factor productivity growth have affected external competitiveness. While Estonia’s post-GFC slowdown in productivity growth and real exchange rate appreciation have eroded its competitive edge, Latvia and Lithuania have shown greater resilience, aided by more balanced real effective exchange rates and, for Lithuania, stronger corporate balance sheets. A micro-econometric analysis further reveals that resource misallocation, particularly in the services sector, has been a key driver of declining productivity in the region. These findings underscore the need for targeted reforms to improve allocative efficiency, boost productivity, and restore competitiveness in the Baltic region.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.

Abstract

Europe’s economy is recovering, benefiting from a strong crises’ response. Yet, the recovery is falling short of its full potential. Uncertainty about persistent core inflation, policy directions, and geopolitical conflicts is dampening the near-term outlook. In the longer term, perennially weak productivity growth—a result of limited scale and business dynamism–-amid new headwinds from fragmentation and climate change are holding back growth potential. Steady macro policies are needed to navigate an uncertain environment. This requires transitioning to a neutral monetary policy stance and reducing fiscal deficits without jeopardizing the recovery. Policymakers also need to tackle barriers to higher potential growth. A larger and more integrated single market for goods, services, and capital will incentivize investment, innovation, and generate scale benefits. Deepening European integration will also strengthen economic resilience by insulating businesses and labor markets from global fragmentation pressures. These are formidable policy challenges, but now is the time to bring Europe to its full potential.

