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Business and Economics > Public Finance

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 23 items for :

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  • IMF Staff Position Notes x
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Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Reaching the MDGs: An Action Plan for Trade
Mr. Brad J. McDonald
,
Rob Gregory
, and
Ms. Katrin Elborgh-Woytek
The actions proposed here focus on trade integration, substantially increasing exports of the poorest countries and helping them to meet the Millennium Development Goals. As the foundation for these ambitions, we emphasize the role of a secure, open global trading environment—strengthened further by concluding the WTO Doha Round. From this base, the poorest countries also need better trade preferences from the advanced and major emerging market countries (EMs). Building the capacity to take advantage of trade opportunities will require support from the international community and policy reforms—such as to trade regimes—by the poorest countries themselves. The Fifteen Point Action Plan proposed here could increase annual exports of the least-developed countries (LDCs) by $10 billion or more, with additional benefits for other Low-Income Countries (LICs).
Keywords:
SPN; preference scheme; LDC export; trade preference; exporters flexibility; LDC beneficiary; policy reform; LIC trade regime; introduced LDC preference; Tariffs; Exports; Valuation; origin and classification; Trade relations; Imports; Global
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Default in Today's Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely
Mr. Carlo Cottarelli
,
Mr. Paolo Mauro
,
Lorenzo Forni
, and
Jan Gottschalk
This note summarizes the main arguments put forward by some market commentators who argue that default is inevitable, and presents a rebuttal for each argument in turn. Their main arguments focus on the size of the adjustment and continued market concerns reflected in government bond spreads. The essence of our reasoning is that the challenge stems mainly from the advanced economies’ large primary deficits. Thus, by lowering the interest bill while triggering the need to move to primary balance or a small primary surplus, default would not significantly reduce the need for major fiscal adjustment. In contrast, the emerging economies that defaulted in recent decades did so primarily as a result of high debt servicing costs, often in the context of major external shocks. We conclude that default would be ineffective and undesirable in today’s advanced economies.
Keywords:
SPN; economy; debt; Greece; default; advanced economy; default episode; emerging economy defaulter; country default; gross financing; public debt debt ratio; restructuring debt; Fiscal consolidation; Fiscal stance; Debt restructuring; Real interest rates; Global
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Fiscal Space
Mr. Jonathan David Ostry
,
Mr. Atish R. Ghosh
,
Mr. Jun I Kim
, and
Miss Mahvash S Qureshi
In this note, the authors reexamine the issue of debt sustainability in a large group of advanced economies. Their hypothesis is that, when debt is in a moderate range, its dynamics are sustainable in the sense that increases in debt elicit sufficient increases in primary fiscal balances to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. At high debt levels, however, the dynamics may turn unstable, and the debt ratio may not converge to a finite level. Such a framework allows the authors to define a “debt limit” that is consistent with a country’s historical track record of adjustment in the sense that, without an extraordinary fiscal effort, any debt increment beyond this limit would cause debt to increase without bound. This debt limit is not an absolute and immutable barrier, however, but rather defines a critical point above which a country’s normal fiscal response to rising debt becomes insufficient to maintain debt sustainability. Nor should this debt limit be interpreted as being in any sense the optimal level of public debt. Indeed, since this limit delineates the point at which fiscal solvency is called into question—and the analysis abstracts entirely from liquidity/rollover risk—prudence dictates that countries will typically want to be well below their debt limit. Given a country’s normal pattern of adjustment, “fiscal space” is then simply the difference between its debt limit and its current level of debt.
