Europe > Norway
Abstract
This report seeks to help the IMF enhance its effectiveness by identifying major recurring issues from the IEO’s first 20 evaluations and assessing where they stand. The IMF’s core areas of responsibility are surveillance, lending, and capacity development. The aim of this report is to strengthen the follow-up process by focusing on key issues that recurred in IEO evaluations, rather than on specific recommendations on their implementation. The IEO believes that a framework of reviewing and monitoring recurring issues would be useful in establishing incentives for progress, strengthening the Board’s oversight, and providing learning opportunities for the IMF.
Abstract
This Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Annual Report 2012 presents an overview of overall developments in FY2012. In FY2012, the IEO expended approximately 97 percent of its total budgetary resources, including the approved budget amount and the resources carried forward from FY2011 as authorized. Vacancies amounted to about one and one-half staff years over the course of the financial year. This level of vacancies is within the range of what could be expected in a small organization with structural difficulties in recruitment and retention.
Abstract
Trade policy occupies an unusual and at times problematic place in the work of the IMF. Though trade policies of IMF members have strong influences on macroeconomic stability, they are often seen as peripheral to the IMF’s core competency. This evaluation, which examines the IMF’s involvement in trade policy issues during 1996–2007, addresses five questions. What is the nature of the IMF’s mandate to cover trade policy? Did the IMF work effectively with other international organizations on trade policy issues? Did the Executive Board provide clear guidance to staff on the IMF’s role and approach to trade policy? How well did the IMF address trade policy issues through lending arrangements and surveillance? Was IMF advice effective? The evaluation finds that the IMF’s role in trade policy has evolved in some desirable and some less desirable ways and recommends how to use the limited resources the IMF can devote to trade policy to fill these gaps.
Abstract
This paper focuses on Procedures for Surveillance contained in the document entitled “Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies” attached to Decision No. 5392-(77/63), adopted April 29, 1977, as amended. The Executive Board shall review the general implementation of the IMF’s surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies at intervals of two years and at such other times as consideration of it is placed on the agenda of the Executive Board. The Executive Board would adopt, without discussion, a decision approving the conclusions set forth in the staff report. The Executive Board would adopt, without discussion, a decision completing the consideration of a staff report by the Executive Directors. Hence, the Executive Board would take note of the staff report, but would not approve any conclusions set forth in the report. The Executive Board would not adopt any decision. The IMF adopts the Instrument to Establish the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust that is annexed to this Decision.