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Diego Mesa Puyo
,
Augustus J Panton
,
Tarun Sridhar
,
Martin Stuermer
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Christoph Ungerer
, and
Alice Tianbo Zhang
The global energy transition is affecting fossil fuel exporters from multiple angles. It is adding to longstanding uncertainties on relative movements of fossil fuel demand and supply—which impact fossil fuel-related exports, fiscal flows, investment and subsequently external and fiscal accounts, economic growth, and employment. While policymakers are very familiar with these challenges, they now also face expectations of a permanent decline in the long-run global demand for fossil fuels. Key factors that could determine country-level impacts include (i) the type of fossil fuel a country exports (ii) extraction costs and (iii) country characteristics. The monitoring and mitigation of fiscal risks will need to be stepped up. Fiscal policy also has a role in reducing domestic emissions, encouraging adoption of low-carbon technologies, and helping those most vulnerable to changes from the transition. Broader macroeconomic risks can be reduced by accelerating ongoing structural reforms that support alternative engines of growth. Low- or zero-carbon emission energy industries could offer new avenues that build on existing fossil fuel knowledge and infrastructure. Concurrently, improved financial regulation and supervision could reduce financial sector exposures. Finally, international coordination on the design and implementation of climate policy as well as international transfer schemes (financing and capacity development) could reduce uncertainties surrounding the transition path and associated adverse economic consequences.
Mrs. Nina Budina
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Mr. Christian H Ebeke
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Ms. Florence Jaumotte
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Andrea Medici
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Augustus J Panton
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Marina M. Tavares
, and
Bella Yao
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, emerging market and developing economies are grappling with economic scarring, social tension, and reduced policy space. Policy actions are already urgently needed to boost growth in the near term and support the ongoing green transition. At the same time, high public debt and persistently high inflation have constrained policy space, posing difficult policy trade-offs. This Staff Discussion Note focuses on emerging market and developing economies and proposes a framework for prioritization, packaging, and sequencing of macrostructural reforms to accelerate growth, alleviate policy trade-offs, and support the green transition. The note shows that prioritizing the removal of the most binding constraints on economic activity, bundling reforms (governance, business deregulation, and external sector reforms), and appropriate sequencing of other reforms (such as labor market and credit sector reforms) can help front-load reform gains. In emerging market and developing economies with large initial structural gaps, the estimated output effects of such a major reform package are sizable—about 4 percent in two years and 8 percent in four years. Achieving higher growth and lower absolute carbon emissions over time requires a well-designed strategy that includes both macrostructural and green reforms.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
The Selected Issues paper discusses United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) focus on reforms for productive and greener growth. This paper aims to quantify the potential long-term growth and productivity gains from ongoing structural reform efforts. Facilitating green and sustainable private finance would reduce the direct fiscal burdens of investment needs and help promote a smooth transition to a lower carbon future. The UAE has recently signed or started negotiations for Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements with eleven countries. Depending on the UAE’s ability to further attract foreign direct investment, the reduction of tariffs, especially on intermediate inputs, can significantly lift long-term growth through stronger competition, access to a higher number of varieties and quality of inputs, and transfer of technology. Developing and scaling up private green and sustainable finance, as well as creating an enabling environment for smooth energy transition, would reduce direct fiscal costs, increase efficiency of green investments, and preserve public financial wealth while delivering on growth and Net Zero ambitions.
Maria Borga
,
Achille Pegoue
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Mr. Gregory M Legoff
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Alberto Sanchez Rodelgo
,
Dmitrii Entaltsev
, and
Kenneth Egesa
This paper presents estimates of the carbon emissions of FDI from capital formation funded by FDI and the production of foreign-controlled firms. The carbon intensity of capital formation financed by FDI has trended down, driven by reductions in the carbon intensity of electricity generation. Carbon emissions from the operations of foreign-controlled firms are greater than those from their capital formation. High emission intensities were accompanied by high export intensities in mining, transport, and manufacturing. Home country policies to incentivize firms to meet strict emissions standards in both their domestic and foreign operations could be important to reducing emissions globally.
Jean Chateau
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Ms. Florence Jaumotte
, and
Gregor Schwerhoff
This paper discusses and analyzes various international mechanisms to scale up global action on climate mitigation and address the policy gap in this area. Despite the new commitments made at COP 26, there is still an ambition and a policy gap at the global level to keep temperature increases below the 2°C agreed in Paris. Avoiding the worst outcomes of climate change requires an urgent scaling up of climate policies. Recent policy proposals include the idea of common minimum carbon prices, which underlie the IMF’s international carbon price proposal (Parry, Black, and Roaf 2021) and the climate club proposal of the German government. While global carbon prices are not a new idea, the new elements are the use of carbon price floors—which allow countries to do more if they wish—and the differentiation of carbon price floors by level of development. In the absence of international coordination, countries with ambitious climate policies are considering introducing a border carbon adjustment mechanism to prevent domestic producers from being at a competitive disadvantage due to more ambitious domestic climate policies. An interesting question from the global perspective is whether border carbon adjustment would deliver substantial additional emissions reductions or incentivize other countries to join a carbon price floor agreement.
Ian W.H. Parry
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Mr. Simon Black
, and
Nate Vernon
This paper provides a comprehensive global, regional, and country-level update of: (i) efficient fossil fuel prices to reflect their full private and social costs; and (ii) subsidies implied by mispricing fuels. The methodology improves over previous IMF analyses through more sophisticated estimation of costs and impacts of reform. Globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $5.9 trillion in 2020 or about 6.8 percent of GDP, and are expected to rise to 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025. Just 8 percent of the 2020 subsidy reflects undercharging for supply costs (explicit subsidies) and 92 percent for undercharging for environmental costs and foregone consumption taxes (implicit subsidies). Efficient fuel pricing in 2025 would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions 36 percent below baseline levels, which is in line with keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees, while raising revenues worth 3.8 percent of global GDP and preventing 0.9 million local air pollution deaths. Accompanying spreadsheets provide detailed results for 191 countries.
Mr. Tokhir N Mirzoev
,
Ling Zhu
,
Yang Yang
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Ms. Tian Zhang
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Mr. Erik Roos
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Mr. Andrea Pescatori
, and
Mr. Akito Matsumoto
The oil market is undergoing fundamental change. New technologies are increasing the supply of oil from old and new sources, while rising concerns over the environment are seeing the world gradually moving away from oil. This spells a significant challenge for oil-exporting countries, including those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) who account for a fifth of the world’s oil production. The GCC countries have recognized the need to reduce their reliance on oil and are all implementing reforms to diversify their economies as well as fiscal and external revenues. Nevertheless, as global oil demand is expected to peak in the next two decades, the associated fiscal imperative could be both larger and more urgent than implied by the GCC countries’ existing plans.
Ian W.H. Parry
,
Victor Mylonas
, and
Nate Vernon
Following submission of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation commitments or pledges (by 190 countries) for the 2015 Paris Agreement, policymakers are considering specific actions for their implementation. To help guide policy, it is helpful to have a quantitative framework for understanding: i) the main impacts (on GHGs, fiscal balances, the domestic environment, economic welfare, and distributional incidence) of emissions pricing; ii) trade-offs between pricing and other (commonly used) mitigation instruments; and iii) why/to what extent needed policies and their impacts differ across countries. This paper provides an illustrative sense of this information for G20 member countries (which account for about 80 percent of global emissions) under plausible (though inevitably uncertain) projections for future fuel use and price responsiveness. Quantitative results underscore the generally strong case for (comprehensive) pricing over other instruments, its small net costs or often net benefits (when domestic environmental gains are considered), but also the potentially wide dispersion (and hence inefficiency) in emissions prices implied by countries’ mitigation commitments.

