We analyze the effect of IMF programs on economic agents' expectations about the economy in transitional countries using survey data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer poll, an annual general public survey monitoring the evolution of public opinion from 1990 to 1997. Previous studies, in contrast, have looked at indirect measures, such as capital flows or yield spreads, to assess the impact of IMF programs on economic expectations. Using a multinomial probit model, we find that IMF loans appear to have a strong effect on agent expectations in the early years, through the inflow of real money, and through the signaling effect. IMF programs during periods of collapsing growth appear to reinforce underlying expectations for the future; they are associated with positive expectations for those with an optimistic outlook and negative expectations for those with a negative outlook. Once recovery is underway, and economic uncertainty diminishes, it appears that IMF programs cease to have a statistically significant effect on the expectations of economic agents. This suggests that IMF programs have the biggest impact on expectations during periods of great uncertainty and less of an impact when countries are subject to minor shocks.
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
Should a closed economy open its trade to all countries or limit itself to participation in regional trade agreements (RTAs)? Based on time-series evidence for a data set for 1950-92, this paper estimates and compares the growth performance of countries that liberalized broadly and those that joined an RTA. The comparisons show that economies grew faster after broad liberalization, both in the short and long run, but slower after participation in an RTA. Economies also had higher investment shares after broad liberalization, but lower ones after joining an RTA. The policy implications support broad liberalization.