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International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.
Harold James

Abstract

The book explores the Fund’s engagement in Europe in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, and especially after 2010. It explains how, why, and with what consequences the International Monetary Fund—along with the European Central Bank and the European Commission (together known as “the troika”)—supported adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus as well as helping to monitor Spain’s adjustment program and exploring modalities for supporting Italy. Additionally, it analyzes how the euro area developments interacted with and affected the rest of Europe, including not only eastern and southeastern Europe but also the United Kingdom, where the political fallout from post-financial crisis populism—in the form of “Brexit” from the European Union—was, in the end, the most extreme. The IMF’s European programs embroiled the Fund in numerous controversies over the exceptionally large lending, over whether or not to impose losses on private creditors, and over the mix between external financing and internal adjustment undertaken by program countries. They also required the IMF to confront longstanding questions about its governance and evenhandedness in the treatment of different segments of its membership. The crisis programs, with Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, all revolved around debt sustainability. In the Greek case, after an intense internal debate, the IMF initially chose a program without debt reduction because it feared that such a program–even if ultimately in the interests of Greece, the client country–would trigger a panic of banks and other creditors and thus generate contagion for the rest of Europe. Learning from the Greek case, in Ireland and Portugal, the IMF pushed for debt reduction, to which the government in Ireland but not in Portugal was sympathetic. There was thus no private sector debt reduction in Ireland and Portugal. The European programs were caught up in big geopolitical debates about the appropriate role of the Fund in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The book examines the intellectual and policy shifts that took place in the IMF as a result of the controversies about its European programs. It concludes with some reflections on how all the programs also produced genuine policy reform and held out the possibility of a return to growth and prosperity.

