Gibraltar’s Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism is reviewed. The principal AML risk to Gibraltar is lodged in its professional sector, which is likely to be involved in the layering and integration of proceeds of crime. There is also some risk to Gibraltar at the placement stage, in connection with drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and organized crime in southern Spain. The Financial Services Commission in Gibraltar has established a strong, risk-based framework for financial institutions for AML.
This paper presents Gibraltar’s assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation including reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on banking and insurance supervision. The Financial Services Commission has been assigned significant additional resources and has developed a well-structured approach to the management of its resources that includes a risk-based approach to supervision. The assessment found a high standard of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for banking supervision.
This paper examines Gibraltar’s Detailed Assessment Report of the Observance of the Insurance Core Principles. Foreign establishments operating in Gibraltar are all European Union (EU)-based and therefore covered by EU directives, including the directive on freedom of establishment. A key reason for the growth in this sector is the ability of firms licensed in Gibraltar to passport their services to EU member states. The domestic insurance market is, however, quite small with a population in the region of 30,000.
Gibraltar’s Detailed Assessment Report of the Observance of the Basel Core Principles is examined. The principal risks are reputational risk, both for the Gibraltar authorities and for the banks, as the bulk of the assets managed are off the balance sheet with the investment risk carried by the client. Credit risk is largely limited to residential mortgage lending and is heightened by the rapid rise in prices both in Southern Spain and in Gibraltar itself.
The paper surveys the characteristics of explicit systems of deposit insurance in 68 countries. It compares these actual practices with a set of best practices that has been adopted by IMF staff for their advice to member countries. These best practices seek to establish a system of deposit insurance that provides incentives for all parties—whether they are directly or indirectly affected by the guarantee—to keep the financial system sound. The paper discerns some convergence toward best practices in recent years, but notes several areas where improvements in the incentive structure are still necessary.