Business and Economics > Insurance

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Mr. Divya Kirti
Rather than taking on more risk, US insurers hit hard by the crisis pulled back from risk taking, relative to insurers not hit as hard by the crisis. Capital requirements alone do not explain this risk reduction: insurers hit hard reduced risk within assets with identical regulatory treatment. State level US insurance regulation makes it unlikely this risk reduction was driven by moral suasion. Other financial institutions also reduce risk after large shocks: the same approach applied to banks yields similar results. My results suggest that, at least in some circumstances, franchise value can dominate, making gambling for resurrection too risky.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
This paper discusses the findings of the Financial System Stability Assessment for Sweden. The Swedish financial system is large and highly interconnected, putting a premium on the accompanying policy framework. Relative to the size of the domestic economy, the financial system is among Europe’s largest. It features complex domestic and international linkages, reflecting Sweden’s role as a regional financial hub. However, the macrofinancial risks have grown since 2011, for example the rising share of highly indebted households. Stress tests also suggest that banks and nonbanks are largely resilient to solvency shocks, but concerns persist about the ability of bank models to capture unexpected losses.
Mr. John Kiff
Klyuev (2008) concluded that the Canadian market for housing finance is highly advanced and sophisticated, but financing options were somewhat limited, particularly at terms longer than five years. This paper argues that the paucity of longer-term loans is caused by a five-year maturity cap on government-guaranteed deposit insurance, and a prepayment penalty limit on residential mortgage loans in the Interest Act. That said, the availability and cost of residential loans for prime borrowers are comparable to those in the United States.
Mr. Paolo Mauro
,
Mr. Torbjorn I. Becker
,
Mr. Jonathan David Ostry
,
Mr. Romain Ranciere
, and
Mr. Olivier D Jeanne

Abstract

This paper focuses on what countries can do on their own—that is, on the role of domestic policies—with respect to country insurance. Member countries are routinely faced with a range of shocks that can contribute to higher volatility in aggregate output and, in extreme cases, to economic crises. The presence of such risks underlies a potential demand for mechanisms to soften the blow from adverse economic shocks. For all countries, the first line of defense against adverse shocks is the pursuit of sound policies. In light of the large costs experienced by emerging markets and developing countries as a result of past debt crises, fiscal policies should seek to improve sustainability, taking into account that sustainable debt levels seem to be lower in emerging and developing countries than in advanced countries. Although much can be accomplished by individual countries through sound policies, risk management, and self-insurance through reserves, collective insurance arrangements are likely to continue playing a key role in cushioning countries from the impact of shocks.

Mr. David J Hofman
and
Ms. Patricia A Brukoff
Natural disasters can put severe strain on public finances, in particular in developing and small countries. But catastrophe insurance markets increasingly offer opportunities for the transfer of such risks. Thus far, developing countries have only tepidly begun to tap these opportunities. More frequent and intensive use of insurance markets may be desirable because it could help introduce an important element of predictability in the post-disaster public finances of disaster-prone developing countries. Against this background, the paper surveys the various available insurance modalities and reviews recent initiatives in developing and emerging market countries. It also identifies some key challenges for the insurance community, donors, and international financial institutions (IFIs).
International Monetary Fund
Member countries are routinely faced with a range of shocks that can contribute to higher volatility in aggregate output and, in extreme cases, to economic crises. The presence of such risks underlies a potential demand for mechanisms to soften the blow from adverse economic shocks -- “country insurance” for short. Protective measures that countries can take themselves (“self-insurance”) include sound economic policies, robust financial structures, and adequate reserve coverage. Beyond self insurance, countries have also established regional arrangements that pool risks, while at the multilateral level the IMF has a central role in making its resources temporarily available to attenuate the costs of economic adjustment when shocks create balance of payments difficulties for a member. This paper analyzes a number of mechanisms through which countries can self-insure, leaving the role of collective regional and multilateral arrangements to subsequent papers.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Abstract

This paper focuses on risk transfer and discusses the insurance sector, particularly life insurers. It expands on issues raised in previous Global Financial Stability Reports by asking whether financial stability has benefited or could benefit from insurers’ broader participation in credit markets, including credit derivatives. The paper assesses the impact on financial stability of life insurers’ investment behavior and risk management in the largest mature markets. It highlights that the policy implications differ from market to market, and may offer useful lessons to emerging market countries with developing capital markets.

Mr. Paul H. Kupiec
Advocates for internal model-based capital regulation argue that this approach will reduce costs and remove distortions that are created by rules-based capital regulations. These claims are examined using a Merton-style model of deposit insurance. Analysis shows that internal model-based capital estimates are biased by safety-net-generated funding subsidies that convey to bank shareholders when market and credit risk regulatory capital requirements are set using bank internal model estimates. These subsidies are not uniform across the risk spectrum, and, as a consequence, internal model regulatory capital requirements will cause distortions in bank lending behavior.
Mr. Alberto M. Ramos
This paper constructs a theoretical framework that rationalizes banks’ short- and long-run adjustment dynamics—in portfolio composition and in the capital structure—following a period of financial distress. The model captures stylized facts about banks’ behavior following a shock to the capital base—namely, the rush to liquidity and credit crunch. Bank panel data show that Argentine domestic retail banks underwent a period of adjustment of six quarters following the Mexican devaluation crisis, reducing their risk-exposure since, owing to bank capital scarcity, depositors became less prone to tolerate bank default risk. Foreign-owned banks suffered a milder shock and adjusted immediately.