International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
This Selected Issues paper provides an international perspective to the authorities’ two recent policy measures: setting up new savings and counter cyclical and climate infrastructure funds and reforming the judicial review of planning decisions in Ireland. The first essay presents international best practices in the design and operation of sovereign wealth funds that could inform the setup of the two new funds in Ireland. It highlights the importance of operating the funds within a strong fiscal policy framework. The second essay reviews Ireland’s planning and permitting system, underscoring the key elements that have hindered public investment. It also looks into the government’s proposed Bill to reform the planning system and contrasts its key features with those of other international jurisdictions. It finds that several issues may contribute to the inefficiencies in the planning and judicial review system, such as the loose standing requirements and lack of mandatory timelines related to judicial review, as well as institutional governance issues within the planning board, which the newly proposed reforms and legislative measures seek to address.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
,
Philippe Martin
, and
Todd Messer
Despite a formal ‘no-bailout clause,’ we estimate significant net present value transfers from the European Union to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, ranging from roughly 0.5% (Ireland) to a whopping 43% (Greece) of 2010 output during the Eurozone crisis. We propose a model to analyze and understand bailouts in a monetary union, and the large observed differences across countries. We characterize bailout size and likelihood as a function of the economic fundamentals (economic activity, debt-to-gdp ratio, default costs). Our model embeds a ‘Southern view’ of the crisis (transfers did not help) and a ‘Northern view’ (transfers weaken fiscal discipline). While a stronger no-bailout commitment reduces risk-shifting, it may not be optimal from the perspective of the creditor country, even ex-ante, if it increases the risk of immediate insolvency for high debt countries. Hence, the model provides a potential justification for the often decried policy of ‘kicking the can down the road.’ Mapping the model to the estimated transfers, we find that the main purpose of the outsized Greek bailout was to prevent an exit from the eurozone and possible contagion. Bailouts to avoid sovereign default were comparatively modest.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
This 2022 Article IV Consultation with Ireland highlights that the economy has rebounded strongly from the pandemic. The financial sector weathered the pandemic crisis well thanks to high capital buffers and effective policy support. The impact of the pandemic on borrowers’ financial position has started to dissipate, but uncertainty remains. While the outlook is strong, uncertainty is substantial due to the indirect impacts of the war in Ukraine. Several pre-pandemic challenges remain: housing shortages, infrastructure, social and green investment gaps, and the need to strengthen multinational enterprises’ inward linkages to broaden growth and make it more inclusive. There is also a need to address the Global Financial Crisis legacy effects on the financial system and tackle the factors contributing to high lending interest rates. The fiscal stance is broadly appropriate. However, in the short term, two-way fiscal flexibility is needed to strike a balance between supporting the economy and containing inflation. In case growth disappoints, automatic stabilizers should be allowed to fully operate and fiscal space deployed, if necessary, through high-quality measures. Structural reforms should aim to remove bottlenecks, increase productivity, and reduce inequities. In particular, housing supply policies should be further strengthened, with a focus on boosting productivity in the construction sector and improving the planning and permit processes.
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.
St. Kitts and Nevis entered the Covid-19 pandemic from a position of fiscal strength following nearly a decade of budget surpluses. A significant part of the large CBI revenues was prudently saved, reducing public debt below the regional debt target of 60 percent of GDP and supporting accumulation of large government deposits.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
Ireland entered the COVID pandemic with reduced vulnerabilities and high growth, especially in multinational enterprises (MNEs)-dominated sectors. The pandemic has had a highly asymmetric impact on the economy. The domestic sectors contracted by about 10 percent in 2020 and unemployment reached 30 percent at the peak of the first wave, while MNEs continued to grow strongly, driving overall GDP growth to 3.4 percent. A swift policy response has been effective in mitigating the crisis impact and protecting households and firms. The domestic sectors are expected to partially recover in 2021, with GDP growth projected at 4.6 percent. Downside risks stem from uncertainties surrounding new COVID variants, post-Brexit trade arrangements, and likely changes in international taxation.
Mario di Serio
,
Matteo Fragetta
, and
Mr. Giovanni Melina
We compute government spending multipliers for the Euro Area (EA) contingent on the interestgrowth differential, the so-called r-g. Whether the fiscal shock occurs when r-g is positive or negative matters for the size of the multiplier. Median estimates vary conditional on the specification, but the difference between multipliers in the negative and positive r-g regimes differs systematically from zero with very high probability. Over the medium run (5 years), median cumulated multipliers range between 1.22 and 1.77 when r-g is negative, and between 0.51 and 1.26 when r-g is positive. We show that the results are not driven by the state of the business cycle, the monetary policy stance, or the level of government debt, and that the multiplier is inversely correlated with r-g. The calculations are based on the estimates of a factor-augmented interacted panel vector-autoregressive model. The econometric approach deals with several technical problems highlighted in the empirical macroeconomic literature, including the issues of fiscal foresight and limited information.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
The UK entered 2020 negotiating a new economic relationship with the EU and facing other challenges, including meeting climate targets, dealing with an aging population, and reinvigorating tepid productivity growth. Growth and investment had been weak since the 2016 referendum, and the current account deficit elevated, but unemployment was low, inflation on target, and balance sheets strong. The global pandemic hit the UK hard in March, and the country now faces a second wave. The economic impact has been severe, but helped by an aggressive policy response, jobs have been preserved, businesses kept afloat, and banking sector losses contained. Still, the outlook for the near term is weak, as the economy works through the second wave, Brexit, rising unemployment, and corporate distress. Risks are overall to the downside, centering on the degree of balance sheet damage sustained by households and small and medium enterprises. The pace at which vaccines are able to bring the pandemic under control could be an important mitigating factor.
International Monetary Fund. European Dept.
This 2019 Article IV Consultation with Cyprus discusses that following a period of very rapid growth in the aftermath of the economic crisis, growth is gradually settling in at a more sustainable but still relatively robust pace despite the external slowdown. Output is projected to rise by around 3 percent in 2019–20, supported by construction and services sectors. Good progress has been made in addressing domestic and external stability risks arising from legacies of the financial crisis. Sales of nonperforming loans (NPLs), amendments to the foreclosure and insolvency framework and resolution of a large systemic bank have helped strengthen bank balance sheets. Reversal of reforms to the foreclosure framework would hinder ongoing NPL resolution efforts and create risks for financial stability. Realization of contingent liabilities from the still weak banking sector or increased fiscal spending pressures could undermine investor confidence, raising interest costs and depressing growth. Cyprus needs to build on recent gains by advancing reforms to secure macroeconomic stability, enhance efficiency and strengthen productivity and growth potential.