Keywords:
SPN; interest rate; debt limit; interest rate schedule; interest rate-growth rate differential; interest rate-growth differential; interest rate-output growth rate differential; interest rate-growth rate schedule; risk-free interest rate; public debt debt ratio; model-implied interest rate; Fiscal stance; Fiscal space; Debt limits; Market interest rates; Southern Europe
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Long-Term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies
Ms. Andrea Schaechter
and
Mr. Carlo Cottarelli
Today’s record public debt levels in most advanced economies are not only a direct fall-out from the global crisis. Public debt had ratcheted up over many decades before, when it had been used, in most of the G-7 countries, as the ultimate shock absorber—rising in bad times but not declining much in good times. Alongside, primary spending increased, particularly during 1965–85, reflecting predominantly a surge in health care and pension spending. Looking ahead, advanced economies will face the formidable challenge of reducing debt ratios at a time when ageing-related spending, in particular often underestimated pressures from health care systems, will put additional pressure on public finances. Addressing these fiscal challenges will require growth-friendly structural reforms, a fiscal strategy involving gradual but steady fiscal adjustment, stronger fiscal institutions, expenditure and revenue reforms, and an appropriate degree of burden sharing across all stakeholders.
Keywords:
SPN; country; debt ratio; debt; GDP; G-7; interest rate; government debt ratios; country difference; IMF staff estimate; government expenditure; baseline debt projection; public debt debt ratio; Health care spending; Social security contributions; Corporate income tax; Europe; Global
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say "No"
Ms. Jennifer A. Elliott
,
Mr. Aditya Narain
,
Ian Tower
,
José Vinãls
,
Pierluigi Bologna
,
Michael Hsu
, and
Jonathan Fiechter
The quality of financial sector supervision has emerged as a key issue from the financial crisis. While most countries operated broadly under the same regulatory standards, differences emerged in supervisory approaches. The international response to this crisis has focused on the need for more and better regulations (e.g., in areas such as bank capital, liquidity and provisioning) and on developing a framework to address systemic risks, but there has been less discussion of how supervision itself could be strengthened. The IMF’s work in assessing compliance with financial sector standards over the past decade in member countries suggests that while progress is being made in putting regulation in place, work remains to be done in many countries to strengthen supervision. How can this enhanced supervision be achieved? Based on an examination of lessons from the crisis and the findings of these assessments of countries’ compliance with financial standards, the paper identifies the following key elements of good supervision—that it is intrusive, skeptical, proactive, comprehensive, adaptive, and conclusive. To achieve these elements, the “ability” to supervise, which requires appropriate resources, authority, organization and constructive working relationships with other agencies must be complemented by the “will” to act. Supervisors must be willing and empowered to take timely and effective action, to intrude on decision-making, to question common wisdom, and to take unpopular decisions. Developing this “will to act” is a more difficult task and requires that supervisors have a clear and unambiguous mandate, operational independence coupled with accountability, skilled staff, and a relationship with industry that avoids “regulatory capture.” These essential elements of good supervision need to be given as much attention as the regulatory reforms that are being contemplated at both national and international levels. Indeed, only if supervision is strengthened can we hope to effectively deliver on the challenging—but crucial—regulatory reform agenda. For this to happen, society must stand with supervisors as they play their role as naysayers in times of exuberance.
Keywords:
SPN; supervision; agency; authority; market; risk management
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy
Mr. Olivier J Blanchard
,
Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
, and
Mr. Paolo Mauro
The great moderation lulled macroeconomists and policymakers alike in the belief that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. The crisis clearly forces us to question that assessment. In this paper, we review the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, we identify where we were wrong and what tenets of the pre-crisis framework still hold, and take a tentative first pass at the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework.
Keywords:
SPN; monetary policy; central bank; interest rate; inflation expectation; core inflation; interest rate rule; monetary policy action; inflation neutral; inflation shock; inflation stability; economic system; inflation rate; Inflation; Asset prices; Central bank policy rate; Inflation targeting; Eastern Europe
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of Financial Crises
Thomas Laryea
This paper starts from a discussion of the economic case for moderated government intervention in debt restructuring in the nonfinancial corporate sector. It then draws on lessons from past crises to explain three broad approaches that have been applied to corporate debt restructurings in the aftermath of a crisis. From there, it addresses challenges in designing and implementing a comprehensive debt restructuring strategy and draws together some key principles.
