Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Countries

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Law > Business and Financial

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 12 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Canada: Financial Sector Assessment Program-IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation-Detailed Assessment of Implementation
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper presents an assessment IMF report on implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) principles in Canada. It highlights that developing an integrated and robust view of risks to support supervisory actions remains a key challenge. The IMF report suggests that the securities regulators should continue to take steps to ensure timely decision making in policy formulation. However, the current governance arrangements, based on a consensus building approach across several entities, is expected to affect timeliness of decision making.
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; securities regulator; financial market; capital issue; holding company; business plan; derivative instrument; commercial paper; terms and conditions; Securities; Auditing; Financial statements; Mutual funds; Securities regulation; Global
Cover IMF Staff Country Reports
Canada: Financial Sector Stability Assessment
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
This report discusses key findings of the Financial Sector Stability Assessment on Canada. Canada’s financial system successfully navigated the global financial crisis, and stress tests suggest that major financial institutions would continue to be resilient to credit, liquidity, and contagion risks arising from a severe stress scenario. Elevated housing prices and high household debt remain an area of concern, though targeted prudential and macroprudential measures are proving to be effective. The regulatory and supervisory framework is strong, and is complemented by a credible federal system of safety nets.
Keywords:
ISCR; CR; bank; Augment OSFI; financing; market; short term; financial crisis; net income; ABCP industry; mutual fund; intervention framework; capital requirement; banking system; market share; holding company; Insurance; Mortgages; Stress testing; Insurance companies; Global; Caribbean
Cover IMF Working Papers
The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?
Mr. Marc G Quintyn
,
Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini
, and
Donato Masciandaro
The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.
Keywords:
WP; governance arrangement; central bank involvement; prudential supervision; supervision unification; supervisory governance; financial supervision; global crisis; supervisory architecture; macroprudential supervision; proactive supervision; involvement in supervision; banking industry; degree of supervision unification; governance indicator; governance work; Bank supervision; Basel Core Principles; Public sector; Europe; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission Impossible?
Ana Carvajal
and
Ms. Jennifer A. Elliott
Weaknesses in the enforcement of regulation have been targeted by the G-20 as a priority concern for reform. But enforcement efforts in securities markets have proven difficult and uneven. The recent scandal in the United States, wherein a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernard Madoff went undetected by the U.S. authorities for more than two decades, has once again highlighted the importance of effective enforcement of securities regulation, as well as the challenges that securities regulators around the world face in implementing credible enforcement programs. While in many instances it is individuals who bear the losses, we show that noncompliance with securities law can have serious system-wide impact and that the credibility of the system as a whole rests on the existence of effective discipline-the probability of real consequences for failure to obey the law. This paper explores the elements of enforcement, why it is so challenging, why it is important, and whether its effects can be measured. Through an analysis of the data gathered in the World Bank/IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the paper examines how enforcement is being carried out around the world and draws conclusions regarding how countries are meeting the challenge of effective enforcement.
Keywords:
WP; securities regulator; regulators surveillance systems; court order; enforcement capacity; insider trading; U.K. FSA
Cover IMF Working Papers
Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A Global Analysis
Ms. Jennifer A. Elliott
and
Ana Carvajal
This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of securities regulatory systems worldwide with a view to a better understanding of common problems and areas of global concern. We found that a consistent theme emerges regarding the lack of ability of regulators to effectively enforce compliance with existing rules and regulation. In many countries, a combination of factors, including insufficient legal authority, a lack of resources, political will and skills, has undermined the regulator's capacity to effectively execute regulation. This weakness is more acute in areas of increased technical complexity such as standards for and supervision of the valuation of assets and risk management practices.
Keywords:
WP; market participant; market intermediary; securities regulator; conduct rule; market country
Cover IMF Working Papers
Public Financial Institutions in Developed Countries—Organization and Oversight
Mr. Lev Ratnovski
and
Mr. Aditya Narain
While public financial institutions (such as public development banks) are commonly associated with developing countries, in fact they are prevalent in the developed world as well. We study a sample of public financial institutions in industrialized countries and identify dominant trends in their organization and oversight. While practices in developed countries may be a useful reference point, a more nuanced approach, accounting for the disparity of institutional environment, regulatory capacity, and government accountability and effectiveness, may be required in developing countries. Further investment in the accumulation of evidence and formulation of best practices in the organization and oversight of public financial institutions seems warranted and necessary. This paper was prepared while Mr. Ratnovski was working in the Financial Supervision and Regulation Division during January-April 2006. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Fiechter, David Marston, and participants of an MCM seminar in April 2006 for their helpful comments.
Keywords:
WP; public financial institutions; financial market; private bank; ownership structure; bankruptcy procedure; interest rate
Cover Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators
Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators
Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes
,
Mr. Michael W Taylor
, and
Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Keywords:
EI; RSA; independence; RSAS' mandate; committee; RSA independence
Cover Dispositifs de responsabilisation pour les régulateurs du secteur financier
Dispositifs de responsabilisation pour les régulateurs du secteur financier
Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes
,
Mr. Michael W Taylor
, and
Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Les décideurs rechignent souvent à accorder l’indépendance aux agences qui réglementent et supervisent le secteur financier, car ils craignent que ces agences, avec leurs responsabilités et leurs pouvoirs étendus, puissent imposer leur loi. Cette brochure décrit les mécanismes permettant de garantir que ces agences soient redevables non seulement envers l'État, mais également envers le secteur qu'elles supervisent et envers le grand public, et propose des exemples de divers pays.

Keywords:
EI; RSA; independence; RSAS' mandate; committee; RSA independence
Cover Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators
Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators
Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes
,
Mr. Michael W Taylor
, and
Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Keywords:
EI; RSA; independence; RSAS' mandate; committee; RSA independence
Cover Sistemas de rendición de cuentas para reguladores del sector financiero
Sistemas de rendición de cuentas para reguladores del sector financiero
Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes
,
Mr. Michael W Taylor
, and
Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Las autoridades de política económica suelen ser renuentes a otorgar independencia a los organismos que regulan y supervisan el sector financiero debido al temor de que estos organismos, con responsabilidades y poderes de amplio alcance, puedan convertirse en una fuente normativa por sí mismos. Este folleto describe los mecanismos para que los organismos reguladores rindan cuentas no solo ante el gobierno sino también ante la industria que supervisan y el público en general, con ejemplos sobre una amplia gama de países.

Keywords:
EI; RSA; independence; RSAS' mandate; committee; RSA independence