This paper estimates insurance requirements against natural disasters (NDs) in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) using an insurance layering framework. The layers include a government saving fund, as well as market instruments. Each layer is calibrated to cover estimated fiscal cost of NDs according to intensity and expected damage. The results indicate that ECCU countries could target saving fund stocks for relativelly smaller and more frequent events in the range of 6-12 percent of GDP, enough to cover 95 percent of NDs’ fiscal costs. To ensure financially-sustainable saving funds with a low probability of depletion, this requires annual budget savings in the range os 0.5 to 1.9 percent of GDP per year. Additional coverage could be obtained with market instruments for large and less frequent events, albeit at a significant cost.The results are based on a Monte-Carlo experiment that simulates natural disaster shocks and their impact on output and government finances.
Tax incentives have been used extensively in the countries of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) to promote investment. The associated revenue losses are large, and benefits in terms of new investment have been limited, raising doubts about the cost effectiveness of the tax incentive schemes. This paper examines the effects of incentives using the marginal effective tax rate approach (METR), adapting this methodology to the case of a small open economy where the marginal investor is a nonresident. The results show that METRs are high in the region; that there is a large dispersion in the size of METRs across financing source; and that METRs on investment are larger than the overall distortion on capital, with a substantial subsidy to domestic saving. In the presence of tax holidays-the most common incentive scheme in the region-the distortion on capital basically vanishes.