Keywords:
SPN; restructuring strategy; default case; debt problem; debt substitution; financial support; private sector; restructuring agreement; restructuring process; private sector debt problem; debt restructuring guideline; debt restructuring effort; household debt problem; debt restructuring strategy; pre-existing debt; debt-servicing obligation; restructuring phase; Debt restructuring; Debt strategy; Legal support in revenue administration; Solvency; Global; wake of financial crises; government intervention; Corporate sector
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Climate Policy and the Recovery
Mr. Michael Keen
and
Benjamin Jones
Negotiations toward a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change have come to a critical point, and domestic climate policies are being developed, as the world seeks to recover from the deepest economic crisis for decades and looks for new sources of sustainable growth. This position paper considers the challenge posed by these two policy imperatives: how to exit from the crisis while developing an effective response to climate change. Blending the objectives of a sustained recovery and effective climate policies presents both challenges and opportunities. Although there are potential “win-win” spending measures conducive to both, the more fundamental linkages and synergies lie in the broader strategies adopted toward each other. Greater climate resilience can promote macroeconomic stability and alleviate poverty; and carbon pricing, essential for mitigation, can contribute to the strengthening of fiscal positions that is expected to be needed in many countries. There are, nevertheless, also difficult trade-offs to face, notably in the somewhat greater caution now warranted in moving to more aggressive emissions pricing. However, the simple policy guidelines for addressing climate issues remain fundamentally unchanged; the need to deploy a range of regulatory, spending, and emissions pricing measures.
Keywords:
SPN; pricing; carbon pricing; public spending; policy; price; C. pricing carbon; emissions pricing; opportunity cost; shadow pricing; output price; mitigation cost; country support; policy objective; further policy development; policy guideline; price shock; Carbon tax; Emissions trading; Greenhouse gas emissions; Climate policy; Global
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
The State of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor: November 2009
International Monetary Fund
This paper highlights the state of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor. This edition of the Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor provides an update of global fiscal developments and policy strategies, based on projections from the November 2009 WEO. These projections reflect the assessment of IMF staff of current country policies and initiatives expected during 2009–2014 Underlying fiscal trends in advanced economies are weaker than previously projected, however, lower expected costs of financial sector support in the United States mean that 2009 headline numbers are better. New estimates of needed medium-term fiscal adjustment in advanced economies. Fiscal policy will continue to provide substantial support to aggregate demand in most countries this year, but a tightening is projected to commence next year in G-20 emerging markets. Fiscal policy is projected to begin tightening in emerging G-20 economies next year, reflecting a combination of reduced anti-crisis spending and expected consolidation beyond the withdrawal of crisis-related stimulus in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, supported by a pick-up of growth. Higher commodity prices are also expected to contribute to lower overall deficit.
Keywords:
SPN; debt ratio; emerging market; government bond; public spending; General government debt ratios; debt level; financial market; country detail; country policy; financial support; debt stock; stimulus packages; government financing; exchange regime; emerging market country; territory government; Fiscal stance; Africa
Cover IMF Staff Position Notes
Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
Mr. Steven A. Symansky
and
Mr. Thomas Baunsgaard
This paper discusses how to enhance automatic stabilizers without increasing the size of government. We distinguish between permanent changes in the parameters of the tax and expenditure system (e.g., changes in tax progressivity) that will enhance the traditional automatic stabilizer, and temporary changes triggered by certain economic developments (e.g., tax measures targeted at credit and liquidity constrained households, triggered during a severe downturn). We argue that, with some exceptions, the latter are preferable as they can be implemented with lower disruptions in other fiscal policy goals (e.g., economic efficiency). Moreover, countries should also avoid introducing procyclicality as a result of fiscal rules, as these would offset the effect of existing automatic stabilizers.
Keywords:
SPN; automatic stabilizer; tax; income tax; country; rate schedule; social security contribution rate; transfer program; expenditure rule; policy package; IMF government finance Statistics; fiscal policy response; Automatic stabilizers; Personal income tax; Unemployment benefits; Social security contributions; Africa