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International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
,
International Monetary Fund. Finance Dept.
, and
International Monetary Fund. Legal Dept.
The note updates and replaces the prior guidance on SMPs, provided in 2003, incorporating changes to the Fund’s lending strategy, and clarifies some operational issues to better guide staff on the use and design of SMPs, while safeguarding even-handed application. Noteworthy changes include clarity on the role of SMPs, specifying the start and end dates of SMPs, clarifying the expected length of SMPs and track record periods, and extensions of SMPs. While many policies are clarified, the principle of flexibility is maintained.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, & Review Department
and
World Bank
This Guidance Note outlines good practices on information-sharing across key areas in which the Bank and the IMF interact. The note outlines general principles consistent with these frameworks and discusses how the staffs of the two institutions are expected to exchange information related to country operations, technical assistance, and policy work.
International Monetary Fund
PRGT-eligible members make considerable use of Fund concessional financing. Since 2010, 56 percent of Fund arrangements have involved a PRGT-facility. This paper examines a number of issues raised by Executive Directors and the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) since the issuance to the Board of the June 2015 staff paper on enhancing the financial safety net for developing countries (IMF, 2015a). This paper concludes that there is a need to clarify guidance in some areas pertaining to PRGT policies. This will be done through an early revision of the LIC Handbook, which is already underway. The paper does not propose changes to the Fund’s concessional facilities at this juncture. A comprehensive review of PRGT (Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust) resources and facilities is planned for 2018.
International Monetary Fund
2015 is set to be a pivotal year for the international development agenda, with agreements to be reached on the objectives and policies for promoting development that is economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable through 2030. The first stage in completing the debate on these issues is the Third UN Conference on Financing for Development (FfD), to be held in Addis Ababa during July 13–16, 2015, which aims to build an international consensus on the actions needed to ensure that sufficient financing is available for developing countries in pursuing sustainable development.
Mr. Kurt Annen
and
Mr. Luc Moers
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
International Monetary Fund
The possible global repercussions from the ongoing turmoil in the Euro Area and recent calls for enhanced emergency assistance in the Middle East and North African region are reminders of the urgent need for a more effective global financial safety net to deal with increased interconnectedness and volatility. Past work by staff identified gaps in the Fund’s lending toolkit to respond to liquidity needs of members with relatively strong fundamentals affected during systemic crises (the crisis bystanders), and to address urgent financing needs arising in a broader range of circumstances than natural disasters and post-conflict situations. The companion paper on the Review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) also identified gaps in the overall flexibility of the financing toolkit. This paper provides proposals to fill these gaps, while preserving the simplicity and coherence of the lending framework, and balancing members’ financing needs against the need for adequate safeguards for the use of Fund resources.
International Monetary Fund
Economic performance in Nicaragua has been better than envisaged; nonetheless, vulnerabilities remain and will be compounded by electoral uncertainties. The decision to use part of the strong revenue performance to lower the fiscal deficit is appropriate. Exchange-rate and monetary policy remain broadly adequate. Fiscal adjustment should set the stage for a strong program of fiscal consolidation following the elections. Continued vigilance in the financial sector will be critical. Improvement in reporting and monitoring of foreign aid flows and transparency is necessary.
International Monetary Fund
This paper proposes a new trust fund that would enable the IMF to join international debt relief efforts for Haiti and other low-income countries hit by similar catastrophic disasters. Following the devastation caused by the recent earthquake in Haiti, an international consensus emerged that creditors should consider full debt relief to support Haiti’s recovery. Haiti’s debt to the IMF stands at SDR 178 million.
Mr. Wolfgang Mayer
and
Mr. Alex Mourmouras
International financial assistance (loans and grants) can potentially raise recipients' welfare in two ways, by affecting a direct resource transfer and by facilitating efficiency-enhancing reforms. In practice, barriers to reform limit the potential of assistance to deliver these two dividends. In this paper, we analyze assistance programs designed to ensure that recipient governments voluntarily adopt reforms and overcome barriers associated with: (i) the reaction of special interests to the prospect of reform; (ii) the possibility of default and political instability in the recipient country; and (iii) adverse selection and moral hazard. Reform barriers raise the cost of incentive-compatible assistance and may result either in no assistance being forthcoming or assistance that ensures repayment but not the implementation of reforms. Critical to the choice of assistance programs is the size of the rent accruing to special interests in the absence of reform and the limited liability rents needed to ensure that repayment terms do not threaten the country's political stability. Optimal assistance contracts feature flexible repayment terms related to real economic growth in recipient countries.