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Middle East and Central Asia > Saudi Arabia

You are looking at 1 - 6 of 6 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies x
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Cover Departmental Papers
Economic and Environmental Benefits from International Cooperation on Climate Policies
Jean Chateau
,
Ms. Florence Jaumotte
, and
Gregor Schwerhoff
This paper discusses and analyzes various international mechanisms to scale up global action on climate mitigation and address the policy gap in this area. Despite the new commitments made at COP 26, there is still an ambition and a policy gap at the global level to keep temperature increases below the 2°C agreed in Paris. Avoiding the worst outcomes of climate change requires an urgent scaling up of climate policies. Recent policy proposals include the idea of common minimum carbon prices, which underlie the IMF’s international carbon price proposal (Parry, Black, and Roaf 2021) and the climate club proposal of the German government. While global carbon prices are not a new idea, the new elements are the use of carbon price floors—which allow countries to do more if they wish—and the differentiation of carbon price floors by level of development. In the absence of international coordination, countries with ambitious climate policies are considering introducing a border carbon adjustment mechanism to prevent domestic producers from being at a competitive disadvantage due to more ambitious domestic climate policies. An interesting question from the global perspective is whether border carbon adjustment would deliver substantial additional emissions reductions or incentivize other countries to join a carbon price floor agreement.
Keywords:
climate policy; border carbon adjustment; international coordination; global minimum carbon prices; ICPF scenario; carbon price floor agreement; B. policy scenario overview; baseline emission projection; GDP cost; Greenhouse gas emissions; Climate policy; Climate change; Global; Africa; East Asia; Caribbean
Cover IMF Working Papers
Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Ian W.H. Parry
,
Mr. Simon Black
, and
Nate Vernon
This paper provides a comprehensive global, regional, and country-level update of: (i) efficient fossil fuel prices to reflect their full private and social costs; and (ii) subsidies implied by mispricing fuels. The methodology improves over previous IMF analyses through more sophisticated estimation of costs and impacts of reform. Globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $5.9 trillion in 2020 or about 6.8 percent of GDP, and are expected to rise to 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025. Just 8 percent of the 2020 subsidy reflects undercharging for supply costs (explicit subsidies) and 92 percent for undercharging for environmental costs and foregone consumption taxes (implicit subsidies). Efficient fuel pricing in 2025 would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions 36 percent below baseline levels, which is in line with keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees, while raising revenues worth 3.8 percent of global GDP and preventing 0.9 million local air pollution deaths. Accompanying spreadsheets provide detailed results for 191 countries.
Keywords:
fossil fuel subsidies; efficient fuel prices; supply costs; climate change; local air pollution mortality; revenue gains; spreadsheet tools.; fossil fuel subsidy; supply cost; price reform; fossil fuel; fuel user price; Non-renewable resources; Fuel prices; Energy subsidies; Greenhouse gas emissions; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Mitigation Policies for the Paris Agreement: An Assessment for G20 Countries
Ian W.H. Parry
,
Victor Mylonas
, and
Nate Vernon
Following submission of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation commitments or pledges (by 190 countries) for the 2015 Paris Agreement, policymakers are considering specific actions for their implementation. To help guide policy, it is helpful to have a quantitative framework for understanding: i) the main impacts (on GHGs, fiscal balances, the domestic environment, economic welfare, and distributional incidence) of emissions pricing; ii) trade-offs between pricing and other (commonly used) mitigation instruments; and iii) why/to what extent needed policies and their impacts differ across countries. This paper provides an illustrative sense of this information for G20 member countries (which account for about 80 percent of global emissions) under plausible (though inevitably uncertain) projections for future fuel use and price responsiveness. Quantitative results underscore the generally strong case for (comprehensive) pricing over other instruments, its small net costs or often net benefits (when domestic environmental gains are considered), but also the potentially wide dispersion (and hence inefficiency) in emissions prices implied by countries’ mitigation commitments.
Keywords:
WP; co; electricity Co; tons Co; percent Co; road fuel price elasticity; Paris Agreement; carbon pricing; G20 countries; instrument choice; air pollution mortality; tax incidence; welfare effects; climate mitigation; fuel price elasticity; fuel price responsiveness; cost increase; monopoly price distortion; welfare cost; responsiveness of emission; countries flexibility; fuel price response; price change; price projection; Carbon tax; Greenhouse gas emissions; Non-renewable resources; Fuel prices; Fuel tax; Africa; Global
Cover Implementing a US Carbon Tax
Implementing a US Carbon Tax
Challenges and Debates

