Middle East and Central Asia > Kyrgyz Republic

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Mr. Peter J Kunzel
,
Phil De Imus
,
Mr. Edward R Gemayel
,
Risto Herrala
,
Mr. Alexei P Kireyev
, and
Farid Talishli
The Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries are at an important juncture in their economic transition. Following significant economic progress during the 2000s, recent external shocks have revealed the underlying vulnerabilities of the current growth model. Lower commodity prices, weaker remittances, and slower growth in key trading partners reduced CCA growth, weakened external and fiscal balances, and raised public debt. the financial sector was also hit hard by large foreign exchange losses. while commodity prices have recovered somewhat since late 2014, to boost its economic potential, the region needs to find new growth drivers, diversify away from natural resources, remittances, and public spending, and generate much stronger private sector-led activity.
Ms. Katrin Elborgh-Woytek
and
Mr. Julian Berengaut
Against the background of the theory of optimum currency areas, the paper analyzes possible sequences for establishing a currency union (CU) in the Middle East and Central Asia region. Between the corner solutions of independent currencies for all countries in the region and a CU comprising all countries, a large number of combinations of member countries in the CU is possible. The analysis aims to determine the composition of potential CUs as a function of the country initiating the CU, an exogenously determined number of currencies in the region, and the weight attached to the particular selection criteria. Within this framework, the study seeks to establish whether some countries are consistently selected at early stages of the process, while others join only at later stages.
Mr. John C. Odling-Smee
and
Mr. Gonzalo C Pastor Campos
This paper summarizes the IMF advice on the ruble area as it was presented to the national authorities in Russia, the Baltic countries, and other states of the former Soviet Union in 1991-93. In the course of doing so, the paper corrects some misperceptions that have arisen about the IMF's role. The evidence presented in the paper suggests that (i) the balance of arguments on the ruble area (and national currencies) changed over time, and hence so did the IMF's advice, and (ii) from the beginning, the IMF staff concentrated on pointing out the pros and cons of alternative monetary arrangements, without strongly advocating a particular one, emphasizing that it was the authorities' decision to stay in or leave the ruble area. Fund advice on how to introduce national currencies was made readily available to the various national authorities as early as January 1992.