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Europe > Ireland

You are looking at 1 - 3 of 3 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Efficiency; Optimal Taxation x
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Cover IMF How To Notes
How to Evaluate Tax Expenditures
Sebastian Beer
,
Ms. Dora Benedek
,
Brian Erard
, and
Jan Loeprick
Governments use tax expenditures (TEs) to provide financial support or benefits to taxpayers. The budgetary impact of TEs can be similar to that of direct outlays: after the support is provided, less money is available to fund other government priorities. Systematic evaluations are needed to guide informed decision-mak¬ing and to avoid a situation where the narrative on the benefits of TEs is primarily driven by profiting stakeholders. By TE “evaluation,” this note refers to a process that seeks to systematically inform policymak¬ers on the desirability of introducing or maintaining specific tax benefits by gathering and analyzing avail¬able quantitative and qualitative information on their effects. Evaluation processes can be tailored to different levels of data availability and analytical capacity. An evaluation should focus on the policy objective of a TE and whether it effectively and efficiently contrib¬utes to that policy objective. Although important lessons can be learned from coun¬try practices in implementing increasingly ambitious evaluation processes, there is no single best-practice approach to replicate.
Keywords:
tax expenditures; cost-benefit assessment; public policy evaluation; sample evaluation; publication order; publication service; title page; post evaluation; Tax incentives; Compliance costs; Value-added tax; Global; East Asia
Cover IMF Working Papers
Pareto-Improving Minimum Corporate Taxation
Mr. Shafik Hebous
and
Mr. Michael Keen
The recent international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the strategic responses to a minimum tax, which—the policy objective being to change the rules of tax competition game--—are critical for assessing the design and welfare impact of, and prospects for, this fundamental policy innovation. Analysis and calibration plausibly suggest sizable scope for minima that are Pareto-improving, benefiting low as well as high tax countries, over the uncoordinated equilibrium.
Keywords:
Tax Competition; Minimum Taxation; Corporate Tax Reform; International Taxation; competition game; policy objective; corporate tax reform; best response; country benefit; residence country; Corporate income tax; Competition; Tax avoidance; Global
Cover IMF Working Papers
Guaranteed Minimum Income Schemes in Europe: Landscape and Design
Mr. David Coady
,
Samir Jahan
,
Baoping Shang
, and
Riki Matsumoto
This paper provides an overview of the design of means-tested Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes, which constitute an important component of social protection systems in European countries. It discusses how key design features differ across countries, including how countries balance the primary objective of poverty alleviation against the desire to both manage the work disincentives inherent in such programs and contain fiscal cost. The analysis finds a clear trade-off between both concerns in practice, with many countries combining low generosity with low benefit withdrawal rates (BWRs) thus prioritizing employment incentives over the primary objective of poverty alleviation. Many countries can reduce this trade off by combining higher generosity with higher BWRs. Countries with very high BWRs should consider reducing these, including through allowing income disregards and time dependent (rather than income-dependent) benefit withdrawal. The work disincentives associated with higher BWRs can also be attenuated through strengthening complementary activation policies that incentivize and support participation in the labor market.
Keywords:
work disincentive; activation policy; Labor disincentive; Guaranteed Minimum Income scheme; benefit generosity; GMI scheme; Income; Employment; Wages; Labor markets; Tax allowances; Europe