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International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
,
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
, and
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The Food Shock Window (FSW) under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) was approved in September 2022 for 12 months, as a complement to the tools used by the Fund to support the broader international effort to address the global food shock. The Fund has been working closely with partners to provide a coordinated international response to the global food shock, and has contributed through policy advice, technical assistance and lending. Where needed and possible, financial support to countries affected by the global food shock has been delivered by the IMF through multi-year Fund-supported programs The FSW complemented this support in situations where these programs were not feasible or not necessary. As the global food shock and associated balance of payment pressures are expected to continue throughout 2023, the IMF extended the FSW until end-March 2024 to allow the FSW to continue serving as a contingency tool. This extension will also provide sufficient time to observe if the FSW can lapse without limiting the capacity of the Fund to support its members. To ensure adequate borrowing space under the emergency financing limits for those countries that have received support through the FSW, the IMF also extended the additional 25 percent of quota added to the Cumulative Access Limit until end-2026 for countries that have accessed the Food Shock Window through the RFI and until the completion of the 2024/25 PRGT review for those that accessed the Food Shock Window through the RCF.
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
,
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
, and
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
The IMF extended the temporarily higher Cumulative Access Limits under the Fund’s Emergency Financing instruments, the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) under the General Resources Account, and the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. This extension ensures that the Fund can continue to support member countries that accessed Fund’s emergency financing during COVID-19 pandemic in case of renewed emergency situations. The temporarily higher cumulative access limits under the RFI will be maintained until end-June 2024 when most RFI recipients will have repaid a significant part of their past emergency financing. The temporarily higher cumulative access limits under the RCF will be maintained until the completion of the 2024/25 comprehensive review of the Fund’s concessional facilities and financing, given the longer repayment schedule for RCF financing.
Yasemin Bal Gunduz
,
Mr. Christian H Ebeke
,
Ms. Burcu Hacibedel
,
Ms. Linda Kaltani
,
Ms. Vera V Kehayova
,
Mr. Chris Lane
,
Mr. Christian Mumssen
,
Miss Nkunde Mwase
, and
Mr. Joseph Thornton

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

Carl-Johan Dalgaard
and
Mr. Lennart Erickson
The First Millennium Development Goal (MDG#1) is to cut the fraction of global population living on less than one dollar per day in half, by 2015. Foreign aid financed investments may contribute to the attainment of this goal. But how much can aid be reasonably expected to accomplish? A widespread calibration approach to answering this question is to employ the so-called development planning technique, which has the Harrod-Domar growth model at its base. Two particularly problematic assumptions in this sort of analysis are the absence of diminishing returns to capital input and an infinite speed of adjustment to steady state after a shock to the economy. We remove both of these assumptions by employing a Solow model as an organizing framework for an otherwise similar analysis. We find that in order to successfully meet the MDG#1 in the context of the currently proposed aid flows, these flows will have to be accompanied by either an acceleration in the underlying productivity growth rate or a major boost to domestic savings and investment in sub-Saharan Africa. In the absence of such changes in the economic environment, the MDG#1 is unlikely to be reached.
Gilles Nancy
and
Boriana Yontcheva
This paper studies the aid allocation of European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Once population is controlled for, poverty consistently appears as the main worldwide determinant of NGO aid allocation. NGOs do not respond to strategic considerations. Their funding source does not seem to exert a great influence on their aid allocation decision. We also find differences across regions. Militarization and the political nature of the regime of the recipient country affect aid allocation in the Middle East. Life expectancy influences aid allocation in countries in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East.