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Europe > Ireland

You are looking at 1 - 6 of 6 items for :

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Cover Policy Papers
Operational Guidance Note On Program Design and Conditionality
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.
Keywords:
Conditionality; Conditionality guidelines; Use of Fund resources; Fund-supported adjustment programs; Debt sustainability analysis; Structural reform; Fragile and conflict-affected states; transparency policy; guidance note; Fund-supported program; financing gap; climate change policy assessment; policy note; existing IMF policy; financial support; Balance of payments need; Debt sustainability; Structural reforms; Global
Cover Policy Papers
Ninth Periodic Monitoring Report on the Status of Implementation Plans in Response to Board-Endorsed IEO Recommendations
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
The Ninth Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assesses the progress made over the last year on actions contained in two “new” MIPs arising from recent IEO evaluations, and another seven for which individual management actions were classified as “open” in the Eighth PMR. Overall, 42 of the 96 actions included in the Ninth PMR remain open, representing roughly the same proportion as the previous PMR. A 25 percent net increase in open management actions over the past year is accounted for by 24 new actions from two MIPs, and 16 actions that have been implemented over the period. There is positive traction on the last four MIPs, but older actions appear challenging to implement. Better progress has been made with the implementation of the actions contained in recent MIPs. Fourteen of the actions implemented since the Eighth PMR relate to MIPs approved after October 2015, while only two actions (out of 24) from earlier MIPs were implemented. Improvements in the follow-up process approved by the Board in October 2015 have contributed to speedier implementation of recent actions, but some challenges remain. There are lingering challenges with defining measures of success for numerous actions, but accountabilities are now clearer and many actions are at advanced stages at the time of the Board’s discussion of the MIPs. This PMR introduces indicators to support the process for resolving challenges with long-standing actions. Despite the slower progress with the older actions, significant advances have been made over the past year in several key areas. These include: protocols for engaging the IEO; risk management and analysis; the mainstreaming of macrofinancial surveillance; an overarching strategy on data and statistics; guidance on cooperation with other organizations, including Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs); improvements in External Stability Assessments; and ongoing analytical work on surveillance and program, including macrostructural issues, emerging topics, and debt sustainability analysis. On the other hand, progress has been slower on macro forecasting, outward spillovers, and cross-country knowledge sharing.
Keywords:
PP; IEO evaluation; Fund staff; fund staff cooperation protocol; data management; staff report; IEO recommendation; financial crisis; Fund mechanism; IMF forecast; Early warning systems; Financial sector; Spillovers; Macrofinancial analysis; Global; East Asia
Cover Policy Papers
Collaboration Between Regional Financing Arrangements and the IMF--Background Paper
International Monetary Fund
NULL
Keywords:
PP; reform program; structural adjustment; country; balance of payments; member country; financial support; primary market; exchange rate; central bank; division of labor; Loans; Lines of credit; Fiscal consolidation; Financial sector; Structural reforms; Global; Africa
Cover IMF Working Papers
Fiscal Reforms, Long-term Growth and Income Inequality
Mr. Santiago Acosta Ormaechea
,
Mr. Takuji Komatsuzaki
, and
Carolina Correa-Caro
We estimate the effects on growth of nine fiscal reform episodes in seven high-income countries using the Synthetic Control Method. These episodes are selected using an indicator-based approach applied to the evaluation of growth-friendly fiscal reforms during 1975-2010. We find that in reform countries the annual growth rate of real GDP was on average about 1 percentage point above their synthetic units 10 years after each respective reform. Moreover, countries which were initially less developed seemed to experience a larger growth impact after their reforms. Results are broadly robust to controlling for structural reforms on business regulation, financial market, labor market, and legal and product markets, which may also affect growth. Our findings also suggest that inequality is not affected by the growth-friendly fiscal reforms analyzed in this paper.
Keywords:
WP; income; SCM result; Chile; Gini coefficient; Fiscal Policy; Synthetic Control Method; Structural Reform; growth effect; country selection; SCM approach; outcome variable; Structural reforms; Personal income; Income inequality; Income distribution; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Can Reform Waves Turn the Tide? Some Case Studies Using the Synthetic Control Method
Bibek Adhikari
,
Mr. Romain A Duval
,
Bingjie Hu
, and
Mr. Prakash Loungani
A number of advanced economies carried out a sequence of extensive reforms of their labor and product markets in the 1990s and early 2000s. Using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM), this paper implements six case studies of well-known waves of reforms, those of New Zealand, Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands in the 1990s, and the labor market reforms in Germany in the early 2000s. In four of the six cases, GDP per capita was higher than in the control group as a result of the reforms. No difference between the treated country and its synthetic counterpart could be found in the cases of Denmark and New Zealand, which in the latter case may have partly reflected the implementation of reforms under particularly weak macroeconomic conditions. Overall, also factoring in the limitations of the SCM in this context, the results are suggestive of a positive but heterogenous effect of reform waves on GDP per capita.
Keywords:
WP; labor market; real GDP; product market; fiscal policy; structural reforms; synthetic control method; liberalization; labor and productivity market reforms; growth; heads of state government; State life insurance insurance company; industrial relations; government's share; predictive power; reform package; donor country; untreated country; income support; firm level; life insurance insurance company; Labor market reforms; Competition; Active labor market policies; Unemployment; Europe; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: How Unpleasant Is Purgatory?
Mr. Ales Bulir
and
Jaromír Hurník
The Maastricht inflation criterion, designed in the early 1990s to bring "high-inflation" EU countries in line with "low-inflation" countries prior to the introduction of the euro, poses challenges for both new EU member countries and the European Central Bank. While the criterion has positively influenced the public stance toward low inflation, it has biased the choice of the disinflation strategy toward short-run, fiat measures-rather than adopting structural reforms with longer-term benefits-with unpleasant consequences for the efficiency of the eurozone transmission mechanism. The criterion is also unnecessarily tight for new member countries as it mainly reflects cyclical developments.
Keywords:
WP; country; disinflation strategy; Euroland