Abstract

Although the future extent and effects of global climate change remain uncertain, the expected damages are not zero, and risks of serious environmental and macroeconomic consequences rise with increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Despite the uncertainties, reducing emissions now makes sense, and a carbon tax is the simplest, most effective, and least costly way to do this. At the same time, a carbon tax would provide substantial new revenues which may be badly needed, given historically high debt-to-GDP levels, pressures on social security and medical budgets, and calls to reform taxes on personal and corporate income. This book is about the practicalities of introducing a carbon tax in the United States, set against the broader fiscal context. It consists of thirteen chapters, written by leading experts, covering the full range of issues policymakers would need to understand, such as the revenue potential of a carbon tax, how the tax can be administered, the advantages of carbon taxes over other mitigation instruments and the environmental and macroeconomic impacts of the tax. A carbon tax can work in the United States. This volume shows how, by laying out sound design principles, opportunities for broader policy reforms, and feasible solutions to specific implementation challenges.

Ian W.H. Parry
,
Mr. Chandara Veung
, and
Mr. Dirk Heine
This paper calculates, for the top twenty emitting countries, how much pricing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is in their own national interests due to domestic co-benefits (leaving aside the global climate benefits). On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $57.5 per ton of CO2 (for year 2010), reflecting primarily health co-benefits from reduced air pollution at coal plants and, in some cases, reductions in automobile externalities (net of fuel taxes/subsidies). Pricing co-benefits reduces CO2 emissions from the top twenty emitters by 13.5 percent (a 10.8 percent reduction in global emissions). However, co-benefits vary dramatically across countries (e.g., with population exposure to pollution) and differentiated pricing of CO2 emissions therefore yields higher net benefits (by 23 percent) than uniform pricing. Importantly, the efficiency case for pricing carbon’s co-benefits hinges critically on (i) weak prospects for internalizing other externalities through other pricing instruments and (ii) productive use of carbon pricing revenues.