Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Topic

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Western Hemisphere > Cuba

You are looking at 1 - 1 of 1 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover IMF Working Papers
Sanctions and Civil Conflict
Mr. Dmitry Gershenson
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases.
Keywords:
WP; defeat income; victory income; challenger group; Sanctions; Conflict; Surrender; apartheid government; Castro regime; challenger's victory; Personal income; Consumption; Defense spending; Africa