Business and Economics > Investments: Stocks

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Juan J. Cortina
,
Mr. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
,
Mr. Sergio L. Schmukler
, and
Jasmine Xiao
China’s equity markets internationalization process started in the early 2000s but accelerated after 2012, when Chinese firms’ shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen gradually became available to international investors. This paper studies the effects of the post-2012 internationalization events by comparing the evolution of equity financing and investment activities for: (i) domestic listed firms relative to firms that already had access to international investors and (ii) domestic listed firms that were directly connected to international markets relative to those that were not. The paper finds large increases in financial and investment activities for domestic listed and for connected firms, with significant aggregate effects. The evidence also suggests the rise in firms’ equity issuances was primarily and initially financed by domestic investors. International investors’ portfolio holdings in Chinese equity markets and ownership in firms increased markedly only once Chinese firms’ locally issued shares became part of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.
Mr. Kenneth Rogoff
and
Yuanchen Yang
This paper provides new estimates of the housing stock, construction rates and price developments by city tier in China in order to understand where imbalances might be concentrated, and the implications of any significant contraction. We also update estimates of the size of China’s rapidly evolving real estate sector through 2021, allowing one to look at the initial impact of COVID-19, as well as extending the analysis to incorporate urban-expansion related infrastructure construction. We argue that China overall faces imbalances between supply and demand for housing stock, but the problem is significantly deeper outside tier 1 cities.
Shiqing Hua
,
Ms. Marina Mendes Tavares
, and
Ms. Xin C Xu
Greece’s investment rate plunged following the Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC) and remained one of the lowest in the world in 2019. This paper explores recent investment dynamics and compares them against estimated benchmarks. Our results suggest that Greece has been under-investing since the SDC, with private investment notably lagging behind. The estimated investment gap ranges from 1.6–8 percent of GDP in 2019. Structural impediments have constrained corporate investment, while business cycle and balance sheet developments have held back household investment. Structural reforms are recommended to remove bottlenecks to corporate investment, improve efficiency of public investment, and boost household investment.
Mr. Fabian Valencia
,
Mr. Richard Varghese
,
Weijia Yao
, and
Juan Yepez
The policy response to the COVID-19 shock included regulatory easing across many jurisdictions to facilitate the flow of credit to the economy and mitigate a further ampli-fication of the shock through tighter financial conditions. Using an intraday event study,this paper examines how stock prices—a key driver in financial conditions—reacted to regulatory easing announcements in a sample of 18 advanced economies and 8 emerging markets. The paper finds that overall, regulatory easing announcements contributed to looser financial conditions, but effects varied across sectors and tools. Financial regulatory easing led to lower valuations for financial sector stocks, and higher valuations for non-financial sector stocks, particularly for industries that are more dependent on bank financing. Furthermore, valuations declined and financial conditions tightened following announcements related to easier bank capital regulation while equity valuation rose and financial conditions loosened after those about liquidity regulation. Effects from non-regulatory financial measures appear to be generally more muted.
Silvia Iorgova
Outside of financial crises, investors have little incentive to produce private information on banks’ short-term liabilities held as information-insensitive safe assets. The same does not hold true during crises. We measure daily information production using data from credit default swap spreads during the global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis. We study abnormal information production around major events and interventions during these crises and find that, on average, capital injections reduced abnormal information production while early European stress tests increased it. We also link information production to outcomes: high levels of information production predict bank balance sheet contraction and higher government expenditures to support financial institutions. In an addendum, we show information production on nonfinancials dramatically increased relative to financials at the height of the COVID-19 crisis, reflecting the nonfinancial nature of the initial shock.
Ms. Deniz O Igan
,
Mr. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
,
Mr. Nicola Pierri
, and
Mr. Andrea F Presbitero
The COVID-19 pandemic could result in large government interventions in the banking industry. To shed light on the possible consequences on market power, we rely on the experience of the global financial crisis and exploit granular data on government interventions in more than 800 banks across 27 countries between 2007 and 2017. For identification, we use a multivariate matching method. We find that intervened banks experience a significant decline in market power with respect to matched non-intervened banks. This effect is more pronounced for larger and longer interventions and is driven by a rise in costs—mostly because of higher loan impairment charges—which is not followed by a similar increase in prices.
Emanuel Kopp
U.S. business investment has taken a serious toll during the global financial crisis and also in the recovery phase investment did not pick up as expected. What is surprising is that the alleged investment slowdown happened at a time of record corporate profits and retained earnings, highly supportive financial conditions, improved sentiment, rising equity valuations, and strong labor markets—factors established in supporting business investment. Applying accelerator models and Bayesian Model Averaging, this paper discusses the extent to which U.S. business investment has been unusual. Results suggest that cautious expectations of future aggregate demand growth explain most of the weakness in investment, and that the oil and gas sector accounts for a considerable portion of the investment slump. Consequently, the behavior of U.S. business investment in recent years has not been unusual once these factors are taken into account. Also, there is very little evidence for uncertainty holding back investment, or that firms’ financial measures "crowded out" capital expenditure.
Mr. Adrian Alter
,
Alan Xiaochen Feng
, and
Nico Valckx
We confirm the negative relationship between household debt and future GDP growth documented in Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) for a wider set of countries over the period 1950–2016. Three mutually reinforcing mechanisms help explain this relationship. First, debt overhang impairs household consumption when negative shocks hit. Second, increases in household debt heighten the probability of future banking crises, which significantly disrupts financial intermediation. Third, crash risk may be systematically neglected due to investors’ overoptimistic expectations associated with household debt booms. In addition, several institutional factors such as flexible exchange rates, higher financial development and inclusion are found to mitigate this impact. Finally, the tradeoff between financial inclusion and stability nuances downside risks to growth.
Sheheryar Malik
and
Ms. TengTeng Xu
Interconnectedness among global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and global systemically important insurers (GSIIs) has important financial stability implications. This paper examines connectedness among United States, European and Asian GSIBs and GSIIs, using publicly-available daily equity returns and intra-day volatility data from October 2007 to August 2016. Results reveal strong regional clusters of return and volatility connectedness amongst GSIBs and GSIIs. Compared to Asia, selected GSIBs and GSIIs headquartered in the United States and Europe appear to be main sources of market-based connectedness. Total system connectedness—i.e., among all GSIBs and GSIIs—tends to rise during financial stress, which is corroborated by a balance sheet oriented systemic risk measure. Lastly, the paper demonstrates significant influence of economic policy uncertainty and U.S. long-term interest rates on total connectedness among systemically important institutions, and the important role of bank profitability and asset quality in driving bank-specific return connectedness.
Mr. Daniel Garcia-Macia
Why did the Great Recession lead to such a slow recovery? I build a model where heterogeneous firms invest in physical and intangible capital, and can default on their debt. In case of default, intangible assets are harder to seize by creditors. Hence, intangible capital faces higher financing costs. This differential is exacerbated in a financial crisis, when default is more likely and aggregate risk bears a higher premium. The resulting fall in intangible investment amplifies the crisis, and gradual intangible spillovers to other firms contribute to its persistence. Using panel data on Spanish manufacturing firms, I estimate the model matching firm-level moments regarding intangibles and financing. The model captures the extent and components of the Great Recession in Spanish manufacturing, whereas a standard model without endogenous intangible investment would miss more than half of the GDP fall. A policy of transfers conditional on firm age could speed up the recovery, as young firms tend to be more financially constrained, particularly regarding intangible investment. Conditioning transfers on firm size or subsidizing credit (as in current E.U. policy) appears to be less effective.