Narrow Your Choices

Refine By Series

Refine By Language

Refine By Date

—

Refine By IMF Taxonomy

Refine By JEL Taxonomy

Refine by LOC Taxonomy

Refine By THEMA Taxonomy

  • Print
  • Save

Business and Economics > Production and Operations Management

You are looking at 1 - 1 of 1 items for :

  • Type: Journal Issue x
  • Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis x
Clear All Modify Search
Cover IMF Working Papers
Watch What They Do, Not What They Say: Estimating Regulatory Costs from Revealed Preferences
Adrien Alvero
,
Mr. Sakai Ando
, and
Kairong Xiao
We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in the size distribution of banks reveals the magnitude of regulatory costs. Using U.S. bank data, we estimate the regulatory costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the estimated regulatory costs are substantial, they are significatnly lower than those in self-reported estimates by banks.
Keywords:
Bank regulation; regulatory costs; the Dodd-Frank Act; bunching; regulatory cost; size distribution; bank data; costs from revealed preference; bank value; Bank regulation; Productivity; Shadow banking; Total factor productivity; Cost-benefit analysis; Global