Middle East and Central Asia > Jordan

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International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Dept.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Middle East Regional Technical Assistance Center (METAC) is currently assisting the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) in enhancing its risk-based supervision through the development of a Supervisory Review and Evaluation SRP framework inspired from European Central Bank (ECB) methodology. The Technical Assistance TA mission is part of a multi-step medium-term project. The TA mission aimed to design, in coordination with CBJ, a progressive multi-step roadmap defining the major milestones for a full implementation of SRP. The mission noted that several dimensions should be taken into consideration when implementing the SRP, most notably bridging the data gap by building a fully-fledged supervisory risk database through a dedicated IT project, assessing whether the current organization of the Banking Supervisory Department should be adjusted, and progressively cover all material sources of risks in the SRP.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The global central banking community is actively exploring Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), which may have a fundamental impact on both domestic and international economic and financial stability. Over 40 countries have approached the IMF to request assistance through CBDC capacity development (CD). Current IMF CBDC CD efforts have focused on facilitating peer learning and developing analytical underpinnings for staff advice to member countries. CD missions have aimed at helping country authorities answer questions about how to think about CBDCs. With more available country experiments and empirical evidence, IMF CD will evolve to provide increased value-added advice more tailored to country circumstances and more solidly anchored in empirical and analytical work, and strengthen synergies with surveillance. This paper sketches a multi-year strategy to address frequently asked questions related to CBDC and outlines the process for developing a CBDC Handbook which will document emerging lessons, analytical findings, and policy views. The paper (1) explains the IMF’s approach to CBDC CD; (2) summarizes member countries’ emerging questions and challenges regarding CBDC; and (3) introduces the CBDC Handbook by motivating its scope and elucidating its governance structure.
Moisés J. Schwartz
and
Ray C. Rist

Abstract

The benefits of independent evaluation in international financial institutions have long been recognized. However, independent evaluation in these organizations is of increased relevance during uncertain times that call for more credible and legitimate institutions. While evaluation has long played a function in the IMF, and its role has expanded substantially with the creation of the IEO, independent evaluation has yet to take on a role within the IMF that fully reflects its potential contribution. A strong global economy requires a strong IMF, and a strong IMF requires a strong independent evaluation culture and practice. The establishment of the IEO was only the start of a process that still needs to be fostered and cultivated. Successful independent evaluation is important for the IMF to be perceived as legitimate and credible—and to achieve it, the independent evaluation function needs to be further integrated in the learning process and culture of the Fund. Independent evaluation has played a significant role in contributing to the improvement of the IMF, but the pending challenge is for the IMF and the IEO to create a shared culture that fully embraces the purpose and mission of the IEO, and the learning opportunities offered by independent evaluation. The IMF’s organizational culture has a profound role to play in prompting actions to make learning from independent evaluation a more vibrant element of the Fund’s activities. This book calls on IMF management to take a more active role in instilling the positive value of independent evaluation across the organization and thus enabling independent evaluation to bring the IMF closer to what the literature defines as the ideal of a “learning organization.”

Mr. Ananthakrishnan Prasad
,
Heba Abdel Monem
, and
Pilar Garcia Martinez
Several characteristics of the structure of the Arab economies, their economic policy framework, and their banking systems make macroprudential policy a particular relevant tool. For most oil exporters, heavy reliance on the extractive sector for generating fiscal revenues and export earnings translates into increased vulnerabilities to oil price shocks. In the case of oil importers, relatively small external and fiscal buffers make them highly vulnerable to shocks. This paper discusses the experience of Arab countries in implementing macroprudential policies and contains recommendations to strengthen their macroprudential framework.
Samy Ben Naceur
and
Ms. Magda E. Kandil
The 1988 Basel I Accord set the common requirements of bank capital to promote the soundness and stability of the international banking system. The agreement required banks to hold capital in proportion to their perceived credit risks, and this requirement may have caused a “credit crunch,” a significant reduction in the supply of credit. We investigate the direct link between the implementation of the Basel I Accord and lending activities, using a data set spanning annual observations covering 1989–2004 for banks in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. The results provide clear support for a significant increase in credit growth following the implementation of capital regulations, in general. Despite higher capital adequacy ratios, banks expanded credit and asset growth. Credit growth appears to be driven by demand fluctuations attributed to real growth, cost of borrowing, and exchange rate risk. Overall, the effects of macroeconomic variables, in contrast to capital adequacy, appear to be more dominant in determining credit growth, regardless of the capital adequacy ratio, and regardless of variation across banks by nationality, ownership, and listing.
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

This Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Annual Report 2012 presents an overview of overall developments in FY2012. In FY2012, the IEO expended approximately 97 percent of its total budgetary resources, including the approved budget amount and the resources carried forward from FY2011 as authorized. Vacancies amounted to about one and one-half staff years over the course of the financial year. This level of vacancies is within the range of what could be expected in a small organization with structural difficulties in recruitment and retention.

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was established by the IMF’s Executive Board in 2001. It provides objective and independent evaluation of issues related to the IMF. The IEO operates independently of IMF management and at arm’s length from the IMF Executive Board. For more information on the IEO’s activities, visit the IEO website: www.ieo-imf.org.

International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

The Independent Evaluation Office’s (IEO) Annual Report 2010 highlights that in FY2010, the IEO expended approximately 95 percent of its budgetary resources. The corresponding underspending (about 5 percent of the budget) resulted from several vacancies for significant periods throughout the year. Staffing developments over the course of FY2010 highlighted the costs of high staff turnover for the IEO’s work. In July 2009, the IEO undertook an assessment of recent staffing experience, the main challenges encountered in recruiting and retaining employees, and the aspects of the IEO’s employment policies that contribute to these difficulties.

Mr. Kenji Moriyama
The estimated spillover of the global crisis to emerging market (EM) economies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) indicates that nearly two-thirds of the increased financial stress in MENA EM countries after the Lehman shock is attributable to direct or indirect spillovers of financial stress in advanced economies. Moreover, the estimated models suggest that the increased financial stress and slowdown in economic activity in advanced economies can explain about half of the drop in real GDP growth in MENA EM countries after the Lehman shock.
International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office

Abstract

The IMF’s surveillance framework encompasses a new focus on multilateral issues, and especially the spillovers from one economy onto others. This third Annual Report of the Independent Evaluation Office describes ongoing and recently completed evaluations and discusses additions to IEO’s work plan. General lessons pertaining to IMF surveillance emerging from recent evaluations are highlighted and discussed, namely the need for better integration of financial and macroeconomic factors as well as bilateral and multilateral policy analysis and policy prescriptions. The findings of an External Evaluation Panel charged with assessing the work of the IEO are also covered.