Western Hemisphere > Suriname

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International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
and
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
At the request of the Central Bank of Suriname (CBvS), this technical assistance (TA) mission assessed and provided recommendations to enhance the transparency, consistency, and stakeholder engagement of monetary policy and financial stability communication. Strengthening communication in these areas is critical to reinforcing the CBvS’s credibility, aligning its practices with international standards, and supporting its mandate for price and financial stability. The mission recommended institutionalizing structured decision-making by implementing fixed schedules for Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) and Financial Stability Advisory Committee (FSAC) meetings, followed by policy-setting Executive Board sessions. These efforts should be supported by the introduction of forward-looking publications, including a Monetary Policy Report (MPR) and an enhanced Financial Stability Report (FSR), ensuring more structured and transparent communication. To further strengthen engagement, the report emphasizes the importance of proactive outreach and capacity-building programs to improve public understanding, foster market confidence, and reinforce CBvS’s credibility. Implementing these measures will enhance transparency, facilitate clearer communication of policy decisions, and help regain public trust in the CBvS’s commitment to monetary and financial stability.
Mr. Serhan Cevik
and
Tianle Zhu
Monetary independence is at the core of the macroeconomic policy trilemma stating that an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and free movement of capital cannot exist at the same time. This study examines the relationship between monetary autonomy and inflation dynamics in a panel of Caribbean countries over the period 1980–2017. The empirical results show that monetary independence is a significant factor in determining inflation, even after controlling for macroeconomic developments. In other words, greater monetary policy independence, measured as a country’s ability to conduct its own monetary policy for domestic purposes independent of external monetary influences, leads to lower consumer price inflation. This relationship—robust to alternative specifications and estimation methodologies—has clear policy implications, especially for countries that maintain pegged exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar with a critical bearing on monetary autonomy.