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Business and Economics > Budgeting

You are looking at 1 - 2 of 2 items for :

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Cover IMF Working Papers
Fiscal Policy Implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Victor Duarte Lledo
and
Mr. Marcos Poplawski Ribeiro
This paper investigates economic, political, and institutional constraints to fiscal policy implementation in sub-saharan Africa. We find that planned fiscal adjustments or expansions are less likely to be implemented the larger they are, the more inaccurate the growth forecasts they are based on, the more fragile the regulatory system in the country, and the weaker the institutions framing the design, approval, and execution of the budget. The findings support ongoing efforts in the region to improve the quality and timeliness of economic data; enhance forecasting capacity; adopt realistic fiscal plans; and strengthen governance, budgetary institutions, and public financial management procedures.
Keywords:
WP; implementation gap; null hypothesis; SSA country; absolute value; fiscal policy; policy implementation; budget institutions; sub-Saharan Africa; fiscal policy implementation; terms of trade; SSA authorities; SSA budget; revenues spread; fiscal policy implementation gap; revenue shortfall; procedure indices; fiscal policy implementation model; expenditure implementation gap; budget procedure; Estimation techniques; Budget planning and preparation; Budget execution and treasury management; Tax gap; Africa
Cover IMF Working Papers
Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
Reza Baqir
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
Keywords:
WP; government spending; city manager; political institutions; executive veto; council size; veto authority; mayor-council city; state indicator; city government; Personal income; Budget planning and preparation; Probit models