Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Topic

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Europe > Norway

You are looking at 1 - 2 of 2 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Natural disasters x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Chile: Technical Assistance Report-Fiscal Considerations in Managing Stabilization Funds
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.
This technical assistance report on Chile highlights fiscal considerations in managing stabilization funds. Chile’s strong fiscal framework has served the country well. Cross-country experience shows that an adequate buffer in stabilization fund can facilitate governments’ response to shocks. Rebuilding fiscal buffers in a holistic framework can help Chile better manage tail risks. The quantitative models suggest that keeping debt well below the current prudent ceiling on central government gross debt at 45 percent of gross domestic product is appropriate. The government can reduce public debt to give space for future borrowing in adverse times or accumulate liquid assets to rebuild fiscal buffers. Fiscal efforts to achieve a broadly balanced fiscal position are an important way to rebuild buffers. The government should avoid borrowing more debt at high interest rates to save assets in the stabilization fund. Overall, the pace of building buffers should be tailored to economic conditions.
Keywords:
IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department; Tail risk; public treasury; Mexico budget revenues stabilization fund; support fund; size of stabilization funds; Fiscal risks; Fiscal stance; Natural disasters; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Are Climate Change Policies Politically Costly?
Davide Furceri
,
Michael Ganslmeier
, and
Mr. Jonathan David Ostry
Are policies designed to avert climate change (Climate Change Policies, or CCPs) politically costly? Using data on governmental popular support and the OECD’s Environmental Stringency Index, we find that CCPs are not necessarily politically costly: policy design matters. First, only market-based CCPs (such as emission taxes) generate negative effects on popular support. Second, the effects are muted in countries where non-green (dirty) energy is a relatively small input into production. Third, political costs are not significant when CCPs are implemented during periods of low oil prices, generous social insurance and low inequality.
Keywords:
EPS change; policy design; Policy implication; popular support; baseline model; Climate change; Climate policy; Fuel prices; Environmental policy; Natural disasters; Global