The CEMAC’s recovery gained momentum in 2022, supported by higher hydrocarbon prices. The external position strengthened, with a rapid foreign reserve build-up, though still below adequate levels. The recent weakening in external buffers will require more forceful action to tighten liquidity conditions, greater compliance of member countries with foreign exchange regulations and stronger fiscal discipline. Underlying non-oil fiscal positions, however, also deteriorated, stressing the need for accelerating structural reforms, addressing recent fiscal slippages, and bringing polices back in line with Fund-supported program objectives and staff advice. This will be critical to strengthen the region’s resilience to hydrocarbon prices volatility, financial instability, entrenched inflation, tighter financial conditions, food insecurity, domestic conflicts and insecurity, and climate-related events.
Mr. Luc Eyraud, William Gbohoui, and Mr. Paulo A Medas
This paper revisits the debate on the design of fiscal rules in resource-rich countries. Its main objective is to assess alternative systems of rules against their policy objectives, while taking into account country characteristics. One of the contributions of the paper is to propose fiscal frameworks that are centered around the principle of insurance against shocks and less reliant on estimating precisely resource wealth, which tends to be highly volatile.
This paper highlights Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) common policies in support of member countries reform programs. CEMAC benefited from favorable hydrocarbon prices in 2022. Economic recovery firmed up and the external position strengthened, with external reserves building up faster in recent months, although still below adequate levels. Monetary policy was tightened to stem rising inflation, and fiscal positions improved owing to higher oil revenues. However, underlying non-oil fiscal positions deteriorated, highlighting the necessity of accelerating reforms and tackling recent fiscal slippages, to help save part of the oil windfalls and bring polices back in line with IMF-supported program objectives and IMF staff advice. The report recommends standing ready to tighten monetary policy further; mop up excess liquidity; and resolve pending challenges to a complete, transparent, and consistent implementation of the foreign exchange regulations. It also suggests accelerating governance and productivity-enhancing structural and regulatory reforms; broaden the tax base beyond the hydrocarbon sector; and deepen regional trade integration.
This paper presents Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) IMF Staff report on Common Policies of Member Countries and Common Policies in Support of Member Countries Reform Programs. The positive terms-of-trade shock amidst the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine has broadly benefited CEMAC, reinforcing its external position and gradual post-pandemic recovery. Regional authorities tightened monetary policy and normalized prudential regulation in 2022, while continuing to advance the reform agenda. Global inflation pressures have passed through to domestic prices, putting pressure on real incomes. Rebuilding buffers and sustaining a recovery that protects the most vulnerable will require stricter adherence to budget and reform plans consistent with IMF-supported programs and policy advice; this will ensure that part of the oil windfall is saved. Implementation of these policies in current favorable conditions is critical to strengthening resilience in the face of rising risks, including most notably to food security, debt vulnerabilities, and tightening of global financial conditions. A prudent management of the oil windfall and faster progress on deep structural and governance reforms are pivotal for laying the foundations for a more diversified, inclusive, and sustainable growth.
CEMAC ended 2021 in a fragile external position, with gross reserves at only 2.7 months of prospective imports and net foreign assets (NFA) at their lowest level in decades, despite the availability of Fund financing, the SDR allocation, and monetary policy tightening. The terms of trade shock this year is expected to be broadly positive for CEMAC. This more favorable outlook is, however, subject to heightened external uncertainties associated with the fallout from the war in Ukraine (notably global inflation pressure, global growth uncertainties, and high oil price volatility), faster-than-anticipated global financial tightening, possible emergence of new COVID strains and risks from cryptoassets. Current high oil prices, if sustained, will help rebuild fiscal and external buffers, provided fiscal policies remain prudent. Shielding vulnerable populations from soaring energy and food prices adds to the complexity of navigating this uncertain environment, given CEMAC’s already limited policy options.
Despite a more favorable external environment, marked by the rebound in global growth, fast-increasing oil prices, and unprecedented Fund financial support, CEMAC is ending 2021 in a fragile external position. Net external reserves fell throughout 2021 to reach their lowest level in decades, and gross reserves are just above three months of imports of goods and services. The launch of a second phase of the regional strategy at the August 2021 CEMAC Heads of States summit saw renewed commitments to accelerate structural, transparency, and governance reforms. The resumption of program engagements with the Fund, combined with high oil prices and significant fiscal adjustments in 2022, should allow for a turnaround, and the build-up in external reserves is expected to resume in 2022. Risks include possible adverse pandemic developments, oil price volatility, possible fiscal slippages, shortfall in external financing, and security issues.
The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21, and Bata explosions in 2021, struck oil-exporter Equatorial Guinea at a time when its economic vulnerabilities had already been aggravated by a prolonged period of depressed hydrocarbon prices, and seven consecutive years of decline in real GDP. The economy is slowly emerging from the ravages of the 2020-21 shocks, buoyed by higher international oil prices. However, substantial challenges remain: (i) surging food prices and banking sector vulnerabilities cloud the short term, while (ii) declining hydrocarbon productionand the implied decline in external reservesloom over the medium term, especially in light of lagging governance and diversification reform implementation.
The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21, and Bata explosions in 2021, struck oil-exporter Equatorial Guinea at a time when its economic vulnerabilities had already been aggravated by a prolonged period of depressed hydrocarbon prices, and seven consecutive years of decline in real GDP. The economy is slowly emerging from the ravages of the 2020-21 shocks, buoyed by higher international oil prices. However, substantial challenges remain: (i) surging food prices and banking sector vulnerabilities cloud the short term, while (ii) declining hydrocarbon productionand the implied decline in external reservesloom over the medium term, especially in light of lagging governance and diversification reform implementation.
Berkay Akyapi, Mr. Matthieu Bellon, and Emanuele Massetti
A growing literature estimates the macroeconomic effect of weather using variations in annual country-level averages of temperature and precipitation. However, averages may not reveal the effects of extreme events that occur at a higher time frequency or higher spatial resolution. To address this issue, we rely on global daily weather measurements with a 30-km spatial resolution from 1979 to 2019 and construct 164 weather variables and their lags. We select a parsimonious subset of relevant weather variables using an algorithm based on the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator. We also expand the literature by analyzing weather impacts on government revenue, expenditure, and debt, in addition to GDP per capita. We find that an increase in the occurrence of high temperatures and droughts reduce GDP, whereas more frequent mild temperatures have a positive impact. The share of GDP variations that is explained by weather as captured by the handful of our selected variables is much higher than what was previously implied by using annual temperature and precipitation averages. We also find evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policies that mitigate adverse weather shocks, especially excessive or unusually low precipitation episodes.