Francesca Caselli
,
Huidan Huidan Lin
,
Frederik G Toscani
, and
Jiaxiong Yao
Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, immigration into the European Union (EU) reached a historical high in 2022 and stayed significantly above pre-pandemic levels in 2023. The recent migration has helped accommodate strong labor demand, with around two-thirds of jobs created between 2019 and 2023 filled by non-EU citizens, while unemployment of EU citizens remained at historical lows. Ukrainian refugees also appear to have been absorbed into the labor market faster than previous waves of refugees in many countries. The stronger-than-expected net migration over 2020-23 into the euro area (of around 2 million workers) is estimated to push up potential output by around 0.5 percent by 2030—slightly less than half the euro area’s annual potential GDP growth at that time—even if immigrants are assumed to be 20 percent less productive than natives. This highlights the important role immigration can play in attenuating the effects of the Europe’s challenging demographic outlook. On the flipside, the large inflow had initial fiscal costs and likely led to some congestion of local public services such as schooling. Policy efforts should thus seek to continue to integrate migrants into the labor force while making sure that the supply of public services and amenities (including at the local level) keeps up with the population increase.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
The 2024 Article IV Consultation highlights that the Latvian economy contracted with significant disinflation. Amid high uncertainty, growth is projected to rebound, but risks are tilted to the downside. Considering the improving outlook, the IMF Staff recommends a less expansionary, neutral fiscal stance for 2024 and a tighter fiscal stance in 2025. Although Latvia has some fiscal space, structural fiscal measures are needed to provide buffers for medium to long term spending pressures. Although the financial sector has so far been resilient, continued monitoring of macrofinancial vulnerabilities and spillovers is warranted. While the current macroprudential policy stance is broadly appropriate, the recent adjustment to the borrower-based measures for energy-efficient housing loans should be reconsidered. The overall policy stance strikes the right balance between maintaining financial stability and the need to extend credit to the economy. However, borrower-based macroprudential measures should be relaxed only when their presence is overly stringent from the financial stability perspective.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
The 2024 Article IV Consultation explains that the euro area is recovering gradually, with a modest acceleration of growth projected for 2024, gathering further speed in 2025. Increasing real wages together with some drawdown of household savings are contributing to consumption, while the projected easing of financing conditions is supporting a recovery in investment. A modest pickup in growth is projected for 2024, strengthening further in 2025. This primarily reflects expected stronger consumption on the back of rising real wages and higher investment supported by easing financing conditions. Inflation is projected to return to target in the second half of 2025. The economy is confronting important new challenges, layered on existing ones. Beyond returning inflation to target and ensuring credible fiscal consolidation in high-debt countries, the euro area must urgently focus on enhancing innovation and productivity. Higher growth is essential for creating policy space to tackle the fiscal challenges of aging, the green transition, energy security, and defense.
Luis Brandão-Marques
,
Roland Meeks
, and
Vina Nguyen
When uncertain about inflation persistence, central banks are well-advised to adopt a robust strategy when setting interest rates. This robust approach, characterized by a "better safe than sorry" philosophy, entails incurring a modest cost to safeguard against a protracted period of deviating inflation. Applied to the post-pandemic period of exceptional uncertainty and elevated inflation, this strategy would have called for a tightening bias. Specifically, a high level of uncertainty surrounding wage, profit, and price dynamics requires a more front-loaded increase in interest rates compared to a baseline scenario which the policymaker fully understands how shocks to those variables are transmitted to inflation and output. This paper provides empirical evidence of such uncertainty and estimates a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area to derive a robust interest rate path for the ECB which serves to illustrate the case for insuring against inflation turning out to have greater persistence.
Mai Hakamada
and
Carl E. Walsh
Central banks in major industrialized economies were slow to react to the surge in inflation that began in early 2021. The proximate causes of this surge were the supply chain disruptions associated with the easing of COVID restrictions, fiscal policies designed to cushion the economic impact of COVID, and the impact on commodity prices and supply chains of the war in Ukraine. We investigate the consequences of policy delay in responding to inflation shocks. First, using a simple three-period model, we show how policy delay worsens inflation outcomes, but can mitigate or even reverse the output decline that occurs when policy responds without delay. Then, using a calibrated new Keynesian framework and two measures of loss that incorporate a “balanced approach” to weigh inflation and the output gap, we find that loss is monotonically increasing in the length of the delay. Loss is reduced if policy, when it does react, is more aggressive. To investigate whether these results are sensitive to the assumption of rational expectations, we consider cognitive discounting as an alternative assumption about expectations. With cognitive discounting, forward guidance is less powerful and results in a reduction in the costs of delay. Under either assumption about expectations, the costs of a short delay can be eliminated by adopting a less inertial policy rule and a more aggressive response to inflation.
Serhan Cevik
,
Alice Fan
, and
Sadhna Naik
Using a large panel of firm-level data, this paper provides an analysis of how inflation shocks in the Baltics between 1997 and 2021 affected total factor productivity (TFP), gross profitability, and net fixed investment in nonfinancial sectors. First, we find that inflation and inflation volatility had mixed effects on TFP growth, profitability and net fixed investment in the first year as well as over the medium term, albeit at a dissipating rate. Second, focusing on subsamples, we find that inflation shocks had differential effects on large versus small firms. Third, we explore sectoral heterogeneity in how firms responded to inflation shocks and observe significant variation across tradable and non-tradable sectors. Finally, estimates from a state-dependent model suggest that firms’ response to inflation shocks varied with the state of the economy. The results suggest that nonfinancial firms in the Baltics have been agile in adjusting to inflation shocks, possibly by either transferring higher production costs to consumers or substituting inputs. Given the differences in the level and nature of the recent inflation shock and the sample period on which our analysis is based, empirical findings presented in this paper might not necessarily apply to the latest bout of inflation in the Baltics.
Tryggvi Gudmundsson
,
Chris Jackson
, and
Rafael A Portillo
We study the global inflation surge during the pandemic recovery and the implications for aggregate and sectoral Phillips curves. We provide evidence that Phillips curves shifted up and steepened across advanced economies, and that differences in the inflation response across sectors imply the relative price of goods has been pro-cyclical this time around rather than a-cyclical as during previous cycles. We show analytically that these three features emerge endogenously in a two-sector new-Keynesian model when we introduce unbalanced recoveries that run against a supply constraint in the goods sector. A calibrated exercise shows that the resulting changes to the output-inflation relation are quantitatively important and improve the model's ability to replicate the inflation surge during this period.