Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Topic

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Europe > Norway

You are looking at 1 - 2 of 2 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Hydrocarbon Resources x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover Staff Climate Notes
How to Cut Methane Emissions
Ian W.H. Parry
,
Mr. Simon Black
,
Danielle N Minnett
,
Mr. Victor Mylonas
, and
Nate Vernon
Limiting global warming to 1.5 to 2°C above preindustrial levels requires rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. This includes methane, which has an outsized impact on temperatures. To date, 125 countries have pledged to cut global methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030. This Note provides background on methane emission sources, presents practical fiscal policy options to cut emissions, and assesses impacts. Putting a price on methane, ideally through a fee, would reduce emissions efficiently, and can be administratively straightforward for extractives industries and, in some cases, agriculture. Policies could also include revenue-neutral ‘feebates’ that use fees on dirtier polluters to subsidize cleaner producers. A $70 methane fee among large economies would align 2030 emissions with 2oC. Most cuts would be in extractives and abatement costs would be equivalent to just 0.1 percent of GDP. Costs are larger in certain developing countries, implying climate finance could be a key element of a global agreement on a minimum methane price.
Keywords:
Climate change mitigation; methane emissions; Global Methane Pledge; carbon pricing; methane tax; extractives; agriculture; design issues; border methane adjustment; international price floor; IMF staff Climate note; methane emission; IMF staff Climate Note 2022/008; IMF analysis; Greenhouse gas emissions; Natural gas sector; Agricultural sector; Agricultural commodities; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Progressive Taxation of Extractive Resources as Second-Best Optimal Policy
Jean-François Wen
The paper provides a critical review of the literature on the concept of progressivity in the taxation of petroleum and mineral resources and offers a fresh perspective on its purpose and measurement. Regressive taxes, such as royalties, exist to satisfy policy objectives other than revenue maximization, such as achieving early revenues, while rent-based or profit-sensitive fiscal instruments must be designed with progressive marginal rates to maximize government revenues. Hence, the emphasis should be placed on tax rate progression of the direct taxation of profit or rent, rather than progressivity in the overall government take. However, as regressive taxes, by their very nature, tend to be distortionary, the optimal degree of progression in the rent- or profit-tax rates must take these distortions into account. The central ideas are illustrated with a simple analytical model in which a second-best optimal tax rate schedule on profit is characterized in the presence of the tax distortions caused by the regressive taxes. Some practical implications of the analysis are discussed.
Keywords:
WP; economic rent; tax rate; progressive tax; income tax; Minerals; petroleum; rent tax; average effective tax rate; second-best optimality; profit tax; factor tax; production function; capture mechanism; tax instrument; revenue tax; rate schedule; input choice; rent capture; Progressive taxation; Marginal effective tax rate