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Europe > Ireland

You are looking at 1 - 3 of 3 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Political Economy x
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Cover Policy Papers
Operational Guidance Note On Program Design and Conditionality
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.
Keywords:
Conditionality; Conditionality guidelines; Use of Fund resources; Fund-supported adjustment programs; Debt sustainability analysis; Structural reform; Fragile and conflict-affected states; transparency policy; guidance note; Fund-supported program; financing gap; climate change policy assessment; policy note; existing IMF policy; financial support; Balance of payments need; Debt sustainability; Structural reforms; Global
Cover Departmental Papers
Affordable Rental Housing: Making It Part of Europe’s Recovery
Khalid ElFayoumi
,
Ms. Izabela Karpowicz
,
Ms. Jenny Lee
,
Ms. Marina Marinkov
,
Ms. Aiko Mineshima
,
Jorge Salas
,
Andreas Tudyka
, and
Ms. Andrea Schaechter
Many European economies have faced pressure from rental housing affordability that has widened social and economic divergence. While significant country and regional differences exist, this departmental paper finds that in many advanced European economies a large and rising share of low-income renters, the young, and those living in cities is overburdened. In several locations, middle-income groups also increasingly face rental affordability issues.
Keywords:
Europe, Rental housing, Rental market policies, Housing affordability, Social inclusion, Low-income housing, Low-income tenants, Income distribution; rental housing affordability; affordability issue; rental market; rental cost; rental price; Housing; Income; Housing prices; Disposable income; Income inequality; Europe; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises
Jihad Dagher
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Keywords:
WP; central bank; financial market; political economy; banking sector; Financial Regulation; Financial Crises; Boom-Bust Cycles; Glass-Steagall Act; financial bubble; ruling party; share price; joint stock; crony capitalism; plain vanilla; stock index; bubble company; joint-stock bank; incumbent governments policy; government sponsorship; Housing; Global financial crisis of 2008-2009; Banking crises; Global; South America