Abstract

Although the future extent and effects of global climate change remain uncertain, the expected damages are not zero, and risks of serious environmental and macroeconomic consequences rise with increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Despite the uncertainties, reducing emissions now makes sense, and a carbon tax is the simplest, most effective, and least costly way to do this. At the same time, a carbon tax would provide substantial new revenues which may be badly needed, given historically high debt-to-GDP levels, pressures on social security and medical budgets, and calls to reform taxes on personal and corporate income. This book is about the practicalities of introducing a carbon tax in the United States, set against the broader fiscal context. It consists of thirteen chapters, written by leading experts, covering the full range of issues policymakers would need to understand, such as the revenue potential of a carbon tax, how the tax can be administered, the advantages of carbon taxes over other mitigation instruments and the environmental and macroeconomic impacts of the tax. A carbon tax can work in the United States. This volume shows how, by laying out sound design principles, opportunities for broader policy reforms, and feasible solutions to specific implementation challenges.

Keywords:
BOOK; policy; cost; price; firm; federal budget budget deficit; carbon tax revenue; tax loophole; fuel excise taxes; fuel economy standard; Carbon tax; Greenhouse gas emissions; Personal income; Corporate taxes; Corporate income tax; Global; Africa; North America
Cover IMF Working Papers
How Much Carbon Pricing is in Countries’ Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits
Ian W.H. Parry
,
Mr. Chandara Veung
, and
Mr. Dirk Heine
This paper calculates, for the top twenty emitting countries, how much pricing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is in their own national interests due to domestic co-benefits (leaving aside the global climate benefits). On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $57.5 per ton of CO2 (for year 2010), reflecting primarily health co-benefits from reduced air pollution at coal plants and, in some cases, reductions in automobile externalities (net of fuel taxes/subsidies). Pricing co-benefits reduces CO2 emissions from the top twenty emitters by 13.5 percent (a 10.8 percent reduction in global emissions). However, co-benefits vary dramatically across countries (e.g., with population exposure to pollution) and differentiated pricing of CO2 emissions therefore yields higher net benefits (by 23 percent) than uniform pricing. Importantly, the efficiency case for pricing carbon’s co-benefits hinges critically on (i) weak prospects for internalizing other externalities through other pricing instruments and (ii) productive use of carbon pricing revenues.
Keywords:
WP; price; net; pricing; carbon pricing; co-benefits; air pollution; fuel taxes; top twenty emitters; fuel price elasticity; uniform price; price responsiveness; welfare cost; cross-price effect; price-gap concept; net benefit; responsiveness of fuel use; mitigation cost; countries price carbon; Carbon tax; Greenhouse gas emissions; Non-renewable resources; Public expenditure review; Fuel prices; Global; Africa
Cover Technical Notes and Manuals
Revenue Administration: Administering Revenues from Natural Resources - A Short Primer
Mrs. Andrea Lemgruber
Many developing countries have significant natural resource endowments, presenting a remarkable opportunity to boost long-term growth. However, this opportunity comes with enormous challenges. To maximize social and economic benefits, strong governance and institutional capacity are essential. Effective and transparent tax administration is crucial for properly managing revenues from natural resources so the country may benefit economically and socially from its natural resources. Revenue Administration describes the challenges that developing countries face and presents good practices to help build countries’ long-term institutional capacity.
Keywords:
TNM; tax administration; NR company; NR revenue; NR sector; NR taxpayer; Revenue Administration; Natural Resource Taxation; Extractive Industries; NR-sector issue; NR tax procedure; Tax administration core functions; Administration in revenue administration; Taxpayer services; Auditing; Sub-Saharan